

## EUROPE ON THE EVE

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# EUROPE ON THE EVE

*The Crises of Diplomacy*

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TO  
MY STUDENTS

that it exhibits these elements of suspense and horror is placed on most laudable mysterious and in other narratives of human depravity and weakness.

*Acts of villainy, shrewdly planned and skillfully executed, usually elicit grudging admiration even from honest burglers.* It is still true that parricides, bigamists, and bonders are accurately belated figures among those who seek to break the vicious forms of morality and to win in the stiffness of the status quo and yet lack the will to defy the codes which bind them. This chronicle might have been treated in a pitiless, unreluctant vein of aesthetic appreciation for the cleverness of the execution of crime and the fabrication of fraud. That it has not been so treated is less a result of my personal predilections for moral indignation than of certain deeper peculiarities of the record itself. The pervasiveness and frugality with poisonous consequences for all the pecking honesty, freedom, and fellowship in stalkers, desperates, and evildoers and who still cherish the Liberal dream of extending the concepts of political ethics to the field of public affairs.

What a world and various in these months live to do with each other rather than meet. Whether ends ever justify means I do not pretend to know. That virtue in its own reward and the virtues of men in death are proportionate forever debatable. But in politics and diplomacy around means have often been held to be justified when they serve moral ends. They have been deemed legitimate (or at least ethical) when they serve ends dictated by personal ambition, national prestige, or social well-being. But here the ends which the actors serve, when stripped of deigning verbiage and weighed in the scales history deemed true in Western culture, are products neither of transcendent moral exigencies nor yet of unrequited and calculated selfishness. By the common criteria of Realpolitik diplomats, decisions are judged good or bad as they strengthen or weaken the power of the State. As this standard the major decisions of the past decades in Paris, London, and Geneva have not merely exhibited a callous indifference to the imperatives of ethics and law, but have displayed a warningly incomprehensible determination to reflect collective selfishness (or both for the Western democratic Powers and for the world community of which the Covenant of Woodrow Wilson was intended to be a new charter of peace and freedom. The equally lawless and immoral decisions reached at Rome and Berlin here, to be sure, revealed the tribal god of Power. But a close scrutiny of this deity in his pious lazararium reveals that he has a hollow head and heart of clay.



The political immorities here recorded are not in the august tradition of the original *Caesars* nor in the style of the Tudors, the Medici, the Bonapartes, or the Habsburgs, nor yet in the school of Walenstein, Napoleon, Bonaparte, or Bismarck. The potpourri chronicle is not a tale of throne-and-petty among rival practitioners of *Machiavellism*. It is rather a narrative of modern and modern engaged co-operatively in demolishing the ruins of European civilization.

This phenomenon is not unique to the present age. It recurs with diurnal regularity in every epoch of cultural decadence. In such an age *Despots* reward blackguards and psychopaths with power and riches and punish men and honest men with disgrace and death. With few exceptions the figures of truth and honor who inhabit these chapters meet with horrible ends. With few exceptions the disciples of corruption, falsehood, and treachery achieve success and the plaudits of the multitude. The times, in short, are out of joint. Societies which split upon honorable men and women and kill traitors and scoundrels as heroes and villains are already rotten with approaching death. Whether sin and stupidity beget decadence, or decadence in some strange fashion drives men willy-nilly to stupidity and sin, I am unable to say. I know only that the Great Society of the twentieth century and the creed of Liberalism which has inspired its most significant achievements and aspirations cannot long survive the assaults of murder and guano if its defenses continue to be entrusted to criminals and liars. If such epiphanies come too harsh, the reader may supply his own. The facts and events, if called by gentler names, will not wash sweetly.

As a "social scientist," however, I have written in these pages for analysis, not indictment. Spicing out is made of words of praise or blame. This is not a treatise on ethics. It is an essay on politics in a generation in which political power has become all-pervasive and "omnipotent" in proportion as those who wield it have become perverted and irresponsible. If the objection be made that hindsight is easier than foresight and that academic judgments are irrelevant to the difficulties which confront those in public office, the answer resides in the record and in the accurate presentation of consequences made by numerous journalists and scholars since the first day of 1913. Where the will to believe falsehood is more potent than the evidence of the senses, there is little likelihood that truth will procure attention. But America is not yet doomed and may still be saved by facing the record of facts, however unflattering that record may

be to Europe's empty idols. My purpose is not accusation but explication and explanation.

"Who understands all forgives all," says an old French proverb. The quality of forgiveness is perhaps out of place among those who are about to be drawn and quartered. But I have endeavored to practice charity and to observe those canons of accuracy and honesty which are current in my profession and not yet wholly discarded on the American continent. The style I use will be judged not in terms of performance expressed or admissions addressed to posterity but in terms of the contributions of these pages to analysis and interpretation and to the solution of the many riddles presented by the record of a mad and tragic epoch.

This book, it is scarcely needful to say, is neither complete nor definitive. Attention is concentrated on the relations among the four Western European Great Powers, with only incidental comment of the Soviet colossus and of the Baltic, Danubian, and Balkan nations. The Status of Scandinavia ("Happy the people whose wrath is brief!") as well as the commotions of the Near and Middle East and the martyred millions of Eastern Asia are scarcely touched upon. Even within its limited scope, the volume leaves many other questions of fact and mode unanswered than presented. In other words, the diplomatic historian inclined to tell all until the veils were opened. When contemporary archives are made accessible in *wholity*, more questions will be solved. But the suggestion may be ventured: the main problems now involved will remain involved. In a period in which diplomacy, like other arts, has degenerated into formalism, most crucial actions are dealt with by word of mouth and through secret emissaries. The first dispatches at Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay, should they be spared from the burning to come, will tell little of the great decisions and ambiguieties of the epoch. Even if they persisted in full truth, however, this suggestion would not justify postponement. Enough is known to permit the discussion of totalitarian *Schrecklichkeit* and of democratic defections, to brood on the *if* not always in minute detail. Memories are short in an age of decay. It is imperative that the record be set forth promptly. It is above all imperative that Americans take the advice of their British cousin to face facts frankly, however unwelcome their nature. Hence I feel justified in exhibiting forthwith this attempt at a reckoning, whatever its limitations and imperfections.

To the many friends and fellow students who have in one fashion

or another had a hand in this enterprise I am deeply grateful. My appreciation is first of all due to the Social Science Research Committee of the University of Chicago, which, three years ago, helped me to finance a research project of which this volume is a segment. I am likewise indebted to the donors and administrators of the "Class of 1908 Fund" at Williams College for assistance in defraying secretarial and stenographic expenses. I am grateful to the staff members of the Seamon Library at Williams and of the Widener Library at Harvard for unfailing courtesy and co-operation. My wife's patience and helpfulness have borne some of the burden and in my bloom. My special thanks are due to Miss Sally Carlson of Williamsstown for ever efficient and faithful service as researcher, typist, editorial assistant, indexer, and general go-between; to Mr. Errol Lang, now of Washington, for helpful suggestions and aid in research; to Mrs. J. S. Burr, Jr., of Cambridge for valued research and during the 1938 term of the Harvard Summer School, to Dr. Spencer Brodsky of New York, Mr. Meredith Colpatrick of Beloit, Mr. Lewis Dexter of Belmont, Dr. Saul Padover of Washington, and Drs. Robert Ruffalo and Enrique de Larriba of Williamsstown for ready interest and timely suggestions, to the New Publishing Company and *The New Republic* for permission to reproduce certain passages already published in those journals; to Harcourt, Brace & Company for permission to reprint a portion of T. S. Eliot's verse; and to various other publishers, named in the notes, for consent to quote from their publications.

Like all students of contemporary world affairs, I feel an immeasurable debt of gratitude to Arnold J. Toynbee, John W. Blacker-Bosssett, and their able collaborators in the Royal Institute of International Affairs, for their invaluable annual *Survey and Documents*. All Americans concerned with the quest for truth owe a debt equally immeasurable to those who have kept the press and the radio of the United States free from political censorship. The able correspondents of the Associated Press and the United Press and of such journals of information as the *New York Times*, the *New York Herald Tribune*, the *Chicago Daily News*, and the *Christian Science Monitor* have, with unflagging industry and accuracy, supplied much of the factual material upon which every observer of the diplomatic scene must draw for information and guidance. To those, here and abroad, who prefer that their contributions remain anonymous my appreciation is as less profound. Other and more specific acknowledgments are made in appropriate places in the text. Last, but far from least, my

colleagues and students in Chicago, Cambridge, and Williamsport have contributed collectively to this study much more than any one of them can possibly be aware of.

None of the individuals or organizations mentioned is in any way accountable for any errors of fact or for any of the interpretations or conclusions, right or wrong, set forth in these pages. For these the responsibility is mine alone. Since I have no love for darkness I shall be pleased if others can show that I have painted the picture of Europe's descent into night in too somber tones. But the rights of ignorant opinion have no proper place among possible remedies for the sickness of a disordered civilization. Freedom can be served only by truth. It has no justification save as it makes possible the discovery and application of truth. In this faith these pages have been written.

FREDERICK L. ALLEN, M.D.

Williamsport, Mass., January 17, 1933

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[The maps of Europe were drawn by Paul Hertz]





## THE HOLLOW MEN

We are the hollow men  
We are the stuffed men  
Leaving together  
Headpiece filled with straw. *Alas!* . . .

Shape without form, shade without color,  
Paralyzed force, gesture without motion.

Those who have crossed  
With direct eyes, to death's other Kingdom  
Remember us—if at all—not as lost  
Violent souls, but only  
As the hollow men  
The stuffed men. . . .

The eyes are not here  
There are no eyes here  
In this valley of dying stars  
In this hollow valley  
This broken jaw of our lost kingdoms. . .

Sightless, unless  
The eyes appear  
As the perpetual star  
Multifoliate rose  
Of death's twilight kingdom  
The hope only  
Of empty men. . . .

This is the way the world ends  
This is the way the world ends  
This is the way the world ends  
Not with a bang but a whimper.

T. S. Eliot, 1915

# ARMS AND THE MAN

## I. AFTER JANUARY

"*Terrible! Terrible!*" The little man scribbled in his diary. Date: December 8, 1913. Place: Berlin. Mood: Despair. "Severe depression persists . . . Personal troubles make all organized work impossible. . . . The danger now exists of the whole Party's going to pieces." A life-work which was at once a career and a crusade faced him. Dr. Paul Joseph Goebbels, the *Mein Kampf*, was doubtly endorsed—not by dislikers, for he was too cynical a mind to cherish illusions, but by the distressed disintegration of the movement in which he had found salvation from his frustrations.

He was thirty-five. His childhood and his derelict career had kept him out of the First World War. His subsequent hopes of becoming a successful dramatist and poet had long since waned. In 1914 he had joined the "Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei" (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei or NSDAP). He had become a journalist and agitator in the Reichland and an ardent "vocalist" colleague of Gregor Strasser. In 1918 he had deserted Strasser to support the "conservative" wing of the Party which enjoyed Dr. Hitler's favor. Thereafter his rise was rapid. He became Gauleiter for "Bad Berlin," founder and editor of *Der Angriff* ("The Attack"), member of the Nazi delegation to the Reichstag in 1928, and, in the following year, Reich Propaganda Leader of the NSDAP and one of Dr. Hitler's right-hand men. He was tame, popular, honest-minded. But his very propensities were venacious: a political man in a movement in which influence and mediocrity achieved sanity and self-importance by following mediocrity and madness. He had found wealth and fame by shouting "Out with the Jews!" and "Germany, awake!"

Morg was promised. Victory after victory brought the Party 137,147,000 votes (out of 37,180,000) and 130 deputies (out of 568) in the Reichstag election of July 31, 1932.

But December brought a threat of danger. Hitler the A.I.I. fighter was plunged in deepest gloom at his Berlin headquarters in the Reichstag Hotel "For hours on end," wrote Paul Joseph, "Das Fuhrer walks up and down the hotel rooms. . . . Once he weeps and says: 'If the Party should ever break up, I throw an end of things in their rooms with a revolver.'"<sup>1</sup>

Threats of suicide were not new with Das Fuhrer. His intense recalled another moment of near-panic followed by despair: the evening of November 8, 1923, in Munich when, resolutely armed, he had led his Stormtroopers into a great mass meeting in the Bürgerbräu. His "friend" and patron, Generalstaatsminister Gerner von Kahr, was speaking. On the platform sat General von Lossow, Reichswehr commander in Bavaria, and Lieutenant von Seiwitz, Munich police chief. Hitler leaped to a table and fired two shots at the ceiling. He proclaimed the "national revolution" and the "destruction" of the governments of Bavaria and of the Reich. He ordered the three officials to join him in a near-by room, where he pleaded with them to support his party. When they hesitated, he brandished his weapon and declared that he had four bullets left—one for each of them and one for himself. They agreed to support him. He agreed to the ultimatum: "Munich will find either a national government in Germany or no deal!"

With Hitler, however, inconvenient promises were always forgotten. Morning brought catastrophe. The storm dissolved. Kahr, Lossow, and Seiwitz "deserted" and ordered out the police and the army to suppress the Nazi parades. Fifteen marchers died before the gun on the Odeonsplatz. Hitler threw himself down, wreathed his forehead, and fled to "Peter" Handke's (sic) cousin's home in Litzing. Peter's sister Eva nursed and attended him. "The mere presence of a woman," he said, "may have kept me from the thought of ending my life."<sup>2</sup> He was arrested two days later. A lenient court sentenced him to comfortable confinement at Landsberg-am-Lech.

The Party was suppressed. The court was lenient. And Hitler still lived—in military. Perhaps suicide was less. He recalled painfully his first love, Geli Raubach, daughter of his half-sister. She too loved her life. Why not follow? But loyal, idolizing Rudolf Hess dissuaded him. He began writing *Mein Kampf* instead. And, in the end, he was

rescued by his enemies. Before Christmas of 1934 he was released from prison. He soon reorganized the Party and set it on the road toward power. That road became hard and easy after universal impoverishment in the turn of the decade drove millions of lower bourgeois into his ranks and brought money and support from the rich and well-to-do.<sup>2</sup>

The debate of December 1932, however, had shown in a rather clearly set of finality "The Old Man," Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, Chief Executive of the Republic since 1925, had defeated Hitler for the Presidency on the 10th of April. Worse, he had spurned *Der Führer* as an irresponsible fanatic. At the end of May the President had dismissed Heinrich Brüning, Centre leader and last democratic Chancellor of the Republic, and had appointed a reactionary "Baron" Cuno,<sup>3</sup> headed by smiling Franz von Papen, with General Kurt von Schleicher as Minister of Defense. Papen had the support of scarcely 5% of the deputies. The 130 Nazis opposed him no less vigorously than the 133 Social Democrats, the 49 Communists, and the 75 Centre, Catholic and Rural German. Goebbels, President of the Reichstag and Nazi leader in parliament, quarreled violently with the new Chancellor. After the Reichstag election of November 6, Cuno's Franz was still without popular or parliamentary support. Hindenburg forced Papen out, but for Hitler he still had only contempt. He offered *Der Führer* the Chancellorship on November 19 on condition that he secure a majority and rule "conditionally." Hitler would not. He refused. Papen resigned to frustrate the negotiations. Schleicher was made Chancellor on December 1.

The NSDAP lost 1,200,000 votes and 34 deputies in the election of November 6. It now had only 31% of the electorate behind it, compared to 32% in July. Hitler had produced 40%. But his loss was improving slightly. Desperation was decreasing. Hope was returning. The rules of gloom and modesty among the masses were beginning to shift. The Party was therefore raised. Contributions from intellectuals fell off. High balls were unasked. The economy, and Goebbels, was in a state of "financial calamity." In Berlin "dejected-looking young men in brown shirts carried money-bags timidly, and without corpse, in the face of standing passers-by."<sup>4</sup> In local elections in Thuringia on December 4 the Nazi vote fell 10% below the level reached a month before. Schleicher contemplated four years in office. Gregor Strasser, who had once negotiated with Brüning behind Hit-

ker's back, now deserted Der Fuhrer and negotiated with the Chancellor for a post in the Cabinet. Gustav Fickel, crack-pot economist who had written the Nazi Program, asked for three weeks' leave from Party work. Not without cause did Goebbels cry, "Traitor!" Hitler walked the floor in the Kaiserhof.

His bitterness was felt the next day, because he had long ago taken to heart the lessons of the Beer Hall debacle and had therefore followed conscientiously an astute political strategy, which he felt would assure ultimate success. Hitler's political science was simple. Never use force against those with superior force unless you are certain that they will not employ their weapons. Terrorize the weak and thrust strong your foes by unrelenting pressure, but neither open violence, until you have overwhelming means of violence in your own hands. Apply the motto of the famed Hubertus Dönitz and Raab, "Compromise with those who have money and might. Serve their interests as they will serve you. Hypnotize the multitude with promises and pagantry. "The primitive simplicity of the minds of the masses renders them a most easy prey to a big lie than a small one, for they shut their eyes often and find lies, but would be ashamed to tell big ones. They would never credit or believe the possibility of such great imposture as the complete reversal of facts."<sup>1</sup>

Prize everything. When your enemies have believed you and surrendered the means of their own defense, destroy them individually. Follow each repudiation of a promise with a new promise and keep each promise only as long as it is expedient to do so. Repeat the promise as often as necessary. Above all, practice politics as if it were a war. Insist upon military discipline and unswerving obedience from your followers. Inspire them with such boasts and give meaning to the empty lives by military comradeship and a martial revival. Punish treason and desertion with death. Compromise only when you can thereby trick or betray your collaboration. Never lose sight of the objective. The ultimate objective is the destruction of the enemy.

These simple and well-worn maxims of the game of power were long ago familiar to Caesar, Machiavelli, Frederick, and Napoleon. They assure victory when the enemy is lacking in will or wit. But only a "miracle" could save the NSDAP at the close of the year 1931. The miracle came to pass. Here, as in the past, the "miracle" was worked by his enemies. In recompensing his sedition they ignored their own destruction, always under the delusion that they were thereby converting their destroyer and purchasing their own security. This Nemesis

is also old—as old as the Trojan horse and the reliance of decadent Rome upon barbarians for defense against barbarians. The “miracle” of Munich was realized in Germany in 1933. On a wider stage it was realized throughout Europe after 1933. The political technique which Hitler perfected within the Reich in the year of victory became the technique of international diplomacy and war in the succeeding years, with results strikingly reminiscent of those against the instrument. The initial pattern within Germany, already foreshadowed by Mussolini, supplies the clue to the mystery of Europe's diplomatic débâcle during the years of abhorrence.

The German miracle-maker of 1933 was the ever close and never wide Frits von Papen, professor, officer, vain dilettante, cherry diplomatist, and subaltern under Wilhelm II.<sup>1</sup> His career rebelled at Schleicher's reversion of the Chancellery. He schemed to oust his former colleague and in his scheming he hoped that his cleverness would subvert several objectives with one blow. He would recover high office for himself, he would oust Schleicher, he would win Hitler, and at the same time he would nourish or “Mussolinize” Der Führer, after the manner of the British Tories in 1931.

Papen's plan was reasonable and “realistic.” It was as clever (and as short-sighted) as the many plans of international appeasement which were to issue from Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay after January. His proposed Cabinet would require Nazi collaboration, since it was alone, despite the paralysis of the defenders of the Republic, that reaction could have a façade of mass support. The NSDAP must therefore be received before it disintegrated utterly. Hitler might even be given the long-coveted Chancellery, providing that the anti-Nazi subalternaries in the Ministry should outnumber the Nazis by a wide margin. To this end Papen would assume the Vice-Chancellorship and build his regime out of the timber of the Brüning Cabinet over which Schleicher still presided. Industrialist support was essential, for money would be needed. Junker support was essential, for the Junkers had purchased Hindenburg with the gift of the Hindenburg estate (1907)<sup>2</sup> and had brought the Old Man to a point at which he made most of his political decisions on the basis of the interests of Junker agriculture. The key men among the industrialists were Franz Thyssen, Ruhr steel magnate and president of the Reichsbank, and Alfred Hugenberg, leader of the Nationalist Party as well as the Herta-Breuer-Hugenberg-Borcheners of the Reich, with many new papers and the Ufa Film Company under his control. The

key men among the Junkers were von Oskar von Hindenburg, Baron von Hinderburg-Jauchwitz, donor of Nienstedt and Count (Baron) von Kallikow, president of the East Prussian Landbund. With them, as he stands, Papen spun his web.

On Wednesday evening, January 4, 1933, a dinner party was held at the Golligau house of Baron von Schleieritz, banker and friend of Papen. It was not reported in the society columns nor mentioned in the political news, although the late Chancellor and the erst Chancellor of the Reich were present. It had been arranged by a nobody on the road to becoming a somebody—champagne salesman Justus von Edlingstrup. The last once-removed von Papen. The party was Hitler. Despite elaborate secrecy, Schleieritz's efficient agents uncovered the event and informed the press without ascertaining what took place. Hitler apparently agreed to co-operate with Papen on two conditions: money and the Chancellorship. Papen wanted some four million marks were collected from Thyssen and other industrialists and poured into the empty Nazi treasury. The other items of the "plan" were details discussed in some detail. But Papen was called his "friend," the Chancellor in office. "Kurt," he declared a few days later in answer to a suspicious query, "in the name of our old friendship and on my word of honor as an officer and as a man, I swear to you that I will never undertake any mission any more whatever against you or against a government of which you are the head." Schleieritz later declared: "He proved to be the kind of traitor beside whom Judas Iscariot is a saint."

On January 10th Count von Kallikow, without consulting the Chancellor, issued a statement to the press denouncing Schleieritz bitterly for failing to "protect" agriculture. Hindenburg received Schleieritz and the Landbund leaders on the 14th and promised to do all he could to "raise agriculture to new life." A banquet followed. Kallikow was cordial toward the Chancellor. During the meal, however, someone handed Schleieritz a copy of the Count's statement. He left the table in anger and declared he would never again receive the Landbund's representatives. The Junkers now attacked him vainly, and appealed to Hindenburg against him. They feared that he might fail to suppress the pending report of the Reichstag committee investigating the Ost-Elbe scandal. They feared with even more that the report would reveal that public funds "in aid of agriculture" had been used by Junker families to reimburse broken-down estates, to acquire new lands, and even to pay pending debts at Munich Carlo. They feared

with cause that the name of Hindenburg himself might be besmirched. They denounced their critics as proponents of "agrarian Bolshevism." Orlow and Pöppel, along with Secretary Otto Meißner, had the Old Man's ear and were not averse to making suggestions.

Hitler was means like engaged in occupying his political forehead by a concentrated campaign in the little state of Lippe. A new Diet was to be elected. Doc Hitler spoke at no less than eighteen meetings and lavishly dispersed his newly found funds in unceasing campaigning. More important, he secured contacts with Hugenberg. Against the advice of Ernst Oberfohren, parliamentary leader of the Nationalists, the behind-faced press campaign made a secret deal with Der Führer. Hitler would be Chancellor, Papen Vice-Chancellor, and Hugenberg Minister of Economics. A majority of the new Cabinet must be non-Nazi, but Hugenberg agreed reluctantly to the dissolution of the Reichstag and a new national election. Hindenburg received Hugenberg privately on Sunday the 17th. The polling in Lippe on the same day was gratifying. The NSDAP won over 40% of the votes. The Old Man's Noodnik could be won by playing upon his fear of "agrarian Bolshevism." General Weiser von Blumberg, East Prussian commander of the Reichswehr, was convinced by the promise of a Cabinet post and the gift of an estate near Königsberg, donated by Jakob Lindemann, a Nazi sympathizer. On the 18th Schleicher was compelled to accept an emergency decree forbidding the forced sale of bankrupt estates east of the Elbe until October 31.

Schleicher now asked Hindenburg to dissolve the Reichstag. Another eloquent refusal might well herald the known message for all time, since Hitler lived on the illusion of inevitable victory. The President refused and asked Schleicher to refrain from making a statement before parliament on the Ost-Mitte. Schleicher refused unless the Reichstag should be dissolved. On Sunday morning, January 24, 1933, Hindenburg asked Schleicher to resign. As the Chancellor departed by rear door, Papen, enticed by another and was at once entrusted with the task of forming a new Cabinet. Papen "negotiated." Hitler wondered whether he had again been betrayed. Schleicher went about for support. He conferred in the afternoon with trade union leaders and apparently discussed the possibility of a punch, supported by the Reichswehr and a general strike, to keep Papen and Hitler from power. But Theobald Lohse, leader of the Social Democratic unions, had as many scruples about effecting "unconstitutional" rebellion to a Presidential violation of the Constitution as his fellow Socialists, Otto



Brown and East Germany, had deployed the preceding July when Papen suppressed the Socialist Cabinet of Prussia. The constabulary of the Potsdam garrison were favorable. The leaders of the Catholic trade unions were favorable. The Communist Party would support such a move. Doubtless many of the Socialists rank and file would approve. But the leaders shrank from action . . .

On Sunday January 29 a hundred thousand workers demonstrated against Hitler and Papen in Berlin's Lustgarten. But the *Frankfurter Zeitung* echoed the hollow roars of German Reaction with the suggestion that a Hitler-Cabinet might "oust" the Nazis. Schleicher hurried north; it was too late. Hitler kept silent. Papen expressed. On Monday morning January 30 at eleven o'clock Hindenburg gave Hitler the new Cabinet. Hitler, Reichsbanner, Papen, Vice-Chancellor, Hugenberg, Minister of Economics, Franz Seidler (Schleicher's brother), Minister of Labor; Blomberg, Minister of Defense, and the main core of the Bruner Cabinet in other posts—Lott von Schwenninghausen, Minister of Finance, Franz Gürtner, Minister of Justice, Baron von Helldorff, Minister of Posts and Transport, Günther Gumbel, Minister of Employment, Baron Knechtel von Natten, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Two other Nazis claimed Cabinet positions: Göring, Minister without portfolio (he became President of Prussia on March 31) and Reich Minister of Air on March 29, and Wilhelm Frick Minister of the Interior. "And now, gentlemen, returned the Old Man, 'Forward with God!'"

To Schleicher it was "like a dream." The Party had the *Chamber of Deputies* and control of the police as well. The new Nazis in the Cabinet, however, were certain that they could "over" Hitler, Brüning, and Frick. Schleicher believed. The Socialist leaders and they would do nothing until the new Government acted "illegally." On Monday evening Hitler, Göring, and Hindenburg stood in the Chamber windows on Wilhelmstrasse and reviewed a torchlight parade of the S.A. and the Stahlhelm. Seven hundred thousand people marched by. Delirious enthusiasm boiled and bubbled through the capital. On the following morning the Catholic Labour Federation and the General Federation of Labor issued a joint democratic note of criticism of the new Cabinet. But they proposed no action. A Communist call for a general strike evoked no response. On Wednesday, despite clashes on the part of Hugenberg, the President dissolved the Reichstag and ordered new elections for March 5.

The faces now swarmed wildly. Hitler denounced Bolshevism and

promised bread, work, honor, and freedom along with the propagation of Christianity, the family, and the hallowed traditions of the Great German past. He demanded the suppression of the Communist Party, all of whose meetings were banned by a decree of February 2. Papen and Hugenberg, who had put Hitler in the Chancellorship in the name of "saving the Fatherland from Communism," opposed the dissolution of the Communist Party, since this step might well give the NSDAP a majority in the election. Had they not planned carefully to keep the Nazis in a minority? Hitler had other plans. On February 22 in the *Spezialsaal* he hinted at the future: "Our program? . . . We will not lie and we will not retaliate! . . . In us alone lies the future of the German people . . . If the German people should desert us, that will not overturn us. We will take the course that is necessary to save Germany from ruin!"<sup>16</sup> Papen, Hugenberg, and Schleier began to wobble. Newspapers, meetings, and organizations were being suppressed on every hand, while Communists and Socialist leaders were being hunted down and arrested by scouts. On the 26th Goering ordered the police to shoot "Communists sometimes" on sight or face punishment for failing to act. Goebbels hinted at an impending Communist revolution. He found thousands to demonstrate the reality of the Red peril from which only the NSDAP could save Germany. If the wavering electorate could be herded into the Nazi camp through fear or belated conversion, Hitler's clever schemes and aims would be undone.

The trick was neatly turned. The inspiration came from Goebbels. The execution was apparently entrusted to a group of Stormtroopers directed by Ratten, Dames, Kullinger, and Heider!<sup>17</sup> The technique was implicit in the very raison d'être of the NSDAP, but to Papen, Hugenberg, and the "respectables" it was so shocking as to be utterly unanticipated and incredible. On Monday evening February 17, six days before the election, the interior of the Reichstag building was destroyed by a terrific conflagration of chemical origin. A Dutch half-wit and ex-Communist, Marinus Van der Lubbe, was arrested in the burning building. He was later tried before the Reich Supreme Court (together overruled as "illegal") along with Ernst Torgler, Communist parliamentary leader, and three Bulgarian Communists: Wazil Tenev, Blagoi Popov, and Georgi Dimitroff. On December 17, 1931, the court acquitted Torgler and the three Bulgarians and found Van der Lubbe guilty of high treason and incendiary arson, committed in "deliberate co-operation with others" who were "unknown." The luckless Dutchman was beheaded on January 20, 1932.

Dieterich, who had aroused world-wide admiration by his fearless defiance of Goering, went to Moscow and was elected Secretary-General of the Comintern International on August 21, 1932.

At the time of the first Götting and Hitler at once announced that the courage was the work of the Communist Party and constituted a signal for bloody proletarian revolt. By prearranged plan, hundreds of Communist and Socialist leaders were at once poisoned upon and jailed. Hitler persuaded Hindenburg the next morning to suppress all civil liberties and to authorize Stresemann to arrest suspects. "For the protection of the nation from the Communist menace."<sup>12</sup> All Marxist services and publications were stamped out. All Germans and Germans who complained were accused of sympathy for "Bolshevik terrorism." The election campaign swept to its climax in a frenzy of oppression.

On Sunday March 5 the terrified German electorate expressed its preference for the last man. The NSDAP won 2,147,000 votes, 33.9% of the total and 281 seats. Almost unbelievably the Socialists retained 120 seats and the Communists 81, with the Centre in fourth place with 92 and the Hugenberg-Soldon "Fighting Front" a poor fifth with 32. The Nazis still lacked a majority and were in effect dependent upon the Fighting Front deputies. Papen and Hugenberg were momentarily alarmed. But Nationalist theory gave way to Nazi practice. The 61 Communist deputies were excluded unceremoniously. The NSDAP then had a clear majority. The Party was in undisputed power—and by "legal" means!

The comedy of legality was played out to its end with a delicate irony paralleling the savage nature of the brown terror which simultaneously swept through the Reich. On March 21 the new Reichstag met. Two days later Hitler appealed for the passage of an "Enabling Act" giving the Cabinet dictatorial powers. But Der Führer was re-assuring, despite talk of "barbaric robberies" against treason and threats of "war" against his critics. The law itself<sup>13</sup> specified that the powers of the Reichstag and the Reichsrat, as well as the powers of the President, would remain undisturbed and that the extraordinary authority conferred would expire April 1, 1933, or whenever the "present national Cabinet is replaced by another." In economic policy, said Hitler in his plea for support, "the strongest support of private initiative and recognition of property" would be assured. Taxes would be lightened and public expenditures reduced. The government must "protect and further the millions of German workers in

their struggle for the right to live. As Chancellor and National-socialist, I feel myself bound to them as companions of my youth." Anarchy was undesirable. No one need fear abuse of power. "The government will make use of these powers only in so far as they are essential for carrying out the vitally necessary measures. Neither the structure of the Reichstag nor that of the Reichsrat is retained. The position and rights of the President remain unaffected. . . . The supreme sovereignty of the federal states will not be done away with. The rights of the churches will not be diminished and their relationship to the State will not be modified."<sup>12</sup> Only the Social Democrats voted against the act. The vote was 94 to 444. Catholics, Nationalists, Bavarian People's Party, State Party—all gave approval and thereby dug their graves.

The blunder of misplaced confidence was irretrievably laid. On May 2, 1933, all the trade unions were abolished, their leaders arrested, and their funds confiscated. The Socialist Party, which had bowed, scraped, licked the dust, and even voted "confidence" in Hitler after his foreign-policy speech of May 13, was dissolved on June 22. The Nationalist Party suffered a like fate "voluntarily" on June 17 and the State Party on June 18. The Catholics, the Bavarian People's Party, and the German People's Party were suppressed on July 4 and 5. A decree of July 14, 1933, made the NSDAP the "only political party in Germany."<sup>13</sup> All non-Nazi organizations were dissolved on February 1, 1934. As for the "peasant national Cabinet," the nine non-Nazis had been reduced to six by June 30, 1933, while the three Nazis had been increased to eight. Goebbels became Minister of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda on March 13; Walther Darré became Minister of Agriculture; Hugenberg's successor, Kurt Schuler, joined the Party, as did Seldow. Rudolf Hess joined the Cabinet without portfolio on June 29. These changes, along with the expiration date of April 1, 1933, were conveniently ignored by Der Führer. Property rights and police initiative became anemias. Anarchy was the order of the day. Taxes soared and public expenditures climbed still higher. The systematic persecution of the Catholic and Protestant churches was well advanced by the summer of 1933. The Reichstag was reduced, with its own "anatomy," to an all-Nazi assembly devoid of all authority. The Reichsrat, also with its "anatomy," was abolished by the "Reich Reform Law" of February 1, 1934, which likewise abolished the federal states.<sup>14</sup> Following the death of Hindenburg, on August 2, 1934, Hitler combined the powers of the Presidency and the Chan-

relationship as a *Reichsführerschaft*, which he asserted in one of his speeches three weeks before the referendum of August 19 which "ruined" the struggle.

No less drastic was the destiny of the well-publicized Nazi Program of February 14, 1932. Its slogan "The Common Weal before All" contained a platform. Its second slogan, "Break the Bonds of Interest Slavery," never became more than a statement of words on Gustaf Feder's word acquaintance. Among the 25 points<sup>12</sup> there which promised Pan-Germanism (1), abolition of the peace treaties (2), national expansion (3), discrimination against the Jews (4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 10), the formation of a national army (11), censorship of the press (13), and governmental centralization (15) were indeed carried out as rapidly as circumstances permitted. But those which promised "socialism" were promptly relegated to limbo, thanks to Hitler's bargain with the industrialists and the Junkers who placed him in power. Those plans were embodied in the nucleus of political promises: "abolition of incomes unearned by work" (16), "ruthless curbing of all war profits" (17), "nationalization of assets" (18), "prohibition of all speculation in wholesale trade" (19), "transfer of the disposition of production for old age" (20), "municipalization of department stores and their lease at a cheap rate to small traders" (21), "coordination with or incorporation of land for common purposes; abolition of interest on land loans, and prohibition of all speculation in land" (22), death for "speculators, profiteers, etc." (23), enlargement of opportunities for higher education (24), and religious liberty coupled with "positive Christianity" (25).

The fate of those who made possible the German Fascist revolution is equally instructive. Hugenberg's friend and Hindenburg's campaign manager, Günther Guentz, was arrested for collaboration on March 19, 1933. Hugenberg's parliamentary leader, Ernst Gumbel, was accused of plotting against Hindenburg on March 29. He was found shot to death in his house on May 7. Hugenberg was forced to resign from the Cabinet on June 27, 1933. On "Bloody Sunday," June 30, 1934, Schleicher and his wife were slain, along with Ulrich Gumbert, Gertie von Kalle, Ernst Röhms, Edward Hirsch, Karl Frow, and hundreds of other victims of the "purga." Pöppel was wounded, arrested, and barely escaped with his life. The friend Edgar Jung, his aide, Herbert von Bose, his collaborator in Coblenz, Arthur Klumner, his protégé, Adolbert Probst, leader of the Catholic youth—were all killed by the henchmen of Himmler and Göring, with Him-

his approval. The Vice-Chancellor resigned. After Hindenburg died in his sleep, Papen hurried to Vienna to restore "friendly relations" with an Austria whose Chancellor had been slain by the Nazis on July 25. His new aide was attached at the Vienna legation, Baron Wilhelm von Karmel, disappeared on March 22, 1938. The body was later found in the Danube. Thyssen and Kallenberg, along with the photographers and journalists whom they represented, had less to complain of, but they found no joy in the continuous tyranny of the new Nazis. The "refugees" thus drank deeply of the bitter wine they had themselves prepared for others.

## 2. THE CULT OF ANNIHILATION

The ever-longening shadow of the viceroy was less the shade of a man or a cult or a country wide large than the projection of a new political technique on an ever larger screen. In politics, as in other arts, there is perhaps nothing wholly new under the sun. Innovations and literary content in combining familiar elements form new patterns and in adapting them to new media and new purposes. Hitler's high-powered propaganda achieved phenomenal results because a potential market for the advertised product already existed and because his competitors were hindering themselves incapable of making their wares appear attractive. But his sales technique was a work of genius. Der Führer and his aides were now following through an direct continuation of the skills of the religious revivalist, the commercial advertiser, the grand master of the secret society, the stage manager, the ballet director, and the recruiting officer. Adolf Hitler was now, these techniques were extended and perfected to mobilize mass enthusiasm, conquest, destruction, and silence critics.

Victory itself, however, was not a direct consequence of these devices, for they never won a majority of the German electorate or the army nor did they suffice to put the NSDAP in power. They created and inspired the Nazi army. The staff plan by which that army was enabled to storm the ramparts of the Weimar Republic was distinct from the institutional and psychological mechanisms which brought the army together, maintained it intact, and kept its morale high. Like, as in war, the art of strategy is different from the science of administration. Nazi administrative skill could have only a limited application outside the borders of the Reich. But Nazi political strategy

had possibilities in the realm of diplomacy quite undreamed of in its earlier and more aristocratic in character days. In the sphere of international politics in it had been as the sphere of German diplomacy. Of late. Upon the success or failure of this strategy depended the final verdict of events upon the proud home of the *Sturm und Drang*. "Today we have conquered Germany! Tomorrow the world is ours!"

The key to the new dispensation lay in a social process of which Hitler was not cause but merely product and beneficiary. This process reflected the material and spiritual decadence of the lower middle class—a decadence manifesting itself in nihilism and mass hysteria throughout Central Europe and in paralyzed bewilderment in the dominions of the West. Behind the facade of the *Poltergeist* lay behind the terror and confusion of the "rumored awakening," behind the new state-forms and the new science of propaganda lay a vast and slowly maturing transformation of attitudes and values, having its origin in the Central-European *Kleinbürgertum* and spreading from its local point upward and downward into higher and lower social strata and outward into peripheral areas. The end result of this transformation in Germany was the realization of the *pure Power state*—i.e. the correction of social, geographic, numerically limited imbalances into historic fictions dedicated to totalitarian victory as a *totalitarian way*. *Führer* diplomacy, like *Führer* economics, art, and philosophy, is intelligible now in terms of this mass transformation of shapes, personalities, and values.

The version of arms in the Western world was for centuries a traditional prerogative of the landed aristocracy. In the feudal age gentlemen were light and heavy arm. War and diplomacy in the late medieval period, the Renaissance, and the early modern age reflected the ideals of chivalry and the stylistic formalism of the *l'homme armé*. At the end of the eighteenth century this nobility gave way to the bourgeoisie at the top of the social hierarchy. The small, mercenary standing armies, affected by aristocrats, gave way to the mass army, affected by a new class of military experts. These captains of peoples-in-arms became in most European States a professional officers' corps which was humanitarian rather than aristocratic in its attitudes, even where the highest posts were still monopolized by those with blood-tainted ancestry. Thus was, in a different setting, there developed forms, styles, and standards of ethics and honor which stamped themselves upon diplomatic practice and international law.<sup>14</sup>

The professional military caste, along with its aristocratic touchstone, suffered an all but fatal eclipse in the outcome of the First World War. In Russia it was utterly destroyed. In Germany and the Habsburg successor States it was decimated. Its counterparts in France, Italy, Britain, and Austria knew victory without glory and honor without influence. In the decade of the 1920's the militarism of the nineteenth century was almost as dead as the clericalism of the thirteenth, not only because a new international concert of power offered little scope for the profession of the warrior, but because plutocrats, peasants, proletarians, and petty bourgeois alike held professional soldiers in world esteem and viewed as gentlemen whose only vocation was war.

The new militarism of Fascism and National Socialism was neither aristocratic nor bureaucratic, but bourgeois. In its decay the lower soldier and war-motivated of social classes became militarized and war-mad, like rabbits turned wolfishly into wolves or hyenas. The militarization of the *Kleinbürger* stemmed from sources as deep-seated as those of the utopian of late capitalists and as complex as those of the Great Depression. The post-war inflation and the primary post-war deflation brought impoverishment and degradation to millions of little men. The far more severe and prolonged secondary post-war deflation reduced more millions to misery. These multitudes in Central Europe were for the most part solid citizens who had grown to maturity under relatively undemocratic but quasi-liberal political regimes which they respected. They had fought and bled for their fatherlands and had known the bitterness of defeat. During four years of hostilities they had spent fortitudes from of manual indulgence and had relished them the more for the sin and suffering which accompanied them. They were patriots and they were veterans. But their households were lost in helpless disgrace. Their sacrifices seemed vain. They had obeyed state officers, respected their "betters," and worshipped their kings. All these kids were now broken.

After the dilapidate many of them embraced a new liberalism and a new pacifism, only to find no economic security and no hope in those alien faiths. They asked, hunger-like, for a chance to trade and grow rich or at least "comfortable." The chance was held out briefly and then denied them by the far-reaching frictions of a unidirectional world economy of which they knew little and understood less. A new generation of ever more faithless and hopeless youth needed the ranks



of despair and cried aloud against the revolution, professors drove their staves in the social scale and against the radical professors as whose level they felt themselves degraded.

From these processes and tribulations came, it may be said, for result and retribution. Most of the phenomena of middle-class unrest which swept the Continent after 1848 are explicable in terms of the reaction and aggressions of an exhausted, disillusioned, and disillusioned social structure which had long been socially and conventionally inactive and had lost its faith in ideas and reason. "Order, discipline, discipline," in the words of Michelet, were the demands of the new day. North of the Alps and east of the Rhine, anti-Semitism was an exciting and satisfying mode of discharge for hatreds against rich and middle-class. Anti-Marxism marched side by side with anti-semitism. Barren and barren and middle-class-borne could not be a capitalistic and would not be a proletarian. They therefore desired both. Their race in misery sought legends in deeds of blood and race. Their frustrated passions began a horror and were passionate protestations. Their frustrated hopes of wealth began a bourgeois "socialism" or "socialism." Their weariness of responsibility, their fatigue with complex tasks, began a desire for an end of thinking and a thing, a self-deep longing for an all-embracing Faith which would answer all questions and an all-knowing Father who would ask of them only "children."

The common denominator of this awakening was more militant as its prototype was no longer the armed and animated horse, washed with pride of power, nor yet the decorated staff officer of a later time, charged with operating a great military machine. The spirit of the new nationalism was plain John Everyman, fresh from his grocery counter, where business was poor, or his accountant's office, where life was dull, or the university, where learning brought no reward and no truth that had somehow become empty. He found meaning in life once more by donning a colored shirt, marching behind a band, cherishing a Messiah who reassured him as to his own importance and promised salvation and glory for himself and his fatherland. This new army, with banners, marching as to war, reconquered the faded coloration of the trenches with pride of its strength and honor. Wagnerian pageantry breathed eye and ear. Street fights, riots, and wars upon Jews and "Bols" furnished danger and excitement. All for one and one for all. The Leader is always right. Believe, obey, fight! Blood and will. Blood and honor! Germany awaked!

Raise high the flag! Stand rank on rank together  
Squadroopers march with steady, quiet tread  
Our comrades, Jews, thus down by Red Front and Reaction,  
In spirit march before the ranks they led

Make free the street for brown formations marching!  
Make free the street! Squadroopers stride ahead.  
Already millions gaze with hope upon our banners—  
The day now dawns for Freedom and for Bread!"

These private armies of rebellion—black shirts in Italy, brown shirts in Germany, other shirts elsewhere—were subsidized by industrialists and aristocrats for each of their areas. Only in this fashion were they enabled to worm the crutches of governments. The power of power was high. Every man found himself betrayed and his hopes of liquidating capitalists and nobles, along with Muslims, Jews, and blacks, forever deferred. But this was of small consequence to Everyman, for the ends of the movement in which he had submerged himself had ceased to be impartial wars in vengeance and national visions. The play was all. Gladstone, self-sacrifice, martial fervor were good in themselves. In his heart he could echo Nietzsche say not that a good cause justifies any war, but that a good war sanctifies any cause. Prussianism and Bolshevism here met and were used. Munich had become such. And, as in all militaries, the part swallowed the whole, the organs absorbed the organism, the fighters who rose to defend the State became in fear of it State, which now ordered only so-called fighters and fighting.

The militarization of the *Kleinbürger* began the militarization of the party, of revolt, and this in turn, once victorious, began the militarization of politics and of the State on a scale beyond all imagining by the militaries of old. Everyman found himself swept from his moorings. His Leader found an instrument of power which cut to shreds the ranks of those still addicted to free speech and compromise and the double decks of pacifism and parliamentarianism. His new rulers found a weapon which could confound and defeat foreign foes no less readily than enemies at home. The men of money and the men of title had lived the new man of shirt and bledoon to protect their privileges and save them from the clutches of the twenty men with hammer and sickle. But the new men of might overgrew their masters. They were content to possess money and title and the privi-

gives herself, but the lords of the realm were now the lords of the guidance of the lesser bourgeoisie. The good-will towards France, to give property not only demolished the Liberal State of machines and masses, but created a German State of warlike dedicated to the cult of Mass. Here Power was a higher imperative than Property. Violence became a creed and a way of life.<sup>17</sup>

The new practitioners of violence were neither knights nor gentlemen nor bureaucrats of war. They were Lark Crows. They were copies of the colonial skirts. They were gang-bangers and criminals of private armies recruited from the ranks of the desperate and hopeless. They were John Derrymen, exiled-pygmae, elevated abruptly to the seats of the mighty, insured and recruited by private prisons and consumed with envy, malice, and ambition. They lacked politics, form, style. They had no standards were those of their own making, conceived in the desperation of want and born in the heat of battle. They were crude, more violent, more unscrupulous, and therefore more dangerous than the randomness of the Britishness of the Prussian Guards of the Czarist of old. By every criterion of decency and honor hitherto prevalent in Western culture, they were blackguards and barbarians—with their barbarism masked to privacy by hypocritical devotion to a cause and their criminality masked to sincerity by political insouciance and engineering genius. Book-burning, Jew-baiting, the sub-in-the-back, and the shot-in-the-ribs were their stock-in-trade.

This new political force, for all its ferocity, was in no sense irresistible. In Italy, Germany and Japan, however, and in other States as well, those who were doomed to subordination and reduction in the victory of the new splendors for power were consistently incapable of offering any effective resistance. Assassination and plot have only seduced political gangsters. That portion of the lesser bourgeoisie which remained faithful to liberalist thought hesitated, with reluctance, aggression with ineffectiveness, hesitation with compromise, hesitancy with perhaps. The proletarian, often enough mildly militant and revolutionary in thought and posture, offered no military opposition to the new military bent upon smothering its organizations and reducing it to servitude. The domestic force which was conquered by the Italian Fascists, the German Nazis, and the Japanese war lords were slowly self-defeated by their own confusion and exposure in the face of the unreserved ruthlessness and unscrupulous will-to-power of their destroyers.

But mere passivity in the face of attack was insufficient to produce an over a difficulty for the crumpp of Fascism and so overwhelmingly a victory for the would-be Cosses. The victors were actively helped to victory by the vanquished. Time after time the cause was rescued from ruin by its enemies. Each group of foes persuaded itself to be persuaded that Fascist victory would save it from imaginary ills and would enable it to gain a victory of its own over some other group. The landed gentry and the capitalists alike rallied to the support of the gang-out-rebels in order to buy protection from "Bolshevism" and to achieve the disintegration of peasant and proletarian organizations disposed to challenge the social status quo. The unconverted portions of the Khrushchyovs were paralyzed by doubts, fears, and hopes. Even if peasants were myths, they still were good. In a faithless age, one must believe in something. Among the workers, Communists saw in Fascist victory the undoing of the Social Democrats and the certain procurement of proletarian revolution. Social Democrats welcomed the liquidation of their Communist rivals for leadership of the masses. Fascism's rise-to-power was marveled by its foes' colleagues as well as its friends.<sup>21</sup> Those whom Fascism could not destroy compromised voluntarily their own destruction.

This disposition of Fascism's enemies and victims to purchase peace by surrender was also duplicated on the larger stage of European diplomacy. The tragedy of national politics was to be played in international politics. Victory followed the desired legend of the Little Caesar in the area of Weltpolitik. Nations pursued their appetites. There, as in every theater of war, greed, covetousness and stupidity are inevitably beset by fanaticism. When madmen and paralytics arrive for the memory of the world, the conclusion is foregone.

### 3. FOLK AND VOLKERBUND

In the life cycle of individual society is often a caricature of childhood. In the evolution of civilization decay and approaching death are often accompanied by a morbid reversion toward primitivism. Fully societies are "folk cultures," bound together by acts of fellowship which are active, almost unconscious, and frequently creative of great art through the media of folk-art and folk religion. The transition from "culture" to "civilization" in the Spenglerian sense is, among other things, a transition from folk society, dedicated to pure-

chief gods and to the vehement mission of the ethnic solidarity of the tribe, to the Great Society dedicated to righteousness, universalism, and world organization.

In their decadence the successive Great Societies which have nurtured the world civilizations of the past have even more disintegrated and un-displaced fragments. In each broken order the radiance men who live in fear of night have sought solace in fearful attempts to return to the gods and to the ways of life of some remote and unremembered dawn. The attempt is always dark, never, for the stream of time flows forward and there is no way by which a people can go back to its childhood. But in the effort a people can really manage to create its imagery, superstition, and pagan religiosity.

A century ago Heinrich Heine predicted the retrogression of his fatherland toward the barbarism of the ancient Germans:

The philosopher of Nature will be terrible injured, he will appear in alliance with the primitive powers of Nature, *die to* awake the demonic energies of old Germanic Paganism—among which there will awake in him that barbar-madness which is still at work among the ancient Teutonic races who fought neither to kill nor to conquer, but for the very love of fighting itself. It is the failure more of Christianity than it more that religious that brutal German passions autonomous or joy in battle, but it could not destroy it. And should that including liberalism, the Cross, but oh, then will come crashing and roaring forth the wild traditions of the old champions, the same Berserker rage, of which the Southern poetry and song. The liberalism is broken, and the day will come when it will pitifully break. The old stone gods will rise from long-forgotten ruin and rub the dust of a thousand years from their eyes, and Thor, leaping to life with his giant hammer, will crash the Gothic cathedrals!

[*The Works of Heinrich Heine*, translated by Charles Gellert. London: New York Dutton, 1908. Vol. V, pp. 202.]

Heine's prophecy has come to pass. "National-socialism" is thus far the most complete expression in the twentieth century of the cultural anti-individualism of European civilization. The central purpose of its devotion is to combine the technology of the machine age with the primitive simplicity and unchallenged regimentation of a folk society. The word most frequently on their lips is "Folk." Hitler roared his countrymen in steel that they were an *Urvolk* (a primal people)

speaking an Unprache. This mass of ancient runs uninterruptedly through Hegel, Schlegel, Paul de la Gardie, Lutz, Lang, Tietze-Wie, Nietzsche, Wagner, and Hermann Siewert. Characteristic is Volkertum Hitler, where it runs to full crescendo.<sup>20</sup> The Third Reich is a "Völkischer Staat." The leading paper of the NSDAP is the "Völkischer Beobachter." The car for the masses is the "Völkswagen." Come bread for the hungry is "Völkbrötchen." Cheap sausage for the poor is "Völkbraten." A folk culture must somehow be re-constituted in life that is non-national, non-ideal, non-compassion. In way of life, dominated by selfish provincial desires, must be narrow and parochial, fanatical and intolerant. The moral myth of Nibelungen, Arminius, and non-Servetus is but an aspect of this disavowal of the pasted essence of Hermann the Teuton, Alaric the Goth, and Attila the Hun. The swastika is the symbol of the polemic. On its banner the Third Reich marches. *In Hoc Signo Vinet.*

This new flesh dug up from the dead is incompatible with the Great Society of the contemporary age. One will perish. The other will perish. The two cannot coexist. The most significant effort thus far made to give the Great Society a framework of political organization commensurate with the world-wide technological and economic interdependence of modern mankind is embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations. The dream of Wilson caught the imagination of Christian Liberalism. "The German Republic under Stresemann's leadership joined the 'Völkertum' at Geneva in 1924. But the Volkertum of Wilson and the Völkischer Staat of Hitler are antithetical. The Third Reich left Geneva in October of 1933. Berlin subsequently made various offers to return—always for a price—but following the withdrawal of Fascist Italy on December 11, 1937, the German Government declared that 'nothing will change the conviction which it shares with the Italian Government that the Geneva political system is pernicious. The return of Germany to the League, therefore, will never again be considered.' The very name was forbidden. Henceforth the League would be referred to in the Reich merely as 'The Geneva System.' Thus was Volkertum expunged from the vocabulary of Völkischer Deutschland."

This act symbolized more than Nazi contempt for democratic France, which had shrunk in fear from using the League to pacify German treaty-breaking or to thwart Fascist aggression in Asia, Africa, and Europe. It symbolized the parting of the ways fought with inevitably single consequences for the whole of Western civiliza-

tion. The very of Wilson, in aspiration if not in performance, was a *very* toward order and justice in a Great Society of interdependent States bound, for the sake of their own salvation, to act together in fulfillment of their common purposes. The very of Hitler, in performance if not in aspiration, was the very raw and unbridled and vicious in a lawless jungle of warring sovereignties competing for tribute and fees for the mastery of a national world. This aspiration is implicit in all the preachings of Das Fuhrer. And for all his followers, Das Fuhrer can say and do no wrong.

We believe on this earth solely in Adolf Hitler. We believe that National Socialism is the sole faith and salvation of our people. We believe there is a God in heaven who has opened us, fed us, and publicly bid His blessing upon us. We believe that God has sent us Adolf Hitler as that German man, the true foundation for his existence through all eternity. Adolf Hitler, hail victory! \*

The diplomatic objectives of the Third Reich were long ago stated by the Nazi Messiah with a clarity which admits of no misunderstanding. The statement, moreover, was initially made in the *Kammler* of the movement: Adolf Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, which was declared by the *Volkischer Beobachter* of December 11, 1919, to contain "for the present and for the future the final principles of *National Socialism*. It should become the Bible of the German people." Since May 1, 1918, it has been presented by the Ministry of the Interior to all newly married couples—provided that the husband is of German nationality and that both partners are non-Jewish. Over four million copies of this Holy Writ have been distributed. Quoted apart from other sources of income the worker has become a millionaire from the reading of this, his only book.

Hitler's basic assumptions regarding international relations are simple and brutal: \*

"The ideas of pacifism and humanity may be applied good after the victorious race has conquered and subdued the world in such a manner as makes him its eternal master. . . . Therefore, first fight, and then, perhaps—pacifism (pp. 319-16).

If the German people had possessed that safe level instinct based on blood . . . the German Reich would probably and by be mistress of the globe. . . . Then perhaps we could have

desired to let today's many misled passions have to get by 'whining and blubbering'. Peace . . . upheld not by the olive branches of luxurious third female movements, but established by the victorious sword of a manly nation which leads the world to serve a higher culture (pp. 437-8).

Some boundaries are opened by men and closed by men. The fact of success for a people in successive acquisition of territory entails no higher guarantee of eternal approval. It proves at the most the power of the conqueror and the weakness of the vanquished. It is from this power alone that right is derived. If the German people today are cramped in impossible space and look to a wretched future, this is no decree of destiny, but is simply a refusal to stand and offer challenge (pp. 740-1).

Germany will become a World Power, or it will not be at all. To be a World Power, however, it needs a hierarchy which in the present age would give it the necessary importance, and to establish the means of life (p. 741).

Never allow two Continental Powers in Europe to arise. Look upon every attempt to organize a second military Power on the frontiers of Germany—even though it be only in the form of a State incapable of military development—as an attack upon Germany, and think it not alone a right but a duty to prevent such a State from arising, or to smother it if it has arisen, by every means, including armed force. Have a care that the strength of our people should be founded not upon colonies but upon the soil of the European home. Never does the Reich waver if it cannot give all the offspring of our people a bit of land of their own for sustenance to come. Never forget that the most sacred right in this world is the right to the soil which one may till for oneself, and that the holiest sacrifice is the blood-shed for this soil (p. 754).

This is no less explicit as to the methods which must be employed to realize these objectives:

Oppressed lands will not be led back into the bosom of the common Reich through flattery promises, but through a mighty sword. To forge this sword is the task of the internal political leadership of a people, to possess the sword and to seek allies in time is the task of foreign policy (p. 805).

One must be perfectly clear that the recovery of lost territories is not achieved by solemn invocations of the beloved Land,



war through peace hopes in a League of Nations, but only through armed violence (p. 70ff.).

As to the direction of his struggle, Hitler early contrasted himself to an "East Germanist" in foreign policy. Here as in other things he was much influenced by one of his earliest colleagues, Alfred Rosenberg, who later became editor of the *Volksischer Beobachter* (1921), head of the Foreign Policy Bureau of the NSDAP (1923), *Rathen-Löcher* and "Director of Weltanschauung for the Reich," and author of *The Myth of the Twentieth Century* (1930), second only in sacredness to Hitler's autobiography. Rosenberg was born in Rast on January 12, 1893, of an old family of Baltic Germans. In the Russian revolution he became a violent anti-Bolshevik and fled ultimately to Munich, where he engaged in anti-Semitic and anti-Marxist propaganda. He met Hitler and joined the Party in 1929. The following, partly-faced fanatic was born very much inclined with hatred for Russia, Slavs, Catholics, Communists, Catholics, Protestants, and Jews alike. He is an apostle of Nietzsche and Chamberlain and a preacher of "Nordic superiority and Teutonic supremacy." Rosenberg fully accepted Hitler's conviction (he may indeed have converted the Führer to this view) that France was a monstrous circle of Negro-Jewish militarism and Freemasonry, used by the Slavophiles to oppress the Reich and humiliate the white race.<sup>12</sup> He agreed that France must be crushed. "Other continents have their apes, Europe has no longer any!"<sup>13</sup> That 36,000,000 French apes should have more land than 70,000,000 German heroes was intolerable.<sup>14</sup>

But Rosenberg envisaged the annihilation of France merely as a means to an end. The end was a free hand for the Reich as the First Germany must crush Slavs, destroy Bolshevism, and give out a new empire on the steppes. This dream had once been rebuffed in 1918, in the conqueror's peace of Versailles imposed by the Second Reich upon a prostrate Russia in 1918. The message to defeated Rosenberg and Hitler in post-War Munich that Herr Fikler's first great political oration in the *Flottenkrieger* in October 1919 was devoted to an indictment of Versailles and a eulogy of Versailles. He returned again and again to this theme in later years, and made it a leit-motiv of his book. Since the theme was Rosenberg's, though the words were Hitler's, the Baltic anti-Bolshevik could say with pride that the Holy Scriptures "reproaches for all future days the unshakable basis of Nationalsozialist feeling and thought. For today, tomorrow,

and the days beyond." "Der Führer's conversion to the new *Drang nach Osten* was complete. Behold the Rede!"

We must take up an active policy, and throw ourselves into a fed and down-right fight with France, with the genius of German war tactics. Only, then will the eternal and unobscured struggle between us and France be brought to a conclusion, on condition that the north-east of France be looked upon solely as a means of gaining finally the possibility of expansion for our people. Today there are 80,000,000 Germans in Europe! The justification of this foreign policy will be acknowledged when after a hundred years 120,000,000 Germans will be living on this continent (pp. 366-7).

Although we realize the necessity of a settlement with France . . . this could not exhaust the aims of our foreign policy. Its only means and end will be to protect our status as to get more living-room for our people in Europe (p. 341).

To crush or annihilate France, Germany must work Italy and Russia within (pp. 343-5, 397, 409, 710-1). But the goal is expansion across the East.

We start where we have terminated six centuries ago. We reverse the eternal Germanic migration to the South and to the West of Europe and look Eastward. In this way we bring to an end the colonial and trade policies of pre-War times and pass over to the territorial policy of the future. If we speak of now and we are in a thick line of Russia and her subject border States (p. 341).

The whole political leadership of the [Second] Reich should have dedicated itself to this exclusive aim. . . . Only with England to cover our rear would it have been possible to begin the new Territorial march. Its justification would have been no less valid than was that of our ancestors. None of our po. then refused, in the name of the East, although the first blow was called "forward." To gain England's favor no sacrifice should have been too great. We should have denied ourselves colonies and expansion, and have spared British industry from our competition (pp. 130-4).

Fortunately, concluded Der Führer in 1904, Germany's opportunity would soon present itself. Under Bismarck the Jewish "Reverser

of decomposition" would presently lead to the collapse of the Entente and the Reich could then march on Moscow. But it must first attack France and for this it must have allies. "An alliance which does not lead to war is useless and worthless. Alliances are made only for conflict" (p. 149). Britain and Italy are the only possible allies for the destruction of French hegemony on the Continent. Negotiations are too great, no negotiations too painful, if they enable the Reich to overthrow France and then march east and in return —

These bloody visions of war and empire were at first regarded in France and Britain by the few who were acquainted with them as the idle ravings of an irresponsible madman. When the director became director of the Reich, they were dismissed as youthful fantasies or as harmless propaganda for home consumption. In reality I think none of that he wrote and would achieve more of what he wrote. But first a mighty sword must be forged and protection for the forging must be won.

#### 4. WORDS OVER WEAPONS

During the winter months the waters of Lac Lemm in western Switzerland are often covered with fog. The romantic valley just of Mont Blanc is usually hidden. Even the Grand Stair is sometimes covered with mist. At the southern tip of the lake the blue-green waters cascade around Reichen's Island to form the Rhône. Along both banks of the lake and river grow in Gland, city of Cabbages and Reichen, city of head-keepers and tourists, city of the League of Nations. After weeks of fog, a few rays of sunshine lit red through the clouds on the 2nd of February 1931. In the dreary Hibernia Hotel, which then housed the League Assembly, 134 delegates from 57 countries gathered for a momentous meeting—the opening session of the General Disarmament Conference. After seven sessions of the Preparatory Commission (May 18, 1926–December 9, 1928), there had emerged a draft convention of sixty articles. It was a document of blank space to be filled in and a record of disagreements to be composed. In January of the preceding year the League Council had fixed the opening date, despite German pleas for November. In May the Council had named Arthur Henderson, then British Foreign Minister, as President of the Conference. The great day had arrived.

Beside the table ran the delegates were glum and cynical. Not

even Swiss hospitality and thoughtfulness in imparting protection from Paris seemed to cheer them.<sup>11</sup> Far away in Shanghai the Japanese navy was celebrating the native day to the most savage bombardment seen anywhere on land or sea since the guns on the Western Front were silenced in 1918. The opening of the Conference was postponed for an hour while the League Council grappled fruitlessly with the Far Eastern problem. None of the delegates expected any disarmament to be achieved. Litrinen's proposal of 1917 for immediate and complete disarmament had been rejected. His plan of 1929 for gradual disarmament had been rejected. He had expected as much. The German delegation was better. For years it had insisted that the heavily armed States must fulfill their promise of 1919 to shorn down to the level of the Reich. They would not. What hope?

"Uncle Arthur" Henderson, erstwhile poor boy of Glasgow and iron-founder of Newcastle-on-Tyne, was naturally in a mood to dispel the gloom. He was sixty-nine years old, full of life and brawn by the beauty and collapse of the Labor Colossus in which he had seen Foreign Minister MacDonald, Thomas, and Snowden had deserted their colleague in September 1929 to join the Tory-controlled "National Government." Henderson became leader of the Opposition. But in the subsequent elections on October 17 Henderson and his own men were defeated in the défilé of the Labor Party which suffered a loss of 113 seats. His career in the old cause to which he had devoted his life was ruined. Perhaps the new cause of disarmament could be somehow salvaged. But his opening address was apologetic. His stress obliged him to remain seated during its delivery.<sup>12</sup>

Four days later the diplomats on silent white women, students, peace-workers, labor leaders spoke earnestly and passionately in support of their petition for total disarmament signed by more than eight million people all over the globe. Thereafter some five thousand war veterans paraded through Geneva for peace, many of them blind, on crutches, or in wheel-chairs, broken by the horror which the Conference was met to banish. Henderson's heart went out to them. They were his people. His eldest son David had been killed on the Somme. For years he had carried about in his pocket a clipping with a little verse on it: "O mothers with little sons, who stand with lifted faces, all of earth's helplessness cry from lonely places: . . . 'Go forthin the future less-than war shall be no more.'<sup>13</sup> But what hope?"

Henderson's fellow countryman, Sir John Simon, British Foreign Minister in the "National Government," offered little cheer despite a

exerts elastic joviality in his apple-cheeks, his bushy black hair, and his bald head fringed with white. His opening speech in the Conference was a dash of cold water. This tall son of a Congregational clergyman brought to diplomacy no warmth of religious fervor, of the "Liberalism" which he had scored in the House of Commons for a quarter of a century. He was above all an attorney. At the age of thirty-seven he had become Solicitor-General in the Asquith Cabinet and won a knighthood. He was cold and rational, though these qualities displayed a certain rhythm and discipline. He avoided strong sympathies and noble sentiments and had a genius for "winning the point." He dismissed the General Strike of 1901 as "illegal." He was chairman of the commission which, after three years of labor, reported in 1930 on a new constitution for India. The report ignored Gandhi and became waste paper. In the MacDonald Cabinet of November 6, 1931, he and Walter Runciman were the "National Liberals" of pro-modernist persuasion. His ability was undisputed. But he also displayed a "bad point" and not without reason, for most of his political enterprises ended in ruin. The Disarmament Conference was no exception. His own responsibility for its failure was not negligible.

What was of vastly greater moment in February of 1931, however, was Sir John's policy toward the Sino-Japanese conflict. Disarmament, as the *Quai d'Orsay* had reiterated at numerous dispatches upon security, which depended upon the League of Nations. The efficacy of the League depended upon the willingness of the Western Powers to defend League members against aggression in accordance with Articles 10 and 16 of the Covenant. Action in contrast of Japanese aggression against China depended upon British leadership. The unequipped States could not plead that it could do nothing because of American indifference. The United States had assumed membership in the League Council in October 1931 for purposes of moderating the conflict. Secretary of State Henry Stimson had proclaimed of his non-recognition doctrine on January 7. On February 2, 1931, less than a week after the General Disarmament Conference opened, President Hoover approved Stimson's proposal that the Nine-Power Pact of 1911 be invoked against Japan. On the following day the Secretary approached the British Ambassador in Washington. The United States was prepared not merely to support existing pressure upon the aggressor but to take the lead in organizing such pressure.

On February 11, 1931, Secretary Stimson, at President Hoover's suggestion, called Sir John Simon in Geneva by transatlantic phone

to sign a joint statement under the Nine-Power Pact—to be followed presumably by consultation on means of bringing Japan to terms. Although guests were being at Shanghai, Sir John was wary and evasive. He wanted to say "no" but dared not. He never informed the Cabinet of the full scope of the American proposals. Scramon phoned again on February 22. Scramon sent cables. Scramon phoned Sir John in London on the 19th and the 25th. At last a light dawned. "While an explicit refusal to my suggestion was very much," wrote the Secretary of State later, "I finally became convinced from his attitude on these conversations that for Scramon satisfactory to it, and which I certainly had no desire to inspire him or curdle, the British government felt reluctant to join in such a démarche. I therefore pressed it no further. The British ambivalence obviously killed the possibility of any such démarche. . . . My plan was therefore blocked. . . . For several days I was deeply discouraged at my inability to carry out the co-operative plan which we had suggested. I seemed doomed as I sat there, while a great tragedy was following its predestined course."<sup>14</sup>

The scope of this tragedy was far greater than either Scramon or Simon could then foresee. It unsettled the future of the Disarmament Conference. It cemented in the acquiescence of the Western Powers to Japanese aggression against China. It led to the breakdown of collective security at Geneva. The lesson was not lost upon Alexander or upon Hitler. The doom of Ethiopia, Austria, Spain, China, and Czechoslovakia, the repudiation of the treaties of Versailles, Locarno, St. Germain, Trianon, and Neuilly, the betrayal of the League, the re-establishment of a balance of power between armed conditions, new preparations for Armageddon—all were implicit in Sir John Scramon's rejection of the American proposals of February 1931. Years later, as Home Secretary, Sir John was to add to his unpopularity by rejecting the first hand-bombs regarding civilian defense in Britain against gas attacks from the air. This too was the fruit of Scramon's February folly. In diplomacy, as in other human affairs, unexpectedly great results often flow from apparently small decisions. Such was the decision of Sir John in fog-bound Geneva.

The irresponsibility and ferocity in evidence, Scramon, MacDonald, and Baldwin opposed League sanctions and Anglo-American co-operation against Japan in the hope that a foot hand in Manchuria for the Tokyo military would cause them to turn northward against the Soviet Union and to respect British interests in the Far East and in the Near

that opposition would cause them to turn southward to the injury of their insurers. This facile calculation was to be oft-repeated in the years to come. Inevitably it was wrong. But there are more wretched holes in those who refuse to learn. Sir John expended a repulse with Japan's aggressions and even doubted the wisdom of the Assembly's non-recognition resolution of March 11.<sup>20</sup> He told reporters, though he denied it later, that China was after all only "a geographical expression."<sup>21</sup> In December, following the establishment of "Manchukuo" and the publication of the Lytton Report, Simons refused Italian, German, and even French pleas for "mediation" and "arbitration" in the application of the Covenant. He presented the Japanese as so badly that Mr. Matsuoka declared that his British friend "had said in half an hour, in a few well-chosen phrases, what he—the Japanese Ambassador—had been trying to say in his bad English for the last ten days."<sup>22</sup> On February 17, 1933, Sir John told Congressmen that the Government was imposing an arms embargo against both China and Japan, "against the aggressor, who had made need of British arms, and *also* against his victim, who needed them desperately." This participation of the American "neutrality" legislation of 1917-19, equally gratifying to aggressors, was short-lived, for no other State followed suit. The winning States lifted the ban on March 14.<sup>23</sup> The "National Government" then preserved cordial relations with Tokyo at the expense of China and Geneva. It thereafter inaugurated a long process of undermining the foundation of Anglo-American collaboration, of collective security, and of any hope of disarmament or organized peace.

To return to the Disarmament Conference, its first steps were to appoint committees and listen to proposals. André Fardieu, French Minister of War, presented a plan on February 9, 1932 for a "preventive and punitive international police force." Britain and America joined Germany and Italy in opposing it. All proposals for effective security were rejected by "have-not" States bent upon upsetting the status quo and by "have" States unwilling to accept constraints on their armed forces. Without security the French Republic and its allies refused to accept any reduction of their armaments, or any grant of equality to the disarmed Powers. The deadlock was never broken. The Conference was still-born.<sup>24</sup> Aristide Briand died in Paris on March 7, 1932 and followed his great collaborator Gustav Stresemann († October 3, 1929) to the grave. After the Cardinal-Archbishop of Paris incongruously blessed the wall of the cathedral a little old lady in heavy mourning fell on her knees before the last of

the Queen d'Orsay and murmured: "God keep your soul. To the peace-makers may God give His power!" "But Britain's successors in Geneva brought not peace but a quarrel."

The corridors intrigues which helped to wreck the Conference are well described in retrospect. There is little reason to doubt the charge that some of the French, German and perhaps American arms firms, the German steel industry, and the social magnates of Berlin were agreed that productivity and profits in the wake of depression could be restored by an arms race. It would be unfortunate for all of them if this pleasant prospect were destroyed at Geneva. Their pressure was not without effect on the French delegation. According to one tale, Albert Thomas, the French Director of the International Labor Office, secured proof of such connivance and promised Briand at Geneva in May 1932 that he would go to Paris and expose the scandal in the interests of an accord. He went to the French capital with his brief-case full of documents. But before he could act he was found dead (May 8, 1931) in an obscure Paris café. The brief-case had disappeared. What hope?

On September 14, 1932, the German Government, headed by Franz von Papen, threatened to withdraw from the Conference unless the Reich's right to equality were recognized. On December 21 the German Government, headed by Kurt von Schleicher, accepted a declaration from Britain, France, and the United States granting it equality "in principle" — "as part of a system which would provide security for all nations." The five Powers further signified their willingness "to join in a solemn affirmation to be made by all European States that they will not in any circumstances attempt to resolve any present or future differences between the signatories by resort to force." One of Schleicher's last acts as Chancellor was to announce on January 16, 1933 that Germany was returning to Geneva to secure "in the shortest time" an arms convention which would achieve equal security for all States by the disarmament of the highly armed Powers.

On February 2, 1933, the German Government, headed by Adolf Hitler, took part in a meeting of the General Commission of the Conference. The Reich was still represented by Herr Nudoly. But he was no longer conciliatory. Complex maneuvering for position ensued, with Nudoly seeking "equality," Paul-Boncour pursuing "security," and the British and American delegations seeking to achieve compromise and to avoid renewed commitments for their own governments. Japan left the Assembly on February 24 and gave notice



of withdrawal from the League on March 27.)

Each delegation to the Conference sought a "solution" which would underwrite its own strategic advantages and minimize those of potential enemies. The British Government championed the doctrine of naval backbone in Europe (to protect the cities of England), but insisted that the right to bomb be retained "for police purposes in certain outlying regions" (to leave it free to discipline Africa, Asia, Iraq, and the north India border states). The Marquess of Londonderry, then British Air Minister, later told Commons (May 22, 1933) that he "had the utmost difficulty at that time, amid the public outcry, in preserving the use of the bombing airplane, even on the frontiers of the Middle East and India, where it is only owing to the presence of the air forces that we have controlled those narrowest without the wild and heavy cost of blood and treasure."<sup>42</sup> To Lord Londonderry, as to many of his fellow Tories, the whole enterprise was at best a *château de verre* to give Hitler what he wanted even at the cost of an armistice. Still better to buy peace by forcing the little States and the weak States to yield up their security and independence. He was in to his wife in March 1933:

It is no use complaining about the Disarmament Conference, the thing is to get it out of the way without the world being led by Germany and a war initiated by the Little Entente as a war of prevention. That is the real danger now. The Little Entente are fully armed and Germany is weak. If Germany recovers the Little Entente's chance of security will seem to them to be disappearing . . . The great difficulty now is not so much the aggressive States—I mean those who were depolled by the Treaty, although there are a hard enough—but the States which have acquired national extensions and are unwilling to cede anything.<sup>43</sup>

But no government would assume responsibility for getting the Conference "out of the way." Prime Minister MacDonald sought to revive it by a dramatic proposal (on March 26, 1933): "The time had come, said he, 'to face the facts. . . . The armed nations must be prepared to make their contribution in disarmament. The disarmed nations must be prepared to make their contribution in helping to establish confidence, good-will, security, mutual understanding and international belief in each other. . . . An adjournment pure and simple would be the most heart-breaking confession of failure that this Conference could indulge in. . . . Failure would let loose the passion

that makes for war."<sup>17</sup> He presented a draft convention in five parts to run for five years and to replace Part V of the Treaty of Versailles. It contemplated consultation in case of any threatened breach of the Pact of Paris; the reduction of Continental armies to a standardized base of men and men for Germany, France, and Italy, each to have an equal number; service milia, including police forces and para-military organizations, with supplementary forces for the colonies; the reduction of war material and the prohibition of aerial bombardment "except for police purposes in certain outlying regions"; the prohibition of chemical, incendiary, and bacteriological warfare; and the establishment of a Permanent Disarmament Commission with authority to investigate alleged violations of the agreement.

The verbal *locus de force* was van. Natchev demanded equality. Marshall for France demanded security plus no disarmament by Germany plus (perhaps) gradual disarmament by France and her allies. By May the deadlock was again complete. Baron von Neurath hated that the Reich was not upon planes, guns, and explosives on a par with its neighbors. On May 11, 1933, Lord Haldane, British Minister of War, told the House of Lords that any German withdrawal would be equivalent to a rejection of MacDonald's offer, that in this event Germany would continue to be bound by Versailles, and that any breach would bring sanctions into operation. Joseph Paul-Boncour, Foreign Minister of France, expressed himself similarly on the following day. Was this verbiage or a genuine warning to Hitler? That would be Natchev reported to Berlin. The Cabinet indicated that Hitler would speak at the Reichstag on May 13. Vice-Chancellor von Papen addressed the Reichstag at Münster on the 15th.

We were no longer have a pacific conception of peace. In the Middle Ages war was a ritual. The existence of the individual had no exaggerated importance. Pacifist literature depicts death on the field of battle as an unnatural death because it does not understand the ancient Germanic horror of death on a bed, and afterwards appears as it were virile than a bullet. Pacifists dwell on the horror of the war dead as if a peace corpse were none worthy. The representatives of the national revolution are men and women who are physically and morally warriors.<sup>18</sup>

President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had been visited by MacDonald and Hitler in the end of April, was now advised by Norman Davis to take account before Der Führer's address. On May 16 he issued

a diplomatic appeal to all States at the Conference urging acceptance of the MacDonald plan, opposing any increase in armaments, favoring laying away limitations, and pleading for a "voluntary and definite pact of non-aggression" which should prohibit any crossing of frontiers by armed forces. The rest of his plan reached Berlin as Hitler was preparing a final draft of his Reichstag speech. The Führer decided bravely that the time was premature for defiance. Better to be negotiating and to make threats solidly by way of saving the number of his foes.

Germany, he declared in Berlin's Krollplatz, had devoted under the treaty "Proportions to pretend that the S.A. and N.S. were military organizations." Their object was and is exclusively the removal of the Communists from Germany. "Their object was and is exclusively the removal of the Communists from Germany." Germany would never resort to force and did not "wish to take any other path than that suggested and justified by the events themselves." Norwise to pretend that the Third Reich was warlike. "No new European war could improve the miserable conditions of the present day. On the contrary, the application of violence of any kind in Europe would have no favorable effect upon the political or economic position which exists today." Germany, not France, should demand security. Germany was willing to assume new obligations if she too would benefit from them. "Germany would also be ready to disband her entire military establishment and destroy the small amount of arms remaining to her if the neighboring countries will do the same thing on equal terms. But if these countries are not willing to enter into the disarmament measures to which they are also bound by the Treaty of Versailles, Germany must at least retain her demands for equality." The British plan might offer a solution. Roosevelt's suggestions were welcomed, but the Reich must have qualitative equality at once and quantitative equality at the end of any transitional period. But let no one make this too

The German Government and the German people will under no circumstances allow themselves to be treated in a way which would mean a perpetuation of the degradation of Germany. . . . The attempt has been made in newspaper articles and representative speeches to threaten Germany with sanctions, but such a measure would only be our punishment for having persisted for the carrying out of the treaties by our demand for disarmament. Such a measure could only lead to the definite and effective annihilation of the treaties. Germany, however, even in this

case, would never abandon her peaceful claims. The political and economic consequences, the chaos which such an attempt would bring upon Europe, would be the responsibility of those who used such means against a people which is doing the world no harm. . . . [In such an event] it would be difficult for us, as a conscientiously defamed nation, to continue to belong to the League of Nations."<sup>10</sup>

The deputies, including the Social Democrats, unanimously voted a resolution approving the Chancellor's declaration. At Paris enthusiasm was more restrained. In a significant gesture, crowded meetings French demands for security Norman Davis asserted at Geneva, on May 28, 1934, that the United States would agree to "consult" with other Powers over violation of the peace. "Further than that, in the event that the States in conformity determine that a State has been guilty of a breach of the peace in violation of its international obligations and take measures against a violator, then, if we concur in the judgment rendered was the responsible and guilty party, we will refrain from any action tending to defeat such collective effort which these States may thus make to restore peace." America would thus relinquish its "neutral right" to trade with the State declared an aggressor and subjected to sanctions. This statement represented the farthest point at which the United States had ever gone in the direction of international collaboration to achieve collective security.

Hope revived. Two days later the Committee on Security Questions, of which Nicholas Ruzick of Geneva was rapporteur, adopted a sweeping definition of aggression based upon Soviet proposals of February. An aggressor was defined as "that State which is the first to commit any of the following actions: (1) declaration of war on another State, (2) invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration of war, of the territory of another State, (3) attack by its land, naval, or air forces, with or without a declaration of war, on the territory, vessels or aircraft of another State, (4) naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another State, (5) provision of support to armed bands formed in its territory which have invaded the territory of another State, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded State, to take in its own territory all the measures in its power to deprive those bands of all assistance or protection."

The Committee report signaled that "no political, military, economic or other consideration" could "serve as an excuse or justification

ing" for aggression and constructed the "principal cases in which States might have thought themselves authorized to resort to an act of force against another State under international law as it existed previously to the Pact of Paris and to the Covenant of the League of Nations."<sup>1</sup> It proposed that a convention of law should be set up to ascertain the facts of any alleged aggression and suggested a draft European Mutual Assistance Pact under which recommendations of the League Council for action against aggressors under Article 16 would be binding on the signatories.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Here at last was a proposed pledge of organized peace which promised, if accepted, to calm French fears, to enlist passive American co-operation, and to make possible a disarmament agreement. But Poincaré and Laroche, no less than Paul-Boncour, reckoned without Thonning Street. Italy opposed the plan. Germany likewise opposed it, though with more reserve. France, the Little Entente, and other small powers acclaimed the Poincaré report, but in the sessions of the General Commission on May 25 and 29 Agostino Soragna and Henri Nodding found support from an unexpected quarter: Clarendon, Anthony Eden, Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs and spokesman for Britain and MacDonald. Britain, no less than Italy and Germany, desired "a less rigid definition" of aggression. Despite British statements, however, continued to shy away from any commitment to act against peace-breakers.

Spring brought blossoms to Geneva, but the flowers of agreement that had bloomed briefly in May in the Refectory Theatre, now withered once more. Issues were obscured in a thicket of compromises. Tarek Razihi Bey denied that Turkey desired the abolition of the disarmament of the Danubian. The Japanese delegation insisted at Tokyo's desire to be released from the naval limitations of the Washington and London treaties. Taka himself said Iraq would never consent to the abolition of air-bombing "in unloading regions." Paul-Boncour insisted that disarmament was contingent on the very use of arms of security. Delegates yawned and packed their bags. On June 5 the General Commission adjourned to June 27.<sup>3</sup> Most of the principal delegations had already left Geneva. Henderson would postpone in preparation for a second reading of the draft convention.

A day before adjournment a strange document was signed in Room 1 of the Four-Power Pact of June 7, 1933—an "Agreement of Understanding and Co-operation" between Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. The project was Mussolini's, but in its final form it bore little resem-

stick to his initial scheme. If Duce hoped to pursue a useful diplomatic frontier with Hitler by championing German expansion, he was already championing Hungarian aspirations for many reasons. Legations, Romeans, and Czechoslovakians were staunchly opposed. France supported them with equal firmness. But, reasoned Mussolini, if France could be drawn into an arrangement with the other three Western Powers, this opposition might be circumvented. Here was the point of many plans as yet without the diplomatic policies of the U.S.S.R., the Rome-Berlin axis, the subordination of the Little Entente to Germany and Italy, the neutralization of Britain, and the neutralization of France. Of these things U Duce was perhaps not yet dreaming. But there were obvious advantages to Italy in a system of Four Power conferences in which France would be outvoted instead of enjoying the support of a solid bloc of small States as in the League Assembly.

Mussolini's first move was a bid for British support. On March 15, 1935, Britain received an invitation to come to Rome. On his arrival in the week arranged for by MacDonald, he was shown a draft agreement which U Duce had already committed to the Italian Ambassador in Britain and to M. Douet de Juvigny, the French Ambassador in Italy.<sup>1</sup> The draft stated that its purpose was the maintenance of peace "according to the spirit of the Kellogg Pact." It championed "the principle of the revision of the treaties of peace," a common policy with regard to European and colonial questions, and equality of rights for Germany. Simon and MacDonald suggested modifications to obtain French approval. Daladier, Paul-Boncour, and Juvigny were favorable, but Thérèse denounced the scheme in *Le Démocrate* of 1501 (April 1, 1935) as a project for a Four-Power directory to control the map of Europe to the detriment of the interests of France and her allies. The Little Entente and Poland were at once up in arms. The Little Entente Council at Geneva expressed its views on March 17: "Since nobody can dispose of anybody else's property, either directly or indirectly, the States of the Little Entente formulate the most explicit reserves with regard to the proposed conclusion of any agreement of the kind in respect of anything that touches their own rights or policy." Foreign Minister Titulescu of Rumania visited Paris and London; Foreign Minister Beck of Poland visited Prague, Helsinki, and Bucharest. Foreign Minister Doxa of Czechoslovakia visited Simon at Geneva and scoffed the Pact in the Czech parliament on April 25. "While discussing this question at Geneva

with Sir John Simon I was compelled to remind him that freedom of movement cannot be imposed upon any State and that anyone attempting anything of the sort with Czecho-Slovakia would bring to herself an army into her territory. We should know how to defend ourselves."<sup>10</sup>

The rock of these quarrels was the preparation of a French draft and a British draft.<sup>11</sup> The French project was accepted by the Little Entente, since it was completely orientated, but Wilson was still furious at any scheme which denied to Poland the status of a Great Power. The final text was a compromise between the Italian and French documents. All mention of colonial questions, territorial revision, and German arm equality was omitted. The Pact embodied specifically mentioned the League Covenant, the Pact of Paris, Locarno, and the "no force" declaration. The signatories agreed mainly (Article 1) to "work together" and "to pursue within the framework of the League of Nations policy of effective co-operation between all Powers with a view to the maintenance of peace." They further agreed (Article 2) to arrange between themselves "proposals to give effect to Articles 12, 18, and 19 of the Covenant." Article 12 entrusted the Assembly to "adopt the recommendations by members of the League of Nations which have become inapplicable."<sup>12</sup> But Article 13 guaranteed the territorial integrity and political independence of League members and Article 16 provided for economic and military sanctions against aggression. The Four Powers likewise agreed (Article 17) to work for the success of the Disarmament Conference and to discuss between themselves any questions left to be solved. They also declared (Article 4) that they would consult on economic questions. The Pact was concluded (Article 5) for ten years and was thereafter to run indefinitely subject to a right of termination on two years' notice.<sup>13</sup> The Pact was initiated at Rome on June 7 and formally signed on July 15 by Benito Mussolini and the Ambassadors at Rome of the other three parties: Henri de Jouvenot, Ulrich von Helldorf, and Sir Ronald W. Graham.

Germany, alas, had failed of its purpose. No longer was the agreement that Britain hesitated to sign, but a phone call from Mussolini to Hitler on June 7 brought German acceptance. The Quai d'Orsay regarded the document as wholly satisfactory. Simon agreed and rejoined that it involved no extension of British obligations in European affairs. Paris in effect reiterated French opposition to any action under Article 19 of the Covenant. London in effect reiterated

Bain's opposition to any action under Articles 16 and 16. Arnold J. Toynbee justly observed that the Four Power Pact then "had the initial and propitious result of welcoming, de facto, all those articles of the Covenant which the final text of the Pact reaffirmed."<sup>10</sup> On November 20, 1933, Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay indicated to Rome that they would not submit the Pact to their parliaments for ratification until Germany returned to the League.<sup>11</sup> The Fascist Grand Council resolved on December 5, 1933 that "the continued collaboration of Italy with the League of Nations shall be conditional upon the radical reform of the League in its constitution, objectives, and objectives within the shortest possible time."<sup>12</sup> As for the Pact itself, it was never ratified. But in intention if not in outcome it *did* do its infernal, frustration-filled thing to come.

Meanwhile another international congress had met in fertility and, unlike its counterpart in Geneva, had dissolved in haste. On June 27, 1932, in the Geological Museum in South Kensington, delegates of sixty-four States met under the chairmanship of Ramsey MacDonald in a World Economic Conference sponsored by Washington and London. The United States had insisted that war debts and tariff schedules must not be discussed. But the delegates met hopefully. Premier Deladier was a model of cheerfulness: "We have put an end to the inevitability of crises!" MacDonald was solemn but optimistic: "There we come as delegates and decide as though our respective nations were isolated units in the world. Then we shall fail, and a world which looks upon us today with expectation will have to drain the bitter cup of disappointment. . . . We must not fail."

On June 27, however, President Roosevelt rejected an Anglo-French-American agreement for currency stabilization which had been signed even days previously. Secretary Hall then proposed a general 10% tariff cut which Senator Norman denied that the American delegation had endorsed. The President sent Raymond Moley, Assistant Secretary of State, to make peace. Moley and Roosevelt refused to discuss currency stabilization. The States still on gold refused to discuss tariff reductions in the absence of agreement to halt further depreciation of the dollar and the pound. Ambassador Ivan Miskin of the USSR declared: "The whole work of the Conference has been deeply permeated by one fundamental mood, one optimistic adjustment." This optimism was realized on July 27.

By June 15, speculation an increasing contract was being. On June 16 Alfred Hugenberg, German Minister of Economics, presented a



memorandum at London (doubtless motivated by a desire to please Hitler) demanding the return of the German colonies and proposing that the Poles grant Germany a corridor to the sea, "economic freedom and creative growth" to "reconcile" Russia. Litvinov expressed surprise even at this "monstrous." The German delegation is repulsed in Hamburg and dismissed by Hitler ten days later. He had revealed the diplomatic objectives of the Third Reich.

Only one diplomat came away from London with something more in his brief-case than he had brought with him. Vladimir Litvinov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR. In consideration of his position, Georges Chicherin, who emerged from the unsuccessful economic conference at Geneva in 1932 with the Treaty of Rapallo, Litvinov negotiated new agreements at London with the signature of the Moscow Protocol of February 9, 1933, which had put the Pact of Paris into immediate effect between the USSR and its neighbors. He now proposed that they adopt the Pact's repudiation of 1932 liability agreements. All agreed save Finland, which was dubious, and Lithuania, which would sign no pact in which Poland was a party. Litvinov's ingenuity was equal to the occasion. On July 2, 1933, Afghanistan, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Rumania, and Turkey signed a convention with the Soviet Union adopting among themselves the definition of aggression noted above. On July 3 Lithuania and the USSR signed a bilateral convention to the same effect. On July 4 Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, Rumania, Turkey, and the USSR signed a third identical convention, in which Finland adhered on July 24.<sup>1</sup> Litvinov likewise passed the war at London for the signature on September 3 of an Italian-Soviet non-aggression pact and for the grant of diplomatic recognition to Moscow by the United States on November 27, 1933. Apart from these not inconsiderable achievements on the periphery, and a few agreements on wheat and silver, the London Economic Conference died without issue. The Geneva Disarmament Conference was likewise buried, but not yet dead.

### 5. DISARMAMENT + OCTOBER 14, 1933

On June 8, 1933, Premier Édouard Daladier, Captain Aristides Filon, the Marquis of Londonderry, and Mr. Norman Deth met in Paris. They discussed the possibilities of agreement on the abolition of "offensive" weapons and on the reduction of French armaments.

Deliberation and no conclusion was possible without additional guarantees of French security. The American and British friends offered no guarantees. The discussion was adjourned. Mr Henderson attempted to continue it with the delegates in London, but found them all too busy. On June 19 the General Conference of the Disarmament Conference, which had been in session since June 7, accepted a recommendation of Bureau that it adjourn until October 16. It asked Henderson to continue his efforts. Only Nadolet dissented and warned that the consequences of adjournment might be very serious. "Uncle Arthur" returned to Paris, Rome, Berlin, and Prague in mid-July. He met Hitler in Munich. Der Führer took no more kindly than did Mr. Delidier to Henderson's suggestion that the two men arrange a personal meeting. They were to meet for the first time five years later under conditions much more gratifying to the Nazi leader. Before the adjourned a new French suggestion for a preliminary period of international supervision of armaments, after which more disarmament might be attempted—providing that the system of supervision and enforcement proved adequate.

In September, Eden and Davis returned to the French capital and accepted the French plan for a preliminary testing period. Delidier promised to consider a substantial reduction of French armaments if the proposed system fulfilled French expectations. By the time of the 1938 League Assembly, which opened on September 27, the French, British, American, and Italian governments were in accord as to the desirability of a new period of three or four years during which there would be no reduction of existing armaments and no increase in German armaments. Each of these is now far off, if not divine—would be considered in the "several period." Neurath warned the foreign press in Berlin on September 17 that if the other Powers continued to evade their obligation to disarm, Germany would have the right and the duty to provide for the safety and security of its own people according to its own judgment and without any limitation or false scruples.<sup>1</sup>

Both Neurath and Delidier came to Geneva in September. The Propaganda Minister was verified, but the Foreign Minister held long discussions on the fringe of the Assembly with Paul-Boncour, Simon, Eden, Smith, and Davis. It is proposed that the transformation of the Reichswehr into a short-service army of 100,000 be permitted during the transitional production period and that the Reich be allowed to have "prototypes" of the weapons possessed by other Pow-

Bombard was doubtful. Simon and Edoué wanted definitions. The negotiations ended on September 22. Göttsch and Neurath returned to Berlin. Simon, Edoué, and Seisich left Geneva on the 20th.

On October 4, 1933 the German Ambassadors in Bonn and London (but not in Paris) presented notes in reply to requests for definitions of samples or prototypes.<sup>1</sup> Berlin herein expressed approval of the original British plan of a five-year period of preliminary disarmament, but rejected the French scheme for a probationary period. Germany must have equality forthwith. Germany was willing to abandon claims to any weapons which other Powers might possess. As for weapons not to be renounced but to be limited quantitatively, Germany must possess what others possessed with options to be decided upon later. As for weapons subject to further prohibition and limitation, Germany must have complete parity. Norman Davis at Geneva received a copy of this communication on October 7. Daladier, however, was apparently still in ignorance of it on October 8 when he addressed a congress of the Radical Socialist Party at Vichy and indicated that London, Washington, and Rome had agreed to a four-year trial period.

The Bureau of the Conference met at Geneva on the 9th. Henderson's report is a progress. The British Cabinet met simultaneously and agreed to support the French proposal despite Germany's rejection of it. Simon left London on the 10th and on the next day reached Geneva, where he conferred with the other delegates. On Thursday, October 12, Nideley discussed the issue inconclusively with Simon and returned to Berlin. Hindenburg's illness remained unpropitious so the German capital from Nuremberg. The German Cabinet met on Friday and apparently approved the course which Hitler proposed.

But Sir John must first have his say, although, all unknown to him, the Third British decision was already taken regardless of what he might say. The Bureau met on Saturday morning to hear the British Foreign Minister describe the results of the recent negotiation. He covered, with lawyer-like precision and complete disregard of reality, that the conversations had led him to "take the view that the draft convention which the United Kingdom Government put before the General Conference over six months ago, and which has been unanimously adopted as the general framework for the proposed agreement, will require to be in some aspects revised." The proposed five-year period must be extended to eight. At the end of eight years there will be "(a) a substantial measure of disarmament actually realized

and completed on the part of the newly armed Powers, and (b) the achievement of the principle of equality in a regime of security. . . . But in order to attain this it is necessary to proceed by steps. . . . The present unsettled state of Europe is a fact, and witnesses in drawing up their plan have to face the facts. The need therefore for modifying the draft convention so as to accomplish this purpose by a process of evolution is clearly established."

The proposed eight-year period would begin with the transformation of Continental armies into short-service militias and the establishment of an adequate system of supervision through a Permanent Disarmament Commission. "Without hesitating myself finally to the length of this first stage, I report that the period of four years was mentioned by several governments, though others have raised the question whether it could not be somewhat shortened." "But"—and the "but" was all:

This program involves a future which appears to me to be essential. I must state it with complete frankness to the Bureau—the scheme involves the principle that the Powers now under restriction of the Peace Treaties should not begin to increase their armaments forthwith but should express their willingness to conform to a timetable such as I have indicated. . . . By accepting the principle of no-immediate rearmament, and co-operating with the rest of us in forming a convention which is best calculated to restore the sense of confidence which had recently been so rudely shaken, the necessary conditions of success can be established."

Sir John sat down well pleased. Davis, Paul-Boncour, Scraggs, Boser, Polak, and others expressed approval. Freiherr von Kiderlen, Nideley's substitute, was non-committal. The meeting of the Bureau ended at 11:30. The noon papers in Berlin were already carrying screaming headlines. Hovesbrosch's of diplomatic thunder reached Geneva. By 3:00 p.m. Sunday, October 14, 1933, Henderson had received a telegram from Nieuwboer:

On behalf of the German Government I have the honor to make to you the following communication. In the light of the course which recent discussions of the Powers concerned have taken in the matter of disarmament, it is now clear that the Disarmament Conference will not fulfill what is its sole object: namely, general disarmament. It is also clear that this failure of

the Conference is due solely to unwillingness of the highly armed States to carry out their contractual obligations to disarm. This renders impossible the satisfaction of Germany's recognized claim to equality of rights, and the conditions on which the German Government agreed at the beginning of this year again to take part in the work of the Conference no longer exist. The German Government is accordingly compelled to leave the Disarmament Conference.

The same afternoon two manifestos were issued in Berlin—one in the name of the Reich Government<sup>11</sup> and one in the name of Hitler. Both announced Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations (final notice was received by the Secretary-General on October 11) as well as from the Disarmament Conference. Dr. Fischer's manifesto declared the Reichstag dissolved and ordered a new election and a referendum "to give the German people an opportunity of electing those deputies who, as correct representatives of this policy and of peace and honor, can give the nation a guarantee of an unswerving representation of its interests in this respect." In a long broadcast speech delivered early Sunday evening Hitler revealed his political genius at its best. He rallied the nation to his cause by an adroit appeal for national solidarity against foreign oppression. He defied the world in language well calculated to evoke the indignation of frustrated patriots. And he coupled his defiance with such adroit professions of peace and such plausible appeals for justice as to depict any disposition toward retaliation abroad.

It would be a great day for all humanity if these two nations [France and Germany] would branch, once and for all, down from their common life. The German people is ready to do so. While claiming boldly those rights which the nations themselves have given us, I will say as boldly that there are otherwise for Germany no grounds for territorial conflict. When the Saar territory has been restored to Germany, only a madman would consider the possibility of war between the two States, for which, from our point of view, there is no national or moral ground. . . .

If the world decides that all weapons are to be abolished, down to the last machine-gun, we are ready to join at once in such a convention. If the world decides that certain weapons are to be destroyed, we are ready to dispense with them immediately. But if the world grants to each nation certain weapons, we are not

prepared to let ourselves be excluded from this discussion as a nation with inferior rights. . . .

We have such intense love for our people that we desire wholeheartedly understanding with other nations, and when ever it is possible we shall try to attain it, but, as representatives of an immense nation and as men of honor, it is impossible for us to be members of institutions under conditions which are only bearable to those who are devoid of a sense of honor."<sup>1</sup>

Baron von Neurath told the foreign press on Monday that the British Government had repudiated its own plan of March. He ridiculed Lloyd George's proposal and asserted that the transformation of the Reichswehr from 100,000 trained men to 100,000 raw recruits would weaken the Reich. "It is pure mockery to explain this second disarmament of Germany by the catchword of no rearmament for Germany. . . . What grounds are given for this impossible plan? The alleged menace to European peace by new Germany. It is really difficult for me today to go objectively into this unprecedented accusation. What action has the new German Government taken from which anyone in the world could, even with any appearance of justice, infer to us unpeaceful intentions? Who will presume to doubt the peace declarations of our Chancellor Adolf Hitler, which are inspired by the greatest seriousness and the profoundest feeling of responsibility? They must be entirely convincing to everyone who values truth, and I will refrain today from adding a single word to them."<sup>2</sup>

"Friede und Gleichberechtigung"—"Peace and Equality of Rights"—became the slogan of the Nazi election campaign. No one noted that Nazi spokesmen had already declared for home conscription; that "equal rights" were nonsense and that Germany acknowledged no rights on the part of others.<sup>3</sup> Hindenburg decreed the referendum and Reichstag election for November 12.<sup>4</sup> He further decreed that the "banners of all accepted election lists must combine, together with the statement of the party, the names of the five or six candidates of each list."<sup>5</sup> There was of course only one "accepted" list—that of the NSDAP—since all other parties had been outlawed. On October 20 the form of the referendum ballot was disclosed.<sup>6</sup> It contained the text of the Government Manifesto of October 14 and posed the question: "Do you (Do) German men and you German women agree to this policy of your National Cabinet and are you willing to declare it to be the expression of your own opinion and will and to

expense is solely his!" On the green ballot two squares containing circles were captioned "Ja" and "Nein." The white Reichstag ballot had printed at the top "NSDAP (Hitlerbewegung)" and under it 10 names out of 666 candidates: Hitler, Bess, Frick, Goering, Goebbels, Katten, Darré, Selts, Papen, and (as a joke) Hugenberg, who had been dismissed from the Cabinet in June. To the right of the names was a square containing a single circle. Voters could either approve the list or invalidate their ballot. Millions of marks were spent in propaganda and demonstration, though there was of course no opposition. Unanimity was demanded: "We Will Not Be a People of Inferior Rights!" "Freedom and Bread in Honor and Peace!" "With Hitler for a Peace of Honor and Equality!" The climax came on November 10. Hitler appealed to the workers from the dynamo hall of the Siemens-Schuckert Electrical Works in Berlin after one minute of silence throughout the Reich. On Saturday evening, November 11, Hindenburg read the chorus with an appeal for support of the Cabinet.

On the sunny autumn Sunday of November 12 Germany voted. Almost all voters were inspired and misled by what they had seen and heard. The doctors had been warned that "No" votes might have grave consequences. The writer, then in Berlin, saw many suspects voting "Ja" publicly instead of in polling booths, rather than incur suspicion. Stenographers headed late voters to the polls. The result was gratifying: 41,093,616 or 91.5% of the qualified voters cast ballots. Of these 91.2% voted for the Nazi list while only 7.8% of the ballots were "invalid." On the referendum 43,421,373 or 96.5% of the electorate voted. Of these 93.2% voted "Ja" and only 4.9% voted "Nein"; 257,256 ballots were invalid.<sup>10</sup> Hitler and Goebbels harnessed perfected the technique of mobilizing unanimity. They used it frequently thereafter. On August 12, 1934, 88% of the German electorate approved Hitler's assumption of the powers of the Presidency.<sup>11</sup> On March 10, 1935, 98% of the voters elected a new "Reichstag of freedom and peace." On April 10, 1938, 99.06% of the electorate endorsed the invasion of Austria. Verily, "Germany is Adolf Hitler, and Adolf Hitler is Germany."

The repercussions abroad of the thunderbolt of October 12 corresponded to Hitler's expectations. In Brussels and France consternation and despair were expressed, but there was little demand for retribution. On October 17 Sir John Simon broadcast an address in refutation of Neurath's charges and asserted that "the object of British pol-

icy" was "not to arouse resentful feelings." On the same day Deladier declared that France was "deaf to no appeal, but blind to no aim. It was sincerely willing for understanding, why begin with repairs? If one wishes to respect obligations, why oppose the verification of undertakings?" In Rome there were expectations of official acknowledgment. At Geneva the Bureau met on October 16. Henderson proposed a reply to Neurath. Some delegations expressed opposition to the secrecy of the secret negotiations and to the fact that they were not consulted in drawing the reply. Henderson passionately pounded the table with his gavel and declared: "If there are no further objections, the telegram will be sent forthwith." <sup>10</sup> Poland, Turkey, and the USSR abstained from approval. The Bureau adjourned until October 16. The telegram expressed regret "that this grave decision should have been taken by your Government for reasons which I am unable to accept as valid." <sup>11</sup>

In the consultations which ensued, Italy favored a speedy termination of the Conference on the ground that all further discussion in the absence of Germany was fruitless. Simon, however, desired only an adjournment to give Berlin an opportunity to "reconsider." Norman Davis was of a like mind. But Deladier and Bonnet refused that there should be neither adjournment nor termination. The delegates should continue their labors, draw up a convention, and submit it to Germany for signature or rejection. This line of policy at Paris was not altered by a rapid succession of Cabinet changes in which Deladier was succeeded by Sarraut as Premier (October 17), Sarraut gave way to Chautemps (November 15), Chautemps was voted out in turn (January 17) and displaced by Deladier once more on January 30. Joseph Paul-Boncour remained Foreign Minister until Deladier assumed the post for the few unhappy days of his 1934 Premiership. The succession of Louis Barthou to the Quai d'Orsay on February 9, 1934, under Premier Gaston Doumergue, reflected an abrupt shift from Left to Right, but the new Minister also felt that the Disarmament Conference should neither yield to Nazi demands nor confer favors because of the German decision.

At Westminster the new situation was envisaged in terms of compromise and "taking facts." Said Sir John to Commons on November 7:

What we have to do is to see inside the mind of those in Germany—wherever we may think of what they have done—and try to understand why it is that they have exhibited this vehemence.



movement. . . . It is no good simply going back and saying that 'if people had done as well as this might not have happened. We must look at this thing as it is. . . . I do not wish to say anything that would make the resumption of the Disarmament Conference most difficult, but we must face the central fact as it is. The central political issue is how to reconcile Germany's demand for equality with France's desire about security. . . . We stand, as we believe the vast mass of our fellow countrymen stand, for international co-operation with a view to firmly establishing peace, and, at a time like this, when the international order set up since the war is in jeopardy, we declare ourselves, without any qualification, believers and upholders of the League of Nations as the best available instrument for international co-operation. . . . We shall not get out of our difficulties by crying isolation.

On November 24, 1933 Sir John was even more conciliatory toward the Third Reich: "Germany is not a target for discussion. She is a partner in discussion. . . . The adjournment of the Disarmament Conference does not mean the adjournment of work for disarmament. It means the very opposite. . . . We welcome the assurance of Herr Hitler that Germany's one desire is for peace and that she has no aggressive designs." MacDonald agreed in that the Conservative leader Stanley Baldwin, though the latter conceded that "the position is one of extreme difficulty, I think it is well that we should look at the facts." "Looking at the facts command us efforts to make new concessions to Berlin. Hitler was vindicated in his first application of *Staatsräson* toward diplomacy.

Under these circumstances the Disarmament Conference slowly approached its tedious demise. Everything was referred to committees—Geneva's traditional mode of evasion and delay. The Bureau adopted a report of a committee on November 22 recommending that unsolved questions be referred to other committees. Most of the delegates went home. Henderson threatened to resign unless the governments displayed more interest in the work. A faint echo of Sir Alfred Tennyson long ago reached Geneva: the date was the fifteenth anniversary of the Armistice: "In Flanders fields the poppies grow . . . If ye break with us who die We shall die deep, though poppies grow in Flanders fields."

But the diplomats did not believe in ghosts. They moved from futility to frustration. From November to April conferences and re-

passiers were exchanged between Berlin and Paris, with London and Rome conferring and consulting as consultants.<sup>24</sup> The Premier of Belgium, Camille de Broqueville, came dangerously close to the heart of the issue when he told the Belgian Senate on March 4, 1934 that no investigation of German treaty violation was possible, that the disarmament of Germany could be stopped only by a preventive war, and that no one would assume responsibility for such action.

It is certain that at least two of the Great Powers which have a permanent seat on the Council, Britain and Italy, will refuse to order an investigation. Under these conditions, Germany will refuse to permit it. . . . There remains only the second method: a preventive war. . . . To prevent the disarmament of Germany there is no other means than immediate war. For myself, I refuse to throw my country into such an adventure.<sup>25</sup>

The German military budget for 1934-5 was published on March 22—the last budget to be thus revealed. It provided for an increase of expenditures on armaments (forbidden to the Reich by the Treaty) from 38,000,000 marks in 1933-4 to 120,000,000 marks, with an increase in the Reichwehr strength from 344,000 men to 526,000 men. Anxious British inquiries at Berlin asked the Germans what the Treaty limited Germany arms, but not German expenditures for arms? A French note to London of April 17 asserted that Germany had destroyed the basis of negotiation. It called for the resumption of direct discussion and a resumption of the Conference where it had left off in Lausanne the preceding October.

Brown was distant but cheerful. "I do not believe," he told Congress on May 16, "that we ought at this stage to go to Geneva and start a new initiative." Even if the Conference broke down, this would not mean "the end of the world. On the contrary, on the very day that it happens we have all of us to start new efforts for the same purpose." On the 20th Mussolini announced that the Italian air force would be reorganized at a cost of a billion lire. Efforts at disarmament, he opined, could be "regarded as exhausted." In any event, "War is a phenomenon accompanying the development of humanity. . . . The fundamental virtues of man are revealed to the full light of the sun only in blood-stained struggles."<sup>26</sup>

Keynes and Lorraine met at Geneva on May 18 and found themselves of one mind. Steps should be taken to conclude an "Eastern Locarno." The Disarmament Conference should concentrate on at-

action as a means to strengthen collective security. Since he defined "A conference called for the purpose of disarmament could not be transformed into a conference for devising plans of security on the basis that no disarmament at all was possible." British isolationism was now pressing for an end of all Continental "entanglements." Sir John was for reopening negotiations with Berlin and conceding Germany's right to arms. Far better to do this than sacrifice "disarmament" as the means of security. Washington and the northern neutrals were sympathetic since they were equally reluctant to assume any new responsibilities. Barthou wased neutral. With the support of the Little and Balkan Ententes he reaffirmed the principle that all discussion of disarmament was useless in the absence of the organization of security. Lavisier proposed that the Conference transform itself into a permanent body to organize security.

In the acrimonious debate which followed, Henderson again threatened to resign after Barthou had opposed his suggestion, which Simon and Eden supported, for further French-German negotiations. On June 6, 1932 the Bureau and the General Commission, with Italy dissenting, adopted another formula which avoided the necessity of a choice: "The General Commission . . . invites the Bureau to seek . . . a solution of the outstanding problems, without prejudice to the previous conversations on which Governments will desire to meet in order to facilitate the attainment of final success by the return of Germany to the Conference . . . decides to appoint a special Committee to conduct such preliminary studies as it may consider appropriate in order to facilitate the conclusion of regional security agreements in Europe. . . ." <sup>14</sup> The issue was thus resolved by a formula which settled nothing.

The elaborate committee machine of the Disarmament Conference now slowed down and came to a crossing halt. At Henderson's call the Bureau met again on November 20, 1932. It agreed to abandon efforts at disarmament or security and to concentrate its attention on a draft convention to regulate the private manufacture of trade in arms which had emerged on July 2 from the appropriate committee. Hugh Wilson for the United States had before the Bureau a new draft amplifying the committee report and proposing a Permanent Disarmament Commission to supervise execution. The Bureau decided that this project should be examined by the Committee on the Miscellaneous Provisions of the Disarmament Convention, while other com-

members should discuss other parts of the American proposals. But all meetings were postponed.

The Committee for the Regulation of the Trade in, and Production and Stock Manufacture of, Armaments met February 14, 1933. It referred everything to other committees or subcommittees. The Committee on Miscellaneous Provisions met on February 28 and followed the pacifist example. The British delegation opposed the American plan in the name of "greater simplicity" and "a settlement with Germany." The Reich would oppose any Permanent Disarmament Commission with stubbornity to arrangements. Despite the fact that Downing Street had urged permanent and automatic supervision in an memorandum of January 29, 1934, London now opposed the plan, as did Italy, Japan, and Poland. The Commission ought to have power merely to call for explanations when violations were alleged. The proposals for publicity of violations also met with British opposition. Thanks to this obstructionism, no progress could be made even toward the limited objective of an agreement on the trade in arms. Germany openly repudiated the disarmament clauses of the treaty on March 16, 1933. None of the committees met during the second half of the year. On September 14 the United States closed the offices of an Geneva delegation and reduced the staff to one official. A fortnight later the Italian attack upon Ethiopia was launched. The Disarmament Conference was dead.

The diagnosis of the physicians was jaundice. Others spoke of heartbreak. But Arthur Henderson, now in the shadows, still had hope. He had been returned to Commons from Clay Cross in 1933. And in the summer of 1934 he had journeyed to Oslo for the award of the Nobel Peace Prize. But his illness grew worse in the following summer. An operation was performed in September. It was in vain. He died quietly at his home amid his family on the Sunday evening of October 10, 1935. On the same day Dr. Hans Lammers, Secretary of State in the Reich Chancellery, was quoted in Berlin as saying: "There is no need for a constitution. . . . One thing suffices in the National-socialist State—a firmest will, based on faith in the Führerprinzip and loyalty to *Der Führer*!" " On the same day Germany ceased to be a member of the League of Nations. And on the same day one League member reported "perdition" in its relations with another League member: "Italy's Southern Army, wearing a horridified enemy stronghold, was reported officially today to have wiped out among Ethiopian

*James is a brave fight last Friday at Daguerri in the Sciaweth region after the Webbe Shabeh River*"<sup>14</sup> As least "Uncle Arthur" as he lay dying in London could take comfort in the thought that at long last League sanctions were being imposed upon an aggression. Death spared him from knowing that the enterprise too would founder ignobly on the rocks of realism.

## *SWORDS OVER AUSTRIA*

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### 1. SCHIKLGRUBER VS. SCHMUTZ

Northeast of Salzburg, on the river which for centuries divided Bavaria from Austria, lies the little border town of Braunau-am-Inn, across from the German frontier village of Steinhilber. Aside from a railway span, a single bridge connects these communities, with customs officials stationed well recently at each end. The few thousand inhabitants of Braunau are gathered in their old houses about the Stock Place, which is embellished with a baroque Rathaus and fountain facing the Gothic church of St. Stephan—completed as no less a hero as the year in which Columbus first reached the West Indies. On the east side of the square is the Salzburg Quax Tower. Beyond the portal a street leads toward the Spital Kirche and the Palm Park. Midway down this street on the left-hand side is a former Austrian army barracks. Adjacent to it is a simple stone dwelling now housing the "Gasthaus des Josef Pormann." Prior to March 1938 this house was wholly inconspicuous, save for a tiny placard in a window of the small restaurant within. On the placard was inscribed:

In this house on April 26, 1889 was born the German Reichs-kanzler, Adolf Hitler.

Next door, before the barracks, stood a small metal cross and behind it a tablet:

To the memory of Dr. Engelbert Dollfuss, who in these barracks on November 4, 1932 concluded his active military service. On July 25, 1934 he was treacherously murdered in Vienna. The FATHERLAND REMEMBERS.

Those who perpetrated the murder were the followers of the man born in Bremen. He had written in *Mein Kampf*, page 17:

German Austria must again come back to the great German motherland, and this not at all because of any economic considerations. No, no, even if this reunion, from an economic point of view, were unnecessary, yes, even if it were harmful, it must none the less take place. The same blood belongs in a common Reich. The German Volk possesses no more right to colonial political activity so long as it is unable to join its own sons in a common State. Only when the Reich's frontiers include the last German, without the possibility of securing its food-supply, does there grow out of the need of its own Volk the moral right to occupy foreign earth and soil. The plow is then the reward, and out of the ruins of war grows daily bread for Germany. So this little frontier town seemed to me to be the symbol of a great task.

The merry-minded Austrian who wrote these words was the son of the disciplined son of Maria Anna Schützgraber. Maria married the father of her child when her little Alois was five years old, but her son kept his mother's name for another thirty-five years—until 1873. He then adopted that of his father: Hiedler, Händler, or Hader, variously spelled by various members of this almost illiterate peasant family. Alois Schützgraber (Hader) mended shoes and earned money. His first wife, fourteen years his senior, helped to secure him a job in the Austrian civil service. He became a customs official with uniforms, baton, and prestige. Six weeks after her death in 1873 Alois remarried, but his new wife died within the year. Thirteen months later, on January 7, 1875, he married a distant cousin, Klara Pöschl, twenty-three years his junior. She had been a maid in Alois's home during his first marriage. She had later gone to Vienna and then returned to her native village of Spital and married her old employer.

Alois had two children by his first wife, Alois Jr., who later became a waiter in Hamburg, where he died, and Angela, who married a Hans Raspl in Vienna and became a cook in a home for Jewish students. (Her younger half-Sister Adolf brought her subsequently to his Buchenburgerstrasse studio as his housekeeper. Her daughter Geli still is here with her new famous uncle and in the sequel committed suicide.) Alois Schützgraber's third wife, Klara, gave birth to Adolf in 1883 and to Paula in 1885. A second son, Edmund, died in childhood. For seven years Papa Alois lived with his family in Bremen and performed his

ducks at the bridge. In 1890 he entered on a pension and moved to Lorchdorf near Linz with his wife and boy.<sup>1</sup>

Three years after Adolf's birth another baby of even lessluder parentage was born in the tiny village of Tatzing in Lower Austria. The place was not far from the Danube to the south and the town of St. Pölten to the northwest. The mother was a smallish peasant girl who had caught the fancy of a young wood-cutter. Their child saw the light without benefit of clergy on the feast-day of St. Francis of Assisi, October 4, 1896. He was named Engelbert, after a named archbishop of Cologne. His mother's horrified parents made haste to find a husband for their erring daughter. The wood-cutter was gone or worthling or unacceptable—the story varies with the teller. A certain Herr Schwartz was agreeable. Within a year the wedding took place and the new family moved to the hamlet of Kersberg, where Uncle Engelbert presently had three half-brothers and a half-sister. Sophister Schwartz was hank. Engelbert never adopted his name, preferring to call himself Dullfuss after his mother's family.<sup>2</sup>

These two children never met, either as boys or as men. But the weird vicissitudes of life and politics were to make them bitter foes. The enmity between the bastard child of Tatzing and the son of the Secretary of Braunsau was to bring untold grief to Austria. Engelbert went to the village school at Kersberg and at the age of thirteen was sent by the Bishop of St. Pölten to the school at Hildesheim (1909-11). He was tiny in stature, whimsical, argylish, and above all pliant. For three months he studied for the priesthood and then abandoned it to go to the University of Vienna. His Catholic piety never left him in after life. "There was something faintly ecclesiastical in his manner. His cheeks had the pallor and delicacy of a novice. His eyes were mild and sad. His voice was low and timid. He suggested a very young priest of the Church, one of the boy cardinals of the Renaissance."<sup>3</sup>

Despite his distinctive size (he was less than five feet tall) the reputation of Herr Schwartz was accepted in the army in the autumn of 1914 and later became a commander of a machine-gun section. He served ably and without wounds on the Italian front and was demobilized until the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy in November 1918. He returned to the University of Vienna. A year later he was appointed secretary to the Kronenblatt. By discovery, Elfriede Sturm, took him to Eichen, where he pursued his studies and met Friedrich Abene Circle, whom he later married. After becoming director of the Lower Aus-



trian Chamber of Agriculture and President of the Federal Railways, his political advancement was rapid in the clerical Christian Social Party of Father Ignatz Seipel. This was the party of Karl Lueger, post-War Mayor of Vienna, from whom the young Hitler had imbibed much of his anti-Semitism. The party later lost its anti-Semitic complexion, though not its clericalism, which Hitler repudiated. In 1911 Dollfuss became Minister for Forestry and Agriculture. On May 20, 1912 he was asked by President Mädlar to assume the Chancellorship. He hesitated, for he was modest and shy. After spending the night in prayer in a little church in a poor quarter of Vienna, he accepted. Seipel on his sick-bed breathed more easily at the news. "Now Austria is in safe hands and I can die in peace."<sup>4</sup>

The son of Alois Schicklgruber had no such normal life, no such good fortune, and no such easy road to fame. Alois died at Leonding on January 3, 1890, and his widow, Klara, followed on December 12, 1897. Young Adolf had hated the indolent and much-married father who had opposed his son's dream of becoming an artist and instead that he become a Brewster-like pope. His mother he loved with a passion which he was never able to transfer to any other mortal woman. Under the influence of his teacher at Leu, Dr. Leopold Prosench, he transferred at length to a mythical Pan-German goddess—Germaria. Religiously he fixed his recommendations upon that which his father symbolized: the Habsburg monarchy with its motto of Czechs and Poles, South Slavs and Rumanians as the bringers of the German and Magyar communities. At seventeen he went to Vienna. He failed the entrance examinations to the art academy and was unable to enter a school of architecture because he had never completed his secondary education. He did odd jobs and borrowed schollings from his sponsor, sister, Paula. He was at length forced to become a building-trades helper. This son of the Klischgrubers, then reduced to a proletarian, rebelled at his poverty and degradation. He developed deep hatred toward workers, toward trade-union leaders, toward Social Democrats, and, above all, toward Jews. "Gradually I began to hate them. . . . I was transformed from a wealthy would-be citizen to a fanatic anti-Semite."<sup>5</sup>

At twenty Adolf Hitler was doing water-colors in Vienna. He was now "independent," but was still living in misery. He went to Munich in 1912. With the outbreak of war he joined the Bavarian forces with enthusiasm. There was release, adventure, and fulfillment of dreams. He fought on the Western Front and was wounded on the Somme.

He recovered, returned, fought again, won a corporalship and an Iron Cross and was gassed at Ypres in October 1918. When the débâcle came and once more destroyed all meaning in his life, he was consoling at Paderborn. Having tasted soldiering, he could not bear to return to civilian handiwork. He shunned women and had no friends. He stayed with his Munich regiment and lived through the Soviet regime of 1919. He became an agitator. On a June evening of 1919 he was made member No. 7 in the "German Labor Party," which was the nucleus of the NSDAP. He could not vote, for he was a citizen of Austria. He did not become naturalized as a German until 1931, when he challenged Hindenburg for the Presidency. But he had no interest in voting. His mission was to awaken other voters to the great task of "saving" Germany from the Jews, the Social Democrats, the Communists, the Liberals, the "World Citizens." The rest is history, in which the frustrations of a lost generation found final expression in the movement led by the reborn and embittered son of the austere official of Brunnau-am-Inn.

His Pan-German dream of uniting Austria with the Reich had little in common with the efforts of the German and Austrian Socialists to achieve a union of the two States in 1923 for democratic reasons, nor with the attempts of Catholic leaders in both countries a decade later to achieve *Anschluss* for ecclesiastical and economic reasons. Hitler's conception of *Anschluss* was rather a reversion to the early Middle Ages, when the German or the East Roman (*Österreich*) was a Germanic outpost against the Slavs. From the Slavs the land had been wrested by Karl der Grosse, King of the Franks and first Holy Roman Emperor. Against the Slavs it had been held. A Bavarian dynasty ruled it first and then the Babenbergers and, briefly, the Kings of Bohemia, until it passed to Rudolf of Habsburg in 1276 and so has been for the next seven centuries.

Hitler may have been, as some who asserted, Austria's revenge on Prussia for the Seven Weeks' War of 1866. But his vision of a Pan-Germanic "reunion" of Austria with Germany was historical nonsense. Prior to Bismarck's forcible inclusion of Austria from North German allies, many of the small German States were under Austrian domination. But Austria had never since the early Middle Ages been under the control of any German State. The Dual Monarchy of the Habsburgs was as much Hungarian as German after the Turks had been driven from the middle Danube in the late seventeenth century. The Bohemians or Czechs had already passed under Habsburg sway:

diggy, along with the Sudetenlanders who lived within their mountain walls. The South Slavic peoples passed under Habsburg control as the rule of the Germans rounded toward Asia. This polyglot nation fell in ruins in 1918. The pathetic fragment of "Austria" that was left was now indeed properly German in language. But culturally it was quite distinct from the Prussian north. It was solidly Catholic. It showed upon its face and in its spirit that it had survived far longer generations at the gruesome intermediary between Western civilization and the European wasteland during the long centuries when the West was in its antea-French.<sup>2</sup>

But the new Austria was an economic messianism. Germans and Austrians alike in the epoch of *disputa* about the Armistice desired to be one country. Such a country, however, would leave the debased Reich larger, more populous, and more powerful than the Kaiser's Empire of 1914 and would enable it to dominate Hungary and to threaten Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and even Rumania. Such a union was unthinkable to the strategists and diplomats of France and the Little Entente. The attempts of the Austrian and German contractors assembled to achieve union in February and March of 1919 were sternly vetoed by Article 23 of the Treaty of Saint Germain<sup>3</sup> and Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles.<sup>4</sup> A recognition of international law, granted on condition of non-alienation of independence, kept Austria alive in unhappy sovereignty. Brüning and Cuno in Berlin, Schober in Vienna, sought to effect a customs union in 1921, but this too was vetoed by the Quai d'Orsay and held illegal by the World Court.<sup>5</sup> A new international loan of 300,000,000 schillings was arranged for in July 1921, though not actually issued until August 1922. Here again French diplomacy insisted upon no Anschluss and a re-affirmation of the pledges of the Financial Protocol of October 4, 1921.

For over a decade the Quai d'Orsay and the Little Entente condemned Austria to a miserable independence embraced by any considerable portion of its people. When the Nazi revolution in the Reich boldly converted a large majority of Austrians to the cause of independence by converting Socialists and Catholics alike that *Anschluss* would now be disastrous, the Quai d'Orsay and the Little Entente were prevented with an opportunity of turning a fiasco into a reality and frustrating all Pan-German schemes on the Danube for an indefinite period. But they missed this opportunity and trusted the new Caesar in Rome to keep the Third Reich out of the *Querschnitt*—with

units that were ultimately to prove catastrophic.

For Hitler the issue of 1933 was one of finding means of bringing to power in Vienna the Austrian branch of the NSDAP and thus achieving effective union through the Party machine. The issue for Dollfus was not of finding means to destroy this game. Germany was large, Austria was small. The Austrian NSDAP, however, was negligible. It had won some seats, including fifteen in the Vienna Council, in the municipal elections of 1932, but had not elected a single deputy to parliament in the last national elections (1930). Despite subsidies from Munich, it made little progress. In January 1930 Hitler had appointed Alfred Fussenfeld leader of the Vienna Gau (district) and in July 1931 he had named Theo Haeckel Provincial Inspector of the NSDAP for Austria.<sup>12</sup> Following Nazi victory in Berlin the Party in Austria became a state within a state, controlled from abroad and striving for mastery of the realm. But its followers were few. With discipline and shrewdness its purposes might be frustrated despite support given it by the Third Reich.

The tragedy of Austria after 1933 lay in the inability of those charged with the burden of preserving its independence to come to terms with the only group in Austrian politics and the only class in Austrian society capable of standing as a solid barrier against Nazi aggression. Dollfus the peasant boy was too loyal to Property to lean upon the proletarians. Dollfus the Catholic was too loyal to the Church to collaborate with Social Democracy. Catholicism and Property called upon an indigenous clerical Fascism and upon Italian Fascism to defend Austria's independence against German Fascism. In scorn and fear of the Marxist workers the Dollfus regime outlawed democracy and entrusted its defense to Little Caesar at home and to Big Caesar at Rome. Under the pressure of these doubtful allies, Dollfus was subsequently compelled to outlaw Socialism as well as democracy. He and his sides themselves betrayed those without whose support against Berlin they meant themselves to be betrayed by Berlin. Austrian independence was betrayed by its defenders. Property and Catholicism were in the long run also undone. Here too Hitler was so kind that his enemies and victims could confidently be relied upon to corrupt their own destruction and rescue him from the most difficult necessities.

The Little Caesars here whose heads the mounted Engelbert delivered himself and his Government were leaders of a typical private militia, subsidized by industrialists and aristocrats and recruited from adventure-hungry peasant lads and gipsy's chicks. This militia-the

*Hilfsworte* or Home Guards—developed in the provinces in the middle 1920's to "combat Marxism" and "serve Austria." It employed the paraphernalia of Nazi brown shirts and Italian black shirts, but it lacked a single leader. The Vienna branch was headed by Major Ernst Foy. His chief rival for control was Prince Ernst Radlger von Starhemberg, who owed thirty-six counties and traced back his ancestry a thousand years to October 1. At the age of eighteen he had joined a dragoon regiment and served on the Russian and Italian fronts. Thereafter he became a military adventurer and patriotist who took part in the German-Polish conflict in Upper Silesia in 1920 and in Hitler's beer-hall coup of 1923. Like Hitler, he was full of contempt for liberalism and democracy and full of hatred for Marxists and Jews. But he broke with the NSDAP, sold out to Mussolini, and became an advocate of clerical Fascism. Seipel said of him in 1937: "An extremely serious young man, a man who embodies a patriarchal social program, a great hope of Austria."<sup>12</sup> In policy he was an irresponsible politician, a luxury-loving man, and a would-be petty despot. Like Franz von Papen, Starhemberg was destined to help bring his fatherland to ruin in the name of "saving" it.

After the strikes and civil disturbances of 1927 the Heimwehr became more than ever a useful agency of terror against the trade unions and the Social Democrats. It advised Seipel's efforts to disarm the private armies. Its "Kornberg Program" of 1930 demanded the suppression of political parties and the establishment of a Corporative State, to be controlled of course by the Heimwehr. In September 1930 Starhemberg was elected *Bundesführer*. He put up candidates for parliament under the name of the "Heimwehr" and won 8 seats, compared with the Social Democrats' 75 and the Christian Socials' 49. In May 1931 he yielded to the pressure of Foy and other firebrands and handed over his Heimwehr leadership to Dr. Waldemar Pfrimmer, who interpreted a panath in Syria. It failed ignominiously. Pfrimmer fled to Yugoslavia. Starhemberg was imprisoned for a few days.<sup>13</sup> But in the Austria, as in the German Republic, reactionary conspirators were always dealt with leniency in contrast to the treatment meted out to all movements of revolt from the Left. Starhemberg's constant query was "Austria must become Fascist sooner or later, so why not sooner?"

The Druffen Cabinet of May 20, 1931 included for the first time a member of the *Heimwehr*. It also included Dr. *Karl Wenzel*.

covered the Heimwehr. The Dollfuß Cabinet, with the Social Democrats in opposition, had a majority of only one vote in parliament, including the Christian Socials, the Heimwehren, and the "Landbund" group. Better to rely for support, thought the little Chancellor, upon the Fascist private army of Sturzenberg and Fey so long as they were strictly clerical and anti-Marxist, rather than upon the Social Democrats, who controlled the municipality of Vienna and 40% of the Austrian electorate. No matter that the Heimwehr had no popular following. It had the benediction of Mussolini and the Church and the blessing of the great families of money and title. Major Fey was taken into the Cabinet as Minister of Public Security in September 1932. His first act was to prohibit all political demonstrations by Nazis, Social Democrats, and Communists. As Nazi outrages multiplied after January 1933, Dollfuß found the form of political democracy ever more illusive and the support of the Heimwehr increasingly indispensable.

Parliamentary government in Austria died in March 1933. On the 4th day of the month a Socialist motion against the Cabinet's proposal to punish the workers in a recent railway strike was carried by one vote. When the Chancellor's supporters refused to accept the result on the ground of a minor irregularity in procedure, the President and two Vice-Presidents of the legislature resigned, thereby suspending the assembly. Dollfuß then suppressed parliament with the approval of the Heimwehr and of his own Christian Social Party. After "emergency" and immediate reappointment, he received authority from President Miklas to rule by emergency decrees. A ramp meeting of parliament on March 19 was ordered. Dollfuß was deposed. In a broadcast from Munich Dr. Frank, the Bavarian Minister of Justice, warned that if Vienna persisted in rejecting the Austrian Nazis, their German comrades might be obliged to protect them. Protesters at such threats elicited no apologies from Berlin. In April, after the Nazis had won 9 out of 20 seats in the Innsbruck municipal election, Dollfuß prohibited all elections, ordered Heimwehr men as "auxiliary police," and launched a great campaign for membership in the *Faustlandische Front* (VF).

This somewhat artificial creation was designed to mobilize mass support for the anti-Nazi and anti-Marxist dictatorship which Dollfuß had established. Austria might still tolerate political parties, but the VF would be above parties and might become the basis, if necessary, of a one party State. Following Seque's inspiration, Dollfuß made the

captured even the symbol of the movement. Unlike the hooked cross of Hitler, it was Christian in origin, having been employed by Theodoric, by the Crusaders' Kingdom of Jerusalem and by the Knights of the Holy Sepulchre. The VF also had badges, buttons, parades, banners (red-white-red), and a variety of all-embracing activities on the unitarian model.<sup>12</sup> Under pressure many Austrians joined.

But the VF was never an effective mass organization. Dollfus's greatest political asset was his own personality. He was genial and charming. His quietly subversive demagoguery was easily colored even by its enemies, at least in its greater moods. He combined exuberance and efficiency in equal proportions. His dwarfish figure helped to make him beloved. Endless jokes about his size added to his political success rather than diminished it. "The Chancellor has broken his leg falling off a ladder while picking strawberries." "Dollfus is so wounded he goes up and down under his bed all night." "At Geneva he got hold of everything he wanted except the doorknob." "Have you heard? Dollfus is to be on a new postage stamp—life size!"<sup>13</sup>

The late Chancellor in his battle with Hitler always walked on the edge of the precipice and always (until the end) kept his balance. Early in May 1933, following rumors of a Nazi purge, the Cabinet forbade the wearing of all political uniforms except by the Heimwehr. On May 13 Dr. Frank, accompanied by Dr. Kaul, the Reich Minister of Justice, arrived uninvited in Vienna to attend a Nazi demonstration planned to challenge a Heimwehr parade. He was allowed to address a meeting, attended by the German Minister, Dr. Raith, but was warned to avoid "political" subjects—as if any subject could be unpolitical to a Nazi! A hundred or so Nazis were arrested. Frank and Kaul declared in Gern that Berlin would order reparation for this "affront" to Germany. Thereupon the Austrian Minister informed Wilhelmstrasse that Frank would be expelled if he did not depart at once. He left, but the German Government now imposed a fine of 1,000 marks, effective June 1, on all Germans going to Austria to "prevent unpleasantness" arising from forbidden Nazi uniforms on German backs. The actual purpose was to ruin the Austrian tourist traffic and thus bring Dollfus to terms.

This blow was followed by a Nazi campaign of terror in Austria which led to the formal suppression of the Austrian NSDAP. On June 11 Dr. Seidler of the Tyrol Heimwehr was wounded by Nazi bullets. Bombing outrages took place all over the land.<sup>14</sup> Berlin

earned Habicht a press attack of the German legation in Vienna to give him diplomatic immunity. He was nevertheless arrested and deported to the Reich. Berka attained on June 13 by swimming and expelling the Austrian press attack. On June 19, 1933 Fey phoned Dollfus, then in London for the Economic Conference, that he had ordered the dissolution of the Nazi Party after a bomb attack on the Hubscher police at Krems. The Austrian Nazis, who now were "underground" and armed themselves by cutting phone wires and putting switches on telephones and buildings, transferred their headquarters to Munich. On July 5 Habicht initiated a long series of broadcasts from the Austrian capital:

The prohibition of the German National Socialist movement in Austria by the Dollfus Government was a stab in the back and in its consequences, both political and economic, a crime not only against the future of Austria but against the whole German people. . . . Let us take up the struggle which the Dollfus Government has thrust upon us and carry it through, ruthlessly and relentlessly, to victory. With us are a thousand years of German history, behind us stands the whole German people, but before us lie, in our goal, the liberation of Austria and the establishment of the German nation. Long live Adolf Hitler, long live the greater Germany! "

Neither Austrian protests nor the representations of the Powers stopped these broadcasts, for they were an integral part of the new Nazi technique of provoking civil war and intervention against foreign governments. No less than 84 such broadcasts were made between July 5, 1933 and February 19, 1934. Habicht delivered 21. German aircraft occasionally crossed the frontier to drop leaflets on Austrian towns, abusing Dollfus and summoning the inhabitants to revolt. On German soil an "Austrian Legion" of Nazi refugees was formed and trained in the arts of insurrection. In November 1933 an auxiliary "Kampfbrigade" of Austrians in Germany was established. Vienna's Minister, Herr Tauschitz, protested repeatedly, but was told that encouragement to such groups could not be regarded as contrary to international law when they were designed to promote Communist revolutions in other States. These and other activities "convinced the Austrian Chancellor that he must reckon with a determined Nazi effort, fully supported from Berlin, to destroy his regime and his State. In an interview in London he asserted



What I have to contend with is the possibility of an uncontrolled invasion of Austria by the German Nazis. I am determined to take all measures at my command to prevent such a situation, and I have good ground for believing that I have the sympathy of other countries, both of governments and of public opinion. An independent Austria is the best safeguard for peace in Europe."<sup>17</sup>

Dollfus's efforts to secure support abroad were not unsuccessful, though Paul-Boncour told the Chamber in May with apparent equanimity that the French transfer of the Austrian loan had been deferred and it was clear that Dollfus could maintain the independence of his country. The Chancellor secured a "good press" in London, Moscow, and by the end of June both the British and French governments were prepared to give moral and financial support to Vienna.<sup>18</sup> But they opposed all suggestions that Austria should appeal to the League of Nations against Germany. Dollfus looked to his friend and patron, Mussolini, whom he had visited in Rome at Easter.<sup>19</sup> Il Duce desired neither any action at Geneva nor any joint démarche by the Powers. He made friendly representations at Berlin in late July. Wilhelmstrasse disclaimed responsibility for terrorism, but asserted that it would do all in its power to halt the radio and aerial propaganda. On August 7 British and French representatives at Berlin called attention to Article 10 of the Treaty of Versailles and to the recently signed Four-Power Pact. Herz von Bismarck denied any infraction of the treaty, questioned the applicability of the pact, and rejected any foreign "intervention." The Munich headlines continued:

Austria's "Mittelmeerpolitik" sought safety by a reticent policy of negotiations, concessions, and appeals for foreign aid. In mid-August he spent some days with Mussolini at Il Duce's villa at Roccamare on the Adriatic, bathing, boating, and recreating and securing new assurances of Italian support against the specious—always haunting to Rome—of Germany at the Brenner Pass.<sup>20</sup> At the end of the month he obtained the consent of the Powers for the maintenance (contrary to the restrictions of St. Germain) of a special military corps to a two-year service both to continue an army reserve. At the end of September concentration camps were established in Austria. On the afternoon of October 2, 1933, in the vestibule of the parliament building, Dollfus was shot by one Darré, a swaggle Heimwehr man who had turned Nazi. One bullet wounded him in the arm, another glanced off

his case. His devoted Catholic primary was broken. On his recovery he gave thanks in St. Stephen's for his "miraculous" escape. A decree of November 20 proclaimed martial law to permit the restoration of the death penalty for murder, arson, and public violence.

At the same time reconciliation was sought. Dr. Winkler of the Landtag, Vice-Chancellor from May 1902 until September 1903, always urged a "settlement" with Berlin. Dr. Anton Raudens was of a like mind. Dollfuß admitted that he had twice received Habicht before his expedition, but had rejected his proposals for a coalition of Nazis and Christian Socials which would hold elections but remain in power regardless of their outcome. In a broadcast of September 20 Habicht demanded that the rights of the NSDAP in Austria be restored, that it be granted representation in the Cabinet, and that new elections be held at once. Two days later Dr. Raith, the German Minister, approached Dollfuß for an "understanding." The Chancellor admitted that he could not permit the existence of a party which took orders from abroad, but was disposed to consider a settlement on the basis of the cessation of all uniformly seen by the Reich and a clear recognition of Austria's right to independence. On October 31, 1903 Kurt Schenck-Schaffg, Minister of Education, secretly travelled to Munich at Dollfuß' request and conferred with Rudolf Hess and Heinrich Hammer. Habicht knew of the appointment, but Hitler did not. It was inconclusive.<sup>21</sup> On December 15 Frick told Tauschitz in Berlin that Germany would carry through its struggle to the end, but advised Dollfuß to negotiate with Habicht once more. Two days after Christmas Dollfuß instructed Tauschitz to see Neurath:

In the meantime, it has been urged upon the Austrian Chancellor by another extreme party in touch with Herr Habicht in attempt a solution by a direct conversation between the Austrian Chancellor and Herr Habicht. It has been suggested that Herr Habicht travel to Austria for the purpose of the conversation.<sup>22</sup>

Tauschitz's instructions went on to say that Dollfuß was prepared to meet Habicht again, but only if Habicht made the request with Hitler's approval. In this event he would be granted safe conduct to Vienna and back, provided he travelled incognito and refrained from propaganda.<sup>23</sup> On New Year's Day of 1904 Tauschitz saw the German Foreign Minister and received assurance of Hitler's approval of the plan on condition that Habicht visit Vienna after the projected

ship of Felice Savio, Italian Undersecretary of State. Four days later Habicht secretly received his safe conduct for an air trip to the Austrian capital. The date was fixed for January 8. But at the last moment, while Habicht was already over Austrian territory, Dollfus cancelled the engagement—allegedly because of new Nazi outrages, possibly because of Italian pressure. Habicht returned empty-handed to Munich, but his friend Erpinger, Justice near Waldack-Pyrmont of the German Foreign Office lodged in Vienna.

A "tip" to the Austrian police led to a raid on the apartment of Frauenfeld, former head of the Austrian Nazis, at 1.00 a.m. January 12. The raiders found Frauenfeld in conference with Waldack-Pyrmont and, even more alarming, with Count Althaus, leader of the Lower Austrian Heimwehr. Waldack-Pyrmont had a photograph of Habicht's ultra-secret safe conduct. When the police took it from him he boasted that many duplicates were available. He was conducted to the German legation and left the country later in the day. Tauschke protested in Berlin at this breach of faith. A new protest of January 17, accompanied by a threat to appeal to the League, brought no satisfaction but merely a sweeping denial of all charges.

Who says with the devil must use a long spoon. Dollfus was perhaps beginning to suspect that the Heimwehr devil was no more trustworthy than the Nazi devil. The gang-leaders of the new Christians, whether big or little, are not gentlemen of honor. But with respect to the Heimwehr at least, Dollfus was no longer able to cut the tails in which he was entangled.

Reverend suggestions to Paris, London, and Rome regarding the necessity of an appeal to the League against Berlin brought approval from the French capital and also from Prague. But Mussolini was still opposed and Downing Street was doubtful. Eden dined in Coetmore on January 30, 1934 that the British Cabinet had sought to discourage such a move, but it gave Dollfus no encouragement. As an alternative Dollfus on January 8 presented to the foreign offices of the three Western Powers the dossier on Nazi activities which he had prepared for Geneva. Protracted negotiations followed. Downing Street agreed (February 2) that the preservation of Austria's independence and integrity was an object of British policy, but since the Foreign Office had already said this and since it had no intention of doing anything beyond verbalizing, there seemed to be no occasion for further steps.<sup>10</sup> Finally, however, even London seemed to a Three-Power Declaration to this effect, but only on condition that it contain no new

commitments and be as innocuous in phrasing as possible. On February 17, 1938 the British Foreign Office issued a statement:

The French, Italian and United Kingdom Governments agreed tonight on the following communiqué.

"The Austrian Government has requested of the governments of France, Great Britain and Italy to do their utmost with regard to a dossier which is prepared with a view of establishing German interference in the internal affairs of Austria and communicating to them.

"The conversations which have taken place between the three governments on this subject have shown that they take a common view as to the necessity of maintaining Austria's independence and integrity in accordance with the relevant treaties."

It will be recalled that the Ministry's Government already has made its own position clear in an anti-Communist broadcast the Austrian Minister in London February 9 in connection with the dossier regarding Nazi activities in Austria referred to in the above statement.<sup>20</sup>

But Vienna by this time was already plunged into bloodshed.

## 1. MASSACRE IN FEBRUARY

September of 1933 was a golden month in *Alt Wien*. It was the 900th anniversary of the completion of the tall and slender spire of St. Stephen's Cathedral. It was also the 1500th anniversary of the raising of the siege of Vienna in the hands of the Turkish armies of Mohamet IV. Christendom still preserved some vestiges of unity in 1833. The Catholic defenders were commanded by Duke Charles of Lorraine, Margrave Ludwig Wilhelm of Baden, King John Schiesli of Poland, and Count Ernst Rudiger von Saxe-Hamburg, successor of the Last Czar who now commanded the Habsburgs. On so great an occasion as this the Catholic hierarchy and the Cabinet were agreed as to the most fitting form of celebration. A "General German Catholic Congress," the second of its kind, would be held in the capital. The German thousand-mark was for unfortunately kept away most of the visitors from the Reich and thus depleted the Congress of an all-German character. But many clergymen and laymen came from German possessions in Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, Hungary, Rumania, and elsewhere. From the Austrian provinces anxious people poured in to attend the ceremonies.

The significance of the festival was as much political as religious. It was designed to consolidate the regime on a popular basis of clerical

Fascism. Dollfus addressed the Congress on September 9 and two days later spoke to the first general assembly of the Fatherland Front (VF). The Cardinal-Archbishop of Vienna, Theodor Innitzer, a Jesuitminister who had been Rector of the University and Minister of Public Welfare under Schober, was enthusiastic over the new order. Dr. Richard Schatta, the courtly Minister of Public Welfare under Seipel and now again under Dollfus, took a leading part.<sup>17</sup>

Not least imposing among the speakers, though never brilliant in oratory, was Dollfus's new Minister of Education, who had been Minister of Justice under Bausek. Dr. Kurt Schuschnigg, born in 1891 at Riva on Lake Garda, then the garrison town of his paternal-father, and educated in the Jesuit school at Feldkirch. He had studied law at the University of Innsbruck and spent a year in an Italian military prison camp after the close of the war. Like Dollfus he entered politics as a protégé of Seipel. Like Dollfus he championed the "Christian Corporative State" which was to be based on the principles of the Papal Encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno* of May 29, 1931, in which Pius XI had denounced both socialism and plutocracy. At the coronation Schuschnigg spoke on the mission of Austria in the Christian Order. "German law and German culture combined with a sense of Catholic responsibility should guide our fatherland along its difficult and laborious path."<sup>18</sup>

Over against this stood modern, Dargun massless conversions to the exciting faith of "National-socialism," most of the peasantry, much of the greater and lesser bourgeoisie, and almost all the aristocracy and the elite of Church and State found the Fascist declaration of Dollfus acceptable, for it served both their prejudices and their interests. But the urban working classes would have none of it. Many a wage-earner was willing enough to go to Mass on Sunday—and to be a non-believing Marxist materialist the balance of the week. Christianity was no less anathema to the Social Democratic masses than was Italian Fascism or Hitlerism. They had established the Republic. They had organized their own armed forces, the *Schutzbund*, to protect their Republic against reaction. They had built their trade unions and their party organization. In the proletarian suburbs of "Red" Vienna they had erected the largest, most comfortable, and most attractive workers' apartment buildings in the world—built by the Social Democratic city authorities, financed by high taxes on the rich, and rented to low-rented workers. They were not revolutionaries, save in abstract principle, for they had too large a stake in an

established order which left them free to do these things. But they had earned the better houses of the priesthood, the nobility, and the plutocracy and of many in the lower orders who followed greed, respected nobles, and considered placemen. Against this hatred they were prepared to defend their hard-won gains. Dollfuss had deprived them of political democracy. They were determined not to be deprived of their unions, their cultural organizations, their municipal enterprises.

Dollfuss found himself pushed by the Heimwehr also over more severe measures against Austrian Social Democracy. At Stuebenberg's demand the Cabinet ordered the dissolution of the *Schutzband* on March 31, 1933, on the ground that it was plotting violence against the Government May Day demonstrations were forbidden. The alleged discovery of a "Communist plot" led to the arrest of several hundred persons and the suppression of the insignificant Communist Party some weeks before the NSDAP was banned. Nevertheless the Social Democratic leaders, Otto Bauer, Julius Deutsch, and their colleagues, offered Dollfuss support if he would restore some semblance of parliamentary government. A Socialist petition making this demand secured over a million signatures in the spring of 1933. Fearing that acceptance would drive the Heimwehr and the Right Wing of the Christian Socials into the arms of the Nazis, the Chancellor refused, though the party thus offering him support was the largest in the land, with 1,400,000 regular members—far more than his own VF. He declared that the Nazis could not be fought with Socialist help. The Cabinet would not collaborate with Marxist extremism. A new Constitution was necessary.<sup>28</sup>

By September the Heimwehr was openly at odds with Dr. Winkler and with the relatively democratic Landshut. It demanded the suppression of the Social Democrats. Dollfuss reorganized his Cabinet on September 21, 1933, dropping Winkler and the Landshut Ministers as well as Vengels, Minister of Defense and Chairman of the Christian Social Party. Emil Fey, Heimwehr leader in Vienna, became Vice-Chancellor. A week later Stuebenberg announced that the Heimwehr would join the VF en masse and dissolve the *Heimabteilung*. On October 11 Dollfuss made Stuebenberg his deputy leader in the VF.

Despite these obvious developments the Social Democratic leaders still hoped for an agreement. Dollfuss seemed conciliatory. In a speech of January 24, 1934, he declared himself ready to give the Socialists a place among the ranks of the defenders of Austrian inde-

provision. Shortly thereafter the Socialist leaders decided to offer their co-operation once more on condition of a popular referendum on the proposed new Constitution, free elections to the new "corporations," and recognition of the rights of organizations and collective bargaining. But Felix Slavik visited Vienna, January 18-20. It is probable that he brought word from Menzies that the Socialist Party must go. At any rate the Heimwehr leaders now intervened. On January 22 Seufsböck hinted at a deal with the Nazis. On January 29 the Tyrol Heimwehr mobilized and forced the Governor to yield to their demand for military (i.e. Heimwehr) rule in the province. Similar steps were taken in Upper Austria (February 6), Styria and the Burgenland (February 7), and Lower Austria (February 8). Dollfuss visited Budapest on February 7 and 8. On his return on the 9th he received the Heimwehr leaders, but no announcement was made of the results of this crucial conference.

Fey, however, now felt free to proceed. Taking a lead from the Nazi book, he ordered raids on all Socialist headquarters during the first week of February and announced the discovery of a "Baldern-Maxim plot." On February 10 he deprived Mayor Karl Selz of Vienna of his authority over public safety. On Sunday February 12 he addressed a Heimwehr parade. "During the last few days I have made certain that Chancellor Dollfuss is a man of the Heimwehr. Tomorrow we shall start to make a clean job of things in Austria." Fey further announced that bombs and machine-guns had been discovered in Socialist headquarters and that the raid on the *Arbeiter Zeitung* on February 8 revealed evidence of a Red conspiracy. He accused many leaders of the suppressed Schutzbund, while the Heimwehr press shrieked: "The enemy is on the Left!"; "Merceless efficiency against Reds!"

On Sunday evening the arch-"plotter," Otto Bauer, was attending the movies with his family and enjoying Gross Garbo in *Queen of Mobs*. When he returned home he received a message from Hirt Bernasch, the Socialist leader in Linz, that the local party was organizing a Heimwehr attack on its headquarters the following morning and was prepared to resist. Bauer advised caution. Early Monday morning, February 22, 1934, the Heimwehr sought to attack the Linz headquarters for arms and was denied admittance. With military reinforcements it stormed and took the building after heavy fighting. When the news reached Vienna, about 8:30 a.m., the executive committee of the Social Democratic Party and the trade unions met to decide what to do.

Councils were divided. Bauer still hoped for a compromise. By a margin of one vote a general strike was decided upon for 5.00 p.m. But, by some misunderstanding or sudden inspiration of rage, the electrical workers struck at once and thereby stopped the passing of the *Arbeiter Zeitung*, which were to print the strike notices. The call never went out. While Bauer and Deutsch sought in vain to reach the Chancellor, Dollfuß was attending Mass at St. Stephen's. In the midst of his devotions all the lights went out and all the street cars outside stopped in their tracks. This obviously was the signal for the general strike and for the "Red revolt".

The *Hilfswache* machines, with the full approval of Dollfuß, now went into action. Most of the Socialist leaders with the exception of Deutsch and Bauer were arrested as they sought to plead with Múller and other officials. The general strike never materialized because the necessary orders were never sent out or were intercepted. Without orders from their leaders the well-disciplined Austrian workers would do nothing. The *Schutzbund* members in their municipal apartments armed themselves which never came while *Hilfswache* gangs moved against them with the support of police and troops. Some of the workers forced the iron-long blades away for just such an emergency. Others dug for hours in basements and courtyards and never found them because those who know where they were had been arrested. The attackers looted the huge blocks of apartments from one another—the Goethe Hof, the Engels Hof, the Karl Marx Hof, and others—and besieged them separately with rifles, machine-guns, and heavy artillery.

During Monday night, Tuesday, Wednesday, and part of Thursday the fiercest battle went on. Bullets whistled through the kindergartens and kitchens of the buildings which Dollfuß described as "barricades." Shells tore huge holes in the walls. The Cabinet declared at once that the Socialists were planning a revolt for the 15th. The Vienna Rathaus was seized by the *Hilfswache*, which ran its green-and-white flag up over the tower. On Monday evening the Cabinet proclaimed martial law and decreed the dissolution of the Social Democratic Party, the Socialist unions, and all affiliated societies and clubs. An hour before midnight Dollfuß declared in a radio broadcast that the Socialists were "tyrants who must be hunted out of the country." Scharnhorstberg saw 40 bodies laid out at the Goethe Hof and cried: "Far too few shot!" Official reports placed the Government casualties at 100 killed and 300 wounded and the Socialist losses at 100 killed



and 400 wounded. But the *Schutzbund* estimated that 1,500 of their members had been slain by Tuesday evening. Dollfus took tea with the Pope Nuncio on Tuesday afternoon during the heaviest fighting. Late Wednesday night in another radio broadcast he pleaded and threatened: "For God's sake, let misguided men at last realize that all resistance is in vain. . . . All those who from now on enter all resistance and surrender to us between 7-30 a.m. and noon tomorrow can count on an amnesty. But the responsible leaders are excluded. After midday there will be no quarter given to anyone!"<sup>40</sup>

By the end of the week all was over save the punishment of the peasants. In Graz, Styria, Linz, and other centers Social Democracy was drowned in blood as it had been in the capital. On the afternoon of Wednesday the 17th, Otto Bauer, Julian Deutsch (badly wounded), and thousands of refugees fled into Czechoslovakia at Brno. In a new broadcast from Munich the same evening Theo Hahndel advanced a novel theory of the Marxist spring: "Bolshevik revolutionaries equipped with French trench helmets, Czechoslovak rifles, and Russian armamentaries opened fire on the troops. . . . But the fighters on both sides—whether they realized it or not—are but legions of Foreign Power."

In London Prime Minister MacDonald interceded with Baron Georg Franchetti, the Austrian Minister, on behalf of the arrested Socialist leaders. The British Minister, Sir Walford Selby, was instructed to do likewise at Vienna. On February 17, while Britain, France, and Italy renewed their championship of Austrian "independence," Dollfus declared that the week was the saddest of his life. He avowed that the Socialists had planned the "rebellion" for years in their secret "Journées." "We are not slackers. We did the utmost to spare lives. . . . It was a small but extraordinarily well-armed minority that took up arms against the Government. . . . I hope the blood shed here in our land will bring people to their senses. . . . We are Christian and humane enough to do the utmost to see that the worker gets his rights." In a broadcast to Austria the same evening he insisted again that "a small group of fanatics" had attacked the State and society. Eight death sentences were imposed and hundreds were sentenced to imprisonment for varying terms. Koloman Wallech, Socialist Mayor of Bruck-an-der-Mur, had earned the hatred of the authorities by exposing the Hohenberg arms scandal and revealing in 1933 that Italy was illegally smuggling arms into Hungary through Austria. He now fled vengeance, but was caught near the

frontier. He was tried in Leoben and hanged at midnight on February 19 in the brightly lighted courtyard of the local prison with other Socialist captives looking on from their cells. As he shouted, "Bu lebe die Sozial Demokratie, lebe! Freiheit!" hangman Spanner from Vienna pulled him up from the platform while the hangman's two assistants clasp to his legs until he lost consciousness.<sup>22</sup>

Thus the Heimwehr saved the *Österreich* from the "Red menace," and Dollfuß gave his blessing to the destruction of the only mass movement in Austria capable of saving the land from conquest by the Nazis. The February tragedy made the Chancellor more than ever the promoter of Fey and Strohendorp and the henchman of Mussolini. On March 17, 1934 these protocols were signed in Rome by Il Duce, Dollfuß, and János Gömbös, Premier of Hungary. The first of these instruments pledged the parties to confer and consult on common problems with a view toward pursuing a "concordant policy directed toward the promotion of effective co-operation." The second protocol obligated them to conclude new bilateral agreements for the promotion of trade. The third, directed to Austria and Italy, contemplated preferential treatment for Austrian exports to Italy.<sup>23</sup> On May 14 a number of bilateral accords were signed between the three members of the new "Italian bloc." These and subsequent agreements granted favors to Austrian exports in the Hungarian and Italian markets and enlarged the market for Hungarian grain in Italy.

This partial (and, as it proved, temporary) solution of the Austrian economic dilemma was of more political than commercial significance. Mussolini here took advantage of Austria's dependence upon outside defenders and capitalized upon the failure of France and the Little Entente to do anything effective toward Austria's interests. Gömbös's alliance with Hitler began in June of 1933, but he perceived more advantages for the present in a deal with Rome. In September 1933 an Italian memorandum on Danubian economic reconstruction, based upon the conclusions of a conference at Sucea a year previously, elicited the approbation of the Little Entente, but led to no action. Prague, Belgrade, and Bucharest were ever suspicious of Italian motives in view of Mussolini's championship of Hungarian independence. The Rome Protocols confirmed their suspicions. Il Duce was clearly attempting to convert Hungary and Austria into satellites of Italy. The ultimate implications of such a bloc boded no good for France and her Danubian allies. But the immediate result was to build an effective bulwark against any Nazi assault on Austria, and this was pro-

renowned good at Paris, Prague, and London no less than at Vienna and Rome.

On May 1, 1934 the Austrian Cabinet decreed a new Constitution.<sup>22</sup> Christian Fackler here came fully into his own. Simultaneously Foy assumed the post of Minister of Public Security while Secherreberg was elevated to the Vice-Chancellorship. Otto Neurath von Steuritz, Habsburg leader and Minister of Social Welfare, became head of the Fackler labor organization, following the outlawry of all trade unions on March 1. On July 11 Foy yielded the portfolio of Public Security to Dollfuss and became Special Commissioner for defense of the State. At the same time Prince Alois von Schönburg-Harsternstein, Minister of War and a Habsburg knightman, also gave up his portfolio to Dollfuss, who proceeded to rival Mussolini in the number of his Cabinet posts. The Chancellor likewise took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with Dr. Stefan Tschakert, formerly Minister in Berlin, as his Secretary. The dictatorship of the Christian Corporative State was thus perfected by the personal dictatorship of the greatest boy from Teming—with his careless despotism limited always by the links captain of the Habsburger and the big captain in the Palazzo Venezia.

The fruits of February were sweet. They might have been long enjoyed were that those who plucked them had reckoned without their crows and had ignored the other Austrian in Berlin.

### 3. DOLLFUSS + JULY 25, 1934

In mid-June 1934 Hitler and Mussolini met for the first time in Venice. The Caesar of the Brownshirts had borrowed much from the Caesar of the Blackshirts. Prior to the March on Rome, Hitler had established contact with the ex-fascist who was editor in Milan of the *Popolo d'Italia* and leader of the *Fascisti di Combattimento*, prototype of all the patriotic armies of an age of political piracy.<sup>23</sup> Both before and after the beer-hall putch of 1919, Dr. Fickler had met again to Il Duce. He owed more to the Italian tyrant by way of propaganda technique and political strategy than he was disposed to admit. And the idea of a German-Italian alliance against France was fixed in his mind. These were always obstacles seemingly insuperable. How could a Pan-German commander claim to the 150,000 *Feldregimenten* in the South Tyrol beyond Brenner and around Bolzano?

Hitler urged passionately that they must be sacrificed in the price of an accord. But north of the Dolomites stood the Tyrolean Alps and Austria. If Duce was no more willing to surrender those to Berlin than to yield the South Tyrol itself, Austria was no bridge to Rome, but a barrier. After January Der Führer-turned-Chancellor faced in the problems of Austria the problem of how to come to terms with Rome—in spite of Austria, because of Austria, or without Austria.

The meeting at Venice was unhappy for Hitler and inconclusive for both participants. Hitler was already anxious over the coming events that were so soon to rend the Third Reich with bullets and blood. The initiative for the Venice meeting apparently came from Berlin. But the arrangements of time and place failed to flatter Der Führer. He arrived on June 14 and departed at 4.20 a.m. June 18 to fly back to the Reich. In the interim there were such speeches, conversations, and communications as befitted the meeting of two potentates. The city was alive with frenzied sections for "Duce! Duce!" Hitler visited first for a concert in the courtyard of the Doge's Palace and was almost ignored. The next morning he came in his motorcade to the Fascist parade in the Piazza San Marco. Mussolini came resplendent in uniform. He was hailed by a cheering crowd as he spoke from a balcony facing the square. Few of the cheering paid any attention to Hitler until Il Duce pointed to him. There was lunch at the Venice Golf Club and afterwards a two-hour conference *à deux*; then a motor-branch trip around the Grand Canal; a dinner with forty guests in Mussolini's house at Hitler's house, more talks, and farewell the next morning with Mussolini, now in civilian clothes, saluting, shaking hands, and bidding his great friend goodbye.<sup>22</sup>

The public addresses and communications, with one exception, revealed nothing. On June 15 the Italian delegation gave the press the astounding news that the heads of the two governments "have continued and concluded today, in a spirit of cordial collaboration, the examination of the problems of general policy and of those problems which more directly concern the two countries. The personal relations that entered will be continued in the future."<sup>23</sup> Mussolini's principal speech reiterated the axioms of Fascism: "We have met in an attempt to dispel the clouds which obscure the political horizon of Europe. . . . Our peace is a virile peace, for peace strengthens the weak but accompanies the strong. We are opposed not to the weak but to the unjust. . . . We will defend our patrimony by persuasion if possible, otherwise with the song of our machine-guns. Nobody can stop

the speech of the Italian people." "Fulvio Savich issued a statement: 'Former Mussolini and Chancellor Hitler renewed their respective committed policies on disarmament, which are already known. They found a substantial identity of views existing between them.'"

Savich and young Galeazzo Ciano, husband of Mussolini's daughter Edda and then head of the Italian Press Department, suggested to news-hungry reporters that no agreements had been concluded, but that many avenues of co-operation had been discovered. An announcement in Rome indicated that Mussolini would return the visit, probably at Munich in October. News despatches, representing the desperate guesses of the correspondents, asserted that the two men were agreed as to the maintenance of Austrian independence and as to German entry into the League if armed parity were first granted the Reich.

All this was poison. Hitler had come to discover the terms upon which he might buy Mussolini's consent to Nazi control of Austria. Mussolini had come to discover the means by which he could prevent a Nazi assault upon Austria. Neither man achieved his purpose. But an indirect statement of Ciano hinted at a "deal." If Ciano's son-in-law asserted that Hitler had agreed to abandon efforts at Anschluss, while Mussolini in turn had agreed not to object to a Nazi becoming Chancellor of an independent Austria. An election would be held in Austria in October. Germany would be asked to join the Soviet-French bloc.<sup>12</sup> Berlin reports hinted that Hitler had abandoned the dream of annexing Austria. Official spokesmen at Vienna declared the Vienna reports impossible and fantastic.

The mystery is still involved. The guess may be ventured that Hitler was willing to "compromise" on Austria at the price of an alliance with Mussolini, since he had at yet little to promise Rome and less with which to threaten. Compromise might mean respect for Austrian "independence," coupled with Rome's acquiescence in the re-legislation of the NSDAP in Austria and the grant to it of some Cabinet posts, including if possible the Chancellorship. Hitler had already demonstrated that with the Chancellorship he could take all. Mussolini was desirous of German support as a possible counterweight against France and Britain, but he was not at all disposed to yield up Austria to Berlin nor was he naïf about the purposes and probable results of Hitler's strategy. Nevertheless he was not above considering Delémont and accepting some Austrian Nazi—or better some anti-Nazi "non-purchase"—if that would please Hitler and promote German-

Italian co-operation. But the trick must be masked with a certain decency and with good faith on both sides, i.e. if there could not graft on Der Fuhrer the same privilege of double-crossing as he reserved for himself. The issue was apparently left hanging fire. Mussolini assumed that it would be dealt with as to its details in later negotiations. Hitler perhaps concluded that his would-be ally was disposed to acquiesce in a sudden blow at the Dollfus regime provided it should not be followed by outright annexation.

If any name was mentioned at Venice as Dollfus's possible successor, it was in all likelihood that of the new Austrian Minister at Rome: Dr. Anton Rindler. The *Falkenher Berchberg* was buying at this at the end of the month. Rindler, who had been a law professor, Governor of Styria, and Minister of Education, was a silent, sleepy man who kept himself in the shadows. But he was ambitious and hungry for power. In Styria he had subverted the Cabinet's efforts to root out the Nazi organisations. He admitted privately that he alone could reach an understanding with the Nazis. But he hadly assumed matters that he had Nazi contacts or was slated to succeed Dollfus. Mussolini is reported to have warned Dollfus against Rindler at Rome in August 1933 and to have suggested that he be sent to Rome for safe-keeping.<sup>37</sup> Rindler left all secret functions in the hands of a voracious young lady who lived at the legation, carried a German passport, and advertised herself as an anti-Nazi. She was the Minister's niece or cousin, no one was certain which. She was extremely popular and was seen everywhere. The legation staff seemed ill at ease in her presence.<sup>38</sup> One of Rindler's secretaries in Rome, a Signor Rapaldi, later testified that his master had frequently met Nazi agents.<sup>39</sup> However . . .<sup>40</sup>

If, as is possible, Mussolini agreed upon Rindler as a compromise candidate for the Austrian Chancellorship, the Roman Catur (who played an exaggerated role in the Rome Protocol) must have assumed that Rindler would play the role of conciliator and would effect a modus vivendi between clerical Fascism and National-socialism in Austria. Therewith a Berlin-Rome accord might be consummated with Austrian independence buttressed as a stable internal and international basis. The German Catur was reluctantly willing to accept this. But he doubtless hoped that if the Austrian door could be opened an inch, it could also be opened a foot and eventually opened wide. It is reasonably certain that the time and mode of the transition were not agreed upon at Venice and that the two men who met were

number of use could not clear in their own minds on this all-important point.

While Rintelen was willing to be used by Hitler for Nazi purposes, he was no blood-and-chaos complainer. It is possible that he had an understanding with Foy by which Dollfus was to be quickly swept out and the Cabinet reconstructed as a Nazi-Heimwehr coalition. Perhaps Mussolini and Hitler both approved of some such plan. If this was indeed the scheme, it was spoiled by others. Whether the others included Hitler or merely some of his subordinates is debatable. His control over his sub-leaders was at this time questionable. In any case Rintelen left Bonn on a "holiday," went first to Gera, and then took a room in the Hotel Imperial in Vienna's Kärntner Ring on July 13.

Meanwhile a great convulsion had shaken the Reich. On June 17 Vice-Chancellor von Papen delivered a rash address at the University Union of Marburg. He criticized Göttele, called for freedom of expression, condemned terrorism, and exposed anxiety over a possible "second wave" of the revolution demanded by Nazi extremists. His words markedly reflected a gathering storm. The social radicals in the NSDAP and particularly in the S.A. were growling over Hitler's "sell-out" to the aristocrats and industrialists. What was more important, the Stormtroopers under the leadership of Ernst Röhm and his immediate subordinates were openly aspiring to control of the new German army which Hitler had sworn to build. The army, new or old, was ever the reserve of blue-blooded junkies, who had only contempt for the open-air, bourgeois militarism of the Brownshirts. There was unrest among some of the generals and in certain Catholic circles. When hell-broth was brewing Hitler could only guess. Göring feared Dr. Fritzsche's forebodings and convinced him that an S.A. "revolt" was planned for Saturday, June 30, 1934.

In the dark hours before dawn of "Bloody Saturday" Hitler and Göttele flew from Bonn to Munich. In a frenzy of fear the Chancellor ordered the arrest and execution of sundry Stormtroop leaders who had gathered for a week-end of pleasure. Driving rapidly to Röhm's suburban villa at Bad Wiessee, Hitler surprised his blind-eyed colleague in a "morning-after" stupor, surrounded by other S.A. commanders and a number of nude prostitutes. In Munich under Hitler and in Berlin under Göring and Himmler the Black Guards of the S.A. liquidated the radicals and the leaders of the S.A. along with many other victims of suspicion, spite, or personal enmity. Schleichner and his wife were murdered. Von Papen barely escaped with his life.

Gregor Strasser was kidnapped and beaten to death. Several army officers were slain along with Rittner, Heinke, Ernst, et al. and a number of Catholic leaders. Hitler later admitted that 77 persons were shot. Other sources set the number of victims at 1,416. Black Guard gangs harried for three days. Hitler explained all to the Reichstag on Friday the 19th of July. The dead were guilty of homosexuality, insubordination, drunkenness, conspiracy, rebellion. "The supreme court of the German people during these twenty-four hours consisted of myself!" Cheers and silence."

The precise relationship of the "blood purge" to the sequel in Austria is as obscure as the bond between that sequel and the meeting in Venice. Available evidence suggests the hypothesis that two conspiracies perhaps collided to their mutual confusion. Rintelen and Fey, with the knowledge of German Minister Reich, of Hitler, and perhaps of Mussolini, were bent upon overthrowing the Austrian Cabinet in such fashion as to achieve a Nazi-Heimliche combination and a German-Italian rapprochement. Whether Dollfus was to be forced out, persuaded to resign, or converted to partnership is unclear. His wife and children were already at Rintelen, where he planned to go on Mussolini's invitation on July 24. This was perhaps pure coincidence. R. Duce perhaps summoned him to discuss the Venice conversations in the hope of persuading him to co-operate. Italy's Ciano perhaps desired to have Dollfus safe in Italy while Rintelen and Fey struck their blow. In any event Theo Hekker, the Austrian Legationnaire in Munich, and some at least of the underground Nazi leaders within Austria had different plans, which Hitler may or may not have known about. They were prepared to strike Dollfus down with a sudden blow and deliver Austria wholly to the NSDAP with no interregnum. Though this plot was not divulged to him, Rintelen could be made to serve here too, possibly for the sake of deceiving and concealing Mussolini. The Irish Chancellor and the Munich anti-Nazi in the Cabinet must be liquidated in "Bloody Sunday." The blow must be struck at once, for the purge in the Reich was disconcerting to some of the Austrian Nazis. Dollfus, moreover, might persuade Mussolini to grant him new support against Berlin. The Rintelen Fey plan must be foisted. In addition there was fear of Dr. Fritsch himself. He might be planning to liquidate the Austrian Nazi movement for diplomatic reasons as he had liquidated the S.A. for reasons of internal politics. Therefore: Forward. Who has no scruples and strikes first wins.

In such an atmosphere of suspicion and hope, of conspiracy and



open-air-conspiracy, the puppets and wire-pullers moved toward action with no man tracing his brother. Years hence the dark details of what followed may be clarified. Some will never be known. Whether two plots collided or a single plot went wrong cannot be said with certainty. But of the spirit of the enterprise there was no doubt. There was the perfect expression of *Klatschberg's* heroics, inspired by blind hate and fierce fanaticism. Here little men embraced soltanto and ally Canadian and therewith marched to murder. Here was the almost perfect application of the new politics of assassination and secret war.

On July 11 the Austrian Cabinet decreed the death penalty for the unauthorized possession of explosives, following the discovery that a new flow of arms was pouring across the German border. Several arrests of arms-smugglers ensued. Seven Nazis were scheduled to be tried by court martial in Vienna on July 12. On the 12th Alfred Franzfeld, who had escaped to Germany, made a threat of civil conflict in a Munich broadcast and asserted that the trial would decide the fate of the Dollfus regime. The court martial sentenced two of the Nazis to prison and ordered the remainder to the ordinary courts since their offenses had taken place before July 11. On the 13rd another Nazi refugee broadcasting from Munich nevertheless proclaimed "the rapid approach of the day of judgment for Herr Dollfus." *Der Rote Adler*, Munich organ of the Austrian Legion, declared, "No more time should be lost in clearing the criminals out of the way."<sup>10</sup> No death penalties were imposed under the decree of July 11 until the 14th, when two culprits were sentenced. For seven being Nazis, both were Social Democrats. Dollfus to the end saw the enemy on the Left. One was reprieved. The other, a twenty-five-year-old Czech worker named Joseph Gerl, was beaten by the police and hanged in the courtyard of the Vienna Arsenal. His last words were "Long live Austrian Liberty!"

In the early morning hours of the day when Gerl died on the gallows, Tuesday, July 14, 1934, the little Chancellor took his last journey. He drove from Marzahn near Silesburg, where he had spent the week-end, to Vienna, where a Cabinet meeting had been scheduled for the forenoon. By Thursday he would be free for a holiday with his family and Mikolaj at Rucklow. The anticipation was pleasant.<sup>11</sup> He did not know that the *Deutscher Nachrichten* wire was sending out a message predicting a "Communist uprising" in Austria—or if he knew, he did not care. Nor did he know that early the next morning

the same agency would instruct the Nazi press to use only official German accounts of the news expected that day from Austria. He doubtless knew that Blumstein had left Rome and arrived in the capital the day before, but he thought nothing of it. He could not have known that the *Deutscher Pressedrucke Dienst* was perhaps even then preparing prints of himself, of Blumstein, and of Foy, along with news of the Chancellery and the Raging radio station, for subsequent distribution to the German press, dated (or perhaps misdated) "July 25." He entered the light-beamed capital in a light-beamed mood. He was somewhat late, however, and the morning conference took longer than he had anticipated. The Cabinet meeting was accordingly postponed to Wednesday morning, July 25.

This postponement became known through mysterious sources to a mysterious group of Nazis in the capital and led to a slight change in their plans. The "tougher ups" who framed the plot doubtless included persons in Vienna, Munich, and Berlin, but their identity was never revealed. Circumstantial evidence suggests that Dr. Reich, Alfred Rosenberg, and Theo Habicht knew what was afoot, if indeed they were not in the inner circle of the conspiracy. The actual plotters carried their tactics well and employed disciplined subordinates who did not know too much—a familiar protective device in gang tactics and also a familiar error in German diplomacy and military strategy. The execution of the plan was entrusted to a special Black Guard company which had been secretly established as a *"Militärstandarte"* from the ranks of former soldiers in the Austrian army destined for Nazi activities in 1933. In May 1934 this group had been secretly incorporated into the Black Guard Corps of Heinrich Himmler and designated as "S.S. (Schutzstaffel) Standarte 1." It exhibited useful contacts with sympathizers in the Austrian police forces. It included among its leading members thirty-five-year-old Otto Plazetta, a former sergeant and now a porter, and Franz Hofmeister, a thirty-year-old electrician. This was the body in which the organizers of the conspiracy gave orders to occupy the Raging station and the Bundeskanzleramt or Chancellery Building as the first step in a Nazi purge.<sup>10</sup> Their aim was to coincide with the Cabinet meeting of July 24. All the Ministers were to be arrested at a stroke. When word came that the Cabinet meeting was postponed a day, the blow was likewise deferred.

This delay increased the danger of "leaks." At 4:30 Tuesday afternoon a police inspector reported that he had been informed of a Nazi

plan to attack the Chancellery the following morning, when the Ministers and presiding a new government under Rastels. His superiors took no action beyond informing the local police station guarding the Chancellery. On Monday Detective-Inspector Josef Seiner, who was one of the conspirators, told his colleague and fellow Nazi, Police-Inspector Johann Dobler, that action was imminent. Part of the army and police force would participate. Rastels would be Chancellor. When Dobler wanted further, Seiner declared that all traitors would be shot. Dobler insisted but decided to tell the police. Before he could do so, the Tuesday action was postponed and he was told by Seiner that he would receive new instructions not later than 1.00 p.m. of Wednesday. Dobler told Seiner to leave a message for him at 94 Lerchenfelder Strasse—and then phoned the central office of the VF on Kärntner Strasse to ask that the commander, Dr. Seidler, meet him forthwith at the Weghuber Café. Seiner's threat against traitors was explicit. Several days later, after his examination by the police, Dobler was found dead "suicide."

While waiting at the café about 10 Wednesday morning Dobler met Karl Mahrer, treasurer of the Vienna Heimwehr, and told him his story, suggesting that Fey or Fey's secretary or Herr Karwinsky of the Chancellery be informed. Mahrer at once told his friend Lieutenant Schaulier, who happened also to be in Weghuber's, and phoned Franz Haidung, another Heimwehr leader, who asked him to come at once to the Heimwehr headquarters to report. Haidung phoned Major Wisbal, Fey's aide-de-camp, and asked him to see Mahrer at once. Dobler and Schaulier remained in the café. The VF leader never arrived. But Captain Ernst Mayer, also of the Vienna Heimwehr, appeared in and was told the secret. He phoned Fey directly and proposed that he take Dobler to the Central Café in Herrengasse. Wisbal told Fey the news shortly afterwards (it was now after 11) and Fey ordered Wisbal to proceed with Captain Mayer, Mahrer, and a Detective-Inspector Pfug to the Central Café, where Dobler and Schaulier soon arrived. Wisbal suggested that Dobler go get the instructions awaiting him at 94 Lerchenfelder Strasse. Dobler drove off with Mayer and Schaulier at 11.40 and picked up his message at No. 94.

"10-12.45 p.m. No. 11 Sacherstrasse Strasse, Bundeskanzlerkanzlei. Don't pass through Reine Strasse on the way. Stause!"

Dobler refused Wisbal, who suggested that he pretend to follow

his fellow conspirators. Meyer and Schneider returned to the Central Café, where Pflüg told them that on Weibel's orders they were to go to the Chancellery Building on the Ballhausplatz. Before they departed Weibel sent Pflüg and Detective-Inspector Marek to patrol Seibersdorf Strasse. It was 11:45 a.m. The Cabinet meeting had already begun when Fey walked in and asked Dollfus for a few minutes in private. At nearly noon Fey told the Chancellor of Weibel's report. Eighteen hours had elapsed since the first "leak" to the police and two hours had gone by since Dollfus's story had first been told to Mahrer. No precautions had been taken beyond sending two detectives to an obscure street in another quarter of the city. Dollfus was skeptical, but on Fey's urgent request ordered the Ministers to adjourn and return at 4:00 p.m. War Minister Zeiner was told to go at once to the Ministry of Defense and mobilize troops for action. These were the last official acts of the first Chancellor. By a narrow margin of fifty minutes they prevented the seizure of the whole Cabinet. Dollfus summoned Fey and Karwinsky to his study on the second floor of the east side of the Chancellery Building.\*

Between 11:10 and 11:35 Marek phoned Weibel during from Seibersdorf Strasse, which is outside of the Burg Ring and behind Maria Theres Platz, paralleling Maria Hilfer Strasse. He reported that numerous soldiers, policemen, and some men without uniforms had entered the Gymnasium and that lorries had driven up and were being loaded. His calls suddenly ceased. He had been captured by disloyal police in Seibers Strasse. Weibel was still in the Chancellery with Fey, Karwinsky, and Dollfus, whom he informed of his arrest. Karwinsky phoned Police-President Dr. Seydl and ordered him to increase the Chancellery guard in Ballhausplatz and Harner Strasse and to send a squad of detectives by car to Seibersdorf Strasse. Seydl replied that reports had come of a dangerous plot in perpetration in Michaeler Platz, to the east of the Hofburg, or Royal Palace, and a long block away from the Chancellery. All police precautions were concentrated there. Karwinsky told him to carry out the orders he had given him with all speed. Another phone call found Seydl out of reach. Karwinsky phoned the Chief of the State Police and ordered him to send one flying squad to Seibersdorf Strasse to arrest all the men in the Gymnasium and another to the Chancellery.

Orders and counter-orders crossed in a confusion which was not wholly accidental. The result was that police reinforcements went to Michaeler Platz and military reinforcements to the Hofburg. To the

Chancellery were only a single officer on a motor-cycle. None of these "guards" had any notion of whom to look for or arrest. As the detachment speeded toward Seibersdorf Strauss saw eight lorries drive off toward the inner city loaded with "troops" and a few "police." The Gymnasium was next to an army barracks. Already the army was going into action to protect the Chancellery. All was well.

The lorries were filled with 150 men, most of whom were members of S.S. Standard 89. They were disguised as soldiers and policemen. Many were in fact members of the army and the police force. They had secured arms in the Gymnasium and were ordered in part of the crack *Deutschmeister Regiment*. They thundered down *Ilseitz Strasse* and *Bellaria Strasse*, across the *Burg Ring*, through the broad gardens west of the Hofburg and onto *Bellhausplatz* without arousing suspicion. Meanwhile 17 other members of S.S. Standard 89 proceeded to the Ruvag radio station in *Johannsgasse*, shot the police inspector and the director's chauffeur at the gate, stormed the building, and barricaded it against attack. About 1.00 p.m. the announcer, with guns in his ribs, began broadcasting: "The Dollfus Government has resigned. Dr. Kautner has taken over control." That was the signal for Nazi songs in the provinces and was part of a plan to throw all defense ministers throughout the country into confusion. The Vienna police attacked the station at once with rifles, grenades, and armored cars. After bursting in the doors, they dragged out the parachutists slowly after three attacks.\* An incredible drama was meanwhile being played out on the *Bellhausplatz*.

At seven minutes before 1.00 p.m. the lorries of S.S. 89 reached the Chancellery Building. The guard was being changed. The attack was so perfect as to suggest the master hand of Hitler himself. The parachutists entered the courtyard on tanks behind the regular relief. Once inside they easily disarmed the "defenders," whose rifles were unloaded because they constituted merely a "Guard of Honor." Every detail of the vast and complex structure was known to the invaders. All entries were locked and bolted. One group dashed up the stairs to the Chancellor's suite and overpowered Frey, Wiesel, and several others in a conference room. All members of the Chancellery staff, about 150 in all, were made prisoners. Karwinsky attempted to take Dollfus to safety through the rear rooms and the back stairway, but the Chancellor hurried off with his valet Hedwisch into his study just as Holzeisner and the rebels entered the Pillar Room, which adjoined it. Dollfus rushed through his study to the corner room

and sought to unlock the rear door leading to the hall where were held the Congress of Vienna.

As he did so, Plasman, revolver in hand, burst into the corner room from a side door at the head of a group of paratroops. It was a few minutes past one. Without a word Plasman rushed up to Dollfus, who had made a move toward his writing-desk and then back to the door, and fired two bullets into the back of his neck. One inflicted a flesh wound. The other penetrated his spine and emerged under his right armpit. With a murmur of "Help! Help!" he reeled, fell to the floor, and was still. Hedrick and Karwinsky were herded with other prisoners into Pillar Hall. Some time later two of the captives, Johann Griesenader and Rudolf Meisinger, were permitted to attend their wounded leader. They revived him. He was paralyzed. They placed him on a sofa and tried to bandage him as best they could. Dollfus asked for Schweiching, then for a doctor and a priest—all in vain. He whispered to Fey that Niemöller should take care of his family. Bloodshed should be avoided. Russia should make peace. Dollfus probably believed that all was lost, that he had been betrayed by his own friends and that Runcie was already assuming the Chancellership. He thanked Griesenader and Meisinger. "My boys, you are very good to me. Why aren't the others like you? I only long for peace. We have never taken the offensive, we have always had to defend ourselves. May the Lord forgive them!" His last words were a message of affection to his wife and children. His small body was drained of blood and his injured spine beyond all healing. At quarter of four he reeled and twitched and died.<sup>10</sup>

What was happening inside the Chancellery was unknown to those without. Events outside were a mystery to those within. The paratroops, having failed to capture the entire Cabinet, waited in the barracks building while Dollfus bled to death. They waited for Runcie, who was to be the new Chancellor, with Fey as Vice-Chancellor. Fey seemed willing enough. But Runcie never appeared. They tried to phone a "Herr Kunze" at a café. He was perhaps Herr Gustav Wachter, who was to have brought Runcie to the Chancellery if the paratroops were successful. They waited for the opening in the provinces, for the march of the Ardennes Legion across the Belgian border, and perhaps for open armed aid from the Reich. None of these things materialized. The paratroops were betrayed by their own intentions and by sudden from and unanticipated developments among those upon whom they relied. The slaughter in Vienna never dis-

closed themselves but went into hiding or escaped. The man in the Chancellery hesitated. What to do?

A few moments after two Dr. Friedrich Funder, editor of the *Reichspost*, came to the Chancellery door and was told that he should not be alarmed: Rauschen was Chancellor and a new police chief was on the way from Berlin. Funder dashed away to the Hotel Imperial and somewhere persuaded Rauschen to give himself up at the War Office, where the Cabinet Ministers were gathered. Miklas designated Schuschnigg as temporary Chancellor. Rauschen was arrested and incarcerated in a room under guard. In the evening he was told that the Chancellor was dead. "But that is terrible!" he exclaimed. An hour after midnight two detectives came to take Rauschen to police headquarters for examination. He asked them to wait a moment. As they did so they heard a shot. Rauschen had already written farewell notes, declaring that his name had been misused. He now put a bullet through his chest. But he missed his heart and recovered. Seven months later he was sentenced to life imprisonment for high treason.

Meanwhile police, troops, Hitlerwehr men, passers-by, and press reporters gathered in the triangular Bollwerkplatz before the Bundeskanzleramt. No one knew quite what had happened or what to do. Hitlerwehr teams to attack the building were met by Nazi thrums from within to defend it by force and shoot the protesters. Deadlock. About 3.00 p.m. Major Hans von Bismarck, Hitlerwehr officer and Vice-Governor of Lower Austria, arrived with news that a new government was sitting in the War Office. Half an hour later Fey and Hitlerwehr appeared on the balcony of the Congress Hall, over the main doorway. The Minister of Public Security called down to Police Captain Eitel and Inspector General Humpel to come upstairs to the rear door on Minorato Square. They were received by Hitlerwehr and allowed to see Fey in the courtyard. He told them that Dollfuß was wounded and that Rauschen was expected momentarily. There should be no attack for the moment he bunched. Humpel agreed. Eitel dashed out to an open street phone and told headquarters that Dollfuß was wounded and had resigned, that a new government had been formed, and that Fey remained Vice-Chancellor. Humpel suggested a physician. Eitel returned to the rear door and was told that a physician was no longer needed. Thus the news of the death of Dollfuß filtered out of the besieged Chancellery, but it was not generally known for some hours.

At 4.00 Fey again appeared on the balcony with Hitlerwehr's re-

volmer at his side and asked for Blumel. He summoned Heerpel once more to the rear door. The Inspector General returned with word that Blumel was Chancellor and Fey Vice-Chancellor. At the War Office Schoeneberg phoned President Minkus at Yelden (where he narrowly escaped a Nazi attempt on his life) and received authorization to take charge of activities and not to recognize any orders issued by the prisoners. Neustädter-Schröter personally appeared at the Bollhausplatz to tell Fey that Blumel would not appear and to ask whether he should storm the building. Fey forbade him to take any steps without his authority. Neustädter-Schröter told him that as a prisoner he had no authority and that the building would be stormed in fifteen minutes, i.e. at 3-45.

But the hour passed and no attack was launched. Fey appeared again on the balcony to say that the prisoners were ready to surrender if granted a safe-conduct and military protection to the German border. Neustädter-Schröter assented, though the Cabinet had imposed as condition for a safe-conduct that there should be "no loss of life among the illegally detained members of the Government." The "ultimatum" was extended to 4-30. From a ground-floor window Fey asked that the prisoners be permitted to keep their small arms and be exempt from search. The latter demand was granted, the former refused. Within the disarmed rebels debated. Some favored shooting the prisoners and resisting to the end. Others wished to yield. Heiberster phoned the German Legation and asked Minister Reich to intervene. Reich promptly arrived, but Neustädter-Schröter rejected his "mediation." War Minister Zechner reiterated the pledge of safe-conduct and demanded surrender.

The document came at dusk. At 7-30 the prisoners were freed on condition that the rebels be permitted to talk to Dr. Reich. Fey came out the back door, asked Neustädter-Schröter for a signature, and told him that Dollfus was dead. Carefully she emerged and escorted Reich back into the building. After a secret conversation with the psychiatrists the German Minister came out, exclaimed, "What madness!" and walked away. At 7-30 the front door was opened and the rebels surrendered.<sup>10</sup>

There were 154 prisoners, including 6 policemen, 1 police superintendent, and 1 police inspector. Franz Heiberster in a captain's uniform was the actual leader, though Paul Hoff pretended to be. Schoeneberg arrived and was with the other Ministers in the Berg Garden. They decided to ignore the pledge of safe-conduct because



of the murder of Dollfus. The prisoners were taken to the Marienbuser barracks. Thirteen of them were subsequently hanged, including Holowakeh, Planetta, and four policemen. At the trial Planetta denied he had intended to kill Dollfus. He refused to betray those who had organized the plot. Both he and Holowakeh shouted: "Heil Hitler" at their execution.<sup>10</sup> If their spirits ascended to a Nazi heaven, they must have been cheered four years later by the spectacle of Hitler and the NSDAP transforming them into revered heroes and martyrs worthy of being ranked with the beer-hall panthers of 1923 and with the assassins of Freilinger and Rathenau.

The Nazi uprisings which had belatedly broken out in the provinces were speedily suppressed. The Police-President of Innsbruck was shot dead on the morning of July 15. By Thursday the 16th rebellions were in progress in all provinces save Vorarlberg and Lower Austria. By Friday evening, however, Government forces were masters of the situation, though they suffered 78 dead and 165 wounded. Nazi losses were much heavier. Many refugees fled into Yugoslavia.<sup>11</sup> Efforts of the Austrian Legion to invade the country from Germany at Kallerswald, Kollerschlag, and Hainburg were easily repulsed. Some confusion has of evidence uncovered at the suppression of the provincial revolts left little doubt as to official German complicity. A code was found on the person of Franz Hodel, a German hotel clerk who tried to cross the border at Hainburg on July 16. Some of its phrases are interesting:

<i>New samples of currency not arrived</i>	— <i>Rumelen no move in question.</i>
<i>New samples of currency still on way</i>	— <i>Rumelen negotiating.</i>
<i>New samples of currency arrived</i>	— <i>Rumelen Chancellor.</i>
<i>Candlenicks not arrived</i>	— <i>Federal army hostile.</i>
<i>Candlenicks on way</i>	— <i>Federal army neutral.</i>
<i>Old samples of currency on way</i>	— <i>Dollfus captured.</i>
<i>Old samples of currency not arrived</i>	— <i>Dollfus free.</i>
<i>Old samples of currency arrived</i>	— <i>Dollfus dead."</i>

On July 18, 1934, twentieth anniversary of the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war on Serbia, last services for the late Chancellor were held in St. Stephen's Cathedral after he had lain in state for two days, first in the Chancellery and then in the Rathaus. Schoenbrunn spared no effort to dramatize his predecessor as Austria's martyred hero. A great procession wound its way to the cemetery of Hainburg above the city, where Dollfus was temporarily laid to rest beside his liege

daughter Hansel, who had died six years before. President Mallas was stricken with grief in his eulogy. Sauerberg declared: "Your friend and comrade, leader whom we can never forget . . . your death has given us life. Your death has won the victory. It has secured the independence of Austria . . . so you will live on in the future."

While the mighty ones of State and Church paid homage to the dead, Herr Schwarz in his present Sunday clothes and Dollfus's little mother in her shawl sat weeping. On September 29 the body was taken up and laid in state again at St. Stephen's beside that of Dollfus's patron and friend, Father Seipel. In June Dollfus had dedicated a new Memorial Church on Kärntnerplatz, where a crypt had been prepared for Seipel. As he gazed into a corner of the tomb, he had said: "There's room for somebody else there." The remains of both men were now taken together to the Seipel-Dollfus Gedächtniskirche in a solemn, torchlight procession.<sup>14</sup> Still a third service was held in the Vienna Opera House on November 2, 1934. Beneath a towering death mask over the stage, a mourning chorus intoned Verdi's Requiem as Arturo Toscanini led the orchestra.<sup>15</sup> For a few brief years the peasant boy of Tübing seemed more potent in death than in life.

But many of the workers of Vienna whose comrades and brothers had died before the Hainwasser gun of February felt no grief. Dollfus had betrayed them in betraying himself. Underground Social Democracy kept "strict neutrality" during the July days, content to see Civil Fascists and Nazi Fascists at war. One of the illegal Socialist leaflets distributed after the passing of the little Chancellor was perhaps a more just eulogy than all the eloquence of Lassalle, Sauerberg, and Mallas. It declared simply: "The news of the death of Dollfus was received with delight by the working classes in that of the death of a tyrant and murderer of liberty. Austria is experiencing her June 24th, as in the Reich, Fascists are murdering Fascists and we can look on with satisfaction at the process. Dollfus in pure-fist system must be destroyed too, but never through an alliance with the Brown Fascists."<sup>16</sup>

# VICTORY TO THE VANQUISHED

## 1. BARTHOUSSE

Ten mob edited and revised around the fountains and monuments of the *Place de la Concorde*. It raged in the nearby streets and poured over the *Champs d'Élysées* and the *avenue de Rivoli*. A motor-bus was upset and burned. The Ministry of Marine was ignored. Firemen arrived in, though they were beaten, and had their boxes run by the rioters. The police were strangely inert. The mounted *Garde Républicaine* swooped into the great square. But the young Royalist followers of Charles Maurras and Léon Daudet, who called themselves the *Commissaires du Roi*, threw handfuls of marbles over the pavements to trip the horses, and dashed at their bellies with razor blades on the end of walking-sticks. The Fascist bands, confident that no democratic Cabinet would order troops to fire on "the People," edged the motor-cars ever closer to the bridge over the Seine. Across the river was the *Quai d'Orsay* and the Chamber of Deputies. "Down with the scoundrels!" To storm parliament would perhaps end parliamentary government and give France a reactionary "authoritarian" regime on a model already perfected across the Rhine and beyond the Alps.

Many in the mob had no objective beyond the joy of getting. A few Communists, trying to demonstrate against Fascism and the Government, were choked. The National Union of Ex-Servicemen marched in dignity down the *Champs* and across the *Place* but refused to go near the bridge. But others were headed for the Chamber: the *Jeuneur Patriote* of professor François Coty, the *Soldatiste Fran-*

party, the *Garde de l'Assemblée* of Lieutenant-Colonel François de la Rocque, most of whose followers were demonstrating on the left bank behind the Chamber, and several minor groups of Royalists and Fascists. They tried to rush the bridge. The *Garde* fired. The crowd screamed: "Assassins!" They recoiled and later tried again and were again stopped by a hail of bullets. The bridge was held. The Chamber was saved. But the defenseless Cabinet had been forced to commit "murder" to protect itself. This sufficed. Toward midnight harnessed demonstrations began to gather in order not to miss the last trains on the Métro. Twenty rioters and one policeman were dead, hundreds were wounded; thousands had torn clothes, blackened eyes, and bloody noses.

Thus the creed of the colored shirt and the cult of the Little Caesar made its debut as the capital of the French Republic on the evening of February 4, 1934.<sup>1</sup> This fearful brawl had a double origin: the Stavisky scandal and the weakness and misdeeds of Chamberlain and Daladier. It also had a double consequence: the ouster of Louis Barthou as the *Quai d'Orsay* and the formation of the neo-Fascist People's Front.

Serge Sarrailly, a Russian Jew, had risen from the ranks of petty swindlers to become a magnet of mobstering. He was a friend of André Tardieu, who helped to subdue de la Rocque, and of Jean Chiappe, Paris police chief who sided with Fascism. He was also a friend of "respectable" democrats close to Camille Chautemps, Radical Socialist, Freemason, and political opportunist who held the Premiership from November 27, 1933 to January 27, 1934. One of Chautemps's Ministers recommended Sarrailly's fraudulent bonds issued in the name of the municipal government of Bayonne. The scandal broke in December. Sarrailly died and was found dead at Charente on January 3—either a suicide or a victim of police agents who knew that he knew too much. The setting was perfect for a general assault on the French Left by the Fascist gangs. With the sympathy of much of the Right, they directed insults against parliamentary democracy in the name of public morality. Chautemps resigned, though his Cabinet still had a majority in the Chamber.

Edouard Daladier succeeded. This taciturn son of the South was nicknamed "The Bull." He was the unworldly prodigy of Hitler. Although wealthy by marriage, he posed as a leader of the left wing of the Radical Socialists. In fear of a Fascist coup, he and his Ministers of the Interior, Eugène Frot, discharged Chiappe on February 7 and

offered him (in vain) the Government of Morocco. Chappa made vague threats. The Right showed against the Citizens. The Fascist leagues howled. Daladier and Frot displayed the utmost ingenuity in the periods to February 6. Frot gave permission for the anti-Government parade of the veterans and Fascists. He took no adequate precautions to prevent disorders. Daladier was scheduled to read his ministerial declaration to the Chamber the same evening. When the mob got out of hand the session was suspended. Insurrection triumphed over parliamentary institutions.<sup>1</sup> Only guns could stop the rioting. The use of guns enabled the Right to accuse the Left of "anarchism" as well as "corruption." On the next day Daladier surrendered his office. By stupidity and cowardice he had betrayed the French Left. By stupidity and cowardice he would later betray France and Europe.

In the sequel the Right found its opportunity while the Left girded its loins for a decisive battle for democracy. The Socialist and Communist parties and the two French labor organizations, the C.G.T. and the C.G.T.U., issued a joint manifesto and proclaimed a twenty-day-long general strike on February 12. In a great demonstration of proletarian solidarity in the Place de la Nation, the People's Front was born, though its final shape was not to be determined until later. Meanwhile a Center-Right Cabinet took office (February 9), headed by aged ex-President Gaston Doumergue.<sup>2</sup> He won no secure support from André Tardieu and no living comfort to de la Rocque with his plans for "constitutional reform." But he also was to be undone by the Left's revolt against reaction. His Cabinet included, as Finance Minister, the man who was destined to succeed him in November: Pierre Étienne Flandin. But the most brilliant member of Doumergue's Cabinet was the new Foreign Minister, Louis Barthou.<sup>3</sup>

Barthou's small and unimpressive figure looms ever larger in the perspective of the diplomacy of the age of the Caesars, not only by virtue of his own genius but by virtue of the anastrophic meddling of his predecessors and successors. He succeeded Joseph Paul-Boncour, who had taken office as the Quai d'Orsay on December 18, 1931 and held it continuously until the coming of Barthou, even for a few days of early February during which Daladier took the portfolio himself. Paul-Boncour was a miniature Robespierre (whose portrait he always kept before him) and was as unimpressive a person physically as his successor was undistinguished. With his leonine head, his shock of waving white hair, and his effacement of face and eyes *à la 1793*,

he posed as "Rabouilleur"—favorite epithet of his enemies. He made eloquent speeches. He championed peace and constitution—and paved the way for the destruction of French power on the Continent. He knew the glamorous Antoinette Simon, wife of Saurinsky. But he did not know the diplomatic game. Here he was as inept as Barthou was clever. Barthou's successor at the Quai d'Orsay was Laval, of whom more soon. He completed the ruin which Paul Doumer began. It is not too much to say that Barthou was the only French Foreign Minister with ability, insight, and a grasp of Realpolitik during the whole period of the first five years after January 1913.

Louis Barthou<sup>1</sup> was born a Gascon in Clermont-Saint-Marie, August 12, 1862. Although his parents were poor they could afford an education for their gifted son. He studied law, entered politics on the Left, and became Minister of Public Works at the incredible age of thirty-two. Like many French leaders, he drifted Rightward with the passing years—or, more accurately, the parade of party groups moved Leftward while he stood still. He became Premier in 1903 under President Raymond Poincaré. In the First World War he lost a son. In 1920 he was President of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber, in 1921 Minister of War under Briand, in 1922 Minister of Justice under Poincaré, now Premier. In the best French tradition of the intellectual in politics, he was a writer, an art critic, a good European, an agnostic, and a connoisseur of rare editions. From his own pen flowed biographies of Danton and Mirabeau; essays on the uncovers of Richard Wagner, the love-life of Victor Hugo, and the gardens of Bonadventure, works on feminism, politics, art, Morocco, war, history, and belles-lettres. At the age of seventy-two he had lost little of his youthful vigor. With his high-domed forehead, his shrewd, sunken eyes framed in a small pince-nez, his prominent nose, his square mustache and beard tinged with grey, he somewhat resembled Poincaré the Locusteer, though his features were gentler and more genial. The resemblance was strongest in the bend of his mind and the shape of his foreign policy.

He assumed, correctly, that Hitler's Reich was irrevocably committed to the reconstruction of a formidable war machine dedicated to avenging the verdict of 1918 and to asserting German hegemony over Europe. He assumed that Hitler's prime objective was to denach and destroy France's allies in the East and that any French surrender to this policy meant the end of the Republic as a Great Power and perhaps as an independent nation. He assumed that the Nazi threat

could be met only by keeping Germany diplomatically isolated, by strengthening the ties between France, Poland, and the Little Entente, by making the USSR a member of the bloc committed to opposing Nazi imperialism, and, if possible, by enlisting British and Italian support against the Reich. He assumed that the task of isolating and encircling Germany must be undertaken through the existing machinery of the League of Nations, that the procedures of collective security and sanctions must be strengthened and applied against all aggressors, that the Soviet Union must be brought to Geneva, and that every effort must be made to prevent any subversion of the League by Rome and London. Above all, he assumed that an Eastern League must be negotiated, with Germany included in its benefits—a collective protection against aggression, if the Reich would sign. If it would not, then Paris, Prague, Moscow, Warsaw, Belgrade, and Bucharest must conclude a Grand Alliance for common defense against Berlin through a series of mutual assistance pacts within the framework of the Covenant.

Here for the first time—and for the last—was a clear-cut and soundly conceived French program of meeting the threat of the Third Reich. Barthou was not obliged to make bricks without straw, as were some of his successors who recognized too late the correctness of his analysis. Much French influence on the Continent had been lost before Barthou came to the Quai d'Orsay. But nothing had been irretrievably lost. On the contrary a number of recent diplomatic developments had paved the way for the execution of his plan. Paris and Moscow had already concluded a Non-Aggression Pact, inked August 19, 1931, signed November 19, 1931, and unanimously approved by the Chamber May 18, 1932. Litvinov had a friendly reception in France in July 1932. Harter had had an equally friendly reception in the USSR in August.<sup>1</sup> An Minister Pierre Coe had gone to Moscow at the head of a French air squadron in September 1932. Despite new pacts with Berlin in May 1932, the Komintern had no hope of lasting peace with Hitler. Laval's pacts of July 1932 for the definition of aggression anticipated the diplomatic revolution by which Moscow was to sign itself with the Western Powers against Berlin and Rome. At the 17th Congress of the United Communist Party, January 26, 1932, Berlin championed "Socialism in One Country" and foreshadowed the coming Coalition line of the People's Front.

Doubts and Balkanisms on the eve of Barthou were even more encouraging. Here too the specter of the Third Reich had loomed

wrong desire to derive effective means of common security. A year before, on February 16, 1933, the powers of the Little Entente had signed a "pact of organization" at Geneva, establishing a Permanent Council of the Czech, Rumanian, and Yugoslav Foreign Ministers.<sup>1</sup> They were pledged to collective security and resistance to "aggression," whether emanating from Budapest, Berlin, or Rome. The personal and distinguished Foreign Minister at Bucharest, Nicolo Titulescu, pushed negotiations for a "Balkan Locarno." After much visiting by kings, queens, and diplomats among the Balkan capitals an agreement was at length reached. On the very day on which Barthou took office, February 9, 1934, the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Rumania signed at Athens the treaty creating the "Balkan Locarno."

This accord was not quite all that had been hoped for.<sup>2</sup> Supplementary undertakings made the Balkan Entente operative as an arrangement for mutual defense only against Bulgaria. But the venture prospered and promised to serve its broader purposes. In Belgrade the quasi-Fascist coup d'état of Colonel Radom Georgiev (May 19, 1934) which suppressed parliament and for a time made King Boris a virtual prisoner of the army had the paradoxical result of improving Bulgaria's relations with its neighbors. The chief obstacle to Bulgarian-Yugoslav unity had been the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) of Ivan Mladinov, which had long been subsidized by Fascist Italy to carry out raids and other acts of terrorism against Yugoslavia from Bulgarian territory—all in the name of Macedonian nationalism and Bulgarian irredentism. Georgiev suppressed the IMRO and arrested its leaders. Mladinov fled to Turkey. A Yugoslav-Bulgar commercial treaty was signed, May 12, 1934. A Rumanian-Bulgar and a Greek-Bulgar rapprochement ensued. In November 1934 the Foreign Ministers of the Balkan Entente adopted "incidents" modeled upon those of the Little Entente, creating a Permanent Council and other agencies. These overlapping Ententes thus promised to become integral parts of Barthou's scheme of a Grand Alliance.

With respect to Poland the prospects were less bright. Pierre and graced Marshal Josef Pilsudski, military dictator since his Warsaw pouch of May 1918, was far more anti-Roman than anti-German in his sympathies.<sup>3</sup> The power-hungry feudal oligarchy which he regime represented had much more in common with Hitler than with Stalin. The rulers of Poland, moreover, scorned dependence upon France. They denounced the Four-Power Pact of 1923 and demanded



up "independent" foreign policy is the only means of pulling Poland by its bootstraps to the status of a "Great Power." Piłsudski's colleague and erstwhile chief of staff, Josef Beck, became Foreign Minister on November 1, 1932. When Warsaw became convinced that Paris would not offer leadership in a preventive war to crush the Nazi menace, it concluded that its best hope of saving the Corridor was to cajole or browbeat Berlin into a bargain. On January 26, 1934, Ambassador Lypin and Baron von Neurath signed at Berlin a ten-year non-aggression declaration, pledging co-operation and "good neighborly relations."<sup>17</sup> This Polish flirtation with the Reich was in some measure a consequence of the French fixation with Moscow, through the Franco-Polish alliance of February 19, 1921,<sup>18</sup> and the Guarantee Pact of October 26, 1925, remained intact and theoretically unaffected by the German-Polish accord. Barthou hoped that a policy of strength would enable him to both retain Warsaw in the French camp and add Moscow to it as well.

The new French Foreign Minister visited Warsaw April 22-4, 1934. No new commitments were made. The communiqué was vague. But at least it declared that the "basis of the alliance between France and Poland remains absolutely invariable." On May 3 the Polish Ambassador in Moscow signed a protocol with Litvinov extending the Polish-Soviet non-aggression pact of July 12, 1931 to December 31, 1945. Barthou stopped in Prague (April 26-7) and was visited in Paris by Foreign Minister Bogoljub Jevich of Yugoslavia, June 10-13. He then sped across the Continent to attend the final session of the Little Entente Council meeting at Bucharest on June 19. His reception was most cordial in the Romanian capital, "little Paris" of the Balkans. On June 21 he told the Romanian parliament, which elected him "honorary citizen": "Know that if a single square centimeter of your territory is touched, France will be at your side." At that, the German and Hungarian Ministers walked out of the diplomatic gallery. Barthou likewise addressed the Skupština in Belgrade (June 24-6) and on his return to Paris was visited by Premier George Tsimovici (July 11) and Foreign Minister Thalescu (August 15).

These conferences paved the way for Barthou's project of an Eastern Locarno with Germany if possible, against Germany if necessary, and in any case with the USSR, Poland, and the Little and Balkan Ententes linked in an interlocking system of security pacts. On May 18, 1934 he met Litvinov in Geneva. A year before, the Chamber had approved ratification of the French-Soviet non-aggression pact.

Barthou had said "The Red Army is a very important organization . . . Would it be patriotic to shut one's eyes to these solid facts?" Barthou found himself in full agreement with the Soviet diplomat. In December Lénine had proposed that Poland and the USSR should jointly guarantee the Baltic States and Finland against aggression. Warsaw was negative and evasive. Moscow feared a German-Polish-Finnish entente for aggression against the USSR and welcomed the prospect of either a French-Soviet alliance<sup>10</sup> or an Eastern Locarno as a safeguard. Soviet suspicions of Germany were increased by the German-Polish pact of January 1934 and by Berlin's abrupt rejection of Lénine's proposal (March 28) that the USSR and the Baltic should jointly guarantee the four Baltic States.

On May 18, 1934 Lénine reverted to the old French theme that security must be organized in concentric circles: France, the USSR, Poland, the Little Entente, and the Baltic States in the first rank, the Mediterranean Powers in the second, and the naval Powers of the Pacific in the third.<sup>11</sup> Barthou concentrated attention on the first circle and evolved a program to which Lénine assented early in June. Both at Paris and at Moscow British approval was deemed desirable for the new dispensation. Barthou went to London and conferred with Sir John Simon on July 1-2. Sir John was persuaded to give his blessing to a projected mutual assistance pact between the USSR, Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic States, supplemented by a separate pact between Paris and Moscow for immediate aid under the Covenant against aggression. He suggested that if Berlin would join the first pact, Moscow and Paris should pledge aid to the Reich against an attack by either of them, thus making the arrangement a genuine Locarno on the 1925 model. Barthou assented. Sir John told Commons, July 19: "We have made a timely plan . . . that we are not undertaking any new obligation at all." But he was sufficiently enthusiastic about the prospects to set as his secondary aim to instruct the British Ambassadors in Berlin, Rome, and Warsaw, where most objections were anticipated, to prepare draft texts of three treaties: an Eastern European Pact of Mutual Assistance; a French-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact open to signature by Germany; and a covering constitution linking both to the League Covenant and the Western Locarno treaties of 1925. Italy was cautiously affirmative. Warsaw and Berlin were silent.

The bargaining now became complex. Warsaw objected to entering into any pact with Czechoslovakia. Berlin objected to entering

agree any with Lithuania and insisted on arm equality first. Stresemann desired to please Berlin by offering equality to the Reich if it would agree to an Eastern Locarno. Sir John told Curzon that Barthou had agreed to such a *quid pro quo*. Barthou vehemently denied this and asserted that there could be no connection between arm equality and the Eastern Locarno.<sup>14</sup> Josef Beck visited Strass and Loria in July in the apparent hope of securing their co-operation in opposing the plan. On September 9 at Geneva Barthou and Beck had a strong scene. The Polish Foreign Minister refused to commit Warsaw to support of the project. On September 10, 1934, in a note to London, Paris, Rome, and Moscow the German Government declared that it would not become a party unless arm equality were granted, that it favored bilateral pacts, and that it would join a multilateral pact only if it pledged the signatories merely to non-aggression and not to mutual assistance against aggressors. Poland followed with a formal reply to Barthou on September 12. Warsaw was reluctant to guarantee the borders of Lithuania and Czechoslovakia, it also preferred bilateral agreements; it would not refuse to adhere, but all interested States (including Germany) must also adhere and the new commitments must be compatible with existing obligations, e.g. Poland's non-aggression obligations toward the Reich.

Upon this rock the plan for an Eastern Locarno foundered. Hitler, unlike Stresemann, would not purchase international guarantees of German security at the price of a formal renunciation of German plans of aggression, nor would he be a party to any plan whereby the Reich would be bound to aid other States against aggression and would simultaneously expose itself to concerted action by other States against possible German aggression. Ribbentrop and Beck would do nothing which Germany would not do. They would accept no obligations to defend Czechoslovakia against Germany and still less would they guarantee Lithuania. They had designs of their own against both Prague and Warsaw. They desired to stand aside, moreover, as "neutrals" while Nazi imperialism should be deflected toward non-Polish targets. Barthou had expected the German reply and had feared that Poland might follow suit. His major purpose was to make sure Berlin and otherwise dissuade Stresemann that the German attitude left the Quai d'Orsay no alternative save the conclusion of a French-Soviet pact. In this he succeeded.

The Soviets succeeded in bringing the Soviet Union to Geneva, though here again it was necessary to pay a price which further

widened the breach between Paris and Warsaw. Barthou's first move was to bring about diplomatic recognition of the USSR by the Little Entente. Czechoslovakia and Rumania granted recognition on June 9, 1934.<sup>17</sup> Yugoslavia, however, refused to follow suit. King Alexander Karageorgevitch had a holy horror of communists, despite the fact that his father had come to the Serbian throne in 1909 only through the assassination of Alexander Obrenovitch. The Rumanian Court was a cherished memory of his childhood, for he had studied at the *École des Pages* at St. Petersburg. The Bolsheviks had killed the Tsar. He would not recognize them, Barthou or no Barthou. But he was willing enough that the USSR should be admitted to the League. Sir John in Constantinople on July 13 added his blessing. Next to be left behind, Bulgaria and Hungary also hurried to recognize Moscow.

It was agreed by the end of August that the USSR should be invited to join the League, instead of being required to make formal application, and that it should be granted a permanent seat on the Council. Bourgeois Switzerland, Fascist Portugal, and Catholic Ireland went on principle opposed to opening Geneva's door to the Communist Power. More serious were Poland's objections. The new Poland had annexed over four million Ukrainians and White Russians in the war of 1918. Warsaw was notoriously lax in observance of obligations not to persecute minorities. Moscow gave assurance that it would not raise this delicate question. But Warsaw would not agree to vote for Soviet membership without a most negligible *quid pro quo*. On September 13, 1934, at the 15th League Assembly, Josef Beck made an announcement: "Pending the introduction of a general and uniform system for the protection of minorities, my Government is compelled to refuse, as from to-day, all co-operation with the international organizations by the means of the supervision of the application by Poland of the system of minority protection."<sup>18</sup> Poland would continue to "protect" its minorities. But so long as the Great Powers refuse to accept obligations comparable to those imposed upon Poland and other Central European States by the minority treaties of 1919, Warsaw would henceforth ignore the League Council procedure for insuring fulfillment of these obligations. Poland must have "equality" and could no longer tolerate being treated as a nation of "inferior" rights. The Allied and Associated Powers, it was argued, had morally invalidated the rubric of minority rights by refusing to accept their terms for themselves.

This conversion formula was not lost upon Der Fuhrer at Berlin nor was its sequel. Poland was openly repudiating an integral part of the

settlement of 1919—and a pact which had been made a condition of recognition of Poland's independence. What action would the other signatories take? On September 14 Simon, Barthou, and Aloisi solemnly warned Warsaw that treaties could not be abrogated by unilateral action. A dispatchy document produced no change in the Polish position. The Poles acquiesced—for this was in effect, if not in form, the price they had agreed to pay for Polish support of the entry of the USSR into the League. Here perhaps was Barthou's one serious diplomatic mistake. The USSR was content of admission to the League by the necessary two-thirds vote under Article 1 of the Covenant—"without Poland's vote. To condone treaty repudiation for the sake of securing that vote was surely a course of wisdom.

A secret Council meeting on September 16 had already voted unanimously (Portugal and Argentina abstaining, Poland voting affirmatively) to give the USSR a permanent Council seat. On the following day a letter of invitation to Moscow was drafted. Barthou secured thirty signatures and sent it to Litvinov on the 16th. Three days later, despite De Valera's protests at the procedure, letters were exchanged and the Council vote unanimously (Panama, Portugal, and Argentina abstaining) to invite the Assembly to approve. On September 17 the Assembly refused the issue *pro forma* to its Sixth Committee, where a long debate ensued, all to no point since the question was already decided. Most of Switzerland opposed Soviet admission on religious and political grounds. Switzerland, Portugal, and the Netherlands voted against admission. Argentina, Belgium, Cuba, Luxembourg, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela abstained. By a vote of 38 to 3 admission was approved. The Assembly adopted the report, September 20, 1934, by 36 affirmative votes, with the same 7 abstentions and the same 3 in the negative. Motta and De Valera championed Chauvinism and demanded (in vain) Soviet guarantees of liberty of conscience. The Council resolution to give the USSR a permanent seat was then passed unanimously (no abstentions) and Assembly-President Sandler of Sweden invited the Soviet delegation to take its seat.

The day was the third anniversary of the "Mukden incident." It was observed throughout China—but not at Geneva, where such observation would have been even more appropriate—as "National Humiliation Day." Martin Litvinov stopped at the restaurant and spoke "with that frankness and moderation which every of you, knowing me

of old, will grant me." He surveyed Moscow's foreign relations and indicated his country's conception of the League:

To many members of the League ten or fifteen years ago was accorded to be a remote, theoretical danger and there seemed to be no hurry as to its prevention. Now war must appear to all as the threatening danger of tomorrow. The organization of peace, for which thus far very little has been done, must be set against the extremely active organization of war. Everybody knows now that the exposures of the idea of war, upon geographical maps of a refashioning of the map of Europe and Asia by the sword, are not to be intimidated by paper obstacles. . . . Peace and security cannot be organized on the shifting sands of verbal promises and declarations. Nations are not to be lulled into feeling security by assurances of peaceful intentions, however often they are repeated, especially in those places where there are grounds for expecting aggression or where, only the day before, there have been talk and publication about wars of conquest in all directions, for which both ideological and material preparations are being made. We must establish that any State is entitled to demand from its neighbors, near and remote, guarantees for security, and that such a demand is not to be considered as an expression of mistrust. . . . I am convinced that as we observe the fruitful consequences of this course of fresh forces in the common cause of peace we shall always remember with the utmost satisfaction this day as one occupying an honorable place in the annals of peace.<sup>12</sup>

If these high hopes were destined to frustration the fault lay neither with Lénine nor with Barthou. The French Foreign Minister, like the Soviet Commissar, was pledged to the organization of peace in the only fashion which permits of the maintenance of peace in a world divided into potential aggressors and their victims—i.e. collective obligations of mutual defense on the part of all States concerned with the maintenance of order and law in the international community. In September of 1934 the prospects were bright for the realization of this program. On the 12th, at Geneva, a Baltic Entente came into being to supplement the Little and Balkan Ententes. Representatives of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania signed a ten-year Treaty of Good Understanding and Co-operation<sup>13</sup> providing for periodical confer-

cases of their Foreign Ministers. This was not a part of central activities. Certain "specific problems," e.g. Luthardt's quarrel with Poland over Vilna, were detached from the undertaking to re-organize Italian foreign policy. But here was another step toward the organization of collective security in Eastern Europe. Another six months should suffice to realize Barfleur's design.

## 2. MURDER IN MARSEILLE

An essential feature of Barfleur's plan was a French-Italian accord for the effective maintenance of Austrian independence and the resolution of the rivalries between Paris and Rome in the Mediterranean and Africa. He planned to visit Rome on November 6. Preliminary negotiations between the foreign offices were initiated in September. When the archives are opened it may become possible to form an estimate of Barfleur's conception of the terms of an accord with Italy. The guess may be ventured that he was not prepared to buy a settlement with Italy on any terms which would undermine the balance of his program of collective security. Unlike his successor, he would not purchase Italian collaboration in the risk of building the temple of peace at the price of making the temple down. Better in this case to leave Italy outside the system. But whatever the terms might be, he deemed it prudent to secure the status of France's ally on the Adriatic-Jugoslavia.

Next to Poland, Yugoslavia was the most embarrassing of the allies of Paris in the East. That Belgrade should be chronically on bad terms with Rome and Budapest was all but inevitable in view of the post-Versailles settlement which filled Magyars with bitterness over lost provinces and inspired Yugoslavs with lively apprehension over Italian designs on the Dalmatian coast. That Belgrade should be an equally bad name with large groups of its own subjects was perhaps unnecessary. A savage king and a savage dynasty was answerable for violence as the weapon of national unification—and for the counter-violence which the weapon evoked. Alexander Karađorđević was born in 1888 at Cetinje (Montenegro), where his father Peter lived in exile during the rule at Belgrade of the hated dual dynasty of the Obrenovitchs.<sup>1</sup> In 1903, when Alexander Karađorđević was a boy of fifteen, Lieutenant Peter Živković of the palace guards in Belgrade admitted to the royal residence his fellow officers and co-conspirators

who murdered in their beds King Alexander Obrenovich and his contemporary-minister, Queen Draga. The leader of this conspiracy was a Colonel Dragutin Dimitrevich, nicknamed "The Bos." Since there was no heir, the Obrenovich line was ended and the Karađorđeviches came into their own. Peter was King, but George was Crown Prince. But George was a roadster who finally had to be put away. Brother Alexander became Crown Prince in 1909. In the Balkan wars of 1912-13, which doubled Serbia's territory, he became a military leader and hero. In 1914 he was named Prince Regent.

Shortly thereafter another murder plot in which Dimitrevich the Bos had a hand achieved its goal: Habsburg Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife were shot to death by Serb terrorists at Sarajevo, capital of Bosnia, part of "Serbia Unredeemed." Assassination followed. Alexander accompanied his father Peter into exile once more when the Central Powers conquered his country. He became suspicious of the Bos and his Black Hand Society. He suspected him of republican views and of designs upon his life. Moreover, if the peace of the vanquished must be concluded with Vienna and Berlin, the Serbians' conspiracy had lost its significance. Alexander turned to Zichkovitch, who had fallen out with his fellow killer of 1909, and had Dimitrevich shot for treason at Belgrade in 1917. After victory and unification and the passing of Peter in August 1918, the Prince Regent became Alexander I, ruler of the Kingdoms of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

This beneficiary of bloodshed was able and industrious, ruthless and amoral. He chafed under the democratic Constitution of 1901 and supported Nicholas Pashich and the "Old Serbs" in keeping the culturally advanced Croats and Slovenes in a politically inferior position in the new State. The feud between Pashich and Stjepan Radich, leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, dominated Yugoslav politics. Pashich died in December 1918. On June 20, 1918, during a session of the Skupstina, Radich was mortally wounded by a hotheaded Serb deputy. The Croats walked out of parliament and threatened to secede. For a moment the King contemplated granting Croatia independence. But on January 6, 1919 Alexander scrapped the Constitution and proclaimed a royal dictatorship. He changed the name of his State to "Yugoslavia." He imposed "unity" with an iron hand. On September 3, 1921 he issued a new Constitution, nicely calculated to preserve his dictatorship, and named as Prime Minister his old friend General Peter Zichkovitch. A parade of puppet premiers followed,



with Bogdanof Jewish holding the portfolio of foreign affairs after July 2, 1919.<sup>12</sup> The supposed *simulations* were irreconcilable. Radich's successor, Vladimir Marchuk, eschewed violence. But other Croats did not.

Croatian refugees fled to Italy, Belgium, and Hungary. They organized insurrection acts against Alexander's tyranny with the co-operation of officials in these neighboring States. One Dr. Anton Pavdich, chief of the Croat terror organizations known as the *Ustashe*, fled to Sofia in 1920 with another planner, Gustav Perchet, and joined the IMRO. They and their fellows organized many scenes of conspiracy abroad in Ancona, Ravenna, and Bograna in Italy, at Judoz Poonos "Lazni" and at other places in Hungary. When Alexander's agents sought to halt the movements of terrorists across the frontier, there were shootings, border incidents, and diplomatic protests. Budapest denied allegations of harboring plotters and promised at border crossings and measurement of Hungarian farmers on the frontier. Belgrade insisted that Hungary was going aid to the enemies of Alexander's regime. Rome was severely less guaky or negligent, but the Serb dictatorship found it safer to discharge its resentment against hapless Hungary.<sup>13</sup>

Such were the problems troubling Belgrade when Paris invited King Alexander to visit France in the autumn of 1914. Barthou desired to confer with the Yugoslav monarch with regard to their future policies toward Italy and Austria. Alexander left Subotica by sea on October 4 and landed at Marseille on the 9th. He stepped ashore about 4.00 p.m. at the *Quai des Belges* in the old port while a great crowd cheered. Barthou met him at the dock. The two men took arms side by side in an open car which drove into the city amid enthusiastic throngs.

As the car passed the Stock Exchange at the corner of Queen Elizabeth Street at 4.10, a badly man jumped from the sidewalk, evaded 4 policemen, and approached the royal vehicle with a cry of "Vive le roi!" While the nearest camera clicked, he ducked around the head of Colonel Polet of the home guards, leaped on the right running-board of the car, and began firing a revolver at the King. Colonel Polet at once cut him down with his sabre. He crashed and fell from the pavement, killing a policeman and wounding several bystanders, until he was slain by the police and the infuriated mob. The King was dead. Louis Barthou was wounded and died in a hospital less than two hours later.

The assassin carried a Hungarian passport bearing the name of

Joseph Kalmann. His real name was Yehuda Genguliel. He was a Magyar docteur, terrorist, who was an aide and chauffeur of Imre Mihailov, leader of the PNRD, for whom he had already perpetrated a number of political murders. He had been "loaned" to the Ustaas. He had apparently received his arms at Julia Puzos, though Hungary insisted that this infamous center had been closed in the spring. He was linked in a confused web of conspiracy to Prochac and to Fawstich and Kowenski, who were arrested in Tarn at the French Government's request on October 14. Rume, however, refused to extradite these men to France or permit their interrogation by French detectives. Anti-Italian demonstrations broke out in Zagreb, Ljubljana, and other Yugoslav centers. But Rome and Budapest, like Berlin on the aftermath of the murder of Dollfus, adopted a "correct" and conciliatory attitude. Italy expressed horror, extended condolences, extended mourning, and even provided a naval vessel for the Yugoslav cruiser which carried the King's body back from Marseille to Ragusa (Dubrovnik), distant city of the Adriatic. From Dubrovnik his remains were carried to Belgrade, where the Sava meets the Danube. There they lay in state before being interred on October 18 in the colorful Karadjordjevitch crypt at Obolenski. Behind the coffin, along with President Lachon of France, King Carol of Rumania, and other nobles, walked one of the late King's closest friends and a staunch admirer of dictatorship: Sir Neville Henderson, British Minister.

The diplomatic crisis precipitated by the deed at Marseille was resolved by French pressure upon Belgrade. Next complicity in the assassination was ignored. Fawstich was close to Alfred Rosenberg, and Utravich propaganda literature, full of threats against Alexander, Barthou, Benes, and Tintinova, was printed in Germany. It is not impossible that the ultimate murder of Barthou was in Berlin.<sup>11</sup> However . . . ? The Quad d'Orsay, on the eve of a French-Italian rapprochement, induced Jugoslavia to minimize the evidence of Italian complicity and concentration in attack upon delusional Hungary. Rome agreed not to shield Hungary in return for a French pledge of no formal accusations against Italy. Jugoslavia could not risk desertion by France in any conflict with Italy. Hungary could not risk desertion by Italy if it undertook to resist Yugoslav demands. It was understood that the Yugoslav attack upon Budapest would not go beyond words. Gliding east to Belgrade for the funeral and was reported to have suggested a German-Yugoslav alliance. But the time for this was not ripe. Czechoslovakia and Rumania supported their

partner in the Little Entente in indicting the Magyar State.

After these various understandings had been reached behind the scenes, the public drama was presented upon the Geneva stage. On November 20 Jugoslavija appealed to the League against Hungary, alleging that the criminals had been selected by her at Janka Pucara and had left Hungary freely with Hungarian passports. The crime, alleged Belgrade, was but the culmination of years of terrorist activity, inspired and abetted from Budapest. Tiber von Eckhardt replied in a communication of November 24 denying most of the charges. The League Council met in extraordinary session on December 7 and ended the conflict on the 20th by a long resolution which was accepted unanimously.<sup>26</sup>

This compromise formula refrained from accusing Hungary of direct responsibility, but requested it to "take at once appropriate positive action in the case of any of its authorities whose culpability may have been established" and to report back to the Council. To please Jugoslavija and the Little Entente, Alexander was referred to as "the sufferer" and "the Lighthouse King" (Barbarians received no adjectives) and a commission of experts was set up to study the possibility of an international convention to discourage terrorism. In December Belgrade initiated the brutal execution of several thousand innocent Hungarian peasants, but soon discontinued its campaign in the face of indignant criticism from abroad. On January 12, 1921 Hungary informed the Council that a detailed investigation had disclosed no official responsibility for the Marseille crime, but that two police officers had been dismissed and three gendarmes transferred for failing to enforce adequate supervision over Croatian refugees. Anthony Eden informed the Council in May that the issue was closed. In November 1921 two conventions emerged from the deliberations of the experts and were widely signed. One set forth general principles "for the prevention and punishment of terrorism," the other established an international criminal court of five judges for the trial of future cases between the signatories.

Meanwhile shy little Prince Peter, aged eleven, who was studying in England at the time of his father's murder, succeeded to the Yugoslav throne under a Regency provided by Alexander's will. The Council of Regency was headed by the late King's cousin, English-educated Prince Paul. His colleagues were Ivan Petrovich, a Serbian and former Governor of Croatia, and Dr. Radenko Staskovitch, Alexander's physician and sometime Minister of Education. Although

Prince Paul persuaded Prime Minister Jurek (who succeeded Nikola Uroevich on December 11, 1934) to release Croat leader Maschek (see 12), the Regency maintained the royal Serb despotism and made no genuine concessions to Croat and Slovene demands for autonomy. The aging Tzarovich remained Minister of War. On June 10, 1935 "Lucky" Milan Stojadinovich became Premier and Foreign Minister and prepared himself for a long tenure of office. He was tall, athletic, determined, and fanatical. His affection for things German was not limited to the bear of the Munich Hofbräuhaus. He was determined to sustain Belgrade's situation with the Czar at Rome and Berlin—and thereby to play a not inconsiderable role in undoing Barthou's work.

That work was undone chiefly by Barthou's successors at the Quai d'Orsay. Pierre Laval succeeded as Foreign Minister and remained in the post until January 11, 1936—first under Premier Doumergue, who was forced out on November 3, 1934, then under Pierre Édouard Flaudr (November 9, 1934–May 11, 1935) and Fernand Bouisson (June 1–4, 1935). After June 7, 1935 Laval held the Premiership as well. Under his leadership French diplomacy made mistakes and suffered disaster without parallel in half a century.

With Barthou's passing the strong hand was gone. By a strange coincidence two other great practitioners of Realpolitik at the Quai d'Orsay—both heavy with years and long in retirement—followed Barthou to the grave. Raymond Poincaré, War President and Prime Minister, died on October 15, 1934. Philippe Berthelot, for many years guiding genius and permanent Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, died on November 11, 1934. All the great French diplomats of the old school were gone. Those who came after seemed determined to demonstrate that they were disciples of inactivity or folly. Much of what Barthou had done, and more of what he had hoped for, was to be forever lost. But in his brief eight months of office he had built too widely for the young squires who followed him to lose everything at once. The bond between Paris and Moscow was to grow deeper. Laval, Barthou's own words were his best epitaph: "No one ever really dies, least of all when he dies well." "

### 3. VERSAILLES † MARCH 14, 1935

PIERRE LAVAL'S diplomacy of anastrophe during 1935 opened and closed with generous gifts to the Czar of Rome: the opened with

*Mandelstam* of January 7 and the bargain with *Haas* of December 8. These agreements constituted crucial turning-points in the real and tragic history of the French attack upon Bismarck. But their implications for the game of high politics among the European Great Powers were of even greater moment. Laval and Simon played the diplomatic game in 1933 just as *Papen* and *Hugenberg* had played the German political game in 1933—with identical results. Laval spurned Moscow and preferred Rome as ally against Berlin; he paid Rome's price, which was the betrayal of the League of Nations and the whole system of collective security which Bismarck had sought to strengthen, in paying this price he opened the door to the expedition of both the Treaty of Versailles and the Pact of Locarno by the Third Reich, and he then discovered *post hoc* (for he was blind to the end) that the Roman Caesar had made off with the booty that Laval had offered him, and had forthwith aligned himself with the German Caesar against France. Laval found France strong and respected. He left France weak and contemptible.

Laval's first step was to postpone all action on the Eastern Locarno project for the purpose of placating Poleski and conciliating Hitler. He dined with Berlin and Warsaw throughout November. On December 4, at a special meeting of the League Council called to deal with the Suez, he conferred with Ribbentrop, Nazi commissioner for disarmament questions. Lortzow was anxious and resentful. Rather than risk an open break with Moscow, Laval agreed to put his name to a joint declaration issued at Geneva on December 5, 1933.<sup>10</sup> It expressed "the common resolution of the two Governments to carry to a conclusion the contemplated international work" (the Eastern Locarno), neither would negotiate with others invited to participate, "and particularly with those who have not yet adhered in principle" (i.e. Germany), for the conclusion of any bilateral or multilateral records which might compromise the project or be contrary to its spirit, each would keep the other informed of all such proposals and "the two Governments will refrain from announcing the enterprise without having by common consent agreed upon the desirability of continued negotiations."

Despite this agreement, Laval's distrust was well founded. Laval now felt free to pursue his negotiations for a "entente" with Italy—not an entente which Bismarck would have deemed wise, but an entente which Lauriot-Lecats were madmen. The result was the bargain of January 7, 1935—of which more soon. Apart from the French-Italian

deal in Africa, which was the essence of the accord and the root of Laval's folly, the agreement contained the promise (December 12, 1931) of arms equality to Germany, but declared that no State was entitled to modify its obligations by unilateral action. Should this be attempted, France and Italy would act in concert. As for Austria, the Rome agreement provided no solution and no security for independence. Should Schuschnigg's State be menaced, France and Italy would "consult"—happy word committing no one to anything! They recommended a convention of peaceful non-intervention to be concluded between Austria and all her immediate neighbours—Switzerland, and to be open thereafter to signature by France, Poland, and Rumania. Laval's bargain with Czecho-Slovakia was approved for ratification by the French Chamber on March 11, 1935 10-9, and by the Senate unanimously on March 12—after it had borne its first blow in Hitler's blow of March 16.

The reception accorded in other capitals to Laval's diplomatic manoeuvres was gratifying to its author. Only Moscow was suspicious. Only Warsaw was displeased. The Little Entente, meeting at Lyblikum on January 12, expressed "misfaction." The Balkan Entente expressed, but voiced the hope on January 20 that the Eastern Pact would now be concluded. The French and Italian Ambassadors visited Wilhelmshafen on January 4 to inform von Neupfahl of the agreement. Ambassador von Hassel in Rome raised questions with Il Duce on the last day of the month: Were Britain and Switzerland not to be included in the proposed Austrian convention? How long were France and Italy bound to consult on Austria in the absence of a multilateral accord? Did they reserve for themselves a right of intervention in Austria? Mussolini was evasive. Official Britain was overjoyed. Great vistas of "appeasement" loomed before Downing Street in consequence of the "understanding" at Rome. With almost diabolical regularity the British Cabinet was henceforth, once a year, to pin great hopes on a settlement with Czecho-Slovakia—and each time it was to be tricked and betrayed for its pains.

Meanwhile, without a crisis, the problem of the Saar was disposed of. By Articles 45-46 and Annex of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany had ceded to France "full and absolute possession" of the Saar coal mines as compensation for the destruction of mines in northern France. The Reich had requested governments of the Saar area to the League as trustees. The League was to appoint a Governing Commission of five members. After fifteen years all Saarlanders over twenty

years of age at the time of voting, and residents on the territory on June 18, 1933, would express their choice as between union with France, union with Germany, or maintenance of the League regime. After the plebiscite the League Council would decide on disposition of the territory. On November 29, 1933 Hitler proposed to the French Ambassador in Berlin that the Saar be returned without a plebiscite. On January 30, 1934 he declared that once the Saar problem was settled Germany "would be prepared and determined not only to accept the latter but also the spirit of the Locarno Pact." He proposed a French-German accord. Paris refused. Saarlander Nazis in the *Deutscher Front* initiated a campaign of coercion and terrorism in preparation for the voting, and threatened "long knives" against enemies after victory. On November 28, 1933 the Governing Commission forbade military drilling on the wearing of badges.

The League Council on June 4, 1934 appointed a Plebiscite Commission to prepare voting lists and electoral machinery. It comprised M. Victor Henry, M. Daniel de Jaugh, and M. A. E. Rohde of Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Sweden respectively, with Miss Sarah Washburn of the United States as technical adviser.<sup>17</sup> On December 8 a Council resolution invited Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden to send contingents for an international police force to keep order during the plebiscite. Following their acceptance, 1,500 British, 1,500 Italian, 150 Dutch, and 150 Swedish troops were placed at the disposal of the Governing Commission by the Council.<sup>18</sup> Meanwhile a French-German economic agreement of December 3, 1934 provided that in the event of a return of the Saar to Germany the Reich would buy back the mines, railways, and other properties for 500,000,000 francs to be paid within five years, partly in coal and partly in notes of the Bank of France circulating in the Saar.<sup>19</sup>

Neither the Governing Commission, the international police force, nor the League Council in their efforts to safeguard the secret ballot could prevent those Saarlanders who were not already converted Nazis from having their vote for France or for the status quo would be discovered and punished by the all-seeing eyes of Hitler's agents. The result of the plebiscite of January 13, 1935 was so nearly unanimous that the NSDAP could claim that all Germans, even when under foreign police surveillance and protected from all pressure, were financial disciples of *Das Fuhrer*. Out of an electorate of 510,521, no less than 97.9%, or 518,205, cast ballots. Of these 477,219 (92.15%) voted for reunion with Germany, 48,413 (9.85%) for the status quo,

2,114 (6.4%) for annexation to France, with 2,197 (6.4%) voted *abst.*<sup>10</sup> Five days after the voting the League Council passed a resolution providing for the transfer of the Saar to the Reich on March 1.<sup>11</sup> Thus ended an experiment in international administration and a feature of Mass struggles of triumph.<sup>12</sup>

Laval and Sir John Simon now looked forward confidently to a "general settlement" with a satisfied and co-operative Reich. Laval and Flandin came to London on January 31 in response to Sir John's invitation. After protracted discussion a communiqué was issued on February 5. The object of the meeting was said to be the promotion of "the peace of the world in a spirit of most friendly confidence." The Ministers "welcomed the successful results" of recent League action "as evidence of a conciliatory spirit." The British Government "cordially welcomed the declaration by which the French and Italian Governments have assumed their intention to develop the traditional friendship which unites the two nations" and associated itself with them "in collaboration in a spirit of mutual trust in the maintenance of general peace." It further extended congratulations on the conclusion of the Rome agreement regarding Austria and declared that under the Anglo-French-Italian declaration of February 17 and September 17, 1914 it considered itself "to be among the Powers which will . . . co-act together if the independence and integrity of Austria are menaced." Hope was expressed that progress might be continued "by means of the direct and effective co-operation of Germany. They are agreed that neither Germany nor any other Power whose armistices have been defined by the Peace Treaties is entitled by unilateral action to modify these obligations. But they are further agreed that nothing would contribute more to the restoration of confidence and the prospects of peace among nations than a general settlement freely negotiated between Germany and the other Powers."

The Simon-Laval conception of this "general settlement" was near set forth. Security must be organized by peace "inspiring mutual confidence in Eastern Europe and the system introduced in the Rome protocol verbal for Central Europe. Simultaneously, and in conformity with the terms of the declaration of December 12, 1917, regarding equality of rights in a system of security, this settlement would establish agreements regarding armistices generally which, in the case of Germany, would replace the provisions of Part V of the Treaty of Versailles at present limiting the arms and armed forces of Germany. . . . Germany should resume her place in the League of Nations."



Finally—and this was a relatively new proposal—it was suggested that a Western European air pact, including France, Britain, Germany, Italy, and Belgium, should be negotiated whereby "the signatories would undertake immediately to give the assistance of their air forces to whichever of them might be the victim of unprovoked aerial aggression by one of the contracting parties." Other interested Powers were invited to reply.<sup>22</sup>

On the evening of February 3 Sir John Simon broadcast an explanation of the projected air pact, his nervous voice and emphatic pronouncements betraying apprehensions for the Beverbrook-Bathurst-High Tory isolationists might suspect that new "foreign arrangements" were contemplated. He contended that no commitments beyond those of Locarno were involved, but that the proposal would make Britain a beneficiary as well as a guarantor.<sup>23</sup> Laval's broadcast the same evening bespoke "peace" and "security" and the hope that Germany would respond to the pressing appeal addressed to it.<sup>24</sup>

Stripped of their embellishments, the Anglo-French proposals of February 3, 1935 constituted an offer to release the Reich from the *disarmament* provisions of the Treaty of Versailles and to grant it equality in armaments on condition of the acceptance of four pledges: (1) respect for the independence of Austria through participation in the non-intervention agreement proposed at Rome; (2) respect for the integrity of the Rhine east of Germany through participation in an Eastern Locarno; (3) respect for the security of the Western States through participation in a Western European Air Locarno; and (4) respect for the independence, integrity, and security of all other States through acceptance of the obligations of the League Covenant. Since each of these arrangements would be reciprocal, Germany would not merely incur obligations but would enjoy all the advantages provided therein. If Simon and Laval expected the Reich to accept these conditions or others of similar import, they were proceeding on the hypothesis that the program of *Mein Kampf* had been abandoned and that the Nazi regime was exclusively concerned with "Frieden und Gleichberechtigung." If they anticipated rejection, their only purpose could have been to compel the Third Reich to lay bare its program of Pan-Germanism, Drang nach Osten, and Continental hegemony—in which case the Grand Alliance à la Barthou would presumably be forged. But neither then nor later did they or their successors draw Barthou's conclusions or even accept his premises, despite repeated exposures of Nazi diplomatic objectives. Their hypoth-

was half mystery and half middle. For Berlin it was enough to notice that a promise had been laid out and that its conditions were set forth not as a *give and take* but as a basis for negotiations.

Hitler noted that Belgium and Italy welcomed the prospects of an Air League, that the USSR and the Little Entente were alarmed, and that Flavin in the Chamber on February 5 hinted that this "bright idea" be made the object of a special convention." *Devils at empire* remained the sign of Nazi strategy as a matter of necessity for the dozen of all who hope with slender resources to survive and vanquish overwhelming odds. How to encourage London and Paris to persist in their conciliatory line by pretending to assume obligations of collective security? How to split East and West? How to subvert collective security beyond Bucharest, Berlin, and Koenigsberg where the coming Empire was to be conquered? How to serve collective security beyond the Rhine in order to safeguard Germany's rear? How, above all, to get Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay by the ears and close them to contact with one another instead of facing the Reich in unity?

Hitler had answers. On February 14, 1935 Wilhelmstrasse defined a memorandum to the British Ambassador in Berlin. It was courteous, confidential, and clever. "Germany is in agreement with the British and French Governments in a sincere desire to promote the safeguarding of peace, the maintenance of which is in the interests of Germany's security as well as in the interests of the security of other European States." Germany "welcomes the spirit of truthful discussion" and will examine all proposals "in the spirit of a sincere desire for peace as well as a concern for the security of the German Reich in its especially exposed geographical position in the heart of Europe." Germany will also study means of avoiding an arms race, "which danger has arisen from the standstillism by the heavily armed States of disarmament as prescribed by treaties." Most important, "the German Government welcomes the proposition to increase security against sudden attack from the air by a convention to be made as soon as possible which shall provide for the immediate employment of the air forces of the signatories in favor of the victims of an unprovoked air attack. The German Government is ready in principle to employ its air forces [the Reich was forbidden by treaty to possess any air forces] as a means of deterring disturbances of the peace. It is therefore willing to seek, in free accord with the Powers concerned, ways and means by which such a convention can be realized, which shall

guarantee the fullest possible security to all states." But large-scale negotiations had to precede. Bilateral discussions are preferable. The German Government "would therefore welcome it if, after the preliminary Franco-British discussions, the British Government were first to decide as mediator—as that partner of the London discussions which is, at the same time, the guarantor of the Locarno Pact—to enter into a direct exchange of views with the German Government." "

The meeting thus constituted a perfect test of the possibility of dividing Paris and London. Laval represented some anxiety and urged a joint Anglo-French reply to Berlin. A Soviet note to London and Paris of February 20 emphasized the indivisibility of peace and urged that regional agreements as substitutes for European security, "far from strengthening the prospects of peace," could rather be considered as an open encouragement to a breach of the peace." Drawing Soviet interest, however, on sending its own reply to Berlin, through it accepted *pro forma* the French view as to the indivisibility of the prospects of February 3. Hitler was so informed by the British Government on February 11 in a note suggesting that bilateral negotiations not only were acceptable to London but would be facilitated by a special mission. "It would not be the object of such a mission to assist one party to the exclusion of others." On the following day Hitler gave his *pro forma* concurrence." Sir John told Combarieu on February 15 that he would shortly go to Berlin. Three days later he went to Paris and conferred with a dubious Flandin and a surprised Laval as to the line he should take with Germany regarding the Danubian and Eastern peace. The date of his Berlin visit was fixed for March 5. Plans were also laid for a visit to Warsaw and Moscow to allay suspicion.

Here was much more than Der Führer had bargained for. He had not persuaded the British Cabinet that it should separate the Western Als-Lorraine from the projected Austrian and Eastern accords, but he had persuaded it to accept bilateral negotiations. Still better, he had with scarcely half an effort convinced the British Foreign Minister that he should come to Berlin. Simon was coming, to be sure, to discuss the conditions upon which Germany might be granted some equality. The conditions thus far suggested were highly unequal. But the important thing was that he was willing and even anxious to come. Such anxiety for negotiations, such an ardent desire for a "general settlement"—even at the cost of Anglo-French co-operation and most probably, despite doubts, at the cost of vanishing East and

What in discussions of security—could be made good use of. Dag Filmer prepared a warm reception for Sir John—and then, with the aid of a British diplomatic blunder, yielded to a new inspiration.

On March 4, 1933 His Majesty's Majesty's Stationery Office published, over the initials of Prime Minister Ramsey MacDonald, Parliamentary Command Paper No. 4817 of 1933: "Statement Relating to Defense." This 286-page document was issued in routine fashion in preparation for the debate on armaments scheduled for Commons on March 15. It was general in form and contained no reference to the recent negotiations. It merely reviewed the disarmament discords and British defense policy. And inevitably it referred to the Nazi rearmament program. Section III, § 12 contained the following paragraph:

On the 15th November 1932 His Majesty's Government gave public assent to the armaments on which Germany was engaged, and announced a speeding up of the increase in the Air Force already decided upon. The action of His Majesty's Government did not, of course, imply condonation of a breach of the Treaty of Versailles. It merely noted and made public, as a first step, what was known to be proceeding. The armaments, if increased as the present rate, unchecked and uncontrolled, will aggravate the existing tensions of the neighbors of Germany and may consequently produce a situation whose peace will be in peril. His Majesty's Government have noted and welcomed the declaration of the leaders of Germany that they desire peace. They cannot, however, fail to recognize that not only the forces but the spirit in which the population, and especially the youth of the country, are being organized lend color to, and substantiate, the general feeling of insecurity which has already been repeatedly expressed.<sup>11</sup>

On the morning of March 5 Bacon was Neurath informed the British Ambassador that Hitler had a "cold" and would appreciate a postponement of Sir John Simon's visit. Obviously German feelings were hurt and German honor was engaged by the blunt language of the White Paper. Lord Lothian, who as Philip Kerr had once served as Lloyd George's secretary and had joined the hue and cry for "hanging the Kaiser" and making Germany "pay to the last farthing," explained that the Reich would no longer accept cooked-up plans presented on a plate. He now demonstrated sympathetically on the reasons for Nazi irritation.<sup>12</sup> In some parenthesis, Simon asked the Polish and Soviet Ambassadors on March 4 whether their Governments would still welcome a visit. Since neither Pilsudski nor Stalin had "colds," the query was unnecessary. On the 7th Sir John told Commons that Anthony Eden would go first to Paris, then accompany

John to Berlin, and then proceed to Moscow. This procedure was designed to meet French and Soviet objections to Simon's proposed pilgrimage to the Reich. Two days later Neurath expressed the hope that Simon would come to Berlin at the end of March. Reassurances were exchanged. The date was set for March 14.

On March 12 the Rt. Hon. Stanley Baldwin, Lord President of the Council, explained all to Commons: "If the House expects me today to stand in a white sheet because of the White Paper, it will make a great mistake." With unswerving humor in the light of things to come within six months, he declared that "One of the greatest perils that have met democracies in the past, and meet them today, is when their leaders have not the courage to tell them the truth." And with a wholly unintended irony, in the light of things to come within six days, he asserted that Sir John's visit "will take place in about a fortnight's time, and I should like to express the hope that by that time Herr Hitler will be in full possession of his normal strength."

Before a fortnight was to pass, Herr Hitler's strength would transcend the limits of normalcy and become phenomenal. He had come to a great decision. Precisely when it was reached, and in consultation with whom, cannot yet be said with certainty. But some time about the idea of March he and his advisers had made a correct assessment of Simon and Laval and of the opportunity before them and had decided upon bold action, unilateral repudiation of Part V of the Treaty of Versailles, without warning and without negotiation. Such an act would be an open challenge to the victors of 1918 and a virtual threat that the Reich was determined to undo the work of the First World War. It would enable the Allied and Associated Powers with the full warrant of the law to impose the severest financial, economic, and military penalties, under the impact of which the Nazi regime might well be compelled to yield, since it had as yet no adequate means of resistance. But Hitler reck it far greater that the conquerors of the Second Reich were no longer either allied or associated. He asserted that Paris would bluster and threaten, but would do nothing without British support. He asserted that London in its anxiety for "appeasement" not only would take no positive steps to punish Germany but would sabotage all French efforts in this direction. He asserted that defiance not only would be met with ultimate acquiescence but would precipitate prolonged controversies between London, Paris, and Rome which in turn would furnish new opportunities for German "maneuvering." He could not foresee the scope or duration of the

unimpaired even-tempered wrinkles nor the depths of British desire for "agreements" nor the complacency of Lloyd's partyism, for these things passed all understanding. But he saw enough and he saw truly. His suspicions were correct.

The brilliantly successful venture in the rude diplomacy of the *fait accompli* was foreshadowed by a number of creative and perhaps experimental steps during the preceding week. The French Cabinet was heavily involved in consideration of measures to compensate for the "lost years" of conscription. Between 1919 and 1919 the average annual French birth-rate was only 11.3 per thousand, compared to 18.8 between 1911 and 1914. During the years when the babies of the War period should come of military age, there would be an actual overage of conscripts of only 120,000 in place of the norm of 140,000. Marshal Fauriol urged that military service be extended from one to two years. The text of a draft bill published March 11 by the Minister of War proposed a new military law for the 1936-9 period, authorizing an age extension from twenty-one to twenty and an extension of the period of service. The Cabinet approved this proposal on the 11th, but the Radical Socialist Party was against it. Flaudin thereupon decided to avail himself of the opportunity, afforded by Article 40 of the military law of 1918, to prolong the service period without new legislation. He so informed the Chamber on the 13th and was upheld.

Meanwhile, on the 10th, Göring had informed a representative of the *London Daily Mail*, a pro-Nazi Rothemann street, that Germany was building a military air force. On the 13th Berlin announced that the German offer of April 16, 1934 to renounce possession of bombing planes no longer held good. On the 15th it was stated that Göring, Minister of Air, would be subordinate to Blomberg, Minister of Defense. Work was pushed on a colossal building on Wilhelmstrasse to contain three thousand rooms to house the Air Ministry. That the Third Reich was constructing a military air fleet in violation of the terms of the Treaty had long been suspected abroad. These announcements were apparently designed to rix foreign reactions. Aside from a few feeble protests, and these largely unofficial, there was no outcry. Official Paris was preoccupied with the shortage of recruits. Official London was preoccupied with the new British armament estimates and with optimistic preparation for Severn's journey to Berlin. Any lingering doubts which Hitler may have entertained regarding the wisdom of his contemplated action must have been removed by these developments.

The great blow was struck on Saturday, the 16th of March 1933. The Führer found Saturday a good day for diplomatic and military strokes, as he had earlier found the late evening a good time for political harangues—and for the same reason: resistance was at a low ebb at the end of a week, no less than at the end of a day. The British intervention of the "week-end" and the Christian immersion of the Sabbath both assured inaction almost until Monday morning or later. By then the psychological moment for action would have passed. The busiest days of Nazi diplomatic victories are all Saturdays: October 14, 1933; March 16, 1933; March 7, 1935; March 12, 1935; October 7, 1935. On the second of these days three pronouncements were filed from Berlin: the machine-gun bullet. One was the text of a address which was communicated to the British, French, Polish, and Italian Ambassadors:

#### **Law for the Re-Creation of the National Defense Forces**

The Reich Government has enacted the following law, which is herewith proclaimed:

1. Service in the defense forces is pronounced an universal military service.
  2. The German police army, including police units which have been incorporated in the army, shall compose entire corps commands and therefore divisions.
  3. Supplementary laws for regulating universal military service will be drafted and submitted to the Reich Cabinet by the Reich Minister for Defense.
- Signed by the Führer and all the members of the Reich Government.

Another pronouncement came from the NSDAP:

... We shall permit day the honor of the German nation has been stained. We stand erect as a free people among nations. As a sovereign State we are free to negotiate and propose to negotiate as the negotiation of peace. We again point the German army in order to defend our German homeland by force of arms. The history and life of our people are inseparable from which is arm-bearing Europe can be reorganized only through the strength of the German army. The memory of the glorious German army will be glorious history a new re-organizes a pole historic phenomenon. Phenomenon: Germany has again a military force worthy of that tradition, an army of peace which is also ready to defend itself in the last case if attacked, an army of which we can be proud. ...

In this historic hour the German people do not forget what they owe their leader. They know everything that has been created in his work, that he has given directed the fate of Germany into new channels, into channels of honor and freedom. The products which the German people offer him for this conduct of the broadest mass work which they stand behind him and his unswerving deed.

The third pronouncement was a proclamation by Hitler to the German people. Its appeal to frustrated German patriotism was as

ideal as its plea for "sympathy" and "understanding" abroad. Our Führer began with useful references to the Ambler, Wilson's Fourteen Points, the League of Nations, and the completeness of Germany's unilateral disarmament under the Treaty. The Reich had disarmed. The others had repudiated their pledged word to disarm. Worse, they had added to their armaments. Germany was ready to accept the MacDonald plan, but others rejected it. Germany was justified equality, but denied it. It was obliged in haste to leave the Conference and the League. But it had made new proposals. They too were declined along with "Italian and English proposals along similar lines."

Under these circumstances, the German Government are itself compelled of its own accord to take those necessary measures which would insure the end of a condition of impotent debasement of a poor people and Reich, which was in security so in the last analysis it was menacing. In so doing it proceeded from the same premises which Mr. Balfour in his last speech so vividly expressed. "A country which is not willing to adopt the necessary preventive measures for its own defense will never enjoy any peace in this world, either actual or material."

But the Reich seeks only peace. It had proposed non-aggression pacts to all its neighbors. It had achieved friendship with Poland. It "has finally given France the solemn assurance that Germany, after the adjustment of the Saar question, now no longer will make territorial demands upon France." But the Soviet army of conquest and the extension of French military service to two years again new problems.

Under these circumstances the German Government considers it impossible any longer to refrain from taking the necessary measures for the security of the Reich or even to hide the knowledge thereof from the other nations. . . . For in this hour the German Government turns before the German people, before the entire world, its assessment of its determination never to proceed beyond the safeguarding of German honor and freedom of the Reich, and especially does it not intend in warning Germany to erect any instrument for weapons attack, but, on the contrary, exclusively for defense and thereby for the maintenance of peace. In so doing, the German Reich Government expresses the confident hope that the German people, being again reverted to their own basis, may be privileged in independent equality to make their contribution toward the pacification of the world in



*free and open co-operation with other nations and their governments.*"<sup>47</sup>

The initial reaction of the British press to these declarations was highly gratifying to Berlin. Liberals and Laborites cried out in alarm and indignation. But the great Tory organs which spoke so (and for) those who had elected the National Government<sup>48</sup> were not merely complacent but co-operative. Mr. Garvin's *Sunday Observer* declared that the German act "need cause no surprise . . . . A panic would be an absurdity. What we can't prevent we must reckon with. Germany's equity, often promised, is confirmed in Sir John Simon's impending visit to Berlin. A hard light is now thrown on hard facts. We are now on the bed-rock of realism and that may prove to be the quickest and most reliable route to peace."<sup>49</sup> Lord Desborough's *Sunday Express* declared that no comparison of Germany should or would be attempted. Locarno was a mistake and an Eastern Locarno would be a still greater one. "We must keep our heads clear and our hands free. . . . For four centuries we have exposed the quarrels of Europe. Those four centuries of war never brought us one half a century of peace. Had them now. With our eyes on the future, not on the past, with our hands labouring to build not destroy, let us turn now to our own people all over the world."<sup>50</sup>

The Nazi rulers may have expected Britain's isolationism to behave like ostriches. They could scarcely have expected the British Foreign Ministry to behave like Simple Simon. If the diplomatic sequel could be divorced from its ultimately tragic implications, it would be appropriate material for Gilbert and Sullivan. It is a rule of diplomacy as of business that one should never offer to sell for a price something which can be had for nothing. This rule both Simon and Laval forgot. It is a corollary rule that one should never pay for anything which can be had gratis. This rule Hitler remembered. An additional rule holds that one should never forbid another to do something which he has already done unless one is prepared to undo what has been done by force. This rule both Laval and Simon again forgot. The result was slapstick.

With sound money unsupported by will, the Quai d'Orsay moved at once for a united allied protest in Berlin, an appeal to the League of Nations, and a consideration of punitive and remedial measures. It made the reasonable assumption that since Sir John had intended to go to Germany to discuss the conditions upon which the Western

Paris would grant to the Reich that "arms equality" which the Reich had now asked unconditionally, he would of course cancel his visit. One does not bargain for snakes already lost. But Laval reckoned without Sir John. On Monday morning, March 18, he hastened to send an independent British communication to Berlin before French pressure upon him should become too heavy. This remarkable despatch pronounced mildly on Germany's unilateral action, which "as said to be" misinterpreted seriously as "increased uneasiness in Europe." It reviewed the communications of February 3 and the circumstances giving rise to the proposed visit to Berlin. The meeting had as its object "to carry considerations a stage further on all the matters referred to in the Anglo-French communiqué." Therefore—Downing Street, far from cancelling the journey, requested that the mission be renewed! Thus.

The Majesty's Government are most unwilling to abandon any opportunity which the arranged visit might afford of promoting a general understanding, but in the new circumstances before undertaking it they feel bound to call the attention of the German Government to the above considerations, and they wish to be assured that the German Government will desire the visit to take place within the scope and for the purposes previously agreed.<sup>66</sup>

Neurath was delighted to give Sir Eric Phipps an oral answer of the invitation the same afternoon. Paris was outraged. The Quai d'Orsay protested to London and demanded joint action, a three-Power conference (Britain, France, and Italy), and an appeal to Geneva. Simon refused. Germany, he contended, must participate. What point in a conference to discuss treaty-breaking without the co-operation of the treaty-breakers? The point that Sir John would concede was that Eden should go to Paris to meet French and Italian spokesmen in advance of Simon and then accompany Simon to Berlin. Thus belated, Laval prepared his own protest to the Reich. On Wednesday, March 20, the French Cabinet approved a note to the Secretary-General of the League and another note to Berlin and authorized Laval to go to Moscow. The note to Geneva was dispatched the same day. It declared that Germany had "deliberately repudiated by a unilateral act the contractual engagements embodied in the treaties which Germany has signed."<sup>67</sup> Under Article 12, 1c of the Covenant, France requested an extraordinary session of the Coun-

off to surmise the decision. The French protest to Berlin of March 21 was sharply worded. Paris made "the most formal protestation against those measures with regard to which it now makes all reservations" and reaffirmed "its firm resolution not to accept in any negotiation that any consideration be given unilateral decisions taken in violation of international engagements."<sup>12</sup> A shockwave of protest now followed the French model in declaring that in future discussions Rome could not "simply accept as decisions of fact those acts determined by unilateral decision which would undertakings of an international character."<sup>13</sup>

The high comedy of these communications can be appreciated only in the light of the contemporary and subsequent attitudes of the three Western Powers toward Ethiopia. The Government at Rome, while busily engaged in preparing an act of lawless aggression against a defenceless African kingdom, championed peace and the sanctity of treaties in its protest to Berlin. The Government at Paris, while busily engaged in sabotaging every effort to protect Ethiopia at Geneva, appealed to its Götter against Germany. The Government at London, which would soon be busily engaged in pretending to invoke League sanctions against Italy to uphold such an international obligation, was acquiescent toward German treaty repudiation and opposed any League action against the Reich. The Women of Wilhelmstrasse rocked with scorn glee.

On Thursday, March 22, the German Government *rejected* the French and Italian protest on the correct assumption that words would not be followed by action. On Friday Sir John, in a long address, as distinguished for its apparent earnestness as for its lack-thence, undertook to explain to Germans what had happened and what was about to happen. The proposed visit were to be "explanatory." You "have to acquire and learn the points of view of others rather than to reach a precise position of your own and then present it to other people to accept." (The latter procedure Sir John was anxious to leave to Hitler.) The visit to Berlin was based upon the German invitation of February 27. He had accepted it with French and Italian approval. The German action of March 16 "came as a profound shock. . . . Everybody can see—I should do no good if I attempted to suppress or disguise a reflection—that unilateral decision, whatever the explanation may be, inevitably raises questions as to the value of agreements, and that is a very bad preparation for future agreement." But "to refuse to go, to cancel your engagements,

why not, it leads you nowhere. We demanded an assurance that the scope of the conversations which I have already described should be in no way restricted." Agreement, to be sure, might be difficult since the German figure for effective "concrete" war armaments in Western Europe at the present time could reach 200,000. But we go far beyond. Germany must be brought back into the comity of Europe. "We are not contemplating any special agreement between this country and any other." (Hitler would have changed Sir John's mind in this.) There would be meetings and more meetings. "Our object is to get everybody to face the facts and to face them ourselves, and all the facts."<sup>12</sup>

Not until Sunday, March 15, a full week after the Nazi diplomatic bombshell, was any semblance of agreement arrived at between London, Paris, and Rome. A communiqué was issued at the Quai d'Orsay after the conference:

At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Paris-Lord, Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, British Lord Privy Seal, and Fulvio Spreti, Italian Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, met and proceeded to exchange views on the general situation. In the course of the conversations it was recalled that the visit of the French Minister to Berlin was of an exploratory character and that the scope and purposes of their conversations would be those agreed upon in the London conversations of February 3, in regard to which the identity of views of London, Paris, and Rome has been affirmed. It was decided that after this visit and the other British visit to Moscow, Warsaw, and Prague, all of which are undertaken with the good wishes of the other two Governments, the British, French, and Italian Foreign Ministers would meet at Rome on April 11. Mr. Lord, Mr. Eden, and Signor Spreti noted with satisfaction the complete identity of purpose of their Governments.<sup>13</sup>

This "agreement" was a compromise and a postponement. The British Foreign Minister agreed merely to "explore" and not make any bargains with Berlin behind French and Italian backs. But within two days he would be initiating a bilateral Anglo-German bargain in French expense. He agreed, no doubt reluctantly, that Germany should not be invited to the projected conference at Rome. In return France agreed that the League Council should not meet until after Rome. That the "complete identity of purpose" was neither complete nor an identity was clear from the very fact that a conference at Rome was deemed necessary. Simon might have gone to Paris himself instead of sending Eden, but he wished to avoid any appearance of prior agreement with Paris and Rome before going to Berlin. Postponement was of the essence of Downing Street's program, for with

postponement French determination to do anything beyond what might reasonably be expected to wait.

The French order for action was in any event not pronounced. On the day of the Paris conversations M. Josef Lapsis called upon Baron von Neurath to express Poland's private anxieties. But Warsaw could scarcely be counted upon to act if France would take no action. Italy could most certainly not be counted upon. If Duce was preparing the rape of Ethiopia, Laval was giving him support. For either of them to press for positions against Germany would be embarrassing. Those who prepare great havoc and worldwide cannot complain of mere breach of contract. French troops were moved up to the German frontier. The Superior Council of National Defense met in Paris. But it was explained that this was a "purely technical rearrangement of defense forces," flowing from the reduction of French forces on the Italian border in consequence of the Laval-Mussolini agreement. Having arranged himself to Duce, Laval could scarcely see against Der Führer, despite the fact that the Rome accord had no meaning save as a basis for a French-Italian front against Berlin.

It was under these circumstances that Sir John voyaged to Berlin on Sunday, March 14. It was by now clear that the Western Powers would acquiesce in what the Third Reich had done. Months of debate might follow, but while the debates raged, Germany's new army would be trained, equipped, and brought to the highest level of fighting efficiency. Bombing planes, paratroop craft, tanks, heavy guns, submarines, cruisers, dreadnaughts would pour forth from the foundries of the Ruhr, the factories of Saxony, and the shipyards of Bremen and Hamburg. Versailles was already dead, though the rest of its articles might still seem to stand. The verdict of 1918 was already undone, since the Reich was now free to arm to the teeth, to seek allies, and to adjust toward hegemony over the Continent.

This "German miracle" was the fruit of Hitler's genius. But it was made possible only by the incredible folly and blindness of the rulers of the French Republic and of the United Kingdom—of the upper classes which adulated France and would sacrifice national interests rather than oppose it, of the middle classes that sought a comfortable peace of isolationist security in a world of chaos, of the befuddled masses that knew little of high politics and shrank from states even though the shrinking might ultimately mean death, of unscrupulous press magnates, self-seeking arms-makers, cautious financiers, and, above all, of political leaders who furnished no leadership and accused

their irresponsibility by presenting as *be responsible* an electioneering which demanded responsibility. Hitler would discover that new campaigns and threats could beat Sir John into still greater concessions. Laval would discover that Sir John was quite prepared in the name of peace and the highest morality to sacrifice French interests on the Rhine altar. And Sir John and his successors would discover that Laval, in the name of the highest morality and of peace, was quite prepared to sacrifice Geneva and London alike on the altar of Munich. Henceforth a European force was to turn into rapidly one dignity or beauty.

The beneficiary was the Third Reich. At Munich, on the memorial to the War dead at the University, is an inscription: *severis victi victoribus*—"To the Unconquered from the Conquered who will yet Conquer." This promise Hitler was destined to fulfill.

## *PACT COUNTER-PACT*

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### 1. ISOLA BELLA

ON MONDAY and Tuesday, March 27-28, 1935, Sir John Simon and Anthony Eden conferred at length with Hitler and Neurath in the German capital. Herr von Ribbentrop and Sir Eric Phipps participated. No minutes of these conversations have been published to date, nor is any second-hand account from either British or German sources complete or reliable. The communiqué of March 28 was empty: it simply declared that "a complete clarification of the respective points of view" had resulted from conversations "carried on in the frank and friendly spirit." "It was established that the aim of the policy of both Governments is to secure and strengthen the peace of Europe by promoting international co-operation. Both the British and German Ministers are satisfied as to the usefulness of the direct conversations which have been taking place."<sup>1</sup> Sir John's "explanations" in Commons on March 28 and April 2 revealed little, for they were designed to put the best possible face upon a diplomatic fiasco which was little short of appalling.

From available clues, credible rumors, and the subsequent course of events it is possible to reconstruct the outlines of the Berlin conference. Two general techniques were open to Das Fikere. He could appear conciliatory and co-operative, to soothe British suspicions. Or he could bluster and threaten, to excite British fears. Which procedure promised a maximum of political advantage? British suspicions were not a factor which needed to be taken too seriously. Sir John and the Cabinet had already demonstrated in word and deed that their confidence in German "goodwill" was almost impeccable, their anxiety for "appeasement" profound, and their opposition ad-

ment to any program of coercion or embolism. They had already served Hitler's purposes in disheartening Paris and striking all pretense for positive measures against the Reich. The German Chancellor assumed that these attitudes were relatively permanent and needed no further encouragement from Berlin. Thiers and Blum, however, might shake their optimism with regard to the possibility of a "general settlement." Such a shock might throw London into the arms of Paris and Moscow. But this was impossible since the British Ministry accepted Paris, feared Moscow more than Berlin, and hoped for "compromise" at almost any price. It was most likely to convince them that further concessions to Germany were necessary to achieve compromise. The balance of advantage thus lay in shock-tactics. Hitler employed them to the full, with brilliantly successful results.

As for the proposed Russian Locarno, Das Fuhrer noted sadly that the Reich would accept no commitments to render mutual assistance to other States victims of aggression. In particular it would enter into no such pact with the USSR. Germany favored bilateral non-aggression pacts, or at most multilateral non-aggression pacts, with no obligations beyond consultation, but it would not include Lithuania in any such pact. Aggression, however, was indefinable. Should hostilities break out between the parties to such an agreement, the other parties might well pledge themselves not to aid the aggressor, but under no circumstances should they agree to make his victims. Moral assistance pacts between other Powers, with Germany excluded, were objectionable and dangerous. The Reich would oppose them. As for the Danubian pacts to assure non-intervention in Austria, Hitler felt that non-intervention was as difficult to define as aggression. How could he be expected to agree that Italian subsidies to the Habsburgs were permissible, while German support to the Austrian Nazis was not? But Germany would give consideration to any pact which others might propose.

Here was Hitler's Pan-Germanism and Rosenberg's Dream made Over translated into diplomatic language which even Sir John could understand. The price of "appeasement" or of an Anglo-German accord was a free hand for Nazi aggression in the East. Germany must control the Baltic and "protect Europe from Bolshevism." The gentleman at Downing Street who had read *Mein Kampf* already knew this. Those who had not had now no cause for further doubts—though the doubts were so peculiar and so become gradually sickled after with the pale conviction that perhaps, after all, the price which Hitler de-



attended for peace with Britain was worth paying. But this was for a hour day. Hitler had played his card, knowing that it would grow and mature in the fertile soil of Tory England.

With regard to the other points in the communiqué of February 2, Hitler made clear what was already obvious: that there was no longer any question of bargaining over Germany's right to arms equality. He denied that any para-military organizations existed in the Reich. But Germany needed 35 divisions of 33,000 troops, including a division of Black Guards and militarized police, equipped with all arms possessed by other Powers. All this was beyond discussion. Germany would not return to the League so long as it was still treated as a nation of inferior rights. To deny Germany equality was to keep it in a position of inferiority. At this, it may be surmised, Sir John jumped. He was doubtless aware of the colored opinion throughout the Reich, but not quite prepared for so blunt a demand for colonies as the price of return to Geneva.

The Reich, said Der Führer, favored a Western European Air Pact, but it must have parity in aerial armaments with Britain and France and perhaps more than this if the Soviet Air Force continued to be expanded. Sir John inquired timidly as to when the Reich expected to arm its parity with Britain. Ach, meine Herren, that point had already been passed! Sir John broke out in a cold sweat. This to him was news. The Air Ministry, the Marquis of Londonderry, had breathed no hinting of this. Simon decided later (and correctly) that Hitler did not mean that Germany already had more military aircraft than England, but more than the under British Command of Nations. But, my dear Sir . . . ? But really! . . . *Inwiefern Älter für Frieden und Gleichberechtigung?*

By this time, it may be surmised, Simon and Eden were prepared to grasp at any straw. Hitler held one. Germany was prepared to open negotiations for a naval limitation agreement with Britain. In this field at least the Reich was ready to call a halt to the arms race. But only at a price: a German navy 35% as large as the British navy—"with certain reserves." Yes, that would constitute a repudiation of the naval clauses of the Treaty of Versailles without the consent of the other signatories, but Versailles was in any case dead. Had Simon not come to "face facts"? The British Foreign Minister wiped his brow and sighed. Negotiations would be opened. But for the present they must be kept secret lest others raise objections. A German delegation should come to London "for a preliminary discussion

with a view to a moral agreement in the future."<sup>1</sup>

*Falscheit! Still Hitler?* This was far better than expected, for Sir John had capitulated utterly. Simon took his leave a shocked and broken man. With becoming modesty he told Compton that a "considerable divergence of opinion between the two governments was revealed by the conversations."<sup>2</sup> "At the end of the Berlin interview I expressed our disappointment at the difficulties disclosed in the way of an agreement. . . . I have endeavored to communicate to the House with complete fairness and candor the salient matters ascertained in this series of visits. . . . His Majesty's Government, faithful to their assurance that they would take part in Berlin without previously reaching defined conclusions, have not yet formalized their attitude toward these interviews, and I trust that opinion abroad will await the official utterance of the Government before drawing inferences from unauthorized comments and pronouncements."<sup>3</sup> This was neither candid nor fair nor faithful. But what were these virtues, after all, compared to the ghosts of "agreement"?

Anthony Eden and Ivan Malloy, Soviet Ambassador in London, went on to Moscow. They arrived on the 15th, were met by Litvinov, and entertained at a cordial evening reception. The Soviet Committee for Foreign Affairs toasted King George V and declared: "The coming months, perhaps weeks, will show whether the members of Europe—who cannot fail to see and understand the obvious consequences of any infringement of peace in any part of the world and in feel their enormous responsibility—will show themselves capable of organizing peace in the way urgently required by the international situation, and whether the plan for collective work outlined in London on the 2nd of February will be carried on to its wise and logical consequences."<sup>4</sup> Eden agreed and said British policy was based upon the League. The youthful Lord Privy Seal was in the sincere. He was already perhaps beginning to have doubts regarding the Simon line, but such doubts could not be admitted. On March 19 he saw Salts and Malloy, and continued his discussions with Litvinov. On March 21 he boarded the Warsaw train. Litvinov declared on leave-taking: "I wish you all success, for your success will be our success now." The joint communique issued on the same day stated that Eden had informed Litvinov of the Berlin conversations which "had helped to clarify the European situation." The British and Soviet Governments found no conflict of interests between them and were determined to "govern their mutual relations in that spirit of collaboration and coop-

...to the obligations assumed by them which is inherent in their common membership in the League of Nations."

Mr. Eden and M.M. Szaia, Makarov and Lavinev were of the opinion that in the present international situation it is more than ever necessary to pursue the endeavor to promote the building up of a system of collective security in Europe, contemplated in the Anglo-French correspondence of the end of February, and in conformity with the principles of the League of Nations. It was emphasized in the conversations by M.M. Szaia, Makarov and Lavinev that the organization of security in Eastern Europe and the proposed pact of mutual assistance do not also, as has been or is claimed of any Pact but as the creation of equal security for all participants, and that the participation of Germany and Poland would therefore be welcomed as affording the best solution of the problem.<sup>2</sup>

At Warsaw, April 1-2, Eden was received by President Moscicki, Marshal Pilsudski and Colonel Beck. The return of Poland was still opposed to any collaboration in an Eastern Locarno without German participation. The communiqué said nothing. In Prague, April 4, M. Benes and Mr. Eden noted that the objectives of the policy of the two Governments in respect of the maintenance of general peace were identical, and emphasized their sincere and unfeeling attachment to the League of Nations.<sup>3</sup> In the Czech capital Eden took a plane for Cologne. He was fatigued by his strenuous tour and perhaps disheartened at the Berlin revelations. The plane was battered and tossed by howling winds and sheets of rain. Eden's nerves became chronic. He reached the Rhine a sick man. The Channel was not soothing. He was obliged to retire for rest and recuperation upon his return to England.

The Eastern Locarno and the Danubian pact were now seen to be doomed. Britain and France might well salvage a Western Air Locarno if they granted parity to the Reich, scrapped the naval clause of the Treaty, and abandoned the balance of the proposals of February 3. Downing Street was willing. The Quai d'Orsay was dubious. A Bismarck, a Delcassé, or a Gambetta, a Palmerston, a Disraeli, or a Lloyd George would doubtless have acted differently. The Nazi menace could not be brushed by a few swift blows. But there were no statesmen in either Paris or London. A "preventive war" was unthinkable. Benes to permit the Third Reich to become invincible.<sup>4</sup>

The British Cabinet met April 8 to hear Eden, but he was unable either to report or go to Paris because of his illness. On the next day Laval announced that a French-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact would be considered on his contemplated visit to Moscow. The conference at Paris opened on April 11. Moscicki, Pilsudski, Laval, MacDonald,

and Simon were attended by Pablo Savich, Alexis Leger of the *Quai d'Orsay*, and Ambassador Pompeu Aloia. They met in the morning in the Hall of Mirrors of Savoy Palace on Isola Bella, off the western shore of Lake Maggiore. Here amid green shores, blue waters, and snowy peaks they discussed their problems until noon of the 14th. In the *Papale d'Isola* R. Durr wrote on the eve of the meeting that it would lend neither to peace nor to war, but merely to confusion—"the last resource of mediocrity in the face of reality." Simon reported on his travels. The French representatives submitted a memorandum of protest against the German action for submission to the League Council. The British and Italian spokesmen assented, but doubted whether Germany ought to be mentioned by name. As for any pressure on the Reich, they refused to commit themselves to any financial or economic sanctions, either then or in the event of future treaty-violations. There was apparently no discussion of penalties with respect to the violations just perpetrated and no consideration of military sanctions in any emergency.

Sir John was shamed, not least twenty-breaking go unpunished, but lest the Reich be offended by verbal censure and mutual assistance pacts among other States. "He went to catch a dickie-bird and thought he could not fall, because he had a little pin to put upon its tail." The birdie question was Hitler's offer of *disarm non-aggression* pacts. Sir John phoned Berlin from Stresa (doubtless wishing that he had insured on German participation in the conference) to inquire whether the offer would still stand with respect to Germany's eastern neighbors even if they concluded pacts of mutual assistance among themselves. Neurath's answer was affirmative. Simon so informed the conference. To strengthen Simon's hand in his plea for lenient treatment of the Reich, the German Government issued a statement on the 15th declaring that since it had no aggressive intentions, it had no objection to defensive pacts among other States. It could not accept for itself any obligations of mutual assistance, but was ready to conclude agreements for general obligations of non-aggression and arbitration and even of non-support of aggression.<sup>10</sup> But it considered mutual assistance pacts as contradictory. Those who had no faith in obligations of non-aggression ought not to have faith in those of mutual assistance. Simon and Churchill laughed a short "amen."

The documents which emerged from Stresa might have suggested to the uninitiated that Isola Bella was the "beautiful site of somewhere." The agreements reached had no relevance to the problem of

power which Hitler had posed in the West. They were not programs "of action but formulas of compromise and pledges of further procedural procrastination. The "Joint Resolution of the Conference of Secret" registered, in word, "complete agreement on the various problems discussed" and on a common line of conduct at Geneva. "Negotiations should be pursued for the development which is desired in the security of Eastern Europe." With regard to Austria the pledges of February 17 and September 13, 1934, and of January 7 and February 2, 1935, were reaffirmed. The three Powers would "consult together as an answer to be taken in case of a threat to the integrity and independence of Austria" and would recommend negotiations for a general "Central European arrangement." They would "continue actively the study of the question" of an Air Locarno. They further "took into careful and anxious consideration the recent action of the German Government and reports voiced by Sir John Simon of his recent conversation with the German Chancellor."

Sir John was successful in preventing any condemnation of Germany at Stresa, though at the cost of agreeing to condemnation at Geneva—where it would presumably be less resisted by the French and would be, if possible, even more unopposed. He was also successful in obtaining promises of continued negotiation and pious phrases giving comfort to Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria in their desire to imitate the German example. The Joint Resolution closed as follows:

It was regretfully recognized that the method of unilateral repudiation adopted by the German Government at a moment when steps were being taken to promote a freely expressed consensus of the question of armaments had undermined public confidence in security and peaceful order. Moreover, the repudiation of the declared program of German disarmament, already well in the process of execution, had invalidated the guarantees contingent upon which efforts for disarmament had hitherto been based and shaken the hope by which these efforts were inspired.

The representatives of the three Powers nevertheless reaffirmed their sincere desire to pursue peace by establishing a sense of security, and declared for themselves that they remained anxious to join every practicable effort for promoting international agreement on limitation of armaments.

Representatives of the three Governments took into consideration the desire expressed by the French whose military status is repeatedly diminished by the Treaty of St. Germain, Trianon and Neuilly to obtain revision of the treaty. They decided that other States concerned should be informed of this desire through diplomatic channels.

They agreed to recommend to the other States concerned to raising this question with a view to its settlement by mutual agreement within the framework of general and regional programs of security.<sup>14</sup>

This document was supplemented by an Anglo-Italian declaration designed to please France by reaffirming the obligations of Britain and Italy as guarantors of Locarno and declaring "their intentions should need arise, faithfully to fulfil them." There was likewise a Final Declaration: "The three Powers, the object of whose policy is collective maintenance of peace within the framework of the League of Nations, find themselves in complete agreement in opposing, by all practicable means, any unilateral repudiation of treaties which may endanger the peace of Europe, and will act in close and cordial collaboration towards this purpose." Two words here were significant: "practicable" means were understood to exclude anything beyond verbal condemnation; "Europe" meant "not Africa," where Mussolini was preparing aggression and every-repudiation on a vast scale.

The next step was to enact at Geneva the comedy agreed upon at Stresa. The play was short but not good. The object of the actors was to impregnate the Geneva mountain (with pieces of paper) and cause it to go into labor, not to produce a monster, but something considerably less—i.e. more pieces of paper. These French apprehensions could be given free rein, for phrases were harmless when all understood that they were not preparations for action but substitutes for action. On April 14 there was published at Geneva the text of an extensive French memorandum to the League Council originally submitted on April 9. It reviewed the disarmament and security negotiations, dwelt upon the enormity of Germany's crime, and solemnly warned the Council that it "would not be carrying out its mission if it looked with indifference upon such a threat to international order. It is its duty to meet the threat by considering the most suitable methods for remedying the situation that has now been created and for preventing its recurrence."<sup>11</sup> The Council met on April 15. One of its first acts was to postpone consideration of Ethiopia's plea for an examination of the Italian-Ethiopian dispute. On the 16th the British, French, and Italian delegates presented a draft resolution of twelve paragraphs whereby the Council was called upon to make one declaration, one invitation and two decisions. Thus: The Council

11. Declares Germany has failed in the duty which lies upon all members of the international community to respect undertakings which they have contracted and condemn any unilateral repudiation of international obligations.

12. Invites the Governments abovesigned the initiative on the plan of February 5, or which gave approval to it, to continue the negotiations in earnest and in particular to prevent the acquisition within the framework of the League of Nations

of agreements which appear necessary to attain the objects defined by this plan, that account being taken of the obligations of the Covenant with a view to securing the maintenance of peace.

3. Considering that the universal reputation of international obligations may enlarge the very nature of the League of Nations as an organization for maintaining peace and promoting security—decides: That such reputation, without prejudice to the application of measures already provided in international agreements, should, in the event of its having a solution to understandings concerning the security of peoples and the maintenance of the peace of Europe, call into play all appropriate measures on the part of the members of the League and within the framework of the Covenant. Declares: That a committee shall be appointed to propose for this purpose measures to enable the Covenant more effectively in the organization of collective security and to define in particular the economic and financial measures which might be applied, should, in the future, a State, whether a member of the League of Nations or not, endanger peace by unilateral repudiation of its international obligations.<sup>12</sup>

Laval, Simon, and Aloisi spoke in support of the resolution. Beck expressed skepticism. Lorrainov championed collective security. Salvador de Madariaga of Spain reminded the delegates that no new machinery to restrain peace-breakers and create-violators was needed: all was provided for in the Covenant. Only there was no will to enforce the Covenant. Discussion of armaments in conventional terms was irrelevant. "The important thing when a man in the street carries a revolver is not to know what is its caliber or even if he has other weapons in his pocket, but to know whether he is a policeman or a criminal!" M. Munch of Denmark anxiously proposed amendments to conclude Germany. In the final discussion of the 17th, Lorrainov, with alternate glances at Ethiopia and China, objected to limiting the resolution to "Europe." Simon resumed with heat that the Council must address itself "to a practical problem in a practical spirit, and not at this moment spread the aspirations and endeavor, which we all desire to put into a practical shape, so wide that the whole of our efforts may be lost in shallowness and in substance." Laval and Aloisi agreed. On April 15, 1933 the resolution as submitted was passed unanimously with thirteen votes, Denmark abstaining.<sup>13</sup>

A committee was appointed. It appointed sub-committees. The sub-committees reported in June and July. The reports were filed away and forgotten. At a meeting of the League Executive Council in Geneva on April 18 Briet announced that Czechoslovakia would follow France in negotiating a Mutual Assistance Pact with the USSR. The day Laval had not gone to Moscow, but he and Lorrainov had drafted an accord at Geneva. On April 18 Berlin protested to London

at the Geneva "barricade." On April 20 (Hitler's birthday) the Reich informed the Governments on the Council that it challenged their right to act as judges of Germany and resolutely rejected their resolution. Delegates at Geneva went home. Cloths filed papers. Workmen hurried away at the new League of Nations Palace in Avenue Park. Other workmen in the Ruhr, in Saxony, and in Hamburg hurried away at trucks, planes, guns, and war vessels. Still others took roads through Estonia and Baltic Swedland to the Eklopan frontier.

## 2. DEFENSE AGAINST BERLIN

On May 2, 1935, at the Quai d'Orsay, Pierre Laval and Ambassador Vladimir Potemkin attached their signatures to a Treaty of Mutual Assistance between France and the USSR. On May 26, 1935 Edvard Beneš and Ambassador Serge Alexandrovsky attached their signatures at Prague to a Treaty of Mutual Assistance between Czechoslovakia and the USSR. These engagements were the only concrete diplomatic measures taken by the French Republic and its allies to redress the balance of power which Hitler's repudiation of the military clauses of Versailles had disturbed. They were likewise the only significant results of the protracted negotiations regarding security which had been so long under way. The project of an Eastern Locarno, the plan of a Danubian pact to safeguard Austria, the proposals for an Air Locarno were all buried in the archives after the débâcle of March and April 1935. But the rising menace of the Third Reich made Moscow the ally of Paris and Prague.

The reluctant Laval was pushed into signature only by Hitler's diplomatic thriller and the sound of glass-shards being thrown into rivers across the Rhine. To prevent France from being embroiled in a possible conflict in the Far East, he insisted that the Pact be limited in its application to Europe. To pay lip service to collective security and to meet British objections to alliances and blocs, he insisted that it be so drawn as to be compatible with the Covenant and with Locarno. The Kremlin was willing.

The Pact as signed provided in its first Article that France and the USSR, "would consult immediately upon measures to secure observance of Article 10 of the Covenant" in the event of either of them being threatened with aggression by any European State. Should they be victims of unprovoked aggression by any European State, they would



where as once to each other's aid in the event of the League Council failing to reach a unanimous report on a dispute submitted to it (Article 1).<sup>12</sup> They likewise agreed (Article 2) to come to each other's aid against unprovoked aggression "in application of Article 16 of the Covenant,"<sup>13</sup> even in case of aggression from a non-League member as anticipated by Article 17<sup>14</sup> of the Covenant. All Covenant obligations remained guaranteed by the accord (Article 4). The Pact would take effect on exchange of ratifications, remain in force five years, and then continue in force indefinitely, subject to termination by a one-year notice from either party (Article 5).

An attached Protocol of Signature, which was an integral part of the agreement, specified (Article 1) that the obligation of mutual assistance was limited to cases of aggression against the territory of the parties (i.e. not against their allies) and would be binding even when the League Council should have no recommendation or fail to reach a unanimous decision. It was further specified (Article 2) that previous obligations on the part of the signatories toward third States remained unaffected and that no interpretation would be placed upon the accord which might be incompatible with such prior obligations (e.g. Locarno) and upon the parties to sections Both Powers (Article 3) reserved the right to become parties by mutual consent to other similar agreements of a regional character for the organization of security through obligations of mutual assistance. The final Article of the Protocol referred to the proposed Eastern Locarno agreement in terms of a proposed pact binding the USSR, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Baltic States, with a supplementary pact of mutual assistance between France, Germany, and the USSR.

The present Pact was declared to be applicable "only within limits contemplated in the three-party agreement previously planned" (*"Les engagements énoncés dans le traité d'assistance franco-soviétique doivent être entendus comme ne devant jouer que dans les limites envisagées dans l'accord tripartite antérieurement projeté"*). However, should either party be a victim of aggression on the part of other European States not referred to in the projected tripartite accord, the other would abstain from any assistance to such aggression.

The political and military significance of these somewhat involved obligations was not at once apparent. Certain inconsistencies were permitted to creep into the phrasology. The parties agreed to aid one another against aggressors in the enforcement of the League Covenant. But by Article 1 of the Protocol they agreed to come to

one another's defense regardless of action or inaction by the League Council. In principle France and the USSR bound themselves to mutual defense against attack by any European (but not Asiatic) State. But the implied "any" of Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the Treaty was restricted by Article 4 of the Protocol to a single State: Germany. Thus a Polish or Rumanian attack upon the USSR or an Italian or Spanish attack upon France would not technically require the other ally to come to the defense of the victim, unless—concrete to the actual position of treaty interpretation—the Treaty should be applied without regard to the qualifying Protocol. Moreover, Article 1 of the Protocol, read in conjunction with the Locarno Treaty, meant in effect that in case of conflict with Germany France must secure British and Italian assent to the designation of Germany as the aggressor before it could claim their assistance or that of the USSR. The Soviet Union on the other hand was under no obligation to secure the approval of other States in its judgment of the aggressor as a condition of aid from (or to) France. The point is perhaps of purely academic interest, since the Locarno Treaty was repudiated by Germany before the French-Soviet pact was ratified.<sup>12</sup>

The Czech-Soviet Pact of May 16, 1935 was identical with the French pact save in two respects. By Article 4 Czechoslovakia and the USSR agreed not to aid any aggressor against the other in case "not giving ground for aid or assistance within the meaning of the present Treaty." By Article 5 of the Protocol of Signature Prague and Moscow accepted as between themselves the limitations of Article 4 of the French-Soviet Protocol and declared that each would aid the other only "in so far as assistance may be rendered by France to the party victim of aggression." The Czech-Soviet Pact, like its French-Soviet precursor, was also limited to the case of unprovoked German aggression against Prague or Moscow and was further limited by the requirement of French participation. Polish or Rumanian aggression against the USSR would not require Czechoslovakia (or France) to come to Moscow's aid. Polish or Hungarian aggression against Czechoslovakia would not require the USSR to aid Prague, though Paris would still be bound to extend aid under the earlier Czech-French alliance agreements. If Germany attacked Czechoslovakia or the USSR and France stood aside, neither Prague nor Moscow would be bound to aid the other. But if France defended Czechoslovakia (or the USSR) against the Reich, Moscow (or Prague) was bound to intervene.

\* These limitations and qualifications were in part a consequence of Laval's lack of faith in the whole arrangement. The Czech-Soviet pact was promptly nullified. Ratifications were exchanged June 9, 1935, while Beres was visiting the Soviet capital. Laval, however, took no similar trip. His belated trip to Moscow did not take place until May 13-15, 1935, and was little more than a courtesy call. He apparently made no effort to persuade Ruzsman to enter into a mutual assistance pact with the USSR, despite the fact that Titulescu was sympathetic. Far from endeavoring to secure Poland's participation, Laval insured Beck on his way back to Paris that if the Red Army was ever called upon to defend Czechoslovakia or France it would not need to go through Poland. He added that the purpose of the pacts was less to secure Soviet aid than to forestall a German-Soviet rapprochement. Meanwhile Palamidi had been gathered onto his father's. Laval went to Cracow for the funeral on May 16 and there had a long interview with Goring. He did not accept Goring's invitation to come to Berlin, but in all probability he sympathized with Goring's dislike of the French-Soviet alliance. He delayed ratification and then, to the disgust of Henricot and in marked departure from the usual procedure for treaties of this kind,<sup>12</sup> he submitted the Pact to parliament.

Here, as in the case of the French-Russian agreements of 1925 and indeed in all alliances, the purposes and policies of the parties were of far greater moment in determining what final effect might be given to a pact than the terms agreed upon than formal technicalities of interpretation. Under Laval's blighting hand, the Pact between Paris and Moscow had no life. Its execution took a more generous view of its possibilities, but no military convention was negotiated between the General Staffs and the crucial geographical difficulties in the way of Soviet aid to either Czechoslovakia or France remained unresolved.

The USSR had no common frontier with the Third Reich or the Czech Republic. In order to grant military aid to Prague its forces would be obliged to cross either Poland or Rumania. Both States were almost certain to refuse passage to the Red Army unless compelled to do so by strong French pressure. In the absence of such pressure, the reactionary regimes at Warsaw and Bucharest would prefer by far to see Czechoslovakia and France destroyed and to become themselves vassals of Berlin rather than permit Stalin's legions to cross their frontiers. Neither Laval nor those who came after him saw fit to take any effective action toward the removal of the obstacles. Steps to strengthen French bonds with Moscow were always frowned upon

at Downing Street. After Laval it became a rule of French diplomacy to do nothing which London opposed. The effect of the French-Soviet alliance, through no fault of the Kromls, was thus to push Warren and Buchanan further into the German orbit without affording Paris any assurance of influence or timely Soviet aid in the event of a conflict with Germany. Thanks to suspicion and irresponsibility at the Quai d'Orsay, the only French alliance of the post-Versailles epoch which promised to confront the Third Reich with an adequate counter-weight in the East was allowed to remain unfulfilled. Barthou's Grand Design was here once more betrayed.

### 3. SIMON TO HOARE

In the interim the curious tale of Anglo-German relations moved toward another Nazi triumph. Late in April Prime Minister MacDonald, with the probable approval of Eden and of Robert Vansittart, Permanent Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, condemned Hitler's subversion and challenged him to prove his good faith by constructive action for peace.<sup>11</sup> In an address to Commons on May 1 he made further critical reference to German policy—this possibly as a preparation for publicly proposing the next concession to the Reich as a token of Nazi "moderation" and a further step toward "appeasement." He also announced that Simon, while in Berlin, had turned German spokesmen in London to discuss a naval agreement. The Reich had accepted the bid. In the House of Lords (May 7) much sympathy was expressed for Germany and a motion was introduced, though later withdrawn, expressing regret over the Council's resolution condemning German treaty-violation. Lord Privy Seal Eden on the other hand denounced militarism and championed collective security through the League in public address on May 10 and 11. Simon kept his peace.

In view of the divided state of British opinion, the occasion was appropriate for a new German move to swing the balance in the direction Hitler desired. The victory of March 18, moreover, had now been well beyond all doubting and the day was come for a new initiative to win new advantages. This time, concluded Hitler and his advisers, more could be gained by conciliatory gestures than by further defiance. The new initiative must therefore produce their maximum effect, for Der Führer was dealing with those who could strenuously

be frightened by threats into making concessions for the sake of restoring friendship and enjoyed by promises into making concessions for the sake of avoiding new frights. He was likewise dealing at times with those who wished to make concessions at the expense of others in the name of "peace" and needed fear of war as a means of obtaining public approval of their policy. Hitler displayed a keen comprehension of the dynamics of Wharfedale and a nice adaptability to its various moods. He now called the Reichstag into session for May 21, 1933, and delivered himself of a long address intended for the world and particularly for Britain. The British Cabinet rehearsed its discussion of military policy pending news of Hitler's pronouncements, while *The Times* pleaded for understanding and acceptance of the Chancellor's utterances as sincere.

The Reichstag address of May 21, 1933 resembled that of May 17, 1933, in that it was calculated to reassure a suspicious world as to the pacific intentions of the Third Reich. Hitler asserted that the new Germany, having conquered "Marxist internationalism," desired peace not from weakness or cowardice but because Nazism disavowed the idea of conquering alien peoples. "Germany wants peace . . . Germany needs peace and desires peace. And when I now hear from the lips of a British statesman that such assurances are nothing, and that the only proof of sincerity is the signature appended to collective pacts, I must ask Mr. Eden to be good enough to remember that it is a question of an 'insurance' in any case . . . The world suffers from a singular want of collective co-operation." This idea was Woodrow Wilson's. Germany had greeted Wilson's ideas eagerly. Germany charmed. But Germany was betrayed. The others refused to disarm. Germany possessed constructive plans, but all were rejected. Germany is "not prepared to be regarded and treated for all time as a second-class nation or one with inferior rights . . . No one of us means to threaten anybody. It is only that we are all determined to secure and maintain equality for the German people."

Der Führer went on to stress his objections to an Eastern Locarno. There could be no arrangement for mutual assistance between Nazism-absolutism and Bolshevism. Mr. Eden might deny Bolshevik aggressive tendencies, but Germany had suffered Communist uprisings and revolts hatched in Moscow. Germany was ready to conclude non-aggression pacts with all her neighbors save Lithuania (and even with Lithuania if persecution of the Germans in Moscow should cease), but never mutual assistance pacts. Such pacts were but military alliances

of the old type. "We regret this is a special way because, as a result of the military alliance between France and Russia, no element of legal necessity has been brought into the Locarno Pact, which is the most definite and most really valuable treaty of mutual assistance in Europe." Obligations of non-aggression and non-intermeddling must be defined. "Germany neither expects nor wishes to interfere in the internal affairs of Russia, to annex Austria, or to conclude an Anschluss." All Germany asks is "self-determination." (Blessed word!)

Hitler proceeded next to outline thirteen points of German policy.

1. The Reich rejects the German violation of April 17 because it was not Germany but the other Powers that violated the Treaty of Versailles. Germany cannot accept in Germany unless the Treaty and the Covenant are respected and equality of rights is "restored to all functions and all property rights in international life."

2. Germany will respect all other provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, "including the territorial provisions, and those provisions which shall be declared necessary in the course of time will be put into effect only by the method of peaceful understanding."

3. The German Government "will scrupulously maintain every treaty voluntarily agreed. . . . In particular they will uphold and fulfill all obligations arising out of the Locarno Treaty, so long as the other partners on their side are ready to stand by that pact. In respecting the demilitarized areas, the German Government considers these areas as a contribution to the appeasement of Europe, which contribution is of an unheard-of hardness for a sovereign State."

4. Germany is ready to cooperate in a collective system for safeguarding European peace, but the way must be kept open for treaty-visions.

5. Universal imposition of conditions without previous collaboration. Step-by-step negotiations are indispensable.

6. "The German Government are ready in principle to conclude pacts of non-aggression with their neighbor States, and to supplement these pacts with all provisions that aim at isolating the war-makers and isolating the acts of the war."

7. "The German Government are ready to supplement the Locarno Treaty with an air agreement and to enter upon discussions regarding this means."

8. In no circumstances will Germany depart from the unswerving stance and equanimity of the German defense forces. Limitation by agreement is possible on the basis of equal parity with the individual Great Powers of the West, and no-allothing equal to 35% of the British. "Germany has no the intention to the navy as the means to participate in any new naval rivalry." Germany considers no British control of the sea.

9. Germany desires the exclusion of weapons and methods of warfare contrary to the Geneva Red Cross Convention. "Here the German Government have in mind all those arms which bring death and destruction not so much to the fighting soldiers as, in the first instance, to non-combatant women and children. . . . They believe it possible to prescribe the use of certain arms in contrary to international law and to recommend that these arms still using them. . . . For the

ample, there might be prohibition of the dropping of gas, incendiary, and explosive bombs outside the well-battle zone. The limitation could then be extended to complete international outlawry of all bombing."

10. Germany desires abolition of the heaviest arm, especially heavy artillery and heavy tanks.

11. Germany will accept any limitation whatsoever of the caliber strength of artillery, the use of mortars, and the usage of submarines as even the complete abolition of submarines by agreement.

12. "The poisoning of public opinion among the nations by irresponsible statements orally or in writing, through the cinema or the drama," should be prohibited.

13. "The German Government are ready at any time to reach an international agreement which shall effectively prevent all attempts at world interference in the affairs of other States."<sup>14</sup>

From the perspective of 1939 many of these statements and proposals seem grossly and grossly naïf, with a naïfness homes. The mangled women and children of Almería, Goernicia, and Barcelona, slaughtered by Nazi bombs, rise in mockery. The ghost of Austria, the specters of Locarno, Versailles, and St. Germain, the trampled body of Cautschovenstein, the shades of a dozen broken pledges leer at such transparency. But in May of 1933 these dead still lived. The treachery and murder of yesterday were already forgotten. Hitler assumed then and always that he was dealing with those who live for the moment without memory of what has passed or forethought of what must come. Each hour's promises were believed, regardless of records or prospects. The leaders of Britain and some of the leaders of France knew better, but their followers did not. For reasons of their own, they desired their publics to accept Nazi promises at face value.

Hitler, moreover, was always more or less "sincere" in his promises, not in the sense of saying what he believed, but in the sense of believing—at the time—what he said. Lame he would try other things and believe them too, for he was ever and by-passed by his own country. And he would continue to believe what he had said earlier, for he and his disciples, while masters in principle, were mental plagiarists in practice to the point of a multifarious schizophrenia. But the "superiority" was mingled with a distorted calculus of what vestige would best impress foreign cabinets, and what impression of the Reich foreign cabinets desired their peoples to accept. The only immutable values in this credo were mystical tribal abstractions: "race," "honor," "equality," "freedom," and the "right-to-live"—i.e. the will-to-power. These values forbade the grant to lower tribes of freedom or security

or any right to cede, were as boundless as the Supreme. During the years of preparation, however, these categorical imperatives of the new ethics required more than interpretation, now that. Definitions and applications could not be always consistent, for these depended upon changing circumstances and shifting dispositions on the part of others to submit or resist. But the code was over the ends of the high morality of Montpelier, brought to perfection by the sentence of Deauchaux and Falkner for Wotan and Thor. And ends so noble as these always justify any means necessary for their service. The discovery of fascism was a phenomenon which most of Hitler's sincere foes at home and abroad (apart from pretended "socialists" in high places) were forever incapable of comprehending. Therein were the keys to power and victory.

The oratorical demarche of May 21, 1933 produced the expected results. Laval accepted the proposition as basis for negotiation. Downing Street made inquiries as to details.<sup>10</sup> Neurath told Sir Eric Phipps on May 31 that Hitler's second point covered all the Articles of Versailles still in force, including those relating to the demilitarization of the Rhineland. Baldwin told a large Conservative audience in Albert Hall on May 27 that negotiations must be pursued for an Air Locarno.<sup>11</sup> Sir Herbert Samuel made a plea for speed. Others urged that the proposed expansion of the British air force should be deferred pending negotiations. Simon was opposed to this, but favored every effort to reach an "understanding."<sup>12</sup> The Marquis of Londonderry, Minister of Air, was as keenly in favor of a rapprochement with the Reich that he was at least two minds about the optimum tempo of British aerial rearmament. "I am successful in conveying to my most influential colleagues the actual fact that, whereas there was no time to be lost, the transient peril almost daily predicted by certain newspapers was altogether foregone."<sup>13</sup> Eden and Vansittart were chided for their lack of faith in *Der Führer*—now shown to be justified.

Meanwhile Simon's "invitation" to the Reich to negotiate a naval accord began to bear fruit. The Liberal *Manchester Guardian* had declared on March 22 that Berlin would be rebuffed if it sought to lead Simon into expensive naval negotiations. But "Liberal" Sir John thought otherwise. On April 26 Downing Street admitted that German naval experts would arrive within a week or so. On the same day Berlin informed London that orders had been given for the assembling of a dozen U-boats of 150 tons each, forbidden by the Treaty but



manufactured during the preceding winter. This information shocked Sir John Simon as much as Hitler's blind admission on March 15 that Germany already had as large an air fleet as Britain's. There was again delay. But Hitler's speech soothed imperial feelings and presently all was arranged. A German naval delegation headed by Joachim von Ribbentrop reached London on June 1 and negotiations were begun at once.

On June 7, 1933 a long reported reshuffle of the British Cabinet was announced. Since the autumn of 1931 the "National Government" had been in office under renegade Laborite Ramsay MacDonald with the initial support of the Conservative and Liberal parties. In the election of October 1931 the Conservatives secured 54.9% of the popular vote and the Liberals 12.1% compared with the Labor Opposition's 30.7%. But in Commons, thanks to disproportional representation, the National Government had 61% of the M.P.'s in its ranks. The Cabinet still had an overwhelming majority after November 1932, when the Liberals split once more, with renegade Simon and his handful of "National Liberals" remaining with the Cabinet and the followers of Sir Herbert Samuel and David Lloyd George crossing the gateway to the Opposition benches. A new election would be mandatory in 1936. The Cabinet was contemplating "going to the country" in the autumn of 1935. The transfer of portfolios in June was made with a wary eye on the voters, who seemed to be well enough satisfied and disposed to reject Ramsay Macl's harsh (and indeed, as to his choice of adjectives, quite wrong) judgments of the regime: "The worst, the weakest, the most dishonest, and the most incompetent Government that Britain has known since the days of Lord North." "

MacDonald and Baldwin exchanged posts on June 7, the former retiring to the sinuure of Lord President of the Council and the latter becoming Tory Prime Minister of a Tory Cabinet firmly tilted with "National Liberals" and "National Laborites." Young Malcolm MacDonald became Colonial Secretary. Viscount Halifax yielded up the War Office to Viscount Halifax and became Lord High Chancellor. The Marquess of Londonderry yielded the air post Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister (later Lord Swinton) and became Lord Privy Seal and leader of the House of Lords. Neville Chamberlain remained Chancellor of the Exchequer and Walter Runciman, President of the Board of Trade.

Sir John Simon likewise stepped down from the Foreign Office

and was made Home Secretary and Deputy leader of the House of Commons. There was no suggestion in high places that diplomatic postcards had anything to do with the change. Sir John believed in his policy despite Lloyd George's assertion that no man in the House "has left such a stamp trail of hypocrisy behind him." Philip Snowden once remarked that if Sir John had "any sense of the possible failure he made of the high and responsible office he held . . . he would hide his head in some place of suitable obscurity in the hope that his creditable record would be forgotten."<sup>18</sup> But his Tory colleagues shared his purposes, endorsed his methods, and took no such dark view of his record.

Since Anthony Eden was deemed too young to succeed Simon and had, moreover, earned the enmity of Hitler and Mussolini, he was made Minister Without Portfolio for League of Nations Affairs. As Simon's successor Stanley Baldwin joined an old friend and colleague who had given the impression of being relatively uncommitted as between the "pro-French" and "pro-German" sections of the party—Sir Samuel Hoare. This cultured and well-mannered son of an old banking family had been in the British Intelligence Service in Russia during the War, and Minister of Air in Baldwin's first Cabinet. As Secretary of State for India he was chiefly responsible for the new Indian Constitution. His hobbies were tennis, ice-skating, Cocker-spaniels, French literature, and Russian *desigrés*. He was who brought to a conclusion the negotiations with Ribbentrop.

On June 18, 1935, following two flying visits to Hitler at Berchtesgaden, Ribbentrop exchanged with Hoare the letters which constituted the Anglo-German naval accord.<sup>19</sup> Britain had accepted the German proposal that "the future strength of the German navy is related to the aggregate naval strength of the British Commonwealth of Nations should be in the proportion of 35:100." This was to be a permanent relationship in terms of tonnage, though the Reich retained the right to revise re-estimation of the ratio in case of abnormal construction by other Powers. The ratio would be applied by category as well as globally, though departures from it within the category would be permitted by common accord. "In the matter of submarines, however, Germany, while not exceeding the ratio of 35:100 in respect of total tonnage, shall have the right to possess a submarine tonnage equal to the total submarine tonnage possessed by the Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations." Germany agreed not to exceed 45 % of the British submarine tonnage unless a sanction should arise

which in German opinion "makes it necessary for Germany to avail herself of her right to a percentage of submarine tonnage exceeding the 45% above-mentioned," in which case action would be given and a "friendly discussion" initiated before the right should be exercised.

On June 27, 1909 the captive German High Sea Fleet had been escorted by its escort to Scapa Flow. During the preceding four years Britain had more than once faced invasion and defeat at the hands of German U-boats. Sixteen years later the British Government granted Germany parity in submarines and a new High Sea Fleet more than two-thirds the size of the British navy. The excuse was that if Britain rejected this "agreement"—which was an unqualified acceptance of the Nazi demands with no *quid pro quo*—the British would build an even larger fleet. Since London had no more intention of compelling Berlin to observe the strict limitations of the Treaty of Versailles on the sea than on land or in the air, the view prevailed at Downing Street that half a loaf was better than none—i.e. that a third of the old German navy was preferable to the whole of it. The British Government thus expressly co-operated with the Reich in repudiating Part V of the Treaty of Versailles. Three months to a day had elapsed since Britain had protested Germany's repudiation. Two months and a day had elapsed since Britain had joined a dozen other States in condemning Germany's action. One hundred and twenty years to a day had elapsed since Britain had brought to final ruin another attempt at Continental hegemony at Waterloo. It is not known whether Pitt, Nelson, and Wellington turned over in their graves.

The June capitulation was to the native the worst surrounding in that Senate and House not only failed to secure the approval of other interested Powers but rushed to signature before they could protest. There is no evidence that the USSR, which would be the first victim of German naval control of the Baltic, was consulted at all or even officially informed. As for France and the score of other States which had helped Britain impose the Treaty of Versailles on Germany, they were all just ignored, though their legal rights and their strongest security were alike profoundly jeopardized by British connivance in the Reich's rearmament at sea. Lord Londonderry told the Lords on June 26 that France and the other signatories of the Washington Naval Treaty "were informed on June 7 of the outline of the Agreement which it was proposed to make with the Germans" (the First Lord of the Admiralty said "fully informed" on the 21st), "and they were invited to communicate any observations they might desire to offer

at a very early date." The French note, he said, had been received, before signature, but "their criticisms did not appear to us to be of such a character as would justify us in withholding our consent to an agreement which, in our view, held such a promise for the peace of the world." In any case, "to have insisted on prior consultation with other countries would definitely have meant the loss of the Agreement."<sup>41</sup> A strong statement of French objections from M. Loral and M. Picot, Minister of Marine, had reached the British Embassy in Paris on June 17 and Downing Street on the 18th. It was described sent as a basis of further discussion. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the British Cabinet reached the Agreement to signature with the express object of sweeping aside French protests and confronting Paris with a *fait accompli* à la Hitler.

Windschall added insult to injury by a number of explanatory statements. In a broadcast on June 19 Sir Bolton Eyre-Mansell, First Lord of the Admiralty, virtually apologized for the secret on radio-grams. He and Lord Londonderry later stated that Germany had agreed to adhere to the rules of Part IV of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 and had thereby renounced unrestricted submarine warfare.<sup>42</sup> Sir Bolton in Commons, June 21: "We signed this Agreement . . . essentially as a contribution to world peace and international agreement. . . . We have to face them. . . . Germany is already constructing a fleet which is outside the limits laid down in the Versailles Treaty. . . . We are satisfied that a serious error would have been committed by this country had His Majesty's Government either refused to accept the offer or even hesitated unduly to do so." Londonderry in Lords, June 28:

We are a practical people and we have to face the facts of the situation. . . . We believe that the best method of promoting that "general settlement" to which the London communiqué [of February 2] referred is not to enter upon a period of further competitive building but to endeavor, by agreement with Germany, to circumscribe the effects of the decision announced by Germany. . . . We believe that . . . we have done a great service to other Powers. . . . The concern that has been expressed in some quarters is not unnatural, in view of the fact that our national security was seriously threatened by submarine attack during the late War. . . . The experience that we gained during those four years, painful and costly though the process was, has

led to the development of improved methods for conducting the submarine.

Bloxie declared in Commons, July 1, with astounding logic, that the Agreement "in no way affects the rights of any country not a party to the agreement." On July 11 he stood again in Commons: "On no account could we have made an agreement that was not manifestly in our view to the advantage of the other naval Powers. . . . In the opinion of our naval experts we were advised to accept the Agreement as a safe Agreement for the British Empire."

The sentiment of the British press indicated that the Conservative organs were fully in accord with the Cabinet's move and that Liberals and Labour were befuddled by the magic phrases "peace," "general appeasement," and "facing the facts." *The Times* asserted: "The new British Government have capably begun their work of stabilisation of peace." *The Liberal News-Chronicle*: "It is at least possible to hope it may be the first practical move in building up at last a peace of understanding." *The Labour Daily Herald*: "Anybody who recalls the pre-War years must realise that the naval agreement is quite a real contribution to armament limitation and general pacification." Lord Beauchamp's *Daily Express* was more blunt: "The Anglo-German agreement breaks the Versailles Treaty wide open. Nobody seriously believes the Treaty can be unscathed any longer in any way. The French do not like the new agreement. They must take their own line over it. For Britain it means no naval race with Germany. So we welcome it."<sup>12</sup>

The Quai d'Orsay did not welcome it. So indignant were the French Ministers that Downing Street declared on the evening of the 11th that Eden would go to Paris. He began however with an unpleasant task which he was to pursue for the next two and a half years: that of explaining to the friends of Britain abroad why the British Cabinet walked upon sailing barges at their expense with these enemies. He went to Paris on the 12th, conferred with Laval for two days, spent the 14th and 15th in Rome in vain appeals to Mussolini, Adornato, and then saw Laval again before he flew back to London on the 17th. The French Foreign Minister in a statement of the 11st asserted that "Mr. Eden set forth the reasons which had led his Government to take this decision, and I, for my part, did not fail to renew the reservations made by my Government on the subject." Eden told him that the procedure was "unofficial" and would not be followed

by a bilateral agreement. Since London had now sanctioned a German Navy almost as large as the French and certain to be far more modern and efficient, Paris needed toward the west that France must insure complete liberty of action in naval matters.<sup>22</sup> Naval Minister Fournel told at Berni on June 17:

What has surprised us is the precipitous adhesion of England to this German act [of armaments]—and this in conditions which might make us doubtful, not indeed of England's friendship, but of her traditional prudence. . . . [But] our diplomacy is in good hands. M. Pierre Laval, who grasps it as the interest and honor of France demand, has an intuitive knowledge of how to combine the necessary respect for treaty texts with a legitimate sense of realism.<sup>23</sup>

The compliment was unwelcome and the confidence misplaced. Laval was already sabotaging "the necessary respect for treaty texts" in dealing with Italy, and Howe was neither willing nor able to say Mrs. May. Howe, based on the words of Simon, was sabotaging treaty texts in dealing with Germany, and Laval could do nothing about it. Each accused the other of blindness and exposed himself in the name of "realism." In a long programmatic speech on foreign policy before Congress on July 27, 1935, Sir Samuel came close to imitating Der Führer. He repeated comforting clichés and made promises which were soon to be done. The difference was that Hitler persuaded others abroad to believe what he said and derived advantages from their belief, whereas Howe persuaded nobody abroad and suffered humiliating defeat. At home he persuaded only his own party followers and certain muddled members of the Opposition. That he persuaded himself is doubtful.

The position vis-à-vis the French navy is one of great and solid advantage compared to its pre-War position. . . . The British Government took not only a wise course but the only course in the circumstances open to them. . . . It is no good blaming them. . . . We all want an Air Force. . . . [But] we have got to take the situation as it is, and to face facts as they are. . . . [As to Eastern Europe] there is no question of further [British] commitments. . . . I do none the less agree that a war started in the Centre or East of Europe might, indeed, judging by experience, probably would lead to a general conflagration. . . . This is the reason why the British Government is most un-

long to join an Eastern and a Danubian Pact of non-aggression concluded at the earliest possible moment. . . . We have to take the [German] Chancellor at his word. . . . Let him now therefore take the next necessary step forward, and help on the negotiation of the Eastern and Danubian Pacts. . . . A change in the course of Austria would shake the foundations of European peace. . . . As long as there is an effective League and a system of collective security, we are ready and willing to take our full share of collective responsibility. . . . We intend to maintain the pledges that we have given in our treaties and in the Covenant, and we are ready to work with Europe upon a basis of collective security."<sup>1</sup>

All these words were empty and these intentions vain. Hitler declined to answer Hoare's note of August 1 on an air page and explained in the autumn that such a pact was now out of the question since the Soviet air fleet might destroy Berlin if Germany accepted aerial limitations. The Eastern Pact and the Danubian Pact died. Hoare was to play a high but not honorable role in insuring the death of the League and of collective security. He and his colleagues served "peace" in the name of "realism," and in the name of "realism" they permitted the enhancement of German and Italian power to a point at which peace was to depend no longer upon British and French authority but upon the whims of the Czar.

Only one stark reality emerged from the developments of the spring of 1935.<sup>2</sup> It was the restoration of that which the First World War had been fought to destroy: the military might of Germany. Neither Hoare nor Laval, nor the Governments of which they were members, nor yet the peoples over whom those Governments ruled, were prepared to use the still immensely superior forces at their disposal to halt the onward march of the German military machine toward a position of potential supremacy. From this unwillingness to act to stop German rearmament flowed logically all the British agreements in favor of the bargain of June 18 and a hundred future agreements for a score of future bargains which would bring the Reich and its allies ever closer to Continental hegemony.

# CÆSAR AFRICANUS

## I. DUCE'S DILEMMA

Honesty is still and always an abstraction, of time and space; men are still not brothers, do not want to be, and evidently cannot be. Peace is hence absurd, or rather it is a pause in war. There is something that blinds men to his destiny of struggling, against either his fellows or himself. The motives for the struggle may change indefinitely, they may be economic, religious, political, commercial, but the legend of Cain and Abel seems to be the inescapable reality, while "brotherhood" is a fable which men learn to during the lull-time and the truce. . . .

The Christian and Socialist "men be brothers" is a mask for the cruel and inhuman "bono homini lupus." . . . And man will continue to be a wolf among wolves for a bit of food, for a trickle of water, for a crumb of bread, for a woman's kiss, for a necessity or a caprice; he will continue to ignore others and to spare himself?

This poetry of violence was written in 1902 by an ex-pacifist and ex-Socialist turned gang-leader and would-be Cæsar: Benito Mussolini. As *Italy's* editor of the *Mondo* journal *Avanti* he had distinguished himself as one of the most able and ardent Italian spokesmen of revolutionary internationalism and proletarian revolt. But when war came and Italy remained neutral, he broke with his comrades and became an "interventionist." With the aid of French funds he founded a new paper, *Il Popolo d'Italia*, and devoted all his talents to converting his fellow citizens to the cause of armed participation in the struggle. Ruse bargained to discover which side would promise more. Paris and London were more generous with the property of their foes than



Vicenna and Berlin. By the secret Treaty of London of April 16, 1902, Italy was promised much. On May 24 the Italian Government declared war on Austria-Hungary and called its subjects to sacrifice their wealth and blood in the name of "sacred selfishness."

Despite the difficulty of Caporetto (October 1917), Italy "won the war," in the judgment of most of its poets and politicians. But at Paris, thanks to Wilsonian idealism and Anglo-French greed, Italy "lost the peace." The spoils of battle awarded to Rome were (so others) meagre: "Italian leadership" in the north, including Innsbruck and Trieste plus the Austrian Tyrol south of the Brenner Pass (1908), Zara (1907), Lepanto (1912), and ultimately Fiume (1924) on the Adriatic, the Dodecanese Islands in the Aegean (1947) and confirmation of Italy's title to nearby Rhodes, and advantageous "rectification" of the frontier of Libya, which had been won from Turkey in 1912 in a war of aggrandizement which Socialists Mussolini had denounced bitterly as a criminal manifestation of capitalist imperialism. But the scales of partisan diplomacy, where honor and prestige are weighed along with provinces, peoples, and the tangible powers of power, are like the scales of "social justice" with which economic classes weigh the benefits and deprivations which they derive from their position in the human herd. In both cases satisfaction or dissatisfaction is not a function of what is got, but a function of the relationship between what is got, what is expected, and what others got. By these scales Italy was "cheated" at Versailles. The victorious kingdom, like the defeated Prussia, became a resentful nation of "inferior rights" and an unshaken Stone-broke upon glory and revenge.

This elevation of frustration and defeat lay behind the rise and triumph of Fascism under Mussolini's leadership. Fascism is a phenomenon of the defeated and dejected. It is a phenomenon of marginal classes and marginal nations, of those driven by debasement and fear into hatred and malice for the supposed authors of their situation. It is a phenomenon of national impotence and racial decay. The impotent worship power. Those who are weak and afraid conceal their self-pity in creeds of virility and brutality. Those who are dispirited and disorganizing become paranoiacs of order, hierarchy, discipline. Italy was the smallest, weakest, and poorest of the "Great Powers." Therefore Italian passions were outraged. Italy suffered much from class war and incipient social revolution. Therefore Italian schismatics, plutocrats, and petty bourgeois were terrified and indignant. They sought escape from weakness and from the necessity of asking: though:

in the middle-class culture of reaching Blackshirts. They took refuge from their insecurities in a new cult of national Marxism. They sought solace for their fear of responsibility in a despotism which asked nothing of them but obedience. They looked to a Czar for salvation. After the "March on Rome" (October 28, 1922) the chief beneficiary of these aspirations was Benito Mussolini.

Like Hitler and all other successful Czarist of the petty bourgeoisie, Duce was himself the incarnation of the narrowed understandings of the multitudes who flocked to his banner. He had once found Socialism "the greatest drama which mankind is enacting for the purpose of rising above its animal nature and reaching a humanitarian level." But love for humanity turned easily to hatred. "You hate me because you love me," he shouted to the Socialists who deposed and expelled him from the party in 1924. He, too, was moved to hate what he had loved and to love what he had hated, partly by hatred and more by insupportable inner tensions and contradictions. A mankind which had so long denied his importance was by definition a mean and petty species. Had not Machiavelli and Nietzsche and Stendhal said as much? And it was unstable, fluid, and therefore base. "I haven't a friend. And I cannot have one. First because of my temperament, and secondly because of the opinion I hold of my fellow men. That is why I dispense with amicitiae and conversation."<sup>4</sup>

This son of a Socialist agitator revolted against authority and thereby came to pay reverence. In his youth he was teacher, book-keeper, starveling, political exile, companion of exiles, and inmate of prisons. Wounded in soul as a rebel, wounded in body as a soldier, he escaped from suffering as a creed of hardness and a vision of himself as Superman.<sup>5</sup> Of him could better be said what *Assoluto Franco* once said of Ponce de Leon: "He is so cowardly that he is capable of any act of courage." His cowardly began a cult of hardness.<sup>6</sup> His position turned into refinement, his republicanism into moralism, his Marxism into neo-Marxism, his liberalism into fierce rebellion against democracy, internationalism, humanitarianism, Freemasonry, and (belatedly) Jews. Millions found compatible comfort and enthusiasm from opposing confusion and doubt in discovering what they had once believed and believing what they had once deemed vicious or weak. And in their faith Mussolini found his destiny: "Yes. I am possessed by this entity—so be it—because it inflames, grows, and consumes me, like a physical reality. I want to make a mark on history with my will, like a lion with his claws."<sup>7</sup>

Here, as in every subsequent Fascist, Caesar was drawn toward paths of glory by personal ambition, by the visions of his indoctrinated followers, and by the creed of "heroic" violence in the name of which he came to power.<sup>1</sup> But the abstraction of all these elements from the equation would still have left a formula of aggrandizement by force. And this not only because of Italy's "inferior" position as a Great Power.<sup>2</sup> Eternal violence was here a product of internal passions. Caesar ruled a realm in which the rich and well-born paid Caesar tribute for the privilege of guiding the faces of the poor. The stabilization of the lira in 1927 at an over-valued rate precipitated such deflation and unemployment as to plunge Fascist Italy into the Great Depression a full two years before the rest of the capitalist world. The steady fall of wages and living-standards confronted the regime with a problem of ever more acute misery at the bottom of the social ladder.<sup>3</sup> "How is he happy, although the mother of twelve ever-hungry children?" asked Signora Teresa Loffredo, champion *Madre Protettrice* of the province of Rome in the postwar campaigns of 1934. She answered her question in the one room where she and her offspring and her unemployed husband lived: "Have more children. My children are my treasure and almost my only joy. Having more, and my husband's finding a job, are the things I want most than anything else. Only with no work it is so difficult to feed them."<sup>4</sup>

A Caesar who cannot supply bread must supply opium. Fascism's principal contribution to the arts of government is in all but inevitable technique of inspiring its victims and denizens with such idealized faith in their tribal destiny that they suffer poverty gladly and forget their hunger in dreams of nation, race, and empire. Critics are best silenced not by coercion but by conversion. Conversion is most easily achieved by abolishing all the remembrance of its cause/effort against impostors at home and enemies abroad. Preparation for war is the most efficacious device for eliciting obedience from the masses—for is the simple dichotomy of Mass, "We" must all stand together and "They" are the foes of us all. When this trick is turned, all parties are bound to hail Caesar as conqueror and savior. Citizens then become warriors. Obedience is a virtue above all virtues. Self-sacrifice is the highest duty.

Il Duce learned this lesson early. In 1903 he ordered his cronies to bombard the Greek island of Corfu in defiance of the League and in vengeance for General Trifini, murdered on the Corfu-Albania frontier. Fifteen orphan children died under the hail of shells. But all Ital-

ten parties were thrilled. Fascist "baser" was vindicated. Mussolini once wrote: "The Fascist State was will-to-power and an Empire. The Roman tradition is the idea of Empire. In the Fascist doctrine, the imperial idea is not only a spiritual, military, and mercantile expression, but also one of spiritual and moral expansion. For Fascism, the tendency to the imperial idea means expansion of the nation and is a manifestation of vitality."<sup>10</sup> The price of loyalty was forever the image of Fascism's defeat, threatening the democratic world. "The struggle between two worlds can permit no compromise. . . . Either we or they! Either their idea or ours! Either our State or theirs!"<sup>11</sup>

For years Il Duce had warned his subjects that the half decade between 1931 and 1940 would be an epoch of conflict, and that 1935 in particular would be Italy's year of destiny. Italians believed. They swarmed and slaved and marched to arm guns and troops for the millennium. But Ciano's problem was one of choosing a safe target. "Live dangerously" was the Fascist creed. But prudence forbade any challenge to giants. Fascist Italy was without allies. There were satellites: the puppet governments of Albania and, after 1934, unhappy Austria and truncated Hungary. These pygmies, however, carried no weight in the balance of power. France and Britain controlled the Mediterranean with overwhelming force. Either one alone could hopelessly return Italy, whatever the troops of Fascist preparedness. Across the Adriatic was Yugoslavia. But behind Yugoslavia stood France. In the east was Turkey. But behind Turkey stood the Soviet Union. Neither Britain nor France, moreover, would tolerate Italian conquest in the eastern Mediterranean—as yet. Where to find a victim?

That the choice fell finally upon the only native kingdom of Africa which still retained its independence was not the result of any sudden decision nor yet the consequence of any grievance or dispute. It was a product of a swirling memory four decades old and of elaborate and secret calculations over a period of years. The Capet-Christians Kingdom of Abyssinia, of her rechristened with its ancient name of Ethiopia, was ruled by the proud and warlike Amharas. They had beaten back all foreign conquerors since the days of Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, from whom the reigning dynasty traced its descent. The kingdom remained primitive, feudal, and barbarous in its unopened darkness. Roman legions, mailed crusaders, and modern colonial expeditions had scourged the great circle of the Ethiopian plateau or beat in vain against its ramparts. Young Italy, seeking solace after the French seizure of Tunis in 1881, attempted the conquest of Ethiopia

fifteen years later—with the blessings then of Britain, and the hostility of France. But the hordes of the Emperor Menelik, cut the Italians to pieces at Adowa on March 1, 1896, and the venture was agonizingly abandoned.<sup>12</sup>

The usurpation of the enterprise by Fascism was rendered difficult by the awkward circumstance that Italy, in common with other Powers, had solemnly sworn to respect Ethiopia's independence and had pledged itself with equal solemnity to renounce war as an instrument of policy. In the Treaty of Peace signed at Addis Ababa on October 26, 1896, Italy recognized "the absolute and unassumed independence of the Empire of Ethiopia as a sovereign and independent State." In 1897 Italy concluded a Treaty of Commerce and Friendship with Ethiopia and agreed to delimit the frontiers between Ethiopia and Italy's colonial possessions: Eritrea to the northeast and Italian Somaliland to the southeast. On December 13, 1906, Britain, France, and Italy signed a compact to maintain the political and territorial status quo and to make "every effort to preserve the integrity of Ethiopia" in the event of any disturbance of that status quo. By the secret Treaty of London of April 26, 1915, Italy was proclaimed "compensated" along the frontiers of Libya, Eritrea, and Somaliland in case of British and French acquisitions in Africa at the expense of Germany. The compensations, however, were not to be at the expense of Ethiopia, but at the expense of France and Britain. London made small cessions to Eritrea in 1914. In July 1914 Britain and Egypt ceded Italy an area of desert south of Libya.

In the interim Ethiopia had been admitted to the League of Nations in 1923—with the express support of Italy and France and in the face of some moribund doubts from Downing Street, inspired by the persistence of slavery in the African kingdom. Italy thereafter agreed not merely to respect but to "protect us against external aggression the territorial integrity and the existing political independence" of Ethiopia. This did not prevent Rome and London from attempting two years later to make a deal for economic concessions at Ethiopia's expense. Addis Ababa, however, frustrated the scheme by alert publicity and protest. An Italian-Ethiopian Treaty of Friendship of August 2, 1928, concluded for twenty years, provided for "cordial peace and perpetual friendship" and pledged Rome (Article 5) to "submit to a procedure of conciliation or of arbitration the questions which may arise between them, and which they may not be able to decide by the normal processes of diplomacy, without having recourse

so force of arms." In July 1926 Ethiopia ratified the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, which Italy had ratified in June 1921. In September 1934 Ethiopia accepted the "optional clause" for the compulsory adjudication of legal disputes. Italy had ratified it in September 1922. In February 1927 Italy ratified the Pact of Paris for the renunciation of war which Ethiopia had ratified in November 1926. In March 1927 Italy accepted the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. Ethiopia had already accepted it in September 1921.<sup>12</sup> On March 12, 1935, moreover, Italy—alone among the European Great Powers—adhered to the Argentine Anti-War Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation of October 12, 1923. This instrument established procedures of peaceful settlement through Conciliation Commissions and pledged the parties to non-recognition of "the validity of the occupation or acquisition of territories which may be brought about by force of arms" (Article 1). The final Article declared:

The high contracting parties solemnly declare that they condemn acts of aggression in their mutual relations or those with other States, and that the settlement of disputes or controversies of any kind that may arise among them shall be effected only by the pacific means which have the sanction of international law.<sup>13</sup>

The Kingdom of Italy was thus bound by at least nine treaties to safeguard Ethiopia's integrity and independence or to submit disputes with Ethiopia to conciliation, arbitration, or adjudication. As late as September 29, 1934 Rome announced: "Italy declares here my intention that it not friendly toward the Ethiopian Government, with whom we are bound by the treaty of friendship of 1928."<sup>14</sup> No such serious commitment stood in the way of the first attempt at conquest in 1896. Now, however, despite much heroics and dreams of glory, Fascist Italy had deliberately pledged itself to membership in a new international order. That order was based upon the renunciation of conquest and the rule of law between sovereigns. "No nation," asserted Woodrow Wilson, "should seek to extend its policy over any other nation or people, but every people should be left free to determine its own policy, its own way of development, unhindered, undisturbed, undistorted, the little along with the great and powerful."<sup>15</sup> Democratic Italy had agreed. Fascist Italy had agreed. Seven of the nine treaties forbidding aggression against Ethiopia had been negotiated, signed, and ratified by the regime of Mussolini.

How then embark upon war? Does not "national honor," of which

Faustin ideologues are as justice, require the nation to honor its word—at least when the word is sincerely pledged? Quite the contrary. Machiavelli had written in *The Prince* (1513): “A prudent prince cannot and ought not to keep his word, except when he can do so without injury to himself or when the circumstances under which he contracted the engagement will take.” Faustine denied equality among individuals, races, nations, and States—not merely equality of capacity or achievement, which some courses, but equality of rights, which Western civilization has sworn for a thousand years to uphold. There is one measure for the Supermen and another for the lesser breeds without the law. If Duce would discover that “circumstances” had changed, that Ethiopia was after all not a State but merely barbarism, that Ethiopia had no rights, and, miserable Aias, that Italy not only would be violating no obligations in undertaking the conquest, but would be fulfilling these obligations in the most effective fashion. The crowd was war.

War that brings grief to hearts otherwise closed, that leads to exile and deaths, that puts death before all our eyes, is the great breaker of the most jealously hidden truths. For only at the sight of death does the soul of man go deep and awake in its simplest essence, it is asked in heaven or it is spent in the ignorance for which it is made and whose none without the inevitable event would have seen it. War is justice, nobility, and brotherly pity.<sup>17</sup>

There is no evidence that Il Duce or his advisers were at any time deterred from their enterprise by solicitude for Italian treaty obligations. But they devoted much thought to the question of power. Disciples of violence who never comprehended the language of law always comprehended the language of force. There were those who advised that Britain and France would not permit the conquest. Their reasoning seemed sound. Ethiopia, like Persia, Afghanistan, and Siam, had stood at the focal point of rival imperialisms and enjoyed independence because no rival would permit another to snatch the prize. Britain controlled Suez and Aden at either end of the Red Sea. Britain controlled British Somaliland on the shore of the Gulf of Aden, Kenya Colony to the south, and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan to the west of Ethiopia. The Blue Nile, source of water and wealth for Egypt, arose in Lake Tana in western Ethiopia. For reasons of imperial security, Britain could not permit Italian control of Ethiopia. France also had imperial interests forbidding unrest. The only railway in Ethiopia was

under French control. It ran from Adida to the sea at Djibouti, capital of French Somaliland, strategically situated on the Gulf of Aden south of Eritrea.

The Quai d'Orsay, moreover, had raised its entire position in Europe and in the world since 1919 upon the security of treaties and upon the guarantee of the Covenant. Paris could not permit that position to be jeopardized by allowing Britain to reduce such commitments to scraps of paper. In 1914, both Britain and France had swepted war with a Great Power far more formidable than Fascist Italy in preference to permitting the reduction of treaties to "scraps of paper" through the lawless conquest of a small State. Twenty years later every consideration of national and imperial self-interest dictated a similar course—the more so as Paris and London could halt the contemplated murder of Ethiopia without risk of war simply by warning Britain in due time that they would close the Suez Canal to Italian troops and warships, if necessary, blockade Italy from Gibralter.

The advent of Ciano who took this view had all memory and all logic on their side. Yet Il Duce came to a different conclusion, which, when tested, proved to be sound. Why did he decide that Britain and France would not in the end say *him, nay?* Documentary data on his reasoning are not yet available. But certain suppositions are possible. He noted that Paris and London had acquiesced in Japan's conquest of Manchuria rather than risk friction with Tokio, and that some responsible British and French statesmen, with the apparent support of their public, had even welcomed this adventure in conquest. He noted that the leaders of France seemed to value the Covenant, the Pact, and the whole machinery of banning aggression only as French weapons against Germany, not as a public law of the world society. Promises of Italian aid against the Reich would, he felt, evoke French apprehensions of the Italian adventure in Africa.

British, reasoned Mussolini, would oppose whatever threatened British imperial interests. But if he respected British signs, the Tories would risk no clash with Fascism. They admired it too much. He did not perceive that the British public might wake on a different definition of British interests. But he assumed that the British public, like all masses in democracies, was stupid and cowardly and inevitably committed to peace. Downing Street for fifteen years had refused to accept any commitments (apart from the Covenant, which no one took seriously) requiring Britain to defend others in conflicts where British interests were not immediately endangered. And perhaps he



assured that if the British public became inconvenient, the aristocracy and plutocrats of Toryism could find ways and means of countervailing its desires. These convictions may not have been formulated with such precision at Rome in 1933. But they were at least basic. They were strengthened in the spring of 1935 by French refusal to halt the Third Reich and by British refusal to defend Austria or Czechoslovakia or anything east of the Rhine. These branches were not merely a product of Fascist campaign for Liberalism. They revealed a deep intuitive insight into political motivations and dynamics in the democratic Powers. Here once more "li Duce is always right."

The Fascist decision for war against Ethiopia was reached in secret some time during 1935. General Emilio de Bono, who was to be first Italian commander on the northern front, later revealed part of the tale with the consent and blessing of Mussolini. With all allowances for vanity and exaggeration after the event, his remarks leave little doubt regarding motivations and timing. De Bono was sent to Africa in March 1932 to investigate and report. In September he accompanied the King to Ethiopia. But "in 1932 nothing definite had as yet been settled as regards the character and method of a possible campaign against the probable enemy."<sup>11</sup>

By the summer of 1933 all was settled. "The Duce had spoken to no one of the coming operations in East Africa, only he and I knew what was going to happen and an indiscretion occurred by which the news could reach the public."<sup>12</sup> The question, said Mussolini, must be resolved "no later than 1936." Preparations were pushed during 1934. Colonel Ruggieri of the Bersaglieri was military attaché at Addis Ababa, where he built up "a special network of reliable informers" to spy upon and corrupt the Ethiopian *chefs de clan*.<sup>13</sup> He was now appointed head of the political bureau of the High Command in Egypt. As Minister for Colonies, de Bono visited once more for Africa on January 7, 1934, after the incident at Wal-Wal had furnished a pretext. He reported that the Nigra would not attack. Mussolini replied in a letter of February 24, 1935: "In case the Nigra should have no intention of attacking us, we ourselves must take the initiative."<sup>14</sup>

But even then there were doubts and fears. In June of 1935 Mussolini wrote de Bono in a "very secret note" that "if we get into trouble with the English we would certainly be obliged to renounce our offensive action and content ourselves in the beginning with keeping to a defensive which would have insured the integrity of the colony. This was indispensable also to reduce consumption to a minimum,

increase our supplies, with the closing of the Suez Canal and the probable superiority of the British fleet over our naval division, would have become more than problematical. But even in that to-be-deprecated case, if Decca had decided to take the dive,"<sup>17</sup> This "dive," however, would be dangerous only if Britain and France acted together to save Ethiopia and the Covenant. If France did nothing, the risk would be less. If France also persuaded Britain to take no action beyond empty words and feeble gestures, the risk would be still less. And if Britain and France together would "co-operate" by denying arms to Ethiopia, there would be no risk at all. The first contingency was probable, the second possible, and the third merely a wild hope. But all three were to be realized, thanks chiefly to Pierre Laval. That would mean triumph over Ethiopia and over "the herd of brutes and fools and infinitely blind and ignorant multitudes"<sup>18</sup> who preferred peace to war and who thereby destroyed peace and insured their own defeat at the hands of the conqueror.

## 2. RESCUE BY LAVAL

If Louis Barthou was the last witness of French security in the Quai d'Orsay, Pierre Laval was the first witness of disaster. This butcher's son was born in Châtillon in the Auvergne. As a boy he drove a mail-coach, thereby demonstrating an inexorable consciousness after the event that he displayed qualities of leadership at a tender age. He taught school and studied law in his youth and moved to Paris, where he became a labor lawyer in the proletarian suburb of Aubervilliers. His "undefinable energy and his pungent and convincing eloquence"<sup>19</sup> were placed at the disposal of the Socialist Party. He began his parliamentary career by becoming Socialism's youngest deputy in the Chamber in 1914, elected from Aubervilliers in May. Like Mussolini, he was lured by his Government in a dangerous re-orientation at the outbreak of the First World War. Unlike Mussolini, he remained a pacifist and defensor during the conflict. But in 1918, again like Mussolini, he became a political renegade by renouncing Socialism and moving toward the Right. He lost his seat in parliament (until 1924), but remained Mayor of Aubervilliers. He found a politically profitable (and thus supplies a clue to his diplomacy) to flirt with Right and Left at once. He associated himself with Poincaré, Caillaux, and Briand, who awarded him the Ministry of Justice. He also culti-

used André Tardieu. By such devices he rose to the apt of forty-six to the Premiership (January 25, 1931-February 16, 1931). He also held the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a month in 1931 and returned at upon Barthou's death, coupling it once more with the Premiership in June 1932.

Laval was a squat, dark, and dopey figure—thick-lipped, heavy-lidded, with discolored teeth and forever a white tie, alone nowhere because unwashed. He was reputed to be enormously wealthy. He affected a certain ignorance and naivete, which were possibly not altogether affections.<sup>10</sup> He was a devout Catholic and more than half a Fascist, for he spoke approvingly of the *Croix de Feu* and tolerated its infractions of the law. But he sought also to retain the respect of his erstwhile friends. Who noted that his name read the same from left to right as from right to left. He was denounced by Franklin-Roosevelt as pro-German and defended by Tardieu as pro-Italian. He was praised by Henri de Kéroul as the ally of Fascism and condemned by Pertinax as the betrayer of France's western allies. His vanity caused him to regard himself as the only statesman capable of brooding "peace." His famed *Auvergne* cunning reflected itself in clever deals which proved usually to be blunders and sometimes to be irreparable catastrophes.

The secret of Laval's diplomacy—and his record deserves such a name—was his stubborn pursuit of the will-o'-the-wisp of Italian support for France against the Reich. For this mirage he was prepared to sabotage the Soviet Pact (not because Rome demanded this, but because he feared and hated the boggy of Bolshevism). He was equally ready to betray the League of Nations, collective security, and all the foundations of public law and French power in Europe. He sought to buy French security by giving Mussolini a free hand in Africa and by giving Hitler a free hand in Central Europe. In so doing he infuriated Geneva, London, Prague, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Moscow and in return obtained—nothing. His purchase, indeed, was worth less than nothing, for his bargain drove Il Duce squarely into the arms of Der Fuhrer and left France all her debilitations and alone in the face of an overwhelming combination of foes.

This suicidal folly was in some measure the product of Laval's obscure relations with the extreme Right and the French Fascist League. These groups, claiming a monopoly of patriotism, were subsidized from Rome and Berlin and were always ready to sell out the security of the Republic in order to serve the interests of the classes

they represented and the purposes of the foreign Causes who helped call them into being. They hated Laval's deal with Mussolini as an unworkable and in fighting the People's Front and interfering French democracy.<sup>14</sup> They cheered Mussolini's war to the skies and became particularly vociferous when Laval opposed Fleming in the Premiership on May 31, 1940. In December Laval sought to frustrate legislative efforts to disarm the private armies and to penalize involvement in murder. He played a role in obstructing the "voluntary" disarmament and dissolution of the Leagues on condition of similar action by the Socialists and Communists, who had no private armies in the general area. Representative legislation was enacted, however, and went into force on January 15, 1941. Following a vicious attack with stones and clubs upon Léon Blum on February 13, perpetrated by Royalist *roussins*, a decree dissolved the *Camelots du Roi*, the *Ligue d'Action Française* and the Fascist Students' Federation. On June 18 the *Croix de Feu*, the *Jeunesse Patriote*, and the *Solidarité Française* were also dissolved. French democracy was saved, at least temporarily, in spite of Laval. But in the field of foreign affairs the Leagues had already performed well the last consequence of them by Mussolini and Hitler—and Laval.

But much of the Centre and Left also shared Laval's folly through ignorance, stupidity, or sheer pseudo-national betrayal. It was to be expected that Henri de Kerillis in the *Echo de Paris* should worship Mussolini as a god and, despite his Catholicism, should refuse to publish a Catholic protest against Italian aggression signed by Jacques Maritain, Paul Claudel, François Mauriac, and others. It was to be expected that *Le Matin* (September 17, 1943) should publish with approval its correspondent's impressions of Caesar: "His lips smile, and at moments there is such sweetness in his eyes that I can realize only too well why those who once felt this look upon them should now be devoted to the Dictator's death." It was to be expected that the entire Right press should scream: "Savations are war!" and that the *Journal Français* should demand the assassination of all Left deputies if war should come with Italy. But some wondered why Poincaré should write (July 13, 1943): "We have a great desire to help Italy", why General de Taborin in *L'Œuvre* (July 13) should urge that the Powers ought to talk leniency in the League and leave Italy free to begin war without antagonizing Geneva, why the Left press should also oppose resolution, and why the unabled Blum should blame Laval's bargain with Caesar. "We [the Socialists] voted for the nullification of

the Rome agreements, because we believe this to be in the interests of peace. . . . We could not refuse to approve a diplomatic act which we should have carried out ourselves had we been in power."<sup>1</sup>

Boulton's successor deferred the contemplated visit to Rome in the autumn of 1934. Laval encountered difficulties in the way of his projected Roman peace because of Cesar's influence upon colonial considerations. *The Times* of London (December 31, 1934) declared it "really unfortunate that so beneficial a settlement" could be "held up by a minor colonial difference." Laval was especially anxious to consummate his rapprochement with Italy before the Four plenary. He resolved to board the Duce in his den. On the evening of January 3 he took a train for Rome. He was personally welcomed by Mussolini. There were four meetings on the 3th, 6th, and 7th. At the third session Laval spent the midnight hours alone with Cesar in the Palazzo Farnese, after an official banquet given by the French Ambassador, the Comte de Chambrun. Here it was that the secret was completed. The final mission was devoted to signatures and formalities.

The complex Laval-Mussolini agreements of January 7, 1935 contained provisions already reviewed relating to Austria and Germany. A Protocol on Tunis specified that Italian children born in the French colony between 1923 and 1925 would be free to choose French nationality and would be subject to French law after the latter date. This signified prospectively the commencement of September 18, 1896, by which France had persecuted Italian nationality and Italian schools in Tunis. The heart of the agreement, however, lay in a declaration on economic collaboration in Africa and a treaty on African frontiers. By the former instrument Mussolini got 7% (1,300 out of 18,700) of the shares of the Djibouti-Addis railway, designated as "collaboration" to develop inter-colonial relations. By the latter, Laval paid a second installment on the broader "rectifications" which had been proclaimed at London in 1913 and had been initiated in 1929 when Italy secured Jubaland from Britain and certain outcrops in the desert hinterland of Libya from France. Rome now released Paris from all further obligation to compensate Italy for the African spoils of Versailles and accepted in full settlement two new areas: (1) a small triangle between French Somaliland and Eritrea comprising 13½ miles of coast and 300 square miles of desert; (2) 44,000 square miles of desert south of Libya in the Tibesti mountains. The first region had no inhabitants. It subsequently appeared that the second had sixty-six—*who*, said Il Duce, "had to be searched for like a needle in a haystack and were eventually

found cradled away in an isolated valley."<sup>10</sup> Mussolini herewith renounced his designs on French North Africa, French Somaliland, and Lake Chad and accepted worthless debts in final payment.

On the face of the bargain Il Duce had extracted little from the butcher's son. The agreement on Tunis was an Italian concession to France. The railway shares by themselves were of no consequence. The African territories transferred were valueless. If Mussolini got little, he gave less. The defense of Austria was of more concern to Rome than to Paris. To "concede" was innocuous. To "consent" in case of German repudiation of disavowed obligations was also innocuous. If Laval apparently gave little, he unquestionably got less than he gave. He supposed that he had got Italian support against the Reich. He had in fact got nothing. He said he had got "peace." In reply to Mussolini's toast at the Palazzo Venezia on January 5 he declared: "Peace must be maintained and consolidated. Our civilization must not be allowed to disappear. Let us give an air to the breath of the past: it is always through war that civilizations have flourished."<sup>11</sup>

But below the surface of the bargain, Laval had performed a great service to Mussolini if not to civilization. In return for Italian diplomatic support (which Il Duce subsequently delivered not to Paris but to Berlin) the French Foreign Minister bartered away Ethiopia's right to life. The secret's inner meaning, which explains in full the mystery of Il Duce's modest demands in other matters, was an assurance of French acquiescence in Caesar's plans of conquest.<sup>12</sup> It is impossible that any formal document to this effect was signed. No document was necessary. Mussolini felt that he could count on Laval's discretion word, for Laval was so fascinated by his mirage that he could reasonably be expected to pursue it to its empty end and beyond. Documents would be dangerous, for Laval would be forced if he ever admitted to parliament or public that he had agreed in advance to sabotage and betray the League upon which most Frenchmen still based their hopes of security. He took pains to deny emphatically all such allegations.

As for Ethiopia [he told the Senate on March 16, at the time of ratification] it has been asked whether I may not have forgotten the role of friend and protector which France has always played toward her. I reply that I have forgotten nothing, and that on this point I have not conceded anything with which I

could be reproached. Nothing in the Rome agreement impinged with the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Ethiopia, as these are guaranteed by the Anglo-French-Italian Agreement of the 17th of December 1906, and also—it should not be forgotten—by the Covenant of the League of Nations.

There was nothing [he declared to the Chamber on December 28, 1935] either in the agreement or in the conventions which preceded or followed them that could encourage Italy to resort to war. I am too deeply attached to peace and to want it to be universal and not to be aware that it is fragile. . . . I should have been imprudent, and perhaps even culpable, if I had smoothed the path for some adventure or other in Africa which would deprive us of the presence and the assistance of our neighbor in Europe.

Laval's own language belied his words. He was concerned only with the "presence" (and "assistance") of Fascist Italy, not with that of Ethiopia or the League. Yet the public believed and permitted itself to be duped with the thought that Caesar was now the ally of France. The Little Entente expressed "satisfaction." The British Empire hoped that the Eastern Pact would now be pushed. Moscow was suspicious. Downing Street gave no blessing. Paris and Rome exchanged military, naval, and air missions in the spring. General Maurice Gamelin, Chief of the French General Staff, visited Marshal Badoglio in July. Badoglio visited Gamelin in September and inspected the Maginot Line. Rumors hinted at joint military action to protect Austria. New commercial accords were signed. Laval spent no pains to propagandize the new friendship. Mussolini was quite willing to co-operate in spreading the delusion that Italy had acquired a new "ally." For if Duce it sufficed that Laval's ally gave him a free hand against Ethiopia.

Even before the agreement was signed Mussolini had found his pretense for aggression, though he was later to abandon it and act without pretext. On December 5, 1935, Italian and Ethiopian troops clashed at Wal-Wal, a water-hole in the Ogaden desert, 60 miles within Ethiopia from the paper frontier with Italy. Somaliland drawn by a treaty of May 14, 1908. This undermarked line was 180 miles from the shore of the Indian Ocean and was parallel to the coast. Wal-Wal was 50 miles from the sea.<sup>10</sup> But Rome had insisted that it was Italian and had occupied it in 1908. The occupation was uncon-

ended until 1934, when Ethiopian troops, asserting an Anglo-Ethiopian boundary commission, challenged the Italian garrison. Tanks and planes drove them off with 150 dead and many wounded. Addis Abeba had returned to Rasne in December 6, before it had news of the fighting. Three days later it proposed submission under the treaty of 1928. Howland replied on December 12 with a demand for a formal apology, a salute to the Italian flag, damages of 500,000 dollars, and the punishment of the Ethiopians responsible for the "attack."

The African kingdom which was then challenged by Caesar to combat was symbolized to the outer world by the figure of its sovereign. Ras Tafari Mekonnen, crowned in 1930 as Haile Selassie (Amharic for "Power of Truth"), Negus Negusti or King of Kings, Chosen of God, and Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah. Though small of stature and slight of frame, he bore himself with royal dignity. His thin face, brown and bearded, revealed intelligence and courage. Almost single-handed, he was striving against formidable obstacles to modernize his semi-barbarous feudal realm. His eight million subjects of mixed Somali and African origin had lived for three millennia in a state society under their tribal chieftains or Rasas, knowing little of the outer world before their high plains and beyond the burning deserts which ringed the table-land. From time to time they had fought off invaders. For the rest, they lived in the pastoral discipline they had always known, scraping dairy and rhyolite, cruelty and generosity, with the same unswerving intent which they brought to their archaic Christian creed and to their feasts and dances. They *resisted* change. And Haile Selassie, who knew the outer world, feared that without change they might suffer an enslavement by alien empire-builders far worse than enslavement to their own ancient ways. He strove mightily and with slow success to equip them for living and for defending themselves in the twentieth century. Given time, he would doubtless have succeeded as his task, as the new rulers of China were succeeding. But as the militarism of Tokio would give China no time to secure itself against conquest, so the militarism of Rasne would give no time to Haile Selassie to save his realm from the plunders.<sup>22</sup>

The Negus supplemented his native shrewdness by summoning foreign advisers to his sprawling ramshackle capital. General Vargis of Sweden and M. Aubertin of Switzerland stood him in good stead. His most trusted adviser was Ernest Cohen, an American who had had diplomatic and financial experience in China, Washington, Wall Street, and Haiti.<sup>23</sup> France he rightly suspected. He also viewed with



suspicious Sir Sidney Barton, the British Minister, who had been Consul-General in Shanghai and had played a role in precipitating the first clash between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists in 1927. Barton advised him not to carry his dispute with Rome to the League, but when Mussolini, on December 14, 1935, refused arbitration of the Wal Wal conflict, Haile Selassie appealed to Geneva.

Prolonged and inconclusive correspondence ensued throughout the winter and spring while II Duce poured troops and guns and tanks and planes through Somalia to Ethiopia and Somaliland. The League's Secretary-General, Joseph Avenol, was not above conspiring in Laval's plot. Downing Street also discouraged and obstructed all action at Geneva. In January<sup>11</sup> Tecla Haimanot, Ethiopian Minister in Paris, sought League action to restore peace under Articles 11 and 12 of the Covenant. Baron Aloisi, Italian representative at Geneva, was a polished diplomat of the old school who had served in Copenhagen, Bucharest, Tientsin, Tokyo, and Ankara and spent thirteen years in the Paris Embassy. He maneuvered shrewdly, never questioned his instructions, and realized at all times that sacrifice for a principle was a luxury too dear for Fascist diplomacy.<sup>12</sup> In his efforts to block action he was abetted by Avenol, Laval, and even Anthony Eden. The French was "direct negotiation" under the treaty of 1918, while the league proposed to strike. Italian exploitation created Haile Selassie on March 18 to threaten to invoke Article 15. But Hitler had just denounced Versailles. The Swiss front was struggling to be torn. Paris and London could ill afford to incense II Duce. At the end of January, moreover, Italy had suggested to Downing Street that negotiations be opened for the "mutual and harmonious development of British and Italian interests in Ethiopia."<sup>13</sup> The Foreign Office had secretly appointed the Maffey Committee to report on the effects upon British interests of a possible Italian conquest of Ethiopia. Despite this action, which was then unknown to Parliament and public, Simon blandly stated Commons (February 15) that there were no indications that Italy's military preparations were "aggressive in character." The leaders of both the Western democracies had no desire to fulfill their pledge to protect Haile Selassie at Geneva.

The "dispute" was thus allowed to drift. On March 22, 1935 Rome told Avenol that Italy would observe the 1918 treaty and was prepared to set up an arbitral commission if direct negotiations failed. There fore "Article 15 of the Covenant cannot be applicable in this particular

1935.<sup>1</sup> New Ethiopian appeals were vain. On the eve of Soreau, Rome told Avenal that Italy was now ready to appoint a commission of arbitration. As for the Soreau Conference, Comares was told by Soreau (May 1), by Howe (August 1 and October 22), by Edén (October 23), and informally by Neville Chamberlain (April 6, 1936) that Ethiopia was not "officially" discussed. Chamberlain declared on May 8, 1936 that the failure of the Government to discuss the issue at Soreau was "one of the most critical blunders in the whole course of British diplomacy in these disastrous years." In fact it was discussed unofficially, and when Mussolini threatened to send no representatives to the special Council meeting of April 8 the dispute appeared on the agenda, the Council agreed not to include it. Despite Ethiopian pleas, it was likewise omitted from the Council meeting of May on the ground that a "direct" settlement was impossible. Laval opined that Rome's acceptance of arbitration was a guarantee that no resort to force was contemplated. When someone asked MacDonald at Soreau: "And did you not discuss Abyssinia with Mussolini?" he replied: "My friend, your question is irrelevant."<sup>2</sup>

Italy brought new armies to Addis Ababa. General Gassman was appointed commander in Somali-land. General de Bono became Commander-in-Chief. Italian troops and arms continued to pour through Suez. On May 7 Signor Lenora, Undersecretary for Colonies, declared that Ethiopia was incapable of keeping order and that Italy must settle the problem once and for all. Rome refused to include in the arbitration the crucial question of the location of the boundary and of title to Wal-Wal. Not until mid-May did Rome appoint members of the Commission (Count Luigi Aialawandi-Masconsoli and Signor Raffaele Maragnon) and then it objected to Ethiopia's appointment of two neutral advisers. Professor Albert de La Froidelle of the University of Paris and Professor Pierre Pomeroy of Wisconsin and Geneva. On May 21 Ethiopia again requested Avenal to act under Article 15. High Schools repeated the request on May 22 when the Council met. Mussolini had told his Senate on the 14th that no third Power could "arrogate the inalienable claim to intervene." Laval sought to block all action. But on May 25, 1936 the Council passed 24-2 resolutions, one asking Avenal to keep the members informed of the progress of arbitration and the other summoning the Council to meet again if the four arbitrators had not selected a fifth by July 25 and had not achieved a settlement by August 15. Avenal accepted

Potter and Le Poidevin, but rejected all suggestions that Rome should pledge itself to refrain from an attack or from further troop movements.

The strange "arbitration" which followed was indeed an irony.<sup>12</sup> Between the wolf and the lamb arbitration is impossible. If Duce was willing to play out the feroz, even at the sacrifice of his power, in a return of preventing further discussion at Geneva. The Commission met at Milan on June 6, but reached a deadlock by July 9 because the Italian members refused to discuss the question of cede to Wal-Wal as a basis for assuming responsibility for the clash. Mussolini asserted at Zurich on June 11 that public opinion abroad was "a ridiculous poppet which will be burned up in the end of the Blackshirts." Stimson and Hoover were indifferent, but their colleague Eden pressed for a settlement. On June 24 he came to Rome bearing gifts. Britain would persuade Ethiopia to cede part of Ogaden to Italy, and Britain would grant Ethiopia a 50-mile corridor, 12 miles wide, running to the sea at Zula in British Somaliland. Mussolini at once rejected the proposal.

On August 3 the Council, yielding to Italian demands, instructed the Commission not to discuss frontier questions. It agreed to reconsider the issue on September 4. Laval continued to oppose all efforts to thwart Italy's demand or inhibit Council discussion on the merits of the issue. Armed, in an inspiration of doubtful brilliancy, arranged a cocktail party where Laval advanced new arguments against League action, quite bewitching to Tade Hlewraite. Professor Gaston Jell, who was advising the Ethiopian delegation, hinted that Ethiopia was in effect offered a choice between assassination and suicide. But it was made clear that the corpse must lie quiet during the wake.<sup>13</sup> At long last, the Commission selected a fifth member, Nicolas Politis of Greece. After successive perambulatory meetings in Milan, Scheerzengen, Paris, and Bern, characterized by innumerable delays and obstruction on the part of the Italian members, the Commission handed down its conclusion on September 3. It held that neither Ethiopia nor Italy was responsible for the Wal-Wal conflict, and that therefore no damages were owing by either side to the other. The award was accepted by both leagues.

The "dispute" having thus been "settled," Mussolini marched to war.

### 3. FRAUD AND FORCE

The principal obstacle in the way of the smooth execution of Laval's program to propitiate Caesar at Ethiopia's expense was the public of Great Britain. The "National Government," having been shaped by fraudulent promises in 1931, did not represent that public. All the leading figures in the Cabinet, save Anthony Eden, were staunchly opposed to collaborationism and to any co-operative measures to restrain Fascist aggression in Africa or elsewhere. They perceived themselves that no danger to imperial interests was involved in Mussolini's adventure. Except for public pressure, they would have yielded Ethiopia to Italy gladly. But their sense of domestic political realities and their desire to win another election by fraudulent promises won them ultimately to proceed to embrace a policy which they privately opposed. The pressure was thin and their pledges to the public were soon broken. The result was cheap heroism and hypocrisy in the grand manner.

These noblemen were morningly lost upon H Duce. He had not yet learned that Britain's Tories were his best allies—better than Laval—in furthering his anti-British and anti-French aims. He failed to distinguish between mediocrity or between public and politicians in England. He failed to anticipate that Baldwin would backbite the British electorate and give Laval full co-operation. He seemed instead that British opposition to his program must be a reflection of imperial greed and selfishness. His leading publicist, Virginia Gwyda (*Journal d'Afrique*, May 10-11, 1935), simultaneously accused Britain of planning to attack Ethiopia and of supplying arms to Ethiopia. Later Gwyda published the confidential report of the British Interimperial Commission headed by Sir John Maffey as a means of proving that British imperial interests were unfettered by the Italian conflict. Eden told Chamberlain (February 24, 1936) that Gwyda had secured the report by "theft or disappearance," "through an indiscretion or a deliberate breach of confidence."

The report itself, dated June 18, 1935, is noteworthy. The Commission which issued it was appointed on the basis of a suggestion in a Foreign Office letter of March 5, 1935. This letter referred to the circumstance that in January Signor Vanni, Counselor of the Italian

Embassy in London, had "described the agreement on Ethiopia as already reached at the beginning of that month between France and Italy." (That Laval was here revealed to be an unemigrated liar excepted general notice at the time.) The Foreign Office was quite clear that the Italian aim was "the virtual absorption of as much Ethiopian territory as can be absorbed without projecting Italian influence and interests in other parts of the world." This goal, concluded the Maffey Commission, need not be opposed. "No vital British interests exist in Ethiopia or its neighborhood sufficient to oblige His Majesty's Government to resist a conquest of Ethiopia by Italy. Italian control over Ethiopia would from some viewpoints be advantageous to Britain. . . . As far as local British interests are concerned, it is a matter of indifference whether Ethiopia remains independent or is absorbed by Italy. From the viewpoint of imperial defence, an independent Ethiopia is preferable . . . but the threat to British interests seems very remote and would only become real in the event of war between Britain and Italy which is an eventuality that presently seems very improbable." It would suffice for Britain to safeguard Egyptian interests in the waters of Lake Tana and grant rights for the Somali tribes, either through concessions or agreements with Italy. The Open Door should also be assured. "It would be well to seize the occasion to obtain, if possible, rectification of the frontiers of British Somaliland, Kenya, and the Sudan border in order to incorporate in these territories localities that have ties of ethnic and economic affinity with them."<sup>10</sup>

That the conclusions of this remarkable secret document met with the approval of Baldwin, Simon, Hoare, and Chamberlain is scarcely open to doubt. But the temper of British public opinion forbade any acknowledgment of the fact and precluded any implementation of the proposal to join Mussolini in the partition of Haile Selassie's kingdom. The temper of opinion was strikingly revealed to the *Cathart* by the "British National Peace Ballot," launched in March 1934 by the League of Nations Union and cosponsored by a "National Declaration Committee," consisting of the Union and thirty-eight other organizations. Beginning November 12, 1934, at a cost of over twelve thousand pounds, this Committee polled the British public on 20 answers to five questions. Lord Cecil announced the verdict on June 27, 1935. The poll obtained 11,499,164 ballots and was accepted on all sides as an accurate expression of the views of the entire electorate. The results were as follows.

QUESTIONS	YES		DOUBTFUL ANSWERS	
	YES	NO	YES	NO
1. Should Great Britain remain a member of the League of Nations?	11,090,587	18,1583	10,430	101,405
2. Are you in favor of an all-round reduction in armaments by international agreement?	10,470,489	181,773	11,011	113,830
3. Are you in favor of an all-round abolition of national military and naval armaments by international agreement?	9,513,538	1,580,386	16,876	118,843
4. Should the manufacture and sale of armaments for private profit be prohibited by international agreement?	10,473,330	773,413	15,876	151,345
5. Do you consider that, if a nation insists on attacking another, the other nations should combine to compel it to stop by (a) economic and non-military measures?	10,003,666	433,074	17,033	133,107
(b) if necessary, military measures?	1,514,368	1,331,081	40,803	1,364,441

This emphatic endorsement of collective security, involving a substantial majority for economic and even military sanctions against aggression, produced an abrupt and almost comic reversal of program on the part of the Tory leaders. On July 27, 1914 *The Times* declared the ballot "a deplorable waste of time and effort." Bonar Law

Sir Austen Chamberlain attacked it in *Commons* on November 2. Baldwin at Glasgow, November 17, 1934, declared, in consistent obduracy of Stimson's initiative of 1932, that "a collective peace system, in my view, is perfectly impracticable in view of the fact today that the United States is not yet, to our unbounded regret, a member of the League of Nations and that . . . Germany and Japan have both seceded from it. . . . Never as an individual will I sanction the British navy being used for an armed blockade of any country of the world and I know what the United States of America is going to do." <sup>10</sup> On June 28, 1935 *The Times* pronounced the result of the poll "impressive." On July 15 Baldwin, accompanied by Hoare and Eden, escorted Caccia and a delegation of the Committee and asserted that he accepted the result as a national declaration: "The foreign policy of the Government is founded upon the League of Nations. . . . We value this support. . . . The League of Nations remains, as I said in a speech in Yorkshire, 'the sheet-anchor of British policy.'" The National Government's election manifesto of November declared: "The League of Nations will remain as before the keystone of British foreign policy. . . . We shall therefore continue to do all in our power to uphold the Covenant and to maintain and increase the efficiency of the League. In the present unhappy dispute between Italy and Abyssinia there will be no waver in the policy we have hitherto pursued."

The National Government, as will be shown below, had already made a compact with Lard to betray Ethiopia and the League of Nations. But since votes could obviously be gained by a pretense of loyalty to Geneva, Baldwin and his colleagues played the pretense for all it was worth. On September 5, by a vote of 1,042,000 to 177,000, the Trades Union Congress passed a resolution calling for the use of "all the necessary measures provided by the Covenant to meet Italy's unjust and rapacious attack." In the campaign preceding the parliamentary election of November 14, 1935, the Cabinet made wide use of a poster showing a fist (presumably that of Baldwin) planted squarely on the Covenant with the caption: "our vote is on its side." In the polling the Government won 431 out of 515 seats. The Tories were thus assured of another five years in power by pretending to champion a collective security in which they had no faith whatever (and no intention of realizing), but which they knew that the electorate favored.

Tory continuance in Fascist aggression, here and elsewhere, presents a fascinating problem of motivation among a ruling class ready to

abandon national and imperial interests for the sake of its fear of Communism and secret admiration for the Caesars. While few of the Conservative political leaders could ever bring themselves to speak their inner minds on the issue, this attitude—with a slight shift of symbolism—was well expressed by the Catholic Archbishop of Westminster, Monsignor Hinsley, on October 13, 1935: "To speak plainly, the coloring Fascist rule, in every respect unjust—it is one example of the present-day dedication of Caesarism and of the tyranny which makes the individual a pawn on the chessboard of absolutism—I say that the Fascist rule prevents worse atrocities, and if Fascism—which in principle I do not approve—prevents order, nothing can save the country from chaos. God's cause goes under with it." "Cardinal Schuster of Milan on October 21 lauded the valor of the Italian arms as "opening the doors of Ethiopia to the Catholic faith." " Pius XI belatedly cheered "the triumphal happiness of a great and good people" after the conquest (May 12, 1936). Tory leaders of Britain were not concerned with God's cause or the Catholic faith. But they were profoundly concerned with preventing any diminution of the power or prestige of the Italian Fascist regime. The failure of the Italian campaign or the subversion of that regime through League sanctions they regarded as a calamitous prospect, highly detrimental to the class interests and symbols which they themselves championed. Therefore, having won public approval by a pretense of opposing Fascist aggression, they bent all their efforts toward countering that aggression and ensuring the failure of international efforts to avert it.<sup>14</sup>

The treachery to come was anticipated in the Anglo-French efforts of the summer to buy off Mussolini. Paris warned Rome in mid-June that all Ethiopian offers to buy arms in France were being rejected. During the summer French officials at Djibouti interposed every possible obstacle in the way of rail shipments into Ethiopia or the mercantile war supplies which Hilde Schmidt's agents had been able to purchase elsewhere. In January 1936 all Ethiopian transit licenses through French Somaliland were refused, in return for an Italian pledge not to build the French-owned railway. Early in the summer of 1935 France, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Denmark all imposed restrictions on arms exports to Ethiopia. All British licenses were withheld during the spring. On July 25 Hoare announced that "For the present" all arms licenses to Italy (which had no need of foreign arms) and to Ethiopia (which needed them desperately) would be refused. Hilde Schmidt complained bitterly but in vain: "The tendency to ac-



cept the principle that strong nations should be aided in this manner in its defense of all the concepts of modern civilization and civilization a recognition." " Meanwhile no obstacles of any kind were imposed in the way of Italy's colonial shipments of troops and guns to Ethiopia's frontiers. The British and French bondholders of the Suez Canal Company (with the British Government owning the majority of the shares) would far, for Mussolini paid 35 pf (10 gold francs) for every soldier and 12.00 for every net ton of shipping through the Canal.

Anglo-French plans to Mussolini had only one purpose: to induce Canal to accept as a gift that which he was seeking as a conquest of arms. Early in June Eden signed a pacific commitment under the 1905 treaty. Ethiopia would be induced by Anglo-French postwar to cede territories to Italy. Britain might make small territorial compensations to Hail Selassie. The Tory "Die-Hards" were indignant at such a thought. Il Duce insisted: "We have an old school of settle and a new school to settle and we shall settle them. . . . We shall insist to the lesser those who would now preach us a sermon but who have demonstrated that when they were creating and defending an empire, they took no account of world opinion." " Hail Selassie asked the League on June 27 to send neutral observers to his frontier." " Blanche Hail Selassie appealed to the United States to invade the Port of Paris. Washington offered "moral support"—and enacted the Neutrality Act of August 31, 1935, to bar American arms to victims of aggression and aggressor states.

Foreign Minister Hoare told Commons on July 11 that "we have always understood and well understood Italy's desire for overseas expansion." But war is a means thereby was unnecessary. However, should Italy start to war, it need have no fear of effective British opposition. "Let the members derive from their minds the rumor is disingenuous without foundation that we have asked the French Government to join in a blockade of Italy and that we ourselves are preparing some isolated form of coercion. . . . We stand for peace"—even with aggression. Laval refused all offers to exceed the scope of League action beyond the Wal-Wal altercation, avowing that with this the Council would have "fulfilled once more its great and noble mission." But he was quite willing to manage a diplomatic deal elsewhere, despite Mussolini's declaration in the *Popolo d'Italia* of July 31 that the problem admitted of "but one solution"—"with Geneva, without Geneva, or against Geneva."

A Three-Power Conference met in London on August 23, 1935. Eden and Laval sought to elicit from Mussolini a commitment to abstain from force and a definition of Italian demands. Mussolini refused both. Laval and Eden then submitted proposals of their own to Rome, providing for tripartite "collective assistance" to Ethiopia, "particular account being taken of the special interests of Italy."<sup>1</sup> "We did not ensure, but we did not in any way exclude the possibility of territorial adjustments to which Italy and Ethiopia might agree."<sup>2</sup> Haile Selassie had rejected all suggestions of an Italian "mandate" or sphere of predominance, but was willing to consider economic concessions. Anglo-French-Italian "assistance," with Britain and France abstaining, would mean monopolistic Italian control of the exploitation of Ethiopia. Mussolini received this offer on August 25 as he reviewed departing troops. His reply of August 26 was a flat refusal even to discuss it. The Conference adjourned.<sup>3</sup>

"If you offered me all of Ethiopia on a silver platter," Il Duce was reported to have told the French Ambassador in Rome, "I would refuse it, for I have resolved to take it by force." Armed aggression was now a certainty. There was official talk in Britain of upholding the Covenant by applying sanctions, since this would be popular with the voters and an election was approaching. But no serious doubt was left in Mussolini's mind that this would be but a postponement. All arms were refused to Ethiopia by the Western democracies. When Haile Selassie protested and asked "Is that real neutrality? Is it just?" he received no answer.<sup>4</sup> Hoover had already told Congress on August 1 that the Government approached the problem "from the realist practical attitude. . . . It is easy and perhaps tempting to jump into the arena impetuously, throw down glove and challenge anyone who dares to fight. Supposing, however, that that attitude . . . would cripple the League for a generation to come? Rashness, however courageous it might be, would be folly to the point of criminal folly. . . . It is just because we realize the gravity of the situation that we are determined to take no rash steps which would make the situation irredeemable." Il Duce warned boldly on August 26 that "whatever applies sanctions against Italy will be met by the armed hostility of our country." Other Powers "should follow the example of the United States and leave us alone to fulfill our mission."<sup>5</sup>

In a pathetic effort to appeal to Western cupidity, Haile Selassie at the end of August granted a vast seventy-five-year oil-prospecting concession to a British subject, Mr. F. W. Fisher of the African

Development and Exploration Company, incorporated in the United States in July as a subsidiary of the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company. The Secretary Hall denounced this effort and Standard Oil abandoned it.

At the League Council meeting of September 4 Aloisi exhibited a bulky memorandum full of verbal and photographic horrors denigrating Ethiopian sovereignty, with special emphasis upon cannibals. He charged without further that Ethiopia was planning to attack Italy, that it had "systematically violated all treaties concluded with Italy," and that it had placed itself "openly outside the Covenant of the League of Nations and made itself unworthy of the confidence given when it was admitted. Italy, charged up against such an intolerable state of affairs, defends her own safety, her own prestige, and the good name of the League of Nations." Dr. Jinn replied for Ethiopia and asked action under Articles 10 and 15. Aloisi walked out. Lavrov challenged the Italian thesis and declined to serve on a proposed Commission of Five on the ground that it was a subterfuge to enable League members to evade their responsibilities. The Council appointed the Commission (Britain, France, Poland, Spain, and Turkey), with Salvador de Madariaga as chairman, to seek a "pacific settlement." It held eleven meetings (September 7-24) while Mussolini and Ciano ridiculed its efforts. At Berlin on September 9 Hitler and the Italian Ambassador exchanged greetings and hinted at co-operation. The 15th League Assembly met on the same day and elected Edward Barnes as President. Only the seized photographers regarded Tecla Hutterman as worthy of any attention. On Lord's advice, Barnes, with the full support of the delegates, denounced the impending war which the League had been constituted to prevent. Three years later he was destined to find himself in the same position as Hilda Selasie.

In the midst of these rarely calculated evasions Lord and Hoare had a private discussion on September 10 at which the line of Anglo-French policy toward Italy was determined. Hoare desired a pretence of "sanctions" for domestic demagoguing purposes. Lord was opposed, but arrived at a conclusion that they be so devised as to be innocuous to the aggressor. "We found ourselves unanimously in agreement upon ruling out military sanctions, not adopting any measure of naval blockade, never contemplating the closure of the Suez Canal—in a word, ruling out everything that might lead to war." " Undersecretary Cuthberts later told Commons (March 2, 1936) that

Hoare had kept his hands free to consider other actions subsequently, but had agreed that sanctions should "in the first instance be confined to certain economic and financial measures. His Majesty's Government have repeatedly made it clear that they would not in any event take isolated action." Hoare then gave Laval a word on any drastic pressures. Both men agreed to bar any measures which might inflame Italian aggression and thereby provoke Italian retaliation. That Laval communicated this secret bargain to Rome is not open to doubt. Its terms were never denied from its all that followed. The British press knew nothing of it and assumed that their Government was in earnest in applying measures of "restraint" against Italy. But after September 10, if not before, Ciano knew that he need have no fear of effective sanctions.

The compact of treachery was hidden behind a façade of words. Here the art of mendacity reached new heights. On September 11, before the Assembly, Hoare championed "peaceful change" and freedom of access to raw materials. "The League stands, and my country stands with it, for the collective maintenance of the Covenant in its entirety, and particularly for steady and collective resistance" (some were understood here to say "assistance") "to all acts of unprovoked aggression. . . . His Majesty's Government will be second to none in its intention to fulfil, within the measure of its capacity, the obligations which the Covenant lays upon it." Laval followed on the 13th: "France is faithful to the League Covenant. She cannot fail in her obligations. . . . No country has welcomed with greater satisfaction the word of the British Secretary of State than France. . . . At Stresa, with delegates of the British Government, we found the chief of the Italian Government animated with the same desire and the same determination to preserve the cause of peace. I know he is ready to continue this collaboration. . . . We are all bound by a solidarity which fixes our duty. Our obligations are inscribed in the Covenant. France will not evade these obligations."<sup>11</sup>

Much of the world listened and believed. Even so shrewd an observer as "Angus" (Vladimir Pollakov) declared that Hoare had pledged to Laval full enforcement of the Covenant against Germany—"in Europe generally and in Austria particularly,"—and that Laval in his turn had pledged French military support to Britain in the event of an Italian attack on the British fleet.<sup>12</sup> The British discourse and the French Lefz accepted as reality the façade which their leaders had created. Mussolini later observed:<sup>13</sup> After September's bargain all

the war proclaimed. The elaborate procedure of empty threat and empty counter-threat was necessary only for the sake of appearances. Boni issued warnings: "We find it monstrous that a nation which dominates the world refuses us a watched plot of ground in the African zone . . . It is not a game of poker. . . . We shall go straight ahead. . . . Never from our side will come any hostile act against a European action. But if one is combined against us, well, it means war."<sup>4</sup> The deft was needless, even to convince Italians that their Duce was defying the world.

On September 18 the Commission of Five issued a plan for "international assistance to Ethiopia," i.e. Italian domination, while London and Paris returned their offer "to facilitate technical adjustments." If possible the League was to be used not to defend Ethiopia but to assist Italy in exploiting it without the need of conquest. Litvinov, Titostov, and Briand Aron denounced the plan. But negotiations regarding it proved brief. Hile Selassie, fearing complete destruction, expressed willingness to discuss the scheme. Memoline pronounced a "deficiency." He told G. Ward Price that he was not "a collector of debts," that the Italian troops had not been sent "on an excursion trip" and that "there is no such thing as an Ethiopian nation."<sup>5</sup> Aoun declined to take the proposals to Rome. The Italian Cabinet officially pronounced them unacceptable on September 21. The Commission of Five admitted failure.<sup>6</sup>

On September 21 the Council set up a Committee of Thirteen to study and report. Two days later both Council and Assembly adjourned. Boni asserted that the League "is becoming a new moral, political, and even material force." At the same time Hile Selassie announced (September 21) that Ethiopian mobilization had become necessary, but that his Government would keep its troops away from the frontier and was prepared to co-operate fully in the preservation of peace.<sup>7</sup> An Italian Cabinet communiqué asserted that Ethiopia was making ready to attack while the League "locks itself in a formal labyrinth of procedure."<sup>8</sup>

On the eve of aggression Laval sought to obtain British commitments to aid France against Germany. On September 19 Ambassador Charles Grollier asked Sir Robert Vassieret whether Britain was prepared to apply Article 16 in the event of a resort to force in Europe. Moore replied in a communiqué released on September 20. He noted that on September 21 at Geneva he had already observed that "the recent response of public opinion in this country showed how

completely the action supported the government in its full acceptance of the obligations of League membership, which is oft proclaimed as the keystone of their foreign policy. . . . To suggest or maintain that this policy for some reason was peculiar to the Italo-Ethiopian conflict would be a complete misunderstanding. Nothing could in fact be further from the truth. Any other view would at once be to underestimate British good faith and be an imputation upon British sincerity." But (and the "but" provided the desired loophole) Article 18 "is not made applicable as regards a negative act of failing to fulfill terms of a treaty." Further, in case of a resort to force, it is clear that there may be degrees of culpability and degrees of aggression, and consequently in cases where Article 18 applies the nature of the action appropriate to be taken under it may vary according to the circumstances of each particular case. . . . Elementary aspect of security. . . . The world is not made." British opinion will support the League as long as it remains effective. But men must be callous. "So long as the League preserves itself by its own example, this government and this nation will live up to its full principle."<sup>2</sup>

The context and significance equal to this exchange of views was little noted at the time. On October 2 Downing Street informed the Quai d'Orsay that Hitler had assured Sir Eric Phipps that Germany would not join Italy or attack France during the crisis. At the same time Ambassador Ceratti assured Laval that Italy would not respond to economic and financial sanctions by war, but would remain "on the defensive." The equation was simple: Laval and Hoare would keep sanctions on a level which could not impede the Italian conquest of Ethiopia. Sir Eric Drummond, Earl of Perth and British Ambassador in Rome, had told British on September 20 that British fleet movements in the Mediterranean were "not intended to imply any aggressive intentions." He repeated this assurance on September 23. In return for this service Mussolini offered his *quid pro quo*: no military retaliation against the fleet's sanctions which must be lifted. Meanwhile Hoare assured Hitler that Britain would not apply sanctions to German navy-breasting and perhaps not even against German armed aggression. Hitler offered his *quid pro quo* in turn: no attack on France, no attempt to "draw profit from the present situation," no collaboration with Italy.

Here was a Four-Power Pact in disguise. These British and French pledges to Italy would be kept, since they involved successful disposition of the British and French public and only minor inconvenience

to Rome. Italian pledges to Britain and France would be kept, since war against Powers which (behind the sanctious mask) conspired at Italian aggression would be at once an act of ingratitude and suicide. British pledges to Germany would be kept, since violation of them would involve a departure from a fixed Tory policy. German pledges to Britain would not be kept (except for the promise of no attack on France), because Hitler knew that Tory benevolence toward the Reich would never be changed in a revuls of German breaches of contract. Berlin and London had already fashioned an entente.

With the steps that Mr. B. Duce marched. On October 1 he rolled his subject with bells, drums, and drums in a great national mobilization. From the Palazzo Venezia he bellowed to the multitude:

Blackshirts of the Revolution! Men and women of all Italy! Italians all over the world—beyond the mountains, beyond the seas! Listen! A solemn hour is about to strike in the history of the country. Twenty million Italians are at this moment gathered in the square of all Italy. It is the greatest demonstration that human history records. Twenty millions! One heart, alone! One will, alone! One decision! This manifestation signifies that the tie between Italy and Fascism is perfect, absolute, unalterable. Only brains seduced by parasitic illusions, by sheer ignorance, can think differently because they do not hear what exactly is the Fascist Italy of 1925. . . .

It is not only an army marching toward its goal, but it is forty-four million Italians marching in unity behind this army because the blackest of injustices is being attempted against them, that of taking from them their place in the sun. . . .

For thirteen years we have been patient while the circle dignified around us at the hands of those who wished to suffocate us. We have been patient with Ethiopia for forty years—in a enough now, instead of recognizing the rights of Italy, the League of Nations dare talk of sanctions. But well therein proof to the contrary, I refuse to believe that the authentic people of France will join in supporting sanctions against Italy. . . .

And well there is proof to the contrary, I refuse to believe that the authentic people of Britain will want to spill blood and send Europe to its catastrophe for the sake of a barbarian country unworthy of ranking among civilized nations. Just the same, we cannot afford to overlook the possible developments of immor-

rise. To economic sanctions we shall answer with our discipline, our spirit of sacrifice, our obedience. To military sanctions we shall answer with efficiency. To actual war we shall answer with acts of war. . . .

Never, in all this historic hour, have the people of Italy revealed such force of character, and it is against this people, to which mankind owes its greatest conquest, this people of heroes, of poets, of sages, of navigators, of colonizers, that the world dares threaten sanctions. Italy! Italy! Entirely and universally Fascist! The Italy of the Blackshirts revolution, rise to your feet, let the cry of your determination rise to the skies and reach our soldiers in East Africa. Let it be a comfort to those who are about to fight. Let it be an encouragement to our friends, and a warning to our enemies. It is the cry of Italy which goes beyond the mountains and runs out into the great world. It is the cry of justice and victory.<sup>26</sup>

The mob went wild. Seven days later was called back to the balcony to inform. On October 1, Amiel received a telegram from Haile Selassie stating Italian violation of the frontier in the province of Amara and asking the League observers to meet from French Somaliland to verify the facts.<sup>27</sup> On October 2 French denied the charge, but declared that Ethiopian mobilization expressed "the warlike and aggressive spirit of Ethiopia" which had "succeeded in imposing war" on Italy. This was "a direct and immediate threat to the Italian troops, with the aggravating circumstances of the operation of a neutral zone—announced in Addis Ababa with specific explanations—which is in reality no more than a strategic move intended to facilitate the assembling and aggressive preparation of the Abyssinian troops." Thus conditioned with "aggression," the Italian High Command had been authorized "to take the necessary measures of defense."

On October 3 Ethiopia informed the Council that Italian planes had bombed Addis and Adigant and that a battle was in progress in Agura. Haile Selassie called his troops

It is better to die free than to live as slaves. Soldiers, follow the example of your warrior ancestors. Young and old, unite to fight the invader. . . . Right up to the last moment we shall persist in our efforts for peace. If our repeated entreaties and good-



will fall, our conscience will be pure. God will defend the just cause of our country!"

On October 4 at Rome official communiqué No. 11 announced that the army had crossed the frontier between Ethiopia and Maghaz at 3.00 p.m. of the preceding day "in order to repulse an immense thrust from the Ethiopians" and had advanced twenty kilometers, encountering "the enemy's covering forces which had not been withdrawn at all. . . . The opposition of the Ethiopian forces did not lead to an engagement, while the Italians greeted the entry of the Italian troops by waving white flags." "Mussolini declared: "I have reflected well, I have calculated all, I have weighed everything." "The legions of Cesar were cheered as they went forth to conquer by a new code for Fascist warriors:

The march of armed Blackshirts beyond the borders of the fatherland is the fulfillment of human justice and the victory of civilization.

Who follows the path of justice and civilization makes a contribution of his life. . . .

March, march, fight is no sooner said than done under the Fascist regime. Before, because one knows that the Duce can never be wrong; Obey, because one knows that all orders come from him; Fight, because one knows that a battle under his orders means victory. . . .

At the first cracking of rifles the Blackshirts will see a religious figure of the Duce. They will see him enthroned on the background of the sky behind the enemy, like a gigantic vision in a heroic dream of war. This will be the spiritual center, meaning that the Blackshirts are terrible and splendid, ready to crush all resistance, bombs in hand, daggers between their teeth, and a sovereign desire for danger in their hearts."

#### 4. HOARE TO EDEN

The Fascist attack upon Ethiopia in October 1935 marked in the first effort by the community of nations to apply economic and financial penalties on a world scale against a law-breaking and peace-breaking State. That effort in an initial stage was an inspiration and a verification for all men and women everywhere who had in any degree

caught the vision which Woodrow Wilson incorporated into the Covenant of the League of Nations. The governments and peoples of the West had solemnly declared in 1919 and reasserted when thereafter that modern civilization could not be regarded as established and secure until the rule of justice through law should be achieved in the relations between nations. They had affirmed that this goal of an ordered world was obtainable through procedures of legislation, adjudication, and administration for the redress of grievances and the pacific adjustment of controversies. They had assumed the necessity of international agencies for the collective enforcement of peace in order that the weak should be protected against the strong, and the powerful should be induced by a superior power to submit to the ways of the law. They had denied that Might makes Right and insisted that Right must have Might at its disposal to enforce justice upon all. The dream of the Great Society had been shattered by default in 1931, but it still captured men's imaginations in many lands as the only alternative to chaos. The dream seemingly became a reality in the summer of 1933. Millions demanded that justice be done through international institutions against the aggressor and through collective defense of his victims. Millions waited in hope and fear upon the outcome of the conference.

These hopes were illusory and these assumptions false not because of any lacuna in the Wilsonian logic, nor yet because of any lack of popular faith in the cause in the European democracies. The enterprise was doomed because the responsible political leaders of France and Britain had at no time any desire that it should succeed. Laval's fully placed Paris is league with the aggressor. France followed British "leadership" at Geneva with muffled drums and with every device to balk the march of the minor Powers along the road to enlarged peace. Britain's leaders sponsored resolutions not out of conviction and not out of any wish to see them succeed. Considerations of domestic political expediency drove them into a course which they had always denounced and desired to repudiate.

On October 3, 1933 the League Council met and discussed the report of its Committee of Thirteen (the Council minus Italy), which recommended that "any violation of the Covenant should immediately be brought to an end."<sup>12</sup> It further appointed a Committee of Six to make recommendations. A note from Edinburgh requested the Council to declare that Italy had entered its war within the meaning of Article 16 and to apply sanctions. "Edinburgh asks the League of Nations to

declare that treaties must be respected, that the pledged word must be kept, that wars of aggression must be outlawed, that force must give way to justice." At 4.40 p.m. on October 7 the Council received the report of its Committee of Six, which concluded that Italy had "consented to war in disregard of its covenants." Alicki protested. He had insisted that the invasion was "quite legitimate" and "even within the framework of the Covenant." Against his vote the Council adopted the reports of both Committees.<sup>10</sup> The Assembly met under Broom in the early evening of October 9. The only dissent from the Council's findings was voiced by Italy's plenipotentiary Herr Filagi of Austria and M. de Valéry of Hungary. Debate continued on the 10th. Alicki stated: "Caught as she is in the tide of her full spiritual and material development, but confined by historical vicissitudes and international restrictions within territorial limits which are stifling her, Italy is the country which most needs her voice heard in this Assembly of the States as the voice of the proletarian calling for justice."

This bombast was vain. Only Albania followed the example of Austria and Hungary in endorsing Italy's action, though M. Korta and Switzerland could not participate in sanctions which would endanger its "neutrality." On the 11th Broom announced that of the 34 States represented, 20 had accepted the Council's findings, 3 had dissented, and 1 (Italy) had opposed sanctions. A committee of one delegate from each State was set up "to consider and formulate the co-ordination of measures" under Article 16. It met on the same day, elected Barber de Vasconcellos of Portugal as chairman, and established a Committee of Eighteen (the "League Co-ordination Committee") to recommend sanctions. By October 19 it had adopted five proposals: (1) an arms embargo against Italy; (2) an embargo on all loans and credits; (3) an embargo on imports from Italy, with some exceptions; (4) an embargo on exports to Italy of transport materials, rubber, aluminium, iron ore, scrap iron, tin, and strategic rare metals; and (5) a provision for mutual support in the application of economic and financial measures.<sup>11</sup>

By October 31st, 30 States had accepted the 1st proposal, 47 the 2nd, 47 the 3rd and 4th. On November 2 the Committee of Fifty adopted a resolution of the Committee of Eighteen asking all members to enforce these sanctions by November 28. By December 11, 32 States had accepted the 3rd proposal (30 were enforcing it); 30 had accepted the 2nd (47 in force); 30 the 1st (43 in force); 31 the 4th (47 in force) and 47 the 5th. Austria, Hungary, Albania, and Para-

gamy applied no sanction. Guatemala, Salvador, Luxembourg, and Switzerland deviated appreciably from the program. Others resisted at violations. But by way of compensation, Egypt, though not in the League, accepted all the sanctions suggested, while Germany offered no obstruction and the United States barred American arms to both Italy and Ethiopia. On November 11 Rome protested to every State enforcing sanctions. On November 17 the Fascist Grand Council passed a bitter resolution denouncing this "aquiescence." The great advocate was launched. Few outside observers knew or suspected that its organizers were meeting a farce and were slowly consumed in crossing the villain and aiding him to bring his victim to ruin.

Any honest effort to carry out the intentions of the Covenant would have involved such pressure on the Italian Government as would compel it to halt its aggression and such aid to Ethiopia as would enable it to offer effective resistance. The first objective required steps to stop the campaign of the Italian armies by cutting them off from their sources of supply, and measures of economic strangulation against Italy designed to cause such deprivation and stress as would compel it to cease to yield or face revolution. The second objective required steps to supply Ethiopia with modern weapons of warfare, either through grants of arms from public treasuries or through loans to enable Ethiopia to purchase arms from private manufacturers.

This double problem was relatively simple in both its economic and strategic aspects. Italy's sea-borne imports and exports could be almost completely controlled by the sanctioning Powers by virtue of their possession of Gibraltar and Suez.<sup>10</sup> The Italian armies were fighting in an area some 2,000 miles from Italy and were entirely dependent for supplies on the Red Sea route, which was completely dominated by Britain and France. Their planes, tanks, and trucks, moreover, were entirely dependent upon foreign oil-supplies. The Italian invasion could have been promptly halted by cutting off oil, closing the Canal, or instituting an effective long range blockade of metropolitan Italy. On the other hand, France and Britain controlled all sources and channels for the shipment of munitions into Ethiopia. The French railway from Djibouti to Addis Ababa was completely out of reach of the Italian armies (save for air raids) until the end of the war. The roads from the Sudan into western Ethiopia were at all times open. Ethiopia could have been supplied with arms by the sanctioning Powers as readily as Italy could have been prevented from prosecuting its campaign of invasion.

None of these obvious and necessary steps to halt the aggressor and save his victim was at any time taken or even seriously contemplated. Italy was never blockaded. Italian exports were reduced 40% from January 1935 to January 1936 and Italian imports fell off 30%. The Italian gold reserves were reduced by half. But no embargo was applied to the goods immediately necessary for prosecuting war. Those which were applied were abandoned as soon as they showed promise of producing their intended (or pretended) result. Oil was never included in sanctions.<sup>71</sup> The Suez Canal was kept open at all times, even so the declared shipments of hundreds of tons of poison gas, despite the fact that Italy (April 5, 1935) and Ethiopia (September 18, 1935) had both ratified the convention of June 17, 1925 banning chemical and bacteriological warfare. The British and several other Governments prohibited all arms exports to Ethiopia during the spring and summer of 1935. As late as October 9 the British Cabinet kept its arms embargo in force against Ethiopia. Madeleine could get neither public nor private loans nor public credit nor private credit for private arms. The small consignments which could be bought abroad for cash were frequently held up by the French authorities at Djibouti.

The advocates of sanctions carefully cultivated the impression that they shared some effective measure out of fear that Italy would wage war upon them if pressure were carried to the point of accomplishing the only honest purpose which it could possibly have had—a, that of stopping aggression and rescuing its victim. They asserted that they placed their faith in prolonged Ethiopian resistance and in the slow effects of moderate economic measures against Italy. How Ethiopia could be expected to resist a modern military machine without weapons of defense, how Italy could be expected to yield to measures which neither halted aggression nor seriously disorganized Italian economy, was never explained. The alleged fear of Italian attack was as large as a postage stamp. The secret calculations of Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay were quite coherent.

Laval aimed to attain these goals: (1) preservation of his contact with Rome by convincing in the Italian camp the need for satisfying sanctions, (2) assurance of British support against Germany by "co-operating" in sanctions, and (3) mobilization of the machinery of sanctions for future use against Nazi aggression. The task was hopeless. By striving to realize three impossible purposes, he lost all three. Baldwin and his advisors were concerned with placating the British public for election purposes. They were in agreement with Laval that war

with Italy must be avoided at all costs, not because Italy could win such a war but because Italy would inevitably be beaten. Italian defeat in the Mediterranean would be a disaster for France. It would undermine Cæsar and perhaps open the gates to social revolution. Even an Italian defeat in Ethiopia would so damage Cæsar's prestige as to jeopardize his regime. The French regime must be saved at all costs, for its disgrace and disintegration would provoke proletarian revolution everywhere and endanger the position of the wealthy and the well-born in France and Britain as well. Therefore Mussolini must, if possible, be persuaded to accept the fruits of victory in successive "peace" plans without exposing himself to further risks of defeat. As to the urgency of this task there was at no time any serious disagreement between the Quai d'Orsay and the men of Whitehall.

Disension developed between Paris and London over a wholly different question. Should Britain, in return for half-hearted French support of the half-hearted British policy of half-heartedly pretending to restrain Italian aggression in Africa, promise to fulfill the obligations of the Covenant and of Locarno against Germany? Paris desired such a pledge and was willing to pay for it by going as far as necessary with Britain in "coercing" Italy, so long as both understood that if Duce must not be threatened or confronted with any serious risk of defeat. London was unwilling to assume any definite commitments such as the Reich even after France and other States had pledged defense of Britain against a hypothetical Italian attack. This pledge was quite safe: all knew there would be no Italian attack. There would be no effective sanctions which would provoke attack. The British and French leaders had no desire to make sanctions effective and thereby jeopardize Italian prospects of victory.

Mussolini was kept fully informed of the comedy in all of its stages by Laval. He was perfectly capable of estimating the motives and purposes of his pretended "enemies." He therefore knew that he was utterly safe at all times. In this sense the force of sanctions was pre-announced: by Baldwin to win an election, by Laval to win British support against the Reich, and by Mussolini to mobilize all Italians behind his regime and to give him the glory of a bogus victory over all the world. Sanctions were his means and *trick*, for they converted an unpopular war of conquest against a weak and defenseless State into a Fascist crusade against the degenerate democracies of Geneva. The entire scheme worked out according to schedule, save that none of

the plotters had the wit to foresee that Hitler would be the major beneficiary of their efforts. Baldwin won his election. Daladier and Laval used Mussolini and Fascism as they intended. But in the sequel they lost everything else, not because D Duce defied sanctions and conquered Ethiopia, but because Der Fuhrer acted upon his opening to repudiate Locarno, annihilate the Rhineland, and the fate of Austria, and secure Mussolini as his ally. The failure of sanctions, moreover, destroyed any hope of ever collecting again the support of the small States of the world behind Britain or France in mass aggression.

The performance of the play was accompanied by various military and diplomatic moves and counter-moves from London and Paris which were never made explicit as to their motivation. They were in part designed to counteract the purposes already suggested, in part calculated to create a popular impression in Britain and France that effective sanctions would mean war, and in part inspired by unavowed apprehensions lest Mussolini double-cross the double-crossers and wreck the entire plan. By mid-October the Polish Mediterranean fleet at Alexandria had been joined by a large part of the *Moroccan Fleet* and even by two vessels from China. Caesar reinforced his legions in Libya as a "threat" to Egypt and sought to persuade Britain to reduce her squadrons in the middle sea. Downing Street in turn sought from other Mediterranean Powers assurances of support in case of an Italian "attack." Laval reluctantly assented on October 3 on condition that such support be "voluntary," that it operate in every case of attack from any quarter by land, sea, or air, and that there be no action without prior agreement. The *Quai d'Orsay* confirmed as pledge to Britain on October 18 since the conditions had been accepted.<sup>1</sup> After a full agreement on October 25, Anglo-French naval and air consultations followed in London. The French Government, said Hoare to Comacinaiani (December 13), moved "not a ship, not a machine, not a man." But France agreed "in principle" to mutual defense against attack.

London followed these moves by approaches to other Powers. On January 12, 1938 the British, French, Czechoslovak, Romanian, Yugoslav, Greek, and Turkish delegations at Geneva despatched letters to the Co-ordination Committee indicating that they had concluded a Pact of Mutual Assistance against possible Italian attack. The reply of the Spanish Republic (January 14) was non-committal because Madrid feared enmity toward Rome. Mussolini was to repay this solicitude in a different way within six months. He reluctantly pro-

issued these accords in a note of January 24 to all members of the League,<sup>26</sup> but it is improbable that he felt any anxiety. The British Government, while giving no support whatever to Edouard against the Italian invasion, had deliberately safeguarded itself by guarantees from other States against the alleged danger of an Italian attack upon British ports or ships.

Meanwhile, on November 2, 1915, Mr. Fiddell of Canada proposed to the Committee of Eighteen that petroleum and its derivatives, along with coal, iron, cast iron, and steel, be added to the embargo list. This suggestion was referred to the Economic Sub-Committee and then to a drafting committee. It was adopted by the Committee of Eighteen on November 5 as Proposal 4A and communicated by the Secretary-General to the League members on November 7. By December 21 ten States, supplying 54.5% of all Italian oil imports had expressed approval: Argentina, India, Czechoslovakia, Iraq, Finland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Rumania, Spain, and the USSR.

Laval suddenly awakened to the fact that other governments were rising anxiously. Rome protested and threatened. Laval therefore proposed that the meeting of the Committee of Eighteen scheduled for November 29 be postponed on the ground that he was unable to attend.<sup>27</sup> London acquiesced. In the morning of November 25 Laval phoned Vissacelles and asked him as a personal favor to postpone the session. Vissacelles reluctantly agreed. The General committee declared that the meeting would be "postponed for a few days because M. Laval is anxious to attend in person and is unable to do so on the 29th." On the appointed day Laval phoned Vissacelles once more and asked that the date be fixed not earlier than December 11. Vissacelles insisted on consulting London, but when he discovered London still acquiescent, he accepted the date of December 11.

Time was thus allowed for the completion of an amazing bargain. Its outlines had been under secret consideration since October. Rumor had it that Laval had proposed to Ambassador Cernaï on October 15 the cession of Tyne, Opden, and Hamar provinces by Edouard to Italy in return for a corridor to the sea through British Somaliland,<sup>28</sup> but on October 24 the Quai d'Orsay and the British Embassy in Paris denied the report. Laval told the Deputies that a "solution" could only be sought within the Covenant. By the end of October, however, it was known that M. de St. Quentin of the Quai d'Orsay and Mr. Peterson of the Foreign Office had conceived a "peace plan"



which had been approved by Laval and forwarded to Hoare. On October 28, after Poincaré conferred with Mauguier, a verbal official statement from Rome asserted that conversations were proceeding between Poincaré and Hoare and Paris and London. On the same day at Worcester-shire, Baldwin hinted that there had been "too much talk about war." "The object we seek is peace!"<sup>17</sup> Hoare in Commons four days later declared: "There is still a boding space before the economic pressure can be applied. Can it be used for another attempt at a settlement? Italy is still a member of the League. I welcome that fact. Cannot that eleventh hour be so used as to make it unnecessary for us to proceed further along the unattractive road of economic action against a fellow member, an old friend, and a former ally?" He had already told Sir Sidney Buxton to persuade Haile Selassie for a compromise peace. The Negus refused. Hoare planned to go to Geneva to see Laval and Abtch.

When Lord Cecil reported anxiety, Hoare extended assurances at Chateau Hoare on October 30th:

Our opponents are trying to make ignorant people believe that there is some disagreeable struggle behind this risk [to Laval] and that it means some drastic change of policy. . . . Our policy has always been perfectly simple—namely, loyalty to the League and readiness to help with any honorable settlement of the dispute that is acceptable to the three parties concerned—the League, Italy, and Abyssinia. That has always been our policy. It always will be our policy, and it is the policy that I shall support at Geneva. In the meanwhile, let us pay no attention to these whipsnaps and innuendoes. Let us take them at their real worth. They are threatening, pure and simple, and nothing more.<sup>18</sup>

At Geneva Hoare visited Laval in persuading M. Van Zeeland of Belgium to suggest that the function of "conciliation" be transferred from the Council to a smaller body. The Committee of Eighteen met on November 1. Laval spoke: "We must endeavor to seek, as quickly as possible, for an amicable settlement of the dispute. The French Government and the United Kingdom Government are agreed that their co-operation shall be ensured also in this sphere. This duty is particularly imperative for France, which on the 7th of January has signed a treaty of friendship with Italy. I shall therefore stubbornly pursue my attempts—from which nothing will deter me—to seek for directions that might serve as a basis for negotiations. It is thus that I

have intended conversation—without the slightest intention, however, of putting the matter in final shape outside the League." Hoare followed: "There is nothing mysterious or sinister in these discussions. It is the duty of all of us to explore the roads to peace. This is what we have been doing and when we shall continue to do. Up to the present time . . . there is nothing to report. If and when the suggestions take most definite form we shall take the earliest opportunity to bring them before the Council in the most appropriate manner. There is nothing further from our minds than to make and conclude an agreement behind the back of the League."

Van Zeeland then proposed that Britain and France be entrusted with the task of conciliation. There was no vote, but Hoare took the view that this was "the unanimous sense of the meeting" and that he and Laval had received a "moral mandate" to make peace. No further steps were taken until after the Conservative Party had won its overwhelming electoral victory on November 14 with a program of upholding the Covenant and enforcing collective security. On November 21 Mr. Peacock returned to Paris and resumed discussions with M. de St. Quentin. On December 3 it was indicated that their work was done and that Hoare would meet Laval in Paris on the 9th. Laval had meanwhile secured postponement of any consideration of oil sanctions. On December 4 and 7 Laval conferred with Ambassador Grotto. On December 5, by some strange "leak," the outlines of the plan came out and were published by "Agaar" in the *New York Times*.<sup>10</sup> On the same day Hoare spoke to Commons:

Any treaty emerging from these or other discussions must be acceptable to the three parties to the dispute, Italy, the League, and Abyssinia. I state these facts once again lest anyone is still so foolish as to harbor suspicions that the French and ourselves are attempting to side-track the League and impose on the world a settlement that could not be accepted by the three parties to the dispute. . . . The world urgently needs peace. We and the French, acting on behalf of the League and in the spirit of the League, are determined to make another great effort toward peace. We have no wish to humiliate Italy nor to weaken Italy. . . . I appeal once more to Signor Mussolini and his fellow-countrymen to free themselves from their minds the suspicion that we have sinister motives behind our support of the League. . . . Let them dismiss from their minds the suspicion that we wish to

wishes Signor Mussolini's own position and destroy the Fascist regime. We have not the least desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Italy, and we are most anxious to see a strong Italy, governed by a strong government in whatever form the Italian people may desire.

Hoare was bound for a Swiss holiday, but at Baldwin's urgent request he agreed to stay in Paris on December 7. He met Laval at 5.45 p.m., accompanied by Sir Robert Vansittart and Mr. Peterson of the Foreign Office and by Sir George Clark, the British Ambassador. Laval was accompanied by M. de St. Quentin, M. Rochet, his *Chef de Cabinet*, and M. Alexis Léger, Secretary-General at the Quai d'Orsay. Laval had reached an agreement with Cécile in the morning. Hoare agreed to stay twenty-four hours. He and the French Foreign Minister labored from 10.15 a.m. until 6.30 p.m. on December 8. Laval is reported to have told Hoare that if oil sanctions were recommended by the Committee of Eighteen, Mussolini would sack the British fleet, which could hope for no aid from the French fleet for two weeks or more. But Hoare needed no persuading. He was already convinced.<sup>10</sup> A "plan" emerged and was accepted. It was agreed that it would be transmitted to Rome and Addis Ababa.

The Paris communiqué of December 8 declared that Hoare and Laval had "sought the formulae which might serve as a basis for a friendly settlement of the Indo-Ethiopian dispute. There could be no question at present of publishing these formulae. The British Government has not yet been informed of them; and, once an agreement has been reached, it will be necessary to submit them to the consideration of the Imperial Government and to the League of the League of Nations."<sup>11</sup> Laval asked the press to avoid conjecture. Peterson left for London that night with the "confidential" copy for Baldwin's approval, while Hoare caught a train for the Engadine. But on the morning of December 9 the French press published a full account of the plan. Laval apparently sought in this fashion to force Baldwin's hand and compel him to support Hoare's work. Baldwin read of the scheme in his morning newspaper while Peterson was delivering the "confidential" copy. The Cabinet met at 6 on p.m. It was evidently divided in its views. On December 10 in Commons Baldwin and Eden sought to evade questions by alleging inaccuracies in the press reports.

The Prime Minister asserted: "My lips are not yet unsealed. Were these troubles over, I would make a case—and I guarantee that not a

man would go into the lobby opposite us." He denied that any communication had gone to Rome or Addis Ababa. The hour was 9.47 p.m. At that very moment Downing Street was writing the plan to Perth and Barron. The Quai d'Orsay did likewise, though Laval wished to inform Rome first. On December 11 at 5.00 and 5.30 p.m. Dack received the plan from the French and British Ambassadors. Haile Selassie did not receive his copy until December 12. Not until December 13 was the plan officially communicated by Eden and Laval to Aroual for transmittal to the members of the Council. On the following day the official text was published in the world press.

The Howe-Laval "peace plan" specified that Britain and France would recommend to Haile Selassie the cession to Italy of eastern Tigray province and the Danakil country southeast of Eritrea along with much of Ogaden province. In return Ethiopia would receive from Italy a narrow strip of southern Eritrea adjacent to French Somaliland, giving it access to the sea at Assab. Since the French railway monopoly to Addis Ababa would presumably not be surrendered, this strip would be merely, as *The Times* of London conceded, "a corridor for transit." Under British and French "influence" to be wielded at Addis Ababa and Genoa, Ethiopia would be persuaded to set aside the southern half of the country, much of 1° and east of 35°, as a zone in which Italy would "enjoy exclusive economic rights." Ethiopian sovereignty in said zone "would be exercised by the trustees of the scheme of assistance drawn up by the League of Nations. Italy would take a preponderant but not exclusive role in these trustees." Haile Selassie would accept Italian "advisors," though his chief adviser, to be delegated by the League, would not be "the subject of one of the Powers bandying an Ethiopia."<sup>44</sup>

Such was the scheme with which Mussolini was to be bribed to discontinue hostilities. He was offered generous amercements, a sphere of exclusive exploitation embracing almost half of what would be left of Ethiopia, and a virtual protectorate over the remainder. Not only would the integrity and independence of Ethiopia, which the League members had solemnly vowed to guarantee, become a territory, but, by a master stroke of political chicanery, the all but fatal surgical operation which the aggressor would be permitted to perform on the body of his victim would be supervised by the League itself, acting as a kind of consulting specialists or, more probably, as morticians. On Sunday, December 8, the Haasen correspondent in Addis Ababa received an outline of the plan from Dick. Barron and

Richard, the British and French Ministers, secured official copies three days later for transmission to Haile Selassie after Maunula should have been informed. "We felt that we were treated worse than dirt," said the Emperor's adviser, Ernest Colson. The Quai d'Orsay, knowing that its Minister had no influence with the Emperor, wished Barton to push the scheme. Barton's instructions asked him to "use your utmost influence to induce the Emperor to give careful and favorable consideration to these proposals and on no account lightly to reject them."<sup>24</sup> But Barton also had no influence. The Negus was at his military headquarters at Dargu, far from the capital. Barton and Richard explained the scheme to officials at the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry, but they looked blank.<sup>25</sup> Colson then flew to Dargu and assisted Haile Selassie in preparing a reply, which was delivered to Badier and Barton on December 17 and also communicated to the League Council. It declared that the proposal would perpetrate "the damnable betrayal of Ethiopia" and the "collapse of the sacred principles of the League and the system of collective security." Ethiopia would be reduced to a status worse than that of a mandated territory.

We are convinced that neither the Council nor the Assembly of the League will support such a project of settlement, which goes outside the framework of the Covenant, is destructive of the very basis on which that organization is founded and is an attack on the independence and territorial integrity of a member State, involving a premium for the aggressor at the expense of the injured party.<sup>26</sup>

The Haile-Laval scheme had already collapsed before the Ethiopian reply was received. The technique here employed was too crude to insure success. Haile's successes were to profit by his example and learn that they could sacrifice other peoples on the French altar only after they had carefully prepared the stage with appropriate propitiation for lightheartening British and French publics with the specter of imminent war. Few would then dissent if disorder and relieved acquiescence in whatever plans of rewarding aggression might be concocted by the diplomats of the democracies. Without a war panic such plans would only generate popular indignation. Haile had failed to prepare the ground adequately. The result was the rejection of the scheme which he and Laval had devised.

The Committee of Eighteen met on December 19. Laval asserted that Italy and Ethiopia had been informed of "our suggestion" and

that the Council would soon be enlightened regarding them. Eden declared them "neither definitive nor irreversible. . . . Indeed, we should cordially welcome any suggestions for their improvement." M. Komaricki of Poland, now acting as Laval's stooge, proposed a postponement of any consideration of oil sanctions pending the judgment of the Council on the new peace plan. The Committee adjourned on the 15th. The Ethiopian legation in Paris declared that Addis Ababa would reject any proposals to reward the aggressor. It asked that the Assembly be convoked for "a full and free public debate." Averil replied that the President of the Assembly considered it advisable to await the result of the Council's deliberations.

When the Council met on the 16th, it found the plan already dead in a ritual of loud denunciation against it in Britain. Wolde Mariam of Ethiopia stated: "It is contrary with the Covenant that the Covenant-breaking State should be begged by the League of Nations to be good enough to restore a large part of its victim's territory, together with effective control of the rest under the cloak of the League." Laval opined that the Council ought with to avoid expressing an opinion until it was known how the disputants had welcomed the suggestions. Eden asserted that his Government would not continue to support the plan if the disputants or the Council failed to approve. A Council resolution of December 19 "thanked" the British and French representatives for their "suggestions." . . . "The Council does not consider that it is called upon to express an opinion in regard to them at present." The plan was dead. No formal hostile answer was ever received. But Laval's purpose had been achieved. Oil sanctions were indefinitely postponed.

Meanwhile Vyvyan Adams, Conservative, offered a resolution in Commons on December 11 "that this House will not assent to any settlement of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute which ignores our international obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations by granting the aggressor State greater concessions after its unprovoked aggression than could have been attained by peaceful negotiations." This motion was later withdrawn, but it had evoked widespread public approval. On the eve of a debate on foreign policy scheduled for December 19, Baldwin deliberated as to his course. The unforeseen but unexpected Howe had fallen on the ice in the English Channel and broken his nose in these places. Against his doctor's orders he returned to London on the 16th. On the 17th the Cabinet decided to support him. Baldwin, Eden, and Neville Chamberlain called upon

turn to his home to arrange that he should prepare a fighting speech. But the volume of public protest had now grown so large that Baldwin decided to sacrifice his Foreign Minister rather than endanger the Cabinet. Chamberlain and Baldwin called on Hoare again on the 17th and broke the news. Hoare resigned that evening. With head-aired face he gave Commons his apology on the 19th. His theme was the obvious one. Solicitude for "peace" excuses all.

Ever since I have been at the Foreign Office I have been obsessed with the urgency of two great issues. Day in and day out I have been obsessed with the urgent necessity of doing everything in my power to prevent an isolated war between Great Britain and Italy. I believe these two great issues were two of the issues mainly in the mind of the electorate at the last election—first on the one hand of a general conflagration and on the other of an isolated war between Great Britain and Italy. . . .

From all sides we received reports no responsible government could disregard—that Italy would regard an oil embargo as a military action or as an impending war against her. . . . An isolated attack of this kind launched upon one Power without, maybe, the full support of other Powers would, it seemed to me, almost inevitably lead to the dissolution of the League. . . . I was pressed on all sides to go (to Paris). I was pressed in such a way as to make refusal impossible. It was in an atmosphere threatened with war that the conversations began. . . . Within five days the question of an oil embargo was to come up at Geneva, and I did not feel myself justified in proposing any postponement of the embargo unless it could be shown to the League that negotiations had actually started. . . .

I have been terrified at the thought we might lead Abyssinia to think the League could do more than it can, and that finally we should find a terrible moment of disillusionment in which Abyssinia might be altogether destroyed as an independent State. . . .

I ask myself, looking back, whether I have a guilty conscience or whether my conscience is clear. I say with all brevity to the House that my conscience is clear. . . . I am sure that in dealing with these grave issues the only course to take is the course our commonly believes to be the right course. I believe it was the right course.

Baldwin pushed home the theme. Not only must "peace" be won not by any means, fair or foul, because war is evil, but war must also be stopped because the British public might repudiate the League if it discovered that the League might lead to war. Commonsense and courtesy upheld the Cabinet, but House was out and his plan was buried. The Tory strategists had failed to dramatize sufficiently the alleged "danger" of war. This mistake would not be repeated. House was succeeded by his young collaborator, Captain Anthony Eden, who looked in the public eye as the unsullied knight sworn to enforce the Covenant with clean hands and a pure and strong sword.

In France Pierre Cot opened the parliamentary attack on Laval on December 15. But Laval survived by a vote of 329 to 192 four days later. The Radical Socialism split. The Cabinet was again upheld on December 18. On January 22, 1936, however, it was overthrown on other issues. But the man from Amberges had done his work so well that French policy under Sarraut and Flandin remained unchanged. And, notable shift, it still remained unchanged under Blum and Daladier, the leaders of the People's Front. *Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose!* French policy under Eden also remained unchanged. The ultimate result was the rescue of Mussolini and the death of Ethiopia.<sup>10</sup> But before this result was consummated, Hitler had gathered a new harvest:



## WATCH ON THE RHINE

## 1. LOCARNO + MARCH 7, 1936

There is a tide in the affairs of men, which, when it flows, leads on to fortune, seized, all the waygo of their life is bound as shallows and as rivers. On such a full sea are we now afloat, and we must take the current when it serves or lose our ventures.

Time spoke Shakespeare's *Brutus* to *Caesar* as they planned to rescue Rome from *Caesar's* tyranny. The nations of Europe twenty centuries later were confronted with another *Caesar* whose lawless violence likewise presented them with a crucial choice: to submit or to oppose? The men of France and Britain in whose hands the decision rested were none of those dynamic leaders capable of taking the tide at the flood and finding fortune thereby. They were rather vegetarians pursuing popularity and administering dishonest policies with consistent firmness and honest policies with feebly vacillations.<sup>1</sup> Nervousness at the close of January the upsurge of democratic indignation at the betrayal of December had driven from office the most obvious practitioners of folly. To some it appeared at the time that their successors would halt retreat and treason and still save the day. That they did not—because they would not or could not—was a function of their own limitations and those of their colleagues rather than of any viable demonstration on the part of the parliaments and people to whom they were responsible. But in the equal peoples and parliaments acquiesced in the line of their leaders. In the wake of acquiescence came indifference or fear or despair, all alike conducive to irresponsible meddling or proarranged surrender.

Lam's successor in the Premiership was Albert Pierre Sarraut, middle-class son of Bordeaux who had found competency but not wisdom in the course of his sixty-four years. Poet, journalist, and for more than two decades Radical Socialist deputy from Aube, he

entered the Cabinet under Clemenceau. He served as Governor-General of Indo-China, 1911-14, and again after 1918. He became bureaucratic and reactionary. When he accepted the post of Minister of Colonies under Poincaré in 1921 his party expelled him, but later granted him re-employment. Successively Ambassador to Turkey, Senator, Minister of the Interior, Minister of Marine, and Minister of Colonies once more, he had had an experience more varied than that of most of his contemporaries, but not one which predisposed him to vigorous championing of democracy or of the colored peoples or of collective security against aggressors. As early as March 1921 he had advocated the return of the German colonies. He briefly attained the Presidency in the autumn of 1931 and then became Minister of Marine under Chautemps and Minister of Interior under Doumergue. In the latter capacity he was so severely blamed for negligence in connection with the Barthou assassination that he resigned. Laval's fall brought him to the Presidency again on January 14, 1936. He was short, heavy, bespectacled, and above all slow and cautious in all his thoughts and did.

Sarcey's Foreign Minister was Pierre-Etienne Flandin, also of the Radical Socialist group. He had been in the air service during the War. His tall figure (six feet, four inches) was physically impressive. But in other aspects he added little to the Cabinet's stature. He had been in succession Millerand's private secretary, president of the Académie Française, Undersecretary of State in the first and second Millerand Cabinets of 1916, Minister of Commerce under Tardieu in 1920 (betwixt with Tardieu two years later), and Minister of Finance under Laval (1931-2) and Doumergue (1934). Despite these various public experiences, he never developed interests of political reach. Something forthright was lacking. He was colorless, dull of speech, empty of personality. He was the grand bourgeois and prosperous businessman. He had many English friends and spoke English fluently. He succeeded in irritating the post of many British Tory leaders: that of well-meaning stupidity. But what was with them a politically essential posture was with Flandin perhaps not entirely a façade.

Unlike Barthou, Flandin had no policy toward the Reich save faith, hope, and charity. Unlike Laval, he was not wholly persuaded that the attempted rapprochement with Italy was worth its cost. But he was willing to be convinced and unwilling to abandon Il Duce. He coupled his service to the League with gestures of following Britain against Italy, stimulated by subterfuge and embellished by vain efforts

to induce Downing Street to support Paris against the Reich. The painful experience which was the ineluctable consequence of his meddling brought him later to the conviction that the Republic should pay almost any price for peace with Berlin. In this regard he was to play a role of dubious as the least beneficial of his country's allies. In 1928 he followed Sarraute in looking to London for aid which never came and in staying to London the aid which at least some of the men of Whitehall were seeking.

In the British capital the new Foreign Minister was popularly regarded as a White Knight of the Garter. Robert Anthony Eden, born in 1897, was young. He was the son of Sir William Eden, actor, cavalry officer, and country gentleman. He was handsome and dashing. He went to Eton and from Eton to Flanders (1918), where his elder brother was killed and where he won a military cross and a captaincy. His younger brother Nicholas died at Jutland. Anthony graduated from Oxford in 1921 and married Beatrice Helen Beckett in 1923. He entered Parliament as a Conservative from Warrack and Leamington in the same year. Following a world tour he became Sir Austen Chamberlain's parliamentary private secretary in 1928 and was named five years later Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the first National Government. On New Year's Day of 1934 he became Lord Privy Seal and in June 1935 Minister Without Portfolio for League of Nations Affairs. As a highly popular figure and a staunch advocate of collective security, he was an asset of great worth to his party in the elections of November 1935. He seemed, indeed, "a sturdy youth with worldly thoughts untrained, none better loved than he in all the land."<sup>1</sup>

Unlike many about him, handsome Captain Anthony had a policy. It was based not upon dreamy visions but upon the hard fact, as he saw it, that Britain's future could be secure and prosperous only in a world effectively organized to keep the peace. He did not arrange peace for Britain in terms of buying off the Fascist Powers with other people's property in the hope that they would leave the Empire alone and confine themselves to fighting Communism. He desired that his Government should possess all of its power, and secure responsibilities in proportion to its power and its far-flung interests, in order that the organization of an indivisible world peace might be furthered. But he was constantly thwarted by sabotage from Paris and by the obstructiveness of colleagues and opponents who took a wholly different view of British interests—or had no view at all save

*fact of circumstances.* His silent and self-effacing fellow Boomer Sir Robert Gilbert Vansittart, who became Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs in 1920 after a long and distinguished diplomatic and literary career, apparently shared Hoare's conception of British policy rather than Eden's. Vansittart had a hand in the Anglo-German naval accord and in the Hoare-Laval deal. As the highest permanent official of the Foreign Office he represented the orientation of the administrative machine through which every Foreign Minister must work. That orientation was not conducive to the success of Eden's plan, though Vansittart remained in the background and appeared to conform. Eden also faced Cabinet colleagues who could scarcely be suspected of loyal co-operation in his program. Simon and Hoare (the latter returned to the Cabinet in June) were narrow old men who had no sympathy for Eden's views and who resented his rapid advancement—so far as they could capitalise upon it for partisan purposes.

Eden's chief obstacles, however, were the two Prime Ministers under whom he served. Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain. Baldwin was Eden's patron. He wrote a preface to his young friend's travel book, *Some Frontiers*, in 1904. He seemed to admire and support Eden. But the temper of his leadership was not such as to aid Eden in overcoming other difficulties and intrigues. This more elderly businessman and banker (he was born in 1867, son of the head of the loan and asset firm of Baldwin Ltd.) was a cousin of Rudyard Kipling and a staunch Conservative and Imperialist. During the War he presented a quarter of his huge fortune to the Government. He married Lucy Radcliffe, who presented him with five daughters and four sons. She was tirelessly active in public life and she was a political asset to her husband as a platform speaker.

Baldwin's carefully cultivated political personality—a medley of pique, pique, the English conservatism, and provincial solidarity—was decorated with a shower of kindly piety and a "poet of dull-witted sentiment" \* Churchill once referred to him as "a pale reflection of everybody's perplexities" \*. His policies, he said, were "guided by the craze of events." This formula compared favorably with MacDonald's "on and on and on, not up and up and up" or Asquith's "Wait and see." \* Still integrity and uncompromising honesty were his gowns in office. And yet his electoral victory of 1924 was based upon the fraudulent *Zinoviev* letter and that of 1925 upon pledges which the Hoare-Laval bargain rendered equally fraudulent. Eden

was his salvation, for Eden's appointment personally meant that pledges would be fulfilled and public wrath appeased. But with Baldwin to counter and guide, Fisher's fiery of purpose had always to come to terms with those who were ever willing to compromise their principles in the name of the principle of compromise.

In such a setting the crisis of 1903 unfolded. Amid the diplomatic complications engendered by Bismarck's African war, Britain watched and waited for an opportunity to strike a new blow at the *schicksal* blinding the Reich. His calculations rested upon a firm foundation of military strategy, political psychology, and Geo-politics. His wisdom in applying *schicksal*-tactics to diplomacy and his shrewdness in timing made him a man apart, able to combine or override *Wilhelmstrasse* and the General Staff alike. The problem of 1903, while complex in its details, was of the essence of simplicity in its elements. The basic principle was an ABC of tactics: an army advances with a dangerous enemy at its rear. The advance was to be southward and eastward. The enemy at the rear was France. This enemy already showed an indisposition to act. But its armed forces were formidable and its potential allies were, in combination, terrifying. With the whole Rhine Valley unharmed and demilitarized, General Gamelin's well-equipped divisions could paralyze any German move against Austria, Czechoslovakia, or Poland. The security of France itself against invasion from the east required that the German General Staff be prevented from doing what it had done in 1870 and 1914—i.e. organizing and launching an attack from the territories on the left bank of the Rhine. Foch had attributed French ability to parry the 1904 attack to Russia aid in the east. French safety called imperatively for a demilitarized Rhineland.<sup>1</sup>

For Fisher's task was to close the Rhine breach, not necessarily as a means of organizing a new invasion of France, but as a means of rendering the German rear impregnable. He must attempt, moreover, to split Bismarck from Paris, and Paris from London, and, if possible, bring to an end the danger that either Britain or Italy might aid France in any attempt by Paris to threaten German hopes of hegemony east of the Rhine. The problem was at once legal and military. If the Rhine frontier could be adequately fortified, France would be immobilized and Anglo-Italian obligation to aid France against the Reich would either lapse or be of no practical consequence. If these obligations could be broken, the way would be clear for re-fortifying the Rhineland—assuming that France would remain passive without British aid

Italian support. The nexus between these two aspects of the issue lay in the legal link between Articles 42-44 of Versailles and Article 4 of the Rhine Pact of Locarno of October 16, 1925. The former provisions were as follows:

*Article 42: Germany is forbidden to construct or strengthen any fortification either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn fifty kilometers to the east of the Rhine. Article 43: In the same zone the maintenance and the armament of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily, and military matters of any kind, as well as the keeping of all permanent troops for mobilization are in the same way forbidden. Article 44: In case Germany violates in any manner whatever the provisions of Articles 42 and 43, she shall be regarded as committing a hostile act against the Powers signatory of the present Treaty and as endangering to disturb the peace of the world.*

The Rhine Pact pledged Germany, France, and Belgium to non-aggression and pacific settlement. It guaranteed established frontiers and the demilitarization of the Rhineland. Its final article declared:

*Article IV. 1. In case of the high contracting parties alleges that a violation of Article II of the present treaty or a breach of Articles 42 or 43 of the Treaty of Versailles has taken or is being committed, it shall bring the question at issue before the Council of the League of Nations.*

*2. As soon as the Council of the League of Nations is satisfied that such violation or breach has been committed, it will officially lay finding without delay on the Powers signatory of the present treaty, who seriously agree that in such case they will each of them come immediately to the assistance of the Power against whom the act complained of is directed.*

*3. In case of a flagrant violation of Article II of the present treaty or of a flagrant breach of Articles 42 or 43 of the Treaty of Versailles by one of the high contracting parties, each of the other contracting parties hereby undertakes immediately to come to the help of the party against whom such a violation or breach has been directed as soon as the said Power has been able to satisfy itself that this violation constitutes an unprovoked act of aggression and that by reason either of the crossing of the frontier or of the outbreak of hostilities or of the assembly of armed forces in the demilitarized zone immediate action is necessary. Nevertheless, the Council of the League of Nations which will be seized of the question at accordance with the first paragraph of this Article will first on findings, and the high contracting parties undertake to act in accordance with the recommendations of the Council provided that they are concerned in by all the members other than the aggressors of the parties which have engaged in hostilities . . .*

LUTHER  
STRESEMANN  
FERD. VAN DERVELDE  
A. BELAND  
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN  
BENITO MUSSOLINI

This philosophy was designed precisely to prevent Germany from doing that which Hitler deemed indispensable for safeguarding the German east. If the Reich should arm the demilitarized zone, France was legally authorized to declare this a "flagrant breach" and an "unprovoked act of aggression," in which case Britain, Italy, and Belgium would all be bound to come at once to France's aid. If London, Rome, and Brussels should respect their obligations, the Reich would be confronted with an irrefragible combination as to render hopeless from the outset any attempted repudiation of Locarno. Paris, moreover, had reasons as undoubted to enforce its rights even if it received no aid from the guarantees of the Rhine Pact. With might and right both on the side of the foe, Hitler's problem was seemingly insoluble.

But peace and daring conquer all obstacles. After October 1915 Der Führer leaned toward the conception that neither Mussolini nor Baldwin desired or intended to assist France in holding the Reich within the terms of the treaties. Before acting, however, the question of the most effective moment and the further question of the moral impendability had to be calculated with care. As for the latter, the groundwork was laid for disguising contemplated law-breaking within the forms of law in a German memorandum of May 15, 1915, which contended that the French-Soviet pact was incompatible with Locarno. The argument was that any French action against the Reich under Article 16 of the Covenant would violate the obligations which Paris had assumed in 1913 unless such action should be authorized by a prior decision of the League Council. The French-Soviet pact contemplated defensive action without the necessity of approval from Geneva. It was therefore incompatible with Locarno.<sup>1</sup>

This reasoning was false. Under Article IV, 3 of the Rhine Pact France could take "immediate action" against the Reich in the event of any flagrant aggression or militarization of the Rhineland without waiting for authorization by the Council, even though it agreed to be bound by the Council's subsequent recommendations. It was already established, moreover, that each member of the League could decide for itself whether a breach of the Covenant was being committed. These considerations were pointed out in the replies to the German memorandum—from France, June 15, from Britain, July 31, from Italy, July 19, and from Belgium, July 19, 1915.<sup>2</sup> That Berlin's case was bad law was virtually conceded by the Reich's refusal, then as here, to submit the case to judicial determination. But Berlin reckoned with London's dispute for the French-Soviet pact and with British and

Italian reluctance to support France against the Reich in the absence of any actual invasion of French territory. These considerations made it useful for Waltherausen to press the argument that France had already violated Locarno by its agreement with Moscow.

Der Führer felt his way cautiously through a mine of obstacles. He gave no encouragement to Laval's overtures for an understanding transmitted in October through a confidential agent, M. Couraud de Brion, who was a journalist and old friend of Ribbentrop.<sup>12</sup> Cautious hints of German action in the Rhineland evoked no outbursts in the French or British press. Paris and London issued "indefinite warnings" in mid-January against any German effort to repudiate Locarno.<sup>13</sup> Flaudin, Sarraute, and Lebrun gathered in London at the end of the month for the funeral of King George V († January 20, 1936) and there met Eden and Neurath. But there is no reliable evidence that Locarno or the status of the Rhineland were then discussed.

The Nazi leaders apparently came to the conclusion during the winter that their objective could be achieved by the tried device of the fait accompli more readily than by negotiation. Caution and concealment were therefore in order to allay suspicions abroad. One of Hitler's most useful friends in British political circles, the Marquess of Londonderry, retired from service in the Cabinet in the twenties and made repeated trips to Germany. On January 10-11, 1936 he dined with Göring at the latter's Berlin palace and at Kama Hall, sumptuous hunting lodge in the Schoorheide. The German Air Minister played upon the familiar theme of the necessity of German expansion in the East and hinted at the need of fortifying the Rhineland. By his own account, Londonderry urged a public statement of the German case "to allay suspicions" and suggested that Berlin might well propose a comparable demilitarized zone on the French side of the frontier.<sup>14</sup> This proposal did not fall upon deaf ears. It indicated a willingness in certain Tory circles to abandon France and even to view with favor the scrapping of the Maginot Line. Göring was dumb.

Londonderry lunched with Ribbentrop and Hess on February 1 and was somewhat dazzled by plans for the return of the German colonies. But he listened sympathetically to suggestions of an Anglo-German entente against Bolshevism, with Britain to put pressure on France to co-operate. On February 4 Londonderry dined with Hitler, who skilfully played upon Tory fears of Communism. Moscow must be quarantined. Ribbentrop declared that "misunderstanding" of



Germany in England was due to the "international Jews" who made common cause with Bolshevism. In Berlin, Munich, and Bruchsal-juden Landaukerry conferred with Hitler, Ribbentrop, and other Nazi leaders. He "did not receive any direct hint in official quarters" of any plan to refortify the Rhineland,<sup>12</sup> but he did hear rumors and judgments given encouragement to his bias by his complacent attitude. In his return he wrote a letter to Ribbentrop (February 21, 1936) to express thanks and to report on the state of British opinion.<sup>13</sup>

The free and open ventilation of public opinion in this country through the medium of the Press develops among our people a very confused attitude of mind, so that it is very difficult properly to diagnose our real public opinion. . . . On my return I have realized that I have not very closely in my mind your definite opinion in relation to your desires in Europe itself, nor have I come away with a very clear knowledge of the actual reasons which control your internal policy in relation to the Jews and also in relation to religious bodies. . . . As I told you, I have no great affection for the Jews.<sup>14</sup>

Such soundings as these strengthened the hands of those among Eden's advisers who urged that Britain could be coerced upon in a "silent partner" in the projected enterprise. When Eden was asked a Commons question February 15 whether Britain would fulfill her pledges at the event of a flagrant breach of Articles 42-43 of Versailles, he replied: "The obligations of His Majesty's Government are specified in the Treaty of Locarno itself. His Majesty's Government stand by those obligations and, as has been previously stated in the House, stand, should the need arise, faithfully to fulfill them." Meanwhile Litvinov laid the French-Soviet pact before the Chamber. Marshal Tukhachevsky, Inspector-General of the Red Army, spent the second week of February in Paris conferring with the French General Staff and the Ministers of War, Air, and Marine. What he reported back to Moscow is not a matter of public record. It is possible that he gave vent to the private conclusion that the pact with France would prove unworkable and that the Kremlin should abandon its new line and come to terms with Berlin. In any event the Chamber approved ratification, 23 to 264, on February 27. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the House approved in principle on March 4. A general debate in the Upper House was scheduled for March 22.

Eden passed through Paris on his way to Geneva on the first of the

month and was reported to have assumed, in response to French appeals for a pledge of British support, that Britain would abide by her obligations but could express no view on possible contingencies until Paris had made up its own mind as to what action to take in the event of a German breach of the treaties. Two days previously the *Peter Aich* published an interview with Hitler by M. Bertrand de Jouvenal in which Der Führer assured: "I wish to prove to my people that the idea of landless enmity between France and Germany is an absurdity." When asked why he had not visited *Mons Kopp*, he replied (unofficially) that it had been written at the time of the Ruhr occupation: "I enter my correction in the great book of History." He warned France strongly against the Soviet pact. He offered peace: "The choice is given to you; if you do not seize it, think of your responsibility toward your children."<sup>10</sup> On February 19 Ambassador André Faisan-Ponsot was instructed to ask Hitler for an interview to discuss possible basis of a French-German rapprochement. The interview took place on March 1. Hitler and Neurath requested secrecy (the fact of the conversation was not known until after March 5) and indicated that they would propose and submit proposals.

On March 3 the Committee of Eighteen at Geneva scheduled a discussion of oil sanctions for March 20. If Duce dropped hints that any new sanctions would cause Italy to quit the League and denounce both Locarno and the accords of January 7, 1935, Mussolini may have urged German action as a means of his own preservation. He was doubtless aware of the blow in preparation. Rome and Berlin were alike concerned over the possibility that Flandin and Eden might strike a bargain, whereby the former would agree to oil sanctions and the latter would pledge British support to France to enforce Locarno. This danger must at all costs be averted. A swift blow might well split London and Paris now and consign oil sanctions to limbo. What to strike? Where to strike?

According to some reports, an attack upon Austria was contemplated. But this would estrange Il Duce and might drive British and France together. Rumor had it that the Rhineland blow was scheduled for March 15 and was moved forward in the light of the situation at Paris and Geneva. The decision was reached at a Cabinet meeting at Berlin on Friday, March 6, attended by the heads of the Reichswelt.<sup>11</sup> Who gave what advice to whom cannot be ascertained. But there is little doubt that Schacht, Neurath, and Blumenthal were opposed to the plan on financial, diplomatic, and strategic grounds.

The War Minister and the General Staff warned Der Führer that the new army was not yet ready to offer resistance if the French should march into the Rhineland. In unhesitant withdrawal would ensue a major defeat for the Reich. Goering and Goebbels were more hopeful. Hitler at length concluded that the risk should be taken. The morning had come to act. If France struck back, the game might be lost. Yet, with his usual accuracy amidst democratic delusions, he felt certain that the French would not march, that Britain would abandon them if they proposed any such action, and that Downing Street could be relied upon to reduce French fulminations to verbiage. *Hitler hat immer Recht!*

The Chancellor issued summons that evening for the Reichstag to meet at noon on Saturday, March 7, 1936. He invited the British, French, Belgian, and Italian envoys to call in the morning at Wilhelmstrasse. They did so. Munch presented them with a long memorandum. It was a bombshell padded with olive branches. It began with the statement of the contention that French obligations under the Soviet pact were incompatible with those under Locarno.

The apparently friendly official statements of Germany have been met by France with a military pact with the Soviet Union exclusively directed against Germany and in violation of the Locarno Pact. The Locarno Pact has thereby lost its equilibrium and practically ceased to be Germany's paper shield, therefore, is no longer bound by the former pact. The German Government are now compelled to meet the new situation created by this pact, a situation which is aggravated by the fact that the Franco-Soviet pact is amplified by an equally pointed treaty of alliance between Czechoslovakia and Soviet Russia. In the interests of the natural right of a nation to protect its borders and persons in times of distress, the German Government have therefore resumed arms races, as from today, the full and unqualified sovereignty of the Reich in the Rhineland zone of the Rhineland.

In order to prevent any doubt as to their intentions, and to make clear the purely defensive character of this measure, as well as to give expression to their lasting desire for the true pacification of Europe between nations of equal rights and shared respect, the German Government declare therewith proposed as negotiable new agreements for the establishment of a system of European security on the basis of the following proposals:

1. The German Government declare themselves prepared to negotiate with France and Belgium for the establishment of a bilateral demilitarized zone and to enter no other proposals with regard to the content and effects of such a zone, under the stipulation of complete parity.

2. In order to secure the inviolability and integrity of the frontier in the West, the German Government propose the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Germany, France, and Belgium with duration which they are prepared to fix at twenty-five years.

3. The German Government desires to invite England and Italy to sign the treaty as guarantor Powers.

4. The German Government are willing to include the Government of the Netherlands in this treaty upon condition the Government of the Netherlands desires, and the other treaty partners approve.

5. For the further strengthening of these security arrangements between the Western Powers, the German Government are prepared to conclude an air pact which shall be designed essentially and effectively to prevent the danger of sudden attacks from the air.

6. The German Government repeat their offer to conclude with Soviet leadership in Germany in the East non-aggression pacts similar to that concluded with Poland. Since the attitude of the Lithuanian Government has undergone a certain modification as regards Poland, the German Government withdraw the proposals which they were led to make with regard to Lithuania and declare themselves ready to sign a non-aggression pact with Lithuania also, under the stipulation of an effective repatriation of the guaranteed territory of the Polish territory.

7. With the achievement, at last, of Germany's equality of rights and the possibility of full sovereignty over the whole territory of the German Reich, the German Government repeat the chief reason for their withdrawal from the League of Nations is obtained. Germany is therefore prepared to enter the League of Nations again. In so doing, the response at the same time her expectations that, in the course of a reasonable space of time, the problem of colonial equality of rights as well as of the separation of the League Covenant from its Versailles Treaty base will be clarified in the course of friendly negotiations."

In preparing this communication Neurath declared that German troops had marched across the Rhine at dawn, but that the occupation was merely symbolic. (It was estimated later that this "symbolic" occupation brought 35,000 soldiers over the demilitarized zone by Sunday night and 60,000 by the middle of the week.) He made no reply to François-Poncet's query as to why no negotiations had been initiated. The proposals themselves were obviously drawn to bring the issue, to confuse the moralist abroad, to please the pacifist, to encourage the defunctist, and to precipitate weeks or months of futile palaver while the western frontier should be rendered impregnable. Points 4 and 5 were barren gestures. Point 3-5, if accepted, would destroy the whole French alliance system, require Britain and Italy to attack France should Poinc ever attempt to come to the military aid of its eastern allies against the Reich, neutralize both Belgium and the Netherlands, and give Berlin carte blanche in the East. Point 6, calling for the destruction of the Maginot Line, revealed the madly bold of the Marquess of Londonderry.

The Reichstag met at noon. The French, Belgian, and British Am-

borders stayed away in protest, Hitler delivered a long and self-righteous address in which he indicted every the authors of Versailles and emphasized all sorrow, all misery, and all danger to their handiwork. But Germans seek no heroes' deaths. They are as powerful as other peoples—and as brave and as honorable. But they are poor. "The Russians have eighteen times more land for each member of the population than the Germans have." As for the treaty, "the German people cannot forever bear the injury done it, should not bear it and will not bear it!" Germany had been used for Bolshevism. Europe must be saved. Salvation requires peace, equality, co-operation, common sense. But no co-operation with Bolshevism! "I will not have the grotesque Communist international dictatorship of hate descend upon the German people, which cannot only wrap but can also laugh heartily enough through its life. This destructive Asiatic Weltanschauung strikes at all values . . ."

Europe, continued Der Führer, is divided into two camps: culture and Bolshevism. Germany seeks understanding with France. Germany seeks understanding with England. But France has conspired with Bolshevism and brought Bolshevism into the heart of Europe via Czechoslovakia. Should France go Bolshevik, Moscow would determine the policies of Paris. Red Russia has 1,900,000 troops, 17,500,000 reserves, and the largest tank equipment and air force in the world. To bring this power into Central Europe destroys the balance of power. Therefore Germany had to act.

Men of the German Reichstag! In this historic hour, when in the Reich's western provinces German troops are just entering their future peace garisons, we all unite in two holy inner confusions. First, we swear to yield to no force whatever in the restoration of the honor of our people, and prefer to succumb with honor to the severest hardships rather than capitulate. Secondly, we realize that now, more than ever, we shall move far in understanding between European peoples, especially for one with our western neighbor nations. . . . We want no international relations to start in Moscow. . . . Peace. . . . Peace. . . .

I have therefore decided today to dissolve the German Reichstag so the German people may pass judgment on my leadership and on that of my associates. During these three years Germany has regained her honor, reformed her faith, conquered the greatest economic distress, and finally inaugurated a new cul-

your advice. This I believe I am entitled to state before my conscience and my God. I know all the German people to strengthen me and my faith and to give me, through the strength of its will, further undimmed strength with which to fight ever courageously for its honor and freedom and to provide for its economic well-being. And especially to support me in my struggle for a real peace."

The diplomatic sequel to the coup of March 7 was as gratifying to Das Föhrer as the result of the "election" of the new "Reichstag of Peasants and Priests" on March 29, when 98.75% of the voters did as they were told. Everything depended upon Paris. Would the French Government order its troops into the Rhineland to meet the Reichswehr (which in such an event was prepared to retreat without resistance) or would it acquiesce in an act which inevitably carried with it the certainty of the collapse of all French power on the Continent? There were some hours of hesitation. The French Cabinet met on the morning of March 9. Flankers were the British, Italian, and Belgian envoys in the afternoon. The Cabinet met again in the evening with the General Staff. Under Article IV, 3 of the Rhine Pact of Locarno, France was free to act as once to resist a "flagrant violation." The decision hung fire.

The Ministers ultimately reached a conclusion as disastrous for France in its final consequences as any ever taken by a French Government in modern times. The curious considerations which moved them to a course of autarky overweighed all the logic of strategy and diplomacy. Military action would at once rally to the side of France an incredible coalition, regardless of whether Italy and Britain kept their pledges. This coalition would not even depend upon Soviet support, though that would doubtless have been forthcoming if asked for. On Saturday the French Ambassador at Warsaw was assured that the Polish army would march if France marched. Poincaré was loyal, and would remain loyal even unto death. Jugoslavia and Rumania would also follow Paris. Italy was too preoccupied in Africa to render any assistance to the Reich. The Tory pretense of championing collective security ("Our Word Is Our Bond") would have made it difficult for Downing Street to oppose French action. French mobilization and reoccupation of the Rhineland would have confronted Hitler with a choice between surrender and national suicide. He was prepared to retreat, though such a humiliation might well have caused

his regime. But the French Cabinet was not prepared to advance.

What were the sources of paralysis? Fear of German bombing over Paris. Fear of alienating a Britain already shocked over Ethiopia. Fear of war. Fear of denaturation. Ignorance of German weakness. Fear of fear and preference for "peace" today at the cost of no one knew what tomorrow. Pierre Etienne Flandin, with his arm in a sling and his mind in a fog. Albert Sarraut, who decided on mobilization and then changed his mind. But the central consideration seems to have been at once social and simple: money. Gamelin advised that the Cabinet could either mobilize two classes or order general mobilization. The former would be possible and dangerous. The latter would be expensive. It might cost several billion francs. Sarraut was pledged to defend the franc. Despite Laval's desperate deflationary drive, France was still losing gold because of fear of devaluation. Sarraut conferred with Finance Minister Regnier and with M. Tenaury, Governor of the Bank of France. They had no doubt but that such an emergency expenditure would mean devaluation. For the treasury and the bank and the "too families" and the worker and employer class, deflation with no devaluation seemed preferable to devaluation and inflation. Flandin had no policy. Gamelin did not insist. Sarraut decided to save the franc—and to sacrifice France.<sup>11</sup>

The errors of the past lay in the fact that the franc was not saved. Devaluation became necessary in September, only six months later, and again in June of 1937. And in September of 1938 the French Cabinet would order a far more expensive mobilization—all to no purpose and two and a half years too late. Austria was to die. Czechoslovakia was to perish. Poland was to be lost, the Little Entente was to vanish, French diplomacy was to meet Waterloo and Sedan combined—all for a few francs in the idea of March of 1938. And thanks to Flandin's folly, which confuted Laval, France was to lose even the Soviet alliance which Hitler had used in the pretext to destroy Locarno.

Late Saturday evening Flandin announced the Cabinet's decision to the Press. He bombarded Berlin with words and made it clear that France would act. But the "action" would be under Article IV, 2 and not under Article IV, 3-4a. France would appeal to the League Council and do nothing in the Rhineland. Immense relief was evident in Berlin and in London. Hitler had won his gamble. Londoners wrote to *The Times* to express approval of the German action and urge British acceptance of the German proposals regardless of the French attitude.<sup>12</sup> Rochester's *Sunday Dispatch* (March 8) re-

joined: "The Locarno Pact is dead. It was a commitment in which the people of Britain never gave their sanction. It was made by the governments of the day without any mandate from the electorate. It goes unhonoured and wrong into the vaults of past political errors." *Garratt's Sunday Observer* rejoined: "The first effect of Hitler is to put sanctions in their right place which is nowhere." Baldwin told Chamberlain on March 9: "We have no other choice than to keep calm, to keep our heads, and to continue to try to bring France and Germany together in a friendship with ourselves." Eden joined the chorus: "Let us not divide ourselves. . . . There is, I am thankful to say, no reason to suppose that the present German action implies a threat of hostilities. . . . We are not concerned merely with the past or the present. We are also concerned with the future. One of the main foundations of the peace of Western Europe has been cut away, and if peace is to be secured there is a manifest duty to rebuild. It is in that spirit that we must approach the new proposals of the German Chancellor. . . . No opportunity must be lost which offers any hope of amicable action." Hitler was willing to negotiate forever.

Meanwhile Flandin's telegram to Geneva of March 8 summoned a Council meeting and declared that the Locarno Treaty "cannot cease to have effect otherwise than by a decision of the Council of the League of Nations voting by a two-thirds majority." Belgium joined France in condemning the Council. Sumner broadcast: "The French Government is firmly resolved not to negotiate under duress. . . . We are not disposed to allow Strasbourg to come under the fire of German guns." The *Quai d'Orsay* actively sought reparations and an admission of guilt from Germany, a pledge of British support against German aggression, and a German pledge to withdraw the Reichswehr at once from not to rearm the Rhineland. All in vain. On March 10 Eden, Halifax, Van Zeeland, and Curran met with Flandin and Sumner in Paris. Flandin was firm: no negotiations without evacuation; sanctions if evacuation were refused. Eden and Halifax were shocked. They had instructions to urge negotiations with Germany after the Council should have condemned the Reich—an act which Berlin agreed not to regard as an obstacle to negotiations! Eden phoned Baldwin and then suggested that the Council meet not in Geneva but in London—a more "neutral" atmosphere—with Germany invited to participate. Here, as in March 1935, Downing Street deemed it safer that the culprit should be condemned without dining on the bench with the judges.



Representatives of the Locarno Powers deliberated in London from the 12th to the 19th of March. Britain agreed to meet French desires to the extent of urging a partial withdrawal of the German troops. Berlin was negative. Flaminio reacted step by step. On March 5 he had received Eden's pledge of continued British observance of the remaining obligations of Locarno vis-à-vis France. But for the rest he got nothing. The Council assembled in London on March 12. Berlin accepted an invitation to participate on condition that the other Powers be "prepared to enter into negotiations forthwith [*sofort*] or 'as soon as possible' in regard to the German proposals." The Council asserted that it could give no such pledge. The Reich was nevertheless represented by Ribbentrop after March 19. Flaminio asked the Council to establish the fact of a breach of the Treaty and to recommend remedies. France was willing to submit the issue of the incompatibility of the Soviet pact and the Locarno obligations to the Permanent Court. Flaminio also recalled the Council resolution of April 13, 1923, and declared that the very existence of the League was imperilled.

Eden replied that the German action involved no threat of hostilities. The Council therefore should avoid the "horror of war" and contribute to "reconstruction." Ribbentrop promised co-operation. On March 19 the Council voted a resolution proposed by France and Belgium. Chile abstained. Germany voted in the negative. The resolution stated the obvious:

The Council of the League of Nations, on the application of Belgium and France, made to it on March 8, 1936: Finds that the German Government has committed a breach of Article 43 of the Treaty of Versailles by causing, on March 7, 1936, military forces to enter and establish themselves in the demilitarized zone referred to in Article 43 and the following Articles of that Treaty and in the Treaty of Locarno, instructs the Secretary-General, in application of Article IV, 1 of the Treaty of Locarno, to notify the finding of the Council without delay to the Powers signatories of that Treaty.

On March 19 the Locarno Powers, minus Germany, drew up proposals in London condemning German treaty-violation, reaffirming the obligations of Locarno, providing for consultation among General Staffs for co-operative resistance to apprehended aggression, and inviting the Reich to submit its dispute with France to the Permanent

Court and to limit and suspend the dispatch of troops and war materials to the Rhineland. Berlin rejected both the Council resolution and the London proposals. On March 25 the Council adjourned after noting that there was no application before it for action.<sup>17</sup>

There followed protracted exchanges of negotiation but meaningless results. German counter-proposals on March 31, a French memorandum on April 4, discussions in Geneva, April 10, and finally a British "questionnaire" to Berlin on May 3. This document reviewed the negotiations and asked for information: "was Germany now ready to conclude 'positive treaties'?" "It is, of course, clear that negotiations for a treaty would be useless if one of the parties hesitated far from to deny its obligation on the ground that the party was not at that time in condition to conclude a binding treaty and His Majesty's Government will welcome a clear declaration from the German Government to remove any uncertainty on this point. . . . The question is really whether Germany now considers the point has been reached at which the aim signifies that she recognizes and accedes to respect the existing territorial and political status in Europe except in so far as this might subsequently be modified by free negotiation and agreement." Was Germany still willing to couple an Air Locarno with an agreement to limit aerial armaments? Moreover, "His Majesty's Government also note the proposal in sub-paragraph 17 of paragraph 12 [of the German memorandum of March 31] for non-aggression pacts between Germany and the States on Germany's northeastern and northeastern frontiers. His Majesty's Government would venture to recall the general outline of such pacts given to Sir John Simon by Baron von Neurath in Berlin on the 26th of March 1933. They would like to know whether the German Government suggest that these pacts should follow generally that outline and whether they agree that these pacts also may be guaranteed by mutual assistance arrangements."<sup>18</sup>

Since Germany was ready to re-enter the League, continued the British questionnaire, the proposed non-aggression pact would operate within the Covenant. Was the Reich also ready to coordinate non-aggression pacts with Latvia, Estonia, and the USSR, even though their frontiers were not contiguous to Germany? Did Germany subscribe to the principle of non-intervention as well as non-aggression? What was the Reich's attitude toward the Permanent Court and toward the international court of arbitration which it had proposed? "There are other matters which will have to be raised at a later date."<sup>19</sup>

In this questionnaire Eden's Cabinet colleagues seemingly permitted the crafty Anthony to carry almost to a *reductio ad absurdum* the process of negotiating while Hitler armed for new victories to come. When Downing Street sought to elicit answers from Wilhelmstrasse there were repeated evasions and delays. The questionnaire was never answered. Der Fuhrer might well have replied that all the answers could be found in *Mein Kampf*.

On July 23 Blum, Delboe, Van Zeeland, and Spaak met in London with Eden, Halifax, and Baldwin. They found themselves in agreement. "The main purpose to which the efforts of all European nations must be directed is to consolidate peace by means of a general settlement." The formation of blocs must be discouraged. A new agreement should replace Locarno. If it could be achieved, all other problems could be solved.<sup>11</sup> Hitler's *fast approach* was here accepted as a basis for new negotiations. Blum was delighted. Eden was delighted the three Powers were now looking "definitely to the future" and did not "confine" themselves "to the past."<sup>12</sup> The future, to be sure, arrived. But it was to be made not in London or Paris or Geneva, but in Berlin. The promised "negotiations" came to nothing.

On October 14, 1936 King Leopold of Belgium in a speech to his Cabinet offered his country's alliance with France and championed autonomy and neutrality. Paris was shocked. On April 24, 1937 Belgium ceased to be France's ally. In an exchange of notes Britain and France accepted a pledge from Brussels to defend Belgian territory against any aggression, invasion, or effort to use Belgium as a base for aggression against others; to organize its defenses efficiently, and to remain faithful to the League Covenant. London and Paris likewise reiterated their pledges to continue to defend Belgium. But they released Brussels from all obligations to assist them under the defunct Locarno Pact and the arrangements of March 19, 1936.<sup>13</sup> Berlin rejoiced. Here, thanks to the decision of the Quai d'Orsay on March 7, France had become ally. The others would be lost in the aftermath.

### 1. ETHIOPIA † MAY 9, 1936

If Hitler was in the end the major beneficiary of the crisis precipitated by Il Duce's war against Ethiopia, Mussolini was the immediate beneficiary of Hitler's coup of March 7, 1936. This blow set London and Paris at loggerheads and destroyed whatever faint hope remained

that Eden might bring Paris and Geneva (to say nothing of his own colleagues) to the view that effective sanctions ought to be imposed on aggression. After March the Quai d'Orsay demanded action against the Reich and condemned Mussolini's venture more eagerly than before. After March Downing Street—or at least Eden—demanded action against Italy and condemned the Germans just as eagerly.<sup>17</sup>

On January 15 Ethiopia had appealed once more to the Secretary-General for financial assistance and further sanctions. The Committee of Thirteen rejected the plan on January 17. The Committee of Eighteen met on the preceding day and appointed a sub-committee of experts to study the possible effectiveness of an oil embargo. Its report of February 15 concluded that such an embargo would be effective within three or three and a half months in stopping oil supplies to Italy and exhausting Italian stocks, provided that the United States would limit its oil exports to Italy to normal levels.<sup>18</sup> On February 1, Mussolini, in the *Popolo d'Italia* warned again that "blockade will mean war" and called upon the peoples of Europe "who will have to march into the burning fiery furnace" to "bind themselves into a spiritual unity over the politicians' heads." Such appeals were not in vain. Pro-Fascist violence at the Sorbonne was already making it impossible for Professor Rias to teach. But in Commons on February 25 Laborites and Liberals accused the Cabinet of vacillation and called for oil sanctions.

The Committee of Diplomats reassembled on March 2. Sigvard Bernadotte transmitted an oral message from Flaminio that if oil sanctions were voted, Italy would quit the League, denounce the award of January 1935, treat the French-Italian frontier, and withhold all co-operation should any necessary steps be enforced against her. This was a bar-bary from public threat of "war," which were bombast, but it gave weight to the view that Flaminio could be intimidated by threats as well as bought with empty promises. The French Foreign Minister at once asked Eden to postpone discussion of oil sanctions pending further "machinations." Eden phoned Bédérin, who approved. Flaminio thereupon proposed that the Committee of Thirteen should make a new appeal for peace. Eden agreed but remarked: "His Majesty's Government are in favor of the imposition of an oil embargo by the members of the League as it are prepared to join in the early application of such a sanction if the other principal supplying and transporting States who are members of the League of Nations are prepared to do likewise."

On March 3 the Committee of Thirteen voted a resolution appealing

to both belligerents for the immediate stopping of negotiations and providing for a new meeting on March 12 to hear the reply—and presumably to permit the Committee of Eighteen to consider oil sanctions if "evacuation" should fail. Eden had pressed for a time limit of forty-eight hours, or at most seventy-two, and the cessation of hostilities. But he was outmaneuvered by Flandin.<sup>1</sup> Geyde in the *Quotidiens d'Antwerpen* lauded the French victory over Britain. Phillé Schulse accepted the proposal on March 5. Hitler's blow fell two days later. Liège accepted "in principle" on March 8, but all danger was now past. The Committee of Thirteen did not again meet until March 13, this time in London. There was no consideration of further sanctions. After a two-hour private discussion a resolution was approved:

The Committee of Thirteen takes note of the explanation given by the two parties to the dispute in the appeal addressed to them on the 20th of March. It requests its chairman, assisted by the Secretary-General, to go once more to the two parties and to take such steps as may be called for in order that the Committee may be able, as soon as possible, to bring the two parties together and, within the framework of the League of Nations and in the spirit of the Covenant, to bring about a prompt cessation of hostilities and a final restoration of peace.<sup>2</sup>

On the same day Mussolini sang in Rome: "Victory leaves our flag and the territory our soldiers have conquered in consecrated to our country forever." Salvador de Madariaga, ex chairman of the Committee of Thirteen, made inquiries of Rome regarding Ethiopian allegations of atrocities. Rome denied them and accused Italo-Italians of atrocities. He suggested that Rome send a delegate to Geneva. Rome refused and suggested that Madariaga come to Italy. Ambassador Chamberlain returned to Paris with a Roman pledge to honor Locarno on condition of the immediate repeal of all sanctions, recognition of the League verdict, and acquiescence in a "direct" settlement. On April 1 Walde Mariani wrote the Secretary-General asking financial aid, the removal of obstacles "placed by certain States in the way of the transport of arms consigned to the Ethiopian forces," reinforcement of sanctions, and measures to compel Rome to respect the laws of war and cease "the systematic destruction and extermination of innocent populations." On April 4 and 7, following defeat at Lake Ashangi, Phillé Schulse made new appeals for aid. Eden induced the Committee of Thirteen to reconvene on April 8.

At the meeting Eden spoke sharply regarding the Committee's inaction on Ethiopian charges of Italian use of poison gas. But Flandin agreed with Mussolini that the Committee was incompetent to discuss

this. A commission of jurists was appointed to study the question. The International Red Cross was asked to supply information regarding the charges. It refused on April 4 on the ground that it was "neutral." The jurists reported that the Council was competent to discuss the issue, but that the conventions forbidding the use of gas provided no provision for violation. The Committee of Thirteen finally addressed "a pressing appeal to both belligerents to take all necessary measures for preventing any breaches of the international conventions and of the principles of the law of nations." Ethiopia gave assurances on April 10. Rome blandly replied: "A respect for the laws of war has been, and is, the constant goal of the Italian army."

The Committee of Thirteen decided that Mataraga should not go to Rome. Aloisi came to Geneva, but declared that he was there to discuss Locarno and had no other instructions. He assumed that Rome might consented to send a representative to Geneva after Easter. Eden favored accepting this "offer," with the Committee to remain in session and Mataraga and Avelod to take part in the discussions. Filadelfo thought otherwise: the Committee should adjourn, the chairman and the Secretary-General should be merely "observers." It was at length decided that the Committee should adjourn on April 16. New Ethiopian appeals were without effect. On the 17th Aloisi returned to Geneva and told Mataraga that Italy was ready to negotiate directly on the basis of the *de jure* situation in Ethiopia and hoped that the outcome "will be such as to enable the Italian Government to resume active participation" in the League. Ethiopia protested and demanded that negotiation be within the framework and spirit of the Covenant. On April 17 Mataraga reported the failure of his efforts. The Committee took refuge in procedural evasions. It decided to make a report to the Council—which consisted of itself plus Italy and Ethiopia. Mataraga drafted a report which was accepted on the 18th.

The League Council met on April 20. Mataraga presented his report. Aloisi declared that any settlement must provide for "virtualy the occupation of the whole enemy territory." He further observed that the use of gas was legitimate because the convention of June 17, 1925 "contains no provision forbidding . . . the exercise of the right of reprisals against atrocities." Walter Murray asked the application of Article 16 in its entirety. Eden reiterated his willingness to consider further armistices. As to gas: "If a convention such as this can be torn up . . . how can we have confidence that our own folk, despite

all solemnly signed protocols, will not be harmed, blinded, and done to death in any manner?" Echo answered: "How?"

Fred Borcier played his assigned role: "Conciliation must continue until it arrives at its goal. . . . Pending divergencies must not prevent us from finding ourselves united again in face of the formidable realizations that now weigh on Europe as a result of certain events. . . . We need peace in Ethiopia in order to address ourselves to the dangers with which Europe is threatened. We need a settlement of the position of a great country vis-à-vis the League of Nations, in order that this country may take part in the work of European construction; and I note with satisfaction that the representative of Italy has graciously drawn our attention on this point to the fact that this is also the desire of his own country." The Soviet Ambassador, Potemkin, cynically noted the presence of a "tendency to treat the aggressor with a tolerance, and even an indulgence, that usually increases in the same ratio as the aggressor's own arrogance and venacity." Madariaga was troubled: "But, gentlemen, since the moment when we recognized, now several months ago, that there was an act of aggression and a victim of it, we can only work for conciliation in the somewhat illogical and difficult form of a conciliation between an aggressor and his victim."

The difficulties of logic, however, offered no obstacles to those determined to render unto Caesar the things that Caesar demanded. After a long private discussion the Council adopted a wordy and vagabond resolution, addressing to Italy "a supreme appeal that . . . she should bring to the settlement of her dispute with Ethiopia that spirit which the League of Nations is entitled to expect from one of its original members." Alois voted against it. Ecuador objected. The Council dispersed and did not meet again until May 12.

In the interim Ethiopia was done to death. The Italian invasion from the north under de Bono and that from the south under Graziani had made little progress during the summer. On November 16 de Bono was replaced as Commander-in-Chief by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, sixty-three years old and a veteran of many campaigns. He had immense resources of men and machines at his disposal. He took war to war, victory, for he was accustomed to the service of his master and the cult of power. Years before in Libya he had pondered over a Latin inscription dug up by his men at a remote outpost. It had been written by a soldier of another age: "Here am I, the Captain of a legion of Rome who serves in the desert of Libya and burns and poisons this

truth: that there are in life but two things, love and power, and an man has both." " Bedoglio had long since made his choice.

A majority of western military experts had taken the view (and this view was shared by some so patently the cause which London and Paris pursued) that even the vast mechanized armaments which Caxar had assembled in Eritrea and Somaliland could not in a single season cross the great deserts, scale the Ethiopian plateau, and conquer any large part of the country before next summer's rains should again make operations impossible. This view was based upon geographical and climatic obstacles, and upon the Nigra's ability to hold the loyalty of his chieftains and turn his troops in guerrilla warfare. It also assumed that the Ethiopian armies would have access to an adequate supply of at least small arms and that the invaders would wage war by lawful and accepted methods. The error of these predictions was, in part a tribute to Bedoglio's ability as a strategist. It was in larger part a result of other factors.

The decisive elements in Fasil's victory would appear to have been the refusal of the mechanized powers to permit Ethiopia to secure arms, the enormous superiority of Italy in material, and Bedoglio's willingness, when thwarted, to resort to illicit and savage tactics of terrorism. One correspondent with the Ethiopian armies asserted: "The primary cause of their defeat was that they had no arms, and were allowed none. The secondary cause of their defeat was Italian air co-operation, explained reasonably by the spraying of mustard gas. The great Ras said that they could not fight the bees or the burning sun." "

The invaders had over 300 planes in the North and 100 in the South. The Ethiopians had 12, of which 8 could fly. None was armed. All were slow. All were tied to carry dispatches. The Ethiopians had 8 anti-aircraft guns in the North and 5 in the South and almost no ammunition. They had no heavy artillery, no tanks (Bedoglio used hand-bombs), no motor-trucks (the invaders had thousands), no gas masks. Between January and July 1955 Haile Selassie was able to import 15,000 rifles, 500 machine-guns, and half a million rounds of ammunition. In all he could count on not more than 60,000 modern rifles. He was able to mobilize about 150,000 men, but four-fifths of them were without modern weapons. Officially but secretly, Britain and France refused an arms embargo against Ethiopia throughout the conflict "—because of a desire to see El Duce win, a fear of Italian reaction, and a reluctance to see a cause African army supplied with



contemporary weapons. Courageous Ethiopians fought to defend their country against an ultra-modern war machine with spears, sticks, stones, and with their bare hands and bodies. They were able to inflict only a few thousand casualties on the invaders. In the end they failed. Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay feigned surprise and regret.

Despite their helplessness, however, the Ethiopian soldiery had brought the enemy to a standstill in both North and South by the close of 1935 and even inflicted serious defeat in the Tigris in January. Ceter's commanders resorted to *Schreckkölle*! On December 5, 1935, two bombers singled out the village of Dearya, where Haile Selassie had his headquarters. He himself furiously manned a machine-gun in an attempt to fight them off. Here it was for the first time that the Italian aviators made a special target of the Red Cross. The American Mission Hospital was showered with bombs. One observer on the scene called it "the most contemptible, disgusting, and infamous act of warfare" he had ever experienced in his twenty years as a war correspondent.<sup>22</sup> The Ethiopian sanitary service was at best pitiable. Most of the wounded either recovered without aid or died of gangrene. But, rescued the invaders, if the few who could be accommodated in Red Cross hospitals and camps could be slaughtered in their beds, the morale of the defenders would be shattered.

Downing Street promised to Rome on March 7, 9, 10, and often thereafter at the bombing of British Red Cross units. Sweden protested on December 20, January 22, and March 5. The world was outraged. But the bombing went on. On March 4 at Keren Fiume plane 5-bis circled the Ethiopian camp at a low altitude and carelessly dropped forty bombs on the British Red Cross detachment. The pilot machine-gunned the doctors, nurses, and wounded as they tried to flee. His name was Vittorio Mussolini.<sup>23</sup>

When these tactics did not suffice, worse followed. By March and April Italian squadrons were spraying villages, encampments, towns, farms, huts, roads and forests with mustard gas. The work was easy and pleasant. There was no defense and therefore no danger. Vittorio Mussolini as a boy had never seen a really good film. So he used incendiary bombs in the Adi-Aleo area.

I don't think a more important reason existed . . . We also carried grenades containing shrapnel . . . It was most accurate—ing—work and had a tragic but beautiful effect . . . I still remem-

but the effect I produced on a small group of Galla tribesmen seated round a man in black clothes. I dropped an aerial torpedo right in the center and the group opened up just like a flowering rose. It was most interesting."

Vittorio's brother Bruno also relished his work of civilizing barbarians:

"We had to set fire to the wooded hills, to the fields, and to the little villages. . . . It was all most diverting. . . . The bombs hardly touched the earth before they burst out into white smoke and an enormous flame and the dry grass began to burn. I thought of the animals, God, how they ran! . . . After the bomb-racks were emptied I began throwing bombs by hand. . . . It was most amusing: a big "Zuch" surrounded by tall trees was not easy to hit. I had to aim carefully at the upper roof and only succeeded at the third shot. The women who were inside, seeing their roof burning, jumped out and ran off like mad. Surrounded by a circle of fire about five thousand Abyssinians came to a rocky end. It was like hell!"

In a letter to *The Times* of March 19, 1936, T. A. Lambie, the Executive Secretary of the Ethiopian Red Cross, wrote: "The bombing of country villages in and around Keren and Waldo, the permanent blinding and maiming of hundreds of helpless women and children, as well as the infliction of similar injuries on soldiers with that most devilish of all devilish weapons, Yperite, or so-called mustard gas should cause everyone to ask the question—whether? . . . Today a few thousand peasants in Waldo will be groping their way down the dark years because of a disaster whose name they have never heard of, but whose degree of ruthlessness has put out their eyes. Waldo is a long way from Charing Cross—yes, but not far from asphyxiation. Whether tomorrow?"

Italy answered "Whether?" When Lord Cecil raised the question in the House of Lords on March 30, Lord Halifax declared he had "no information" on Italian use of gas. "It would be quite wrong and quite unjust to pre-judge a matter so grave and so vitally affecting the honor of a great country. . . . The first step must be to obtain the observations and comments of the Italian Government." The British Cabinet never thought it worth while to investigate. British Red Cross units were treating hundreds of gas victims by the end of March. But *The Times* declared glumly on April 1: "The use of

poison gas has not been witnessed by an authoritative British observer." "Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay, like Achille Bati (Pon XI) in Vatican City," had their own reasons for desiring Fascist victory. If the price of victory was the blinding and burning and torture of some thousands of Europeans, who cared?

By such devotees Echagui was beaten. Amba Asadom and Amba Alagi in the North were taken in February. The inexorable advance southward continued in March. Harar was destroyed from the air. Early in April Kiwira was taken, then Dessale, and by the end of the month Badoglio's machine was rolling rapidly toward the capital. On April 17, at Addis Ababa, Princess Tashit appealed to the women of the West through the foreign journalists:

For God's sake help us. Get something done that will really harm the Italian armies and not merely the Italian people. . . . Rally your husbands, brothers, sons, and force them to use their manly strength to compel the parliaments and rulers to take action. Do I ask you purely selfishly to do this? No. We are not only a small race, but I am a woman and its leading daughter, and I know, as you know, that if Mussolini loses armies and gets destroyed my country and people, Christianity will be destroyed too. We have a common cause, you and I. Why therefore do not all do something to drive off this common danger to Humanity, this enemy, this death by bombs, shells, and gas, before it again annihilates itself as it is doing here now, soon to spread fatally to your homes and your menfolk too? Italian aggression and gas have set Humanity a task. If you fail to help us now, we all shall die."

She also sent a plea to Harrier. It produced no result. On April 22, Haile Selassie transmitted an appeal through George L. Sater:

Do the peoples of the world not yet realize that by fighting on until the bitter end I am not only performing my sacred duty to my people but standing guard in the last circle of collective security? Am they too blind to see that I have my responsibilities to the whole of humanity to face? I must still hold on until my treaty allies appear. If they never come, then I say prophetically and without bitterness: "The War will punish." "

On May 1, when all was lost, Haile Selassie left Addis Ababa by rail to Djibouti with his family and a few adherents and thence proceeded

to Jerusalem. He departed from Palermo on a British warship May 13, and reached London June 3. On May 3, Badoglio's troops entered the Ethiopian capital, already given over to looting and arson. At 5:45 p.m., less than two hours after the entrance of the conquerors into the burning capital, Il Duce announced all Italy to a victory celebration. Once more he addressed a cheering throng from the balcony of the Palazzo Venezia.

Blackshirts of the Revolution, men and women of all Italy, Italians and friends of Italy beyond the mountains and seas. Marshal Badoglio telegrapher: "Today, May 3, 1936, on behalf of the victorious troops, I entered Addis Ababa." In thirty centuries of our history Italy has lived memorable hours, but this today certainly is one of the most solemn. I announce to the Italian people and to the world the war is finished. I announce to the Italian people and to the world peace has been re-established. . . . Ethiopia is Italian. It is Italian in fact because it is occupied by our victorious armies. It is Italian in law because of the law of Rome and civilization which triumphs over barbarism, justice which triumphs over cruel whims, civilization of men which triumphs over slavery. . . ."

On May 9, 1936 Oscar addressed the populace once more. Again he hailed victory, now crowned with new decrees: "The territory and peoples which appertain to the Empire of Ethiopia are hereby placed under full and complete sovereignty of the Kingdom of Italy. The title of Emperor of Ethiopia is assumed for himself and for his successors by the King of Italy. Ethiopia is ruled and represented by a Governor-General who has the title of Viceroy and from whom will depend also the Governors of Eritrea and Somaliland." Another decree named Badoglio as Viceroy. General was promoted to the rank of Marshal and presently succeeded Badoglio in the new post. Oscar beamed: "Italy at last has her Empire. It is a Fascist Empire. . . . It is an Empire of peace. . . . The Italian people have created an Empire with their blood. . . . They will defend it against anyone with their weapons. In this supreme emergency, lift your flags, your swords, your banners to attest the righteousness after fifteen centuries of an Empire on the eternal hills of Rome. Will you be worthy of it?" The mass howled. "Yes, yes." "Is this cry a sacred oath?" demanded Il Duce. "Yes!" "Is it an oath that binds you before God and man?" "Yes!" "Is it an oath that binds you for life or death?" "Yes! Yes!"

"Blackshirts and Inquisitors," cried Cassa, "salute the King!" "Long live the King!" —

### 3. GENEVA † JULY 4, 1936

Spring brought flowers in the meadows of the Alps, but in Geneva, as in Ethiopia, it brought death. The Council met May 11-13, 1936. A vote from Hailu Salama in Jerusalem asked its members not to recognize the Italian conquest and not to abandon efforts to secure reparation for the Covenant. Waldo Larrison was more blunt: "The time has been consummated. The Covenant has been torn up. Article 10 has been unscrupulously violated. Article 16 has not been applied." Alistair proposed that the Ethiopian-Italian issue be removed from the agenda: there was no longer any "dispute," for Ethiopia had disappeared. His intervention caused a postponement of the session from 11.00 a.m. to 3.00 p.m. When Eden, acting as Council President, called upon Larrison to take his place, Alistair and his staff walked out. The Council decided that the issue should remain. Mandates recalled the whole Italian delegation on the 12th, while the Council resolved "to resume its deliberations on this subject on the 14th of June and considered that in the meantime there is no cause for modifying the minutes previously adopted in collaboration by the members of the League."

While the Geneva promise was thus preserved, "cause" was soon found elsewhere for abandoning sanctions. Woodrow Wilson had postulated a "union of wills" against aggression as a more potent means of efficient sanctions.<sup>20</sup> The only union of wills in Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay was a union to condone aggression. The immediate problem was one of winning public support for what appeared to be capitulation. The problem was readily enough solved by manipulation of the appropriate symbols, for public opinion in Britain was ready to run to cover. Arnold J. Toynbee described no trumper well when he wrote:

The British diplomats of this generation were the children of an age in which a di-dereve Christian Society had come to believe that its talent for clockwork (institutional as well as marital) could dispense it from the need of holding convictions and of summoning up the courage to act upon them when the conse-

quences of such action were likely to be unpleasant. . . . These children of the Enlightenment fell under the yoke of the Goddess Tyche or Fortune, who, under many different names, had repeatedly established her paralyzing dominion over the souls of men and women who had been called upon to live in periods of social dislocation. . . . They made their momentous choice neither on the absolute criterion of morality nor on the relative criterion of expediency, but on that trivial distinction between the moment and the next which keeps the clapped netting between the blankets when the house is burning over her head.<sup>21</sup>

The Tory leaders of Britain moved slowly to their acquiescence in the decision about to be reached. Eden in Commons on May 6 indignantly repudiated allegations that the Government had "let down" the League. With one-passer aplomb, he argued that Britain had not helped the armateurs to success, that American non-membership in the League had made further sanctions impossible, that the Suez Canal could not have been closed without League action, that no League resolution to close the Canal could have been passed. He confessed "disappointment" at "the failure of the League." But the League must go on. It must be "reformed." The Government will approach these problems "in a spirit of realism and constructive co-operation." It acted a free hand—"with this assurance that it will continue to pursue its policy under the Covenant."<sup>22</sup> On May 13 Baldwin developed the new theme in Albert Hall: war is horrible, on no account must collective security lead to war; the League must be reformed.

As early as April 30 Winston Churchill had said that sanctions he liked. Sir Austen Chamberlain followed suit on May 6. Apprehension was expressed lest the new Cabinet of the People's Front in France might develop a belated enthusiasm for sanctions.<sup>23</sup> Throughout the month of May the tide of sentiment which had found expression in the peace ballot, in the fraudulent election of November, and in the ousting of Hoover, ebbed and receded over the shallows and margins of frustration and defeat.<sup>24</sup> The once-dignified Hoover reentered the Cabinet as First Lord of the Admiralty on June 3. (Eden welcomed Haldane Selous to London on the same day.) The voices for continued sanctions had by now become few and feeble. The Cabinet was content to follow the tide down to the sea of paralysis, with occasional soundings to measure itself as to the direction of the flow.

Neville Chamberlain was chosen to break the news. He performed such tasks well and would learn to do them better. At a dinner in his honor at the 1920 Club on June 19, he broke the Cabinet's silence.

The Italian affair in Abyssinia has resulted in a grievous estrangement between our country with a long and unbroken record of friendship behind them . . . There is no use for us to shut our eyes to reality . . . If we have retained any vestige of common sense, surely we must admit that we have tried to impose upon the League a task which it was beyond its powers to fulfill . . . Surely it is time that the members who compose the League should review the situation and should decide as to limit the functions of the League in future that they may accord with its real powers . . . It is not apparent that the policy of sanctions involves—I do not say was, but a risk of war! . . . That being so, does it not suggest that it might be wise to explore the possibilities of looking the danger upon of the world and trying to find a more practical method of securing the people by means of regional arrangements which could be approved by the League, but which should be governed only by those nations whose interests are directly connected with those danger areas? "

These carefully phrased questions admitted of but one answer. The still popular Eden was obliged to break the news in Commons on June 18: "The fact has got to be faced that the sanctions did not realize the purpose for which they were imposed. The Italian military campaign succeeded. The capital and most important part of Ethiopia is in Italian military occupation and, so far as I am aware, no Ethiopian Government survives in any part of the Emperor's territory." (This was untrue, as the Cabinet well knew, for an Ethiopian Government was still functioning at Gera, west of Addis Ababa. Its communications were relayed by British telegraph agencies to Eritrea, where they were, of course, suppressed. But the Ethiopian Legation in London had established contact and had informed the Foreign Office before Eden's speech. However . . . ?) "That is the situation which has got to be faced. It is a situation which nothing but military action—from outside the country—could possibly avert. Is there any country prepared to take such military action? Or is there any section of opinion in the country prepared to take such military action? . . . His Majesty's Government, after mature consideration and on the advice which I, as Foreign Secretary, thought it my duty to give, has come

to the conclusion that there is no longer any utility in continuing these meetings as a means of pressure upon Italy. . . . If we cling to a course after the objective has become unobtainable, we may lose the greater end for which we are working, the greater end being, in these anxious days, to keep peace."

The day was the tenth anniversary of Winston. Simon asserted: "I do not think there is a single member of the League which is prepared to use force . . . I am not prepared to see a single ship sink even in a successful naval battle in the cause of Abyssinian independence." Two days later Baldwin followed Eden's lead at White, Scotland: "We think it right to drop sanctions because we do not believe that confinement, even if all nations desired it, would serve a useful or effective purpose. . . . We have been abused by our political opponents, we have been mocked by them and by Mr. Lloyd George too. For what? Because we have scurried? Because we have run away? . . . Do these words mean anything unless they mean that we run away from the Italian war? Can they have any other meaning? In other words, that we have run away from war? . . . If that flit is ever lighted upon on the Continent, no man can tell where the headier will come burning, and it is not a risk that I for one am going to take for my country so long as I have control in the Government."<sup>10</sup>

The technique, already foreshadowed in dealing with Japan and Germany, was to prove itself the "Open Source" of the years to come. The British discourse was devoted to peace and was convinced that peace was unobtainable and could be preserved only by assuming the obligation, responsibility, and duty of collective security through the League. Its Tory leaders (Eden excepted, though he too was forced to play the game) repudiated collective security, denied the indispensability of peace, and convinced both at the sanction of voters to aggression and at the discretion of Geneva. How to win approval for such a policy? Feignish. Inflame the public with fear of war, associate collective security and effective sanctions with war, associate the League with war, praise Geneva, but demand "reforms"; make no British commitment to Caste (this would be contrary to the Tory intent), but, with a tear and catch of the voice, present the tragedy of those who have been abandoned as indispensable for "peace." The prescription worked.

Labour's resolution of course was voted down in Commons on June 25, 1938 to 170. Cabinet supporters showed in the Opposition: "Do you want war?" Labour lacked the wit to find an answer which the



public world accept. The fight for the League was lost in London. Keirrie Chamberlain pushed the victory home at Manchester on June 17.

There is only one sanction which today could have any effect at all on the course of things in Abyssinia, and that is force, and force means war. Mr. Lloyd George himself told us in the House of Commons that, in his opinion, the country would never march to war to save Austria against. Does he suggest that we should do for Abyssinia what we would not do for Austria? Does he suggest that we should enter upon a war the end of which no man could see, that we should expose our people to the risk of those horrors which so shocked us when they were applied to Abyssinia?"

In France, despite the defeat of reaction and the triumph of the People's Front, the new premier, Socialist Léon Blum, accepted Tory guidance. His Cabinet decided on June 19 to abide by any League decision on sanctions, but indicated that it desired their abandonment.<sup>22</sup> Other governments—Australia, Canada, Belgium, Ecuador, Poland, and presently all the noncommunist States—followed the British example. On June 20 President Roosevelt declared the war at an end and lifted the American "secondary" embargo. Two days later Eden announced that the Cabinet was halting all arms shipments into Ethiopia from the Sudan. A letter from Lord Cecil in *The Times* warned: "We cannot escape war by running away from it. . . . There is no escape from blackmail by submission." But his voice was alone in the wilderness. Only far-off New Zealand and South Africa stood for continuing sanctions. Almost all States had lifted their embargoes and resumed "business as usual" by the end of June. It remained for Geneva only to ratify the capitulation.

On the motion of Argentina the Assembly met in special session on June 30. President Van Zeeland contributed toward the legislative task of trying to conceal what was about to happen behind a smoke screen of League "reform." On June 27 Hilde Schindler transmitted a letter from Deparatch Nefise to the effect that the Ethiopian Government was functioning at Gore, that it had renounced no rights, and expected the League to apply the Covenant. A letter of Casso on July 19 was read by Van Zeeland to the delegates: "The Ethiopian population . . . welcomed the Italian troops as champions of freedom, justice, civilization, and order. . . . Italy views the work which

she has undertaken as a sacred mission of civilization and proposes to carry it out according to the principles of the Covenant of the League and of other international agreements which set forth the duties of civilizing Powers. . . . The Italian Government declares itself ready to give once more its willing and proposed co-operation to the League. . . . It is in this spirit that Italy acceded to the treaty of Rio de Janeiro [the Argentine Anti-war Pact] of October 10, 1913." M. Moira of Switzerland, with Hungarian and Italian support, previously urged that Haile Selassie be not permitted to speak—or at least not on the first day. British and French efforts to persuade the Negus to keep away from Geneva or to remain silent were unsuccessful. He came. After Seino Carrillo of Argentina, he was the first speaker at the opening session.

Haile Selassie I, Deserted by God, Abandoned by Man, King of the Virgopelved, and Conquered Lion of Judah mounted the rostrum, still awry with a morose air. As he did so there was a feeble patter of applause from the floor—and then broken from the gallery. The Italian journalists, shouting insults and curses, crowded such an uproar that they had to be ejected by the guards before the session could proceed. (Rome denounced their expulsion as a slight upon "Italian honor.") Haile Selassie watched in silence. Then he spoke. His words were coils of fire:

I, Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia, am here today to claim that justice which is due to my people and the agreement promised it eight months ago, when fifty nations assumed that aggression had been contracted in violation of international treaties. None other than the Emperor can address the appeal of the Ethiopian people to those fifty nations. . . . I pray to Almighty God that He shall spare to the nations the terrible sufferings that have just been inflicted on my people. . . . The deadly rain that fell from the sky itself made all those whom it touched fly shrieking with pain. All those who drank poisoned water or ate infected food also perished in dreadful suffering. In turn of thousands the victims of Italian mustard gas fell. It is in order to denounce to the civilized world the crimes inflicted on the Ethiopian people that I resolved to come to Geneva. . . . [the invasion begins] at a time when a certain Government considered that the European situation made it imperative at all costs to obtain the friendship of Italy. The price paid would be abandonment of Ethiopian inde-

pendence to the greed of the Italian Government . . .

Apart from the Kingdom of the Lord, there is not on this earth any nation that is superior to any other. Should it happen that a strong government finds that it may with impunity destroy a small people, then the hour strikes for that weak people to appeal to the League to give its judgment in all freedom. God and history will remember your judgment. . . . Is it the Covenant that needs reform? What undertaking can be of any value if the will to keep them is lacking? It is international morality which is wanting, and not the articles of the Covenant. . . . What measures do you intend to take? Representatives of the world, I have come to Geneva to discharge in your midst the most painful of duties for the head of a State. What reply have I to take back to my people? "

The question of Hilda Selasie was soon answered. Blum spoke not about Ethiopia or Italy, but about France and the benefits of peace, disarmament, and collective security. Eden spoke. "The facts should be squarely faced. . . . The nations have to be recognized. . . . The continuation of sanctions in their present form can serve no useful purpose." M. Ts Wumen of South Africa made a plea for the resumption of negotiations and asserted that the impending decision would "shatter for generations all international confidence and all hope of realizing world peace. . . . Order is losing to chaos: the spectacle of power has hypnotized the world." Litvinov bluntly denounced the betrayal of the Covenant. Speech followed speech, mingling regret and disgust with denials and hypocrisy. On July 2 the Nazis addressed a letter to the Secretary-General, accompanied by two resolutions, one asking a loan of £1,000,000 to Ethiopia and the other asking that no recognition be accorded to annexation obtained by force.

On July 3 the corpse-like quiet of the Assembly was shattered by a revolution-due. With a cry of "C'est le dernier coup!" a Czech journalist, Stefan Lova, ended his life in the Assembly hall in a fit of drawing attention to Nazi persecution of the Jews. On the following day Arthur Gossler, Nazi President of the Danzig Senate, crossed a roomful drawn equally disconcerting. He had come to defy the League, denounce Sen. Lova, League High Commissioner for Danzig, and warn Geneva not to interfere with the contemplated suppression of the Danzig Constitution, which was under League protection. He defied, he denounced, he warned. The Council yielded by transfer-

drop the task of upholding the Constitution in Poland, which was unprovoked Democracy in the Free City died. During passed under the windows. Gorkar entered, thanked his next at the foreign journalists, and shouted in the corridor that it was high time for German bombing planes to deal with the League as it deserved.

Those without honor cannot be moved from the path of disgrace by shame or insult. The day was July 4, 1936. One hundred sixty years previously the United States of America had proclaimed its independence. The words of Thomas Jefferson evoked no echo: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. . . . Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury. A Prince, whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people." On the birthday of the American Republic, the League of Nations—crucifixion of Jefferson's successor, Woodrow Wilson—died at Geneva. Van Zeeland presented a draft resolution expressing "firm attachment to the principles of the Covenant," adopting proposals for "reform," and recommending "that the Co-ordination Committee should make all necessary proposals to the Governments in order to bring to an end the measures taken by them in execution of Article 18 of the Covenant." Ras Tafari voted a vote on the Ethiopian resolutions. But Van Zeeland put his own draft to a vote: 44 ayes, 4 not voting (Chad, Mexico, Panama, and South Africa), and 1 nay: Ethiopia's. Van Zeeland declared that the Ethiopian resolution on non-recognition was thereby covered. The request for a loan to pass a vote: 1 aye (Ethiopia), 12 not voting, 23 nays. The proceedings closed with an address by Van Zeeland, Premier of Belgium. His country had also fallen under the military power of an invader twenty-two years before. Belgium, however, had not been absorbed. But Van Zeeland declared that his conscience and that of his fellow delegates was clear.

The Swiss authorities forbade Hitler Salazar to reside in his nearby villa at Vevey unless he agreed to refrain from all political activity. On the evening of July 5, he went in his long black cloak to the Gare Cornavin, and beseated a train for the north. A handful of journalists called "The Emperor?" He thanked them, bowed, and disappeared into the night. On the next day Lloyd George at Derby called the British Ministers "was which ascends the ship." At Geneva the Co-ordination Committee recommended that all sessions be lifted July

17. Salvador de Madariaga resigned as permanent Spanish delegate on the 10th. Fauri indicated that his pledge to defend Belgium in the Medocrumina was at an end. Other pledges followed into limbo. Señor Becerra of Mexico, but of the speakers in the long debate, had said that Ethiopia would endure "as Bismarck's ghost called to disturb the tranquillity of Geneva's conscience." But there was no longer any conscience to be disturbed.

On July 17, as sessions ended, Ciano exhorted 50,000 from the balcony of the Palazzo Venezia. "On this day, the 17th of July in the twentieth year of the Fascist era, the white flag has been hoisted on the borders of world anarchy. It is only a sign of sacrifice, but one would wish it were a symptom of a return to common sense. The credit for this great victory on the economic front must all be given to the Italian people—to the women, to the children of Italy. Nobody trembled, nobody yielded. We were ready for any sacrifice because we carried in our hearts the certainty that civilization and justice would triumph in the end in Europe as in Africa. And so it has been and so it will be tomorrow and always under the irremovable banners of Fascism!"<sup>10</sup>

In a finale after the curfew, Arosio went to Rome on September 1, on advice from London and Paris, to arrange for Italy's return to Geneva. By Article 16, § 2 of the Covenant, "any member of the League which has violated any Covenant of the League may be declared to be no longer a member of the League by vote of the Council." But no move had ever been made to expel Italy. By Article 1, § 1, Ethiopia alone of all the League members was entitled to remain a member, for only Ethiopia had given "effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations." Arosio's bid to M. Duce, however, was a promise to exclude the Ethiopian delegation from the impending Assembly session. The Cabinet of Léon Blum co-opted by Refouling Professor Jinn to serve as an Ethiopian delegate under threat of the loss of his chair at the Sorbonne. Hilde Schmidt, who went again to Geneva, hardly succeeded Eugène Colson to act in place of Jinn. The 17th Assembly opened on September 12. For the first time in the League's history an American citizen sat on the floor of the Assembly as delegate—not of his own Republic, but of an ancient kingdom which the League Powers had condemned to extinction. Eden and Dalziel sought to persuade the Confederate Committee to bar the Ethiopian delegation. But a majority favored admission. Eden "withdrew" his objections. By 10 to 4 (Austria,

Hungary, Albania, and Ecuador's Calles, Dr. Martín, and M. Tizón were permitted to keep their seats. Rome withheld "co-operation."

Despite this overwhelming victory of Right over Might, the League States rose by one shoneered the Assembly's "German Doctrine" resolution of March 12, 1932, and awarded recognition to the Italian conquest by accrediting diplomats to Victor Emmanuel as King of Italy and "Emperor of Ethiopia." Austria stood firm, on June 12. (Austria was the next member of the League scheduled for extinction.) Germany followed on October 27. Hungary, Japan, and a score of other States did likewise. Britain pledged recognition (and efforts to induce others to grant recognition) by the Clemenceau council of April 16, 1931. France belatedly followed suit in October 1931.

Meanwhile the League earned upon its slow demise. Before the débâcle only five States had given notice of withdrawal, Costa Rica, January 5, 1932, Brazil, Jack 22, 1932, Japan, March 17, 1932, Germany, October 14, 1933, and Paraguay, February 17, 1935. After the débâcle, many left Geneva: Guatemala, May 17; Honduras, June 10; Nicaragua, June 16, 1934; Salvador, August 10, 1935; Italy, December 14, 1937; Chile, May 23, 1938, and Venezuela, July 18, 1951. By the close of 1951, the 41 States that had at one time or another been members of the League were reduced to 40. Among the missing, 11 had withdrawn and 1 (Ethiopia and Austria) had been devoured. Of the Great Powers only the USSR, France, and Britain remained at Geneva. Of these only the Soviet Union was loyal to the Covenant. Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay had killed the Society of Nations.<sup>21</sup>

Even as it died, weakness failed to complete the magnificent new League Palace in Avenue Faid. For all its glories, it was already a splendor—or something worse. One of the workers remarked facetiously to a British journalist: "This, monsieur, is a barracks we are building. It will be ready for occupation by the Germans when they march this way." "That's right" said another. "They will march not down through Switzerland. It's all arranged . . ."<sup>22</sup>

#### 4. EAST OF ROME AND BERLIN

By the confederations of the Rhineland the Reich interpreted a wall of steel and troops between France and its Eastern allies. As soon as the wall should become impenetrable these States would be at the mercy of Berlin. The whole French alliance system would then

collapse and France would be reduced to a third-rate Power, dependent for its security upon that least dependable of all allies: a Britain once called Great. Meanwhile Germany would prosper to become Great Germany. These preparations involved, among other preliminary steps, the economic and political penetration of Denmark and Iceland and the building of a coalition with Italy, Japan, and their satellites.

Hitler's liaison with Hitler was indicated as soon as the *Quai d'Orsay* had carried out Lavet's mad bargain. Rumors of a projected German-Italian alliance had circulated as early as 1932. Austria was ever the fly in the Franco-Nazi ointment. A wedge seemed to be achieved, however, by the German-Austrian accord of July 11, 1935.

The fabricators of the new arrangements were Count Galeazzo Ciano and Hjalr Jochen von Ribbentrop. The former, born in Leghorn in 1904, was son of an admiral who became Fascist Secretary of Transport. After attending college and law school, writing two bad plays, working on a newspaper, and posing the foreign-service examinations, Galeazzo went to Rio, Shanghai, and London and at length became chief of Hitler's press bureau and then head of the new Ministry of Peace and Propaganda. He inherited wealth and married power, for his wife was Hitler's daughter Edla. His father was made Count of Corridattone so that Edla (and some) could be a countess. Young Ciano returned a hero from Ethiopia as a Captain of the Royal Air Force. He was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs June 2, 1936. In this role he was entrusted with the delicate task of wooing Benito Mussolini—and was generally regarded as the most likely candidate for Ciano's mantle when his father-in-law should go to his reward.

Ribbentrop, born in 1893, was the son of an old Rhinish family. He studied in Bonn, Göttingen, and London and worked in import houses in Canada before 1914. He enlisted in the 10th Hussars, became a staff officer of von Seeckt, was sent on a special mission to Turkey, and earned the reserves with the rank of General. In politics he was first a liberal, then a guest of the Herren Klub, and finally a Nazi. During married the daughter of a wealthy liquor baron, Hjalr Haniel, he took over the business and became a champagne millionaire *de facto*. As one of Hitler's intimates, he rose rapidly in the ranks and served as Special Commissioner for Pharmaceutical Questions, saving spy, regarding of the Anglo-German naval accord, and Ambassador to the Court of St. James's.

Ornate preparations for the marriage of convenience were for-

ward during the summer and autumn of 1936. At Avellino on August 30 Il Duce declared: "We reject the absurdity of eternal peace, which is foreign to our creed and to our temperament. . . . We must be strong. We must be always stronger. We must be so strong that we can face any international and local danger in the eye without any peril. To this supreme principle must be subordinated and will be subordinated all the life of the nation." A week previously Hitler had extended German military service from one to three years. The Nuremberg Party Tag of September 1936 was dedicated to denunciations of Bolshevism. Hitler declared wage increases impossible. But "If I had the United Nations with their incalculable mass of resources in raw materials, Siberia with its vast forests, and the Ukraine with its tremendous wheat fields, Germany under National Socialist leadership would reap its plenty." Rosenberg: "The Soviet Union's Government is controlled by Jewish interests and it is money stolen from the Russian people by the Jews that is being used as an attempt to awaken the underworld in all nations to march against European culture and against the holy traditions of all peoples." Goebbels: "Bolshevism must be annihilated. The idea of Bolshevism could have emanated only from the Jewish brain." Hitler denounced Russia and the "Bolshevik Jews" before thousands of marching troops and shouted: "We are ready any hour. . . . I cannot permit raised States on my doorstep."

Here was the façade of the "Berlin-Rome axis." Ciano journeyed to the Reich in October. On the 19th he reached an agreement with Hitler, Neurath, and Ribbentrop. It was not made public, but in a statement to the press Ciano indicated that the accord covered six points:

1. Active and hearty cooperation for European peace and reconstruction, and also in matters concerning the pending revision of Italy and Germany.
2. A determination to defend European civilization against grave dangers threatening its civil and cultural essence.
3. Reconciliation of Spain's territorial and colonial longings, and agreement that the Government headed by General Franco-Frascó commands the support of the Spanish people.
4. Co-operation in the Danubian zone within the framework of the Protocols of Rome and the Austro-German accord of last July 11.
5. Conclusion of a new Locarno pact to be strictly confined to Western Europe.
6. Economic cooperation in Germany in Ethiopia.<sup>20</sup>

Il Duce, in a speech in Bologna on October 14, offered peace: "We hold out an olive branch. But pay attention. This olive branch



emerges from an immense forest. It is a forest of 8,000,000 beysars—8,000,000 bay-sars whetted to moon-like sharpness and entrusted to young and fearless bears." On November 1 at Milan he announced that a "new epoch" had begun. He championed Hungarian irredentism and expressed the "vast sympathy" of the Italian people for Germany. "The meetings at Berlin had as a result an understanding between two countries on definite problems, some of which are particularly troublesome these days. But these understandings which have been consecrated verbally and duly signed—this Berlin-Rome protocol is not a barrier. It is rather an aid around which all European States animated by a desire for peace may collaborate. . . . It is no wonder if we today raise the banner of anti-Bolshevism. That is our old banner! We were born under this sign! We have fought against this enemy! We have conquered it through our sacrifices of blood!" On November 18, 1935 the new partners took their first step in common: simultaneous diplomatic recognition of the rebel regime of Franco in the Government of Spain.

Berlin next looked to the Far East. Japan was the necessary Asiatic counter-weight to the USSR and probable ally in the projected crusade against Moscow. Japan was at odds with the other naval Powers. On December 24, 1934 Tokyo had denounced the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922. The London Treaty of 1930 expired simultaneously. Japan demanded parity with Britain and America. When it was refused, Japan declined to participate in the London Naval Conference of 1936. The new treaty of March 23, 1936, signed by Britain, America, and France and ratified by Italy April 16, 1937, provided for no quantitative limitations or reductions of naval arms, but only for qualitative limitations of ship tonnage and guns. Germany and the USSR later accepted these limits, but they were soon exceeded by virtue of "escape clauses" and an Anglo-American agreement to restrict Japanese construction. In the new naval race Japan was strikingly glooming itself for war with Britain and the United States. The Reich's involvement in any such conflict would be disastrous. Berlin professed to believe that Red Russia was Nippon's chosen foe.

In January 1936 the German Embassy in Tokyo and the Japanese War Office and Foreign Office denied rumors that a German-Japanese treaty of mutual military assistance had been signed. But most observers were certain by spring that an entente was in process of negotiation.<sup>22</sup> Berlin admitted the fact in November. Moscow protested to Tokyo. On November 25, 1936, the day on which the new

Soviet Constitution was presented to the Congress of Soviets, Ribbentrop and the Japanese Ambassador signed and published in accord.

### GERMAN-JAPANESE AGREEMENT AGAINST THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

The Governments of the German Reich and the Imperial Japanese Government, recognizing that the aim of the Communist International, known as the Comintern, is to dominate and subjugate States by all the means at its command, convinced that the relaxation of international life by the Communist International as the universal ally of the masses not only endangers their national peace and social well-being, but is also a menace to the peace of the world, desirous of co-operating in the defense against Communist subversive activities, have agreed as follows:

#### ARTICLE 1

The High Contracting States agree to inform the members of the activities of the Communist International, to consult with one another on the necessary preventive measures, and to carry them through in close collaboration.

#### ARTICLE 2

The High Contracting Parties will jointly bring about States whose internal peace is threatened by the subversive activities of the Communist International to adopt defensive measures in the spirit of this agreement or to take part in the present agreement.

#### ARTICLE 3

The German as well as the Japanese text of the present agreement is to be deemed the original text. It remains in force on the day of signature and shall remain in force for a period of five years. Before the expiry of this period the High Contracting Parties will come to an understanding over the future period of their co-operation.

In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly and properly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this agreement and affixed their seals.

Done in duplicate at Berlin on November 25, 1936—that is, November 25 of the 16th year of Showa Period.

(Signed) Von Ribbentrop, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the German Reich

(Signed) Matsudaira, Imperial Japanese Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador

#### SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISION

On the occasion of the signing today of the agreement against the Communist International, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have agreed as follows:

(a) The competent authorities of the two High Contracting States will work in close collaboration in matters concerning the exchange of information over

the security of the Comintern International as well as emergency and defensive measures against the Comintern International.

(b) The competent authorities of the two High Contracting States will under the framework of the existing laws take severe measures against those who at home or abroad are engaged directly in the service of the Comintern International or promote its subversive activities.

(c) In order to facilitate the co-operation of the competent authorities provided for in paragraph (a) a permanent committee will be set up. In this committee the further deliberative measures necessary for the struggle against the subversive activities of the Comintern International will be considered and discussed.

(Signed) Von Ribbentrop

(Signed) Hiroshima

Berlin, November 25, 1936<sup>11</sup>

This elaborate process of saving civilization from Bolshevism deceived no one. The anti-Comintern agreement was intended for Tory and Catholic consumption and was the perfect façade for the co-operative pursuit of policies aiming at territorial aggrandizement. The protocol, by its use of the words "abroad," "indirectly," and "promote" with regard to those allegedly serving the Comintern, opened wide the door for extensive investigations on a world scale—since any regime or group in any land which fell afoul of Tokio or Berlin could be accused of Bolshevist deviancy. Contemporary rumor from well-informed sources held that the German-Japanese agreement contained a secret understanding whereby Berlin renounced all claims to the Japanese mandated islands in the Pacific and the two Governments divided the East Indies into spheres of influence—and perhaps of prospective conquest.<sup>12</sup>

On December 2, 1936 Japan gained formal recognition in the Italian conquest of Ethiopia by reducing its legation in Addis Ababa to a Consulate General—this despite the fact that in 1935 the Italian press had denounced anti-Japanism and toyed with the notion of "saving" Black Africa from the "Yellow Peril." During the spring of 1937 special surveys and military, cultural, and commercial missions headed to and fro between Berlin and Tokio and Rome and Berlin with increasing regularity. On May 31, 1937 Hitler issued a deed of honor conferring on Mussolini the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the German Eagle. Ciano was similarly honored. Hitler's proclamation to the Nuremberg *Forst Tag* of September 1937 declared: "First, the Treaty of Versailles is dead, second, Germany is free, third, the guarantee of our liberty is our army. . . . The continuity of

secretary between National Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy has revealed itself in the last few months to be more and more an element safeguarding Europe from chaotic madness. . . . Our treaty with Japan serves the same purpose of unity in repelling an attack on the civilized world that today may come in Spain, tomorrow in the East, and the day afterward somewhere else. We are filled with strong hope that other Powers may understand the sympathy of the times in order to reinforce this front of reason for the protection of our peace and culture."<sup>10</sup>

Following the initiation of Japan's new military attack upon China in August 1937, Berlin and Rome both expressed sympathy with Tokyo, though the German military advisers to Chiang Kai-Shek did not leave China until July 5, 1938. On the same day Japan, Italy, and Manchukuo signed a trade treaty. Italy had recognized Manchukuo on November 29, 1937, following formal Italian reference to the anti-Communist accord on November 4, 1937. On this date Ciano in Rome affixed his signature, as an "original signatory," to a protocol bearing the names of Ribbentrop and Ambassador Nomiio Hotta.<sup>11</sup> Foreign Minister Koki Hotta treated the new member of the embassy in Tokyo as a dinner for the German and Italian Ambassadors.

London registered anxiety. Moscow informed Ciano on November 8 that it regarded the Italian action as unfriendly. Former possessor of a secret military agreement against the USSR. On November 19 Göttele and Marone Naga, Minister of Transport, exchanged radio greetings in celebration of the first anniversary of the signing of the anti-Communist accord, now transformed into a Fascist Triumph. The Japanese spokesman asserted: "The Sino-Japanese conflict is first of all a holy war to call the Nanking Government to account for its anti-Japanese attitude, free the Chinese people from the Red Peril, and secure peace in the Far East. . . . Our struggle aims to found world peace on a new order and in a great and just spirit. Through strengthening the anti-Communist camp, whose Tokio-Berlin axis is connected with Rome, new and strong foundations are being laid for world peace and the welfare of humanity."<sup>12</sup>

On December 10 Japanese troops stormed Nanking—and inaugurated an orgy of robbery, rape, torture, and wholesale massacre of the inhabitants almost without precedent in modern times. On Christmas Day 1937 it was indicated in Rome that an Italian mission would proceed to Japan. On May 22, 1938 Germany became the fourth State (after Japan, El Salvador, and Italy) to grant *de jure* recognition to

Marchalions through the signature of a formal treaty establishing diplomatic and consular relations.

For all of its frontal and unobscure strategy at an obvious target, the grand strategy of the new Triple was not fixed by these agreements and undertakings. A successful war against Russia would yield at most the Baku area, the Ukraine, and the Caucasus to the Reich, and Siberia east of Lake Baikal to Japan. For Italy it would yield nothing, for no Caesar or Rome could hope to extend his Empire beyond the Bosphorus with Germany standing between. Italian Fascism looked toward North Africa. No march on Moscow could win this booty. Tokyo's dreamers of glory had their eyes on Indo-China, the East Indies, and the Philippines no less than on Mongolia and Siberia.<sup>17</sup> Some Japanese publishers were committed to war with Britain.<sup>18</sup> Even in the Baltic the road by land to Bagdad and the road by sea to Africa might ultimately prove safer and more tempting than Bismarck's route over the straits. But any dramatization of such objectives would stir alarm in the Western imperialisms, while the crusade against Bolshevism would fill suspicions. Therefore Ribbentrop must say: "Japan will never permit an extension of Bolshevism in Eastern Asia. Germany holds the balisword against this pest in the heart of Europe. Finally Italy, as Il Duce has explained to the world, will hold the anti-Bolshevik banner high in the South."<sup>19</sup>

For the Third Reich the Triple could not be rendered strategically useful, regardless of its ultimate purposes, until Central Europe was conquered. British acquiescence must be assured. France must be isolated beyond the Rhine defenses. The problem of the *Drang nach Osten* was one of smashing the barrier of the French alliance system in the East. The keystone of this barrier was Czechoslovakia. Its defenders were linked to Paris and Moscow in a defensive pact. Paris was linked to Warsaw, Belgrade, Bucharest, Prague, and Moscow. London was linked to Paris. Therefore any frontal assault on the bastion would mean general war against a world in arms. The alternative was a flank attack. On Prague's right flank stood Poland, already half-way in the German camp.<sup>20</sup> Along the left flank was Austria. If the Cisleithania could be seized and if, at the same time, London could be persuaded to induce Paris to abandon Prague, the bastion could be taken with little risk. But this was a problem for the future.

In the interim steps must be taken to destroy French influence in Danubia and Balkans. Transposed Hungary lay beyond the Cisleithania. The Magyar feudal gentry were sworn never to recognize the French

ders of Trianon as defuncta, "*Nem, nem, ismét*" ("No, no, never!") was the national battlecry. In the great square near Budapest's imposing parliament building were symbolic figures of the ungrateful provinces, draped in mourning. The million Magyars in Slovakia and Ruthenia, the million and a half in Transylvania, the half million in Croatia and Slovenia must be liberated from Poles, Serbs, and Belgians. The national creed was deeply rooted in all patriotic hearts.<sup>14</sup> But the hapless Kingdom of Hungary was helpless and could at any time be crushed by the Little Entente. Regent Horthy, moreover, and even pro-Nazi Premier János Gombás, who took office in September 1932, were not disposed to make their State merely a German satellite. They preferred Italian support. Gombás, who appears to have coined the term "*Roma-Berlin szöv.*,"<sup>15</sup> died in a German satellite on October 6, 1936. Koloman Darányi succeeded to the Premiership, with Koloman de Kánya remaining Foreign Minister. On May 29, 1937 Budapest entertained Princess Maria, Queen Elena, and King Victor Emmanuel of Italy, who, for the first time in thirty years, left his country for a State visit abroad.

Berlin maintained close contact with Budapest, but toyed with the plan of bringing to power in Hungary a definitely Nazi regime. The vespers were at hand: Count Alexander Frankel's "Arrow Cross" movement, a copy of the NSDAP with shirts green instead of brown, the "National Will" movement of Major Francis Székely, the "National Front" of Francis Rajnai, and the Fascist association of Fascist students. Horthy tolerated these groups, but when Székely attempted a push in April 1937, his movement was dissolved and its leaders subjected to brief imprisonment.<sup>16</sup> The efforts of these groups to capitalize upon peasant unrest by demands for "land reform" made them anathema to the feudal magnates. Subsidies from the Reich made them dangerous. Horthy and Darányi were at once cognizant of the growing power of Germany (and of the fact that independence could be realized only with German support) and fearful for the fate of the monarchy under a Nazi regime at home. They therefore sought to develop a line of policy which should be anti-Nazi in domestic affairs and pro-German abroad. For the present this sufficed for Berlin's purposes.

The pattern of Nazi penetration was not different among Hungary's neighbors. The security of Yugoslavia's new frontiers demanded solidarity with Poles, Serbs, and Poles against Budapest, Rome, and Berlin. But diplomatic collaboration with democracies against

dictatorships stimulated demands for autonomy and domestic democracy on the part of Croats, Slovenes, and the South-sloppish. The dictatorship was committed to "Old Serb" despotism. As yet it stood in no fear of indigenous Nazi groups subordinated from Germany: the *Borbenki* (Fighters) of Ekieters, with blue shirts; the *Zbor* (Reaction) of Ljotich, the Croatian Independents, followers of Predelj's *Ustashe*, which planned the murder of Alexander, and the clerical *Miroslava Strana* (Croatian guards). Apart from Serbsians, none of these groups was large enough to prove either dangerous or helpful to Belgrade.

Despite the opposition of all the democratic and pro-French forces in the Kingdom, Petar Stoyedjovich sought a diplomatic rapprochement with Rome and Berlin. He held that France and Britain would abandon the small Powers of the East in a crisis, that Yugoslavia must recoup trade losses accruing from sanctions against Italy by commercial agreements with Germany, and that "new friends" could be made without losing old ones. Gano arrived in Belgrade on March 14, 1937, and on the following day signed a five-year political and economic pact with Yugoslavia for mutual respect of frontiers, maintenance of the Adriatic status quo, pacific settlement of disputes, non-support of any aggression against either, and reciprocal suppression of subversive activities in either State directed against the territorial integrity or the existing regime of the other. Gano laid a wreath on the tomb of the Unknown Soldier, visited Alexander's mausoleum, and received from Prince Paul the Grand Cross of the Order of the White Eagle.

To the east lay Rumania, lush in forests, grain fields, and oil reserves. If the conqueror's Peace of Brest-Litovsk (March 3, 1918) represented the ideal blueprint of the Nazi *Droeg nach Osten*, the conqueror's Peace of Bucharest (May 4, 1918) was its indispensable corollary. Pending the arrival of a favorable occasion for reducing Rumania once more to vassalage (with Hungary perhaps recovering Transylvania), similar techniques could be used to promote internal disintegration. Here the tool was the "Iron Guard" of Corneliu Zelea Codreanu and General A. C. Cantacuzescu, established in 1927. Its symbol was the crossula, its program anti-Semitic Fascism, its original paraphernalia the trappings of white-robed night riders ("The Legion of the Archangel Michael")—here replaced by green shirts. With funds from Germany, this gang of political buccanniers became a formidable power. On December 19, 1937 its agents assassinated

Liberal Premier Ion Dacu. "He came to power," declared Codreanu four years later, "because he had pledged himself to destroy our movement. That was an infamous act for which he had to atone by death."<sup>10</sup> The Iron Guard was nominally suppressed after the murder, but re-emerged as the "All-for-Country" party. Its rival was the "National Christian" party founded in 1915 by Octavian Gogu and Professor Alexander Cuza. Berlin supplied money and arms to such groups and bought Romanian newspapers by the score. If its agents could not be brought to power, threats of giving them further aid (and promises of discontinuing such activities) could be used to blackmail Bucharest.

Nicolae Titulescu, personal Foreign Minister and staunch champion of France and the Little Entente, was the Romanian born in the Nazi Black on the Lower Danube. The Iron Guard placed him on its death list. In 1934 three people died when his train was bombed. He planned to make Romania at least a silent partner in the new anti-German front of Paris-Prague-Moscow. He welcomed Benet and Prince Paul in June 1934, at a Little Entente conference which reaffirmed the solidarity of the allies. But he failed to persuade King Carol and Premier George Tătărescu to suppress the Iron Guard and other pro-Nazi organizations. According to one tale, Gogu, after visiting Hitler, brought Carol a dossier prepared by Hitler's Goebbels. This document was intended to discredit Titulescu by accusing him of sympathy for Bolshevism and of neglect in protecting the King from infection because of his red-haired Jewish mistress, Magda Lupescu.<sup>11</sup> Titulescu was sharply dropped from the Cabinet on August 29, 1934. He survived the news on his sick-bed at Cap Martin on the Riviera. Two weeks later he nearly died in Switzerland, allegedly from poison. (Queen Marie was reported poisoned in the following March.) Titulescu's successor was Victor Antonescu, who represented a basic reorientation of Romanian policy. Carol's Ministers, like those in Budapest and Belgrade, now sought to reconcile Berlin and Rome and simultaneously to suppress domestic Fascist groups by stripping their authorization and anti-Semitic character.

But full collaboration with the Fascist Powers was impossible so long as any vestiges of French influence remained and as long as Berlin and Rome championed Magyar particularism. Nazi intervention and French inactivity would soon remove the first difficulty, but the second persisted. The slightest sign of opposition to the Cenzura, moreover, brought new blackmail, with the Iron Guard as its vehicle. In March 1937 Tătărescu requested Italy and Germany to recall their



Ministru, who had attended an Iron Guard demonstration in honor of two "martyrs" who had died fighting for France in Spain. Berlin and Rome refused. Antonescu was obliged to declare the building "closed."<sup>14</sup> When Carol called his brother Nicholas in April, Codreanu sought to make political capital by championing the victim of royal defiance. In November he issued a warning to the King:

If Romanian youth should find itself compelled to fight for Bolshevism and international Jewry, they will draw their revolvers and shoot down all those responsible for that policy. . . . Romanian youths are against the Little Entente and the British Entente because both are detached in the spirit of world Jewry and Bolshevism. They will fight on the side of the Forces of the national revolution, for the cross and for nationalistic ideals against Communism.<sup>15</sup>

French Foreign Minister Yves Delbos visited Bucharest on December 8, 1937. French-Romanian solidarity was reaffirmed. France would still come to Romania. All would be saved. But on December 20, 1937 Tataru's Cabinet was beaten at the polls, obtaining only 33.4% of the vote, compared to the National Peasants' 20.4%, the Iron Guard's 15.4%, and Goga's National Christian's 9.1%. The Peasants resigned on December 26. Two days later Carol named Goga as Premier in a Cabinet dedicated to anti-Semitism, Fascist dictatorship, and collaboration with Berlin. The German and Italian press celebrated the victory. Bucharest was herewith lost to the Quai d'Orsay. In Belgrade the crowds which cheered Delbos and shouted "Vive la France!" were ridden down by the police.

In Bulgaria the German trade drive produced its most spectacular results. Between 1932 and 1936 Germany's share in Bulgaria's imports grew from one-quarter to two-thirds of the total while the German share of Bulgaria's exports increased from one-quarter to well over half.<sup>16</sup> This poor land of sturdy peasants offered opportunities for palace intrigues, but there was little chance for the proliferation of Fascist parties of disgraced petty bourgeois. The army clique headed by Colonel Georgiev which seized power in May 1934 was reactionary in social outlook but ruled toward nationalism in foreign policy. Czar Boris maintained his authority by gradual steps. The pretenses after Georgiev were little more than royal puppets. Two members of Professor Tashkov's Fascist-Nazi movement were included in the Cabinet by the end of 1936, but no openly Fascist regime was actually

in prospect. Neither were Bulgaria's partners encouraged by the consequences of their first military alliance with Germany to look too favorably upon a resumption of the venture.<sup>12</sup> But at least such assurances in Sofia could count upon Bulgarian support whenever the Young Turk Government should reach the lower Danube with victory beckoning upon its horizon and with promises of aid for the realization of Bulgarian irredentist aspirations.

The shadow of the revolution fell no less darkly over republican Greece, cradle of ancient democracy. Modern democracy died in Greece in the summer of 1914. Its friends hoped that, like the Ionic Temple of the Wingless Victory west of the Acropolis, it had been merely threatened while its foundations were being strengthened.<sup>13</sup> Its enemies viewed its passing with pleasure and held it gone for good. On September 30, 1913 King Constantine and Crown Prince George had been forced to flee after the military disaster in Asia Minor. The Republic which succeeded was the child of Eleutherios Venizelos. But in 1915 he was ousted from power by the royalists. In November 1915 the dynasty was restored in the person of King George II and approved by a 98% "plebiscite." Venizelos died in his Paris exile on March 18, 1936. Premier John Metaxas, a general general educated in Prussia, was misled by the Venizelos Liberals, by the Communist minority which held the balance of power in parliament, and by the trade unions. On August 3, 1936, in the name of frustrating a "Communist plot," he crushed a general strike, decreed martial law, and suppressed the Chamber of Deputies. The Maxima Dictatorship looked to Berlin for diplomatic inspiration as well as for useful techniques in the arts of tyranny.

Beyond Greece lay Turkey—cradle and ally of the Second Bulch and Despatchman's former neighbor to Baghdad, the Persian Gulf, and India. The new Turkey was no longer the Osman Empire of decrepit Sultans but a vigorous Republic of strongmen. Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha, nicknamed "Atatürk (Father of the Turks)" by his parliament in 1933. This political and military genius was, like Hitler, the son of a minor customs official—born in 1878 in the then Turkish city of Salonika. Unlike Hitler, he was blind, baldheaded, and ragged, and in appearance far more "Nordic" than Der Führer. He served the Central Powers well after 1914 and helped defeat the Allies at the Dardanelles. But he had no love for the Reich and less for the subservient Schammarsch at Istanbul. After the collapse, he raised the standard of revolt in Anatolia, drove the Greeks from Asia Minor, repudiated the Treaty of

Sevres, and forced upon the Allies the Treaty of Lausanne of July 14, 1923, which ended "capitulations" and made Turkey fully sovereign in the Western sense. His purpose was to create a modern, secularized Turkey, "snatching off the live head of Europe and the dead head of Islam."<sup>1</sup> He made himself President-Dictator, but preferred to rule through parliamentary reforms.

Kemal's Turkey, unlike its Balkan neighbors, was not ripe fruit for the Non Intervention. The new Turkey, like the old, sought security by playing off Great Powers against one another. In the war of 1922-3 Britain supported Greece, while France was pro-Turkish. After Lausanne, Ankara cultivated the cordial relations which it had already established with Moscow. Turkey, along with newly liberated Iraq, joined the League in 1923 and was prepared to seek safety in the collective organization of peace as long as the Western Powers were willing to co-operate. When the rising power of the Black began to overshadow Europe, however, Turkey saw an opportunity for new victories in the old game of Realpolitik. After the Rhineland coup, Ankara informed the Western Powers that it intended to renege on the Dardanelles. Did they prefer negotiations or unilateral repudiation of the Straits Conventions of 1921? They preferred negotiations. While the League died in Geneva, a conference assembled at Montreux at the other end of Lac Lemán. Much of the protracted haggling at Montreux was due to British efforts to keep Soviet naval forces out of the Mediterranean (and to secure entry into the Black Sea for British forces) and to Soviet counter-efforts to keep British forces out of the Black sea and to secure access to the middle sea for the Red navy.<sup>2</sup> The Montreux Convention of July 10, 1926 was a complex compromise. It provided in principle for continued freedom of navigation, Black Sea Powers (e.g. USSR) could send war vessels of any size through the Straits, but other Powers (e.g. Britain) could send only light surface vessels, in peace-time non-Black Sea Powers could not accumulate more than 40,000 tons of war vessels in the Black Sea, in war Turkey was granted full control of the Straits.

Turkey's old enemy, Russia, was thus forced to make concessions to Turkey's new friend, the Soviet Union. The principal threat, however, was Turkey itself, which sent 30,000 troops into the demilitarized zone at midnight of July 20-1. Italy failed to adhere to the convention. Italian-Turkish negotiations of February 1927 produced no concrete results save a declaration in the Turkish press that Ankara was "attached only to the idea of peace, and to no other idea."

Turkey's position between a Britain still clinging to empire in the Mediterranean, a Russia again dominant in the Middle East, and a Reich slowly pushing toward Istanbul was a dangerous one, but in very danger afforded, for a time at least, a measure of security.

In summary, Hitler's restoration of the work on the Rhine, coupled with Anglo-French expeditions to both Rome and Berlin, produced repercussions in Denmark and Bohemia which threatened the disintegration of the French alliance system. The initial victims promised to be the Dutchies and Belgian States themselves. The reduction of France to impotence was threatened as a secondary consequence. The identity of the victims on the third circle of doom was less certain. Berlin might eventually push south and, with Rome as ally, menace Britain in the age-old arena of strife between the Nile and the Euphrates. As if in preparation for such an eventuality, Britain concluded a new alliance with Cairo on August 26, 1936,<sup>20</sup> and granted Egypt a measure of independence such as the Nile Kingdom had never known since its conquest by Alexander the Great. But the hope in London was that Italy could be bought off and that Hitler would follow the itinerary of *Afro Knecht*. In this event the valley of the Danube would become not a road toward India but a base of operations against Russia.

## 5. MOSCOW

As a society, as a culture, and as a Power, Russia has ever been for Western Europe the great uncalculable and a perennial object of wonder, mystery, and fear. From the rise of the first Romanov (Michael, 1613-45) to the decline of the last Romanov (Nicholas II, 1894-1917) and from the Revolution led by Vladimir Ilyich Ulanov (Lenin) to the new world ruled by Josef Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili (Stalin) the great Slav nation has passed Western understanding. Now Russia's word picture of the Western world has found expression in an indifference, a challenge, and a threat, long awaiting the Russian Revolution.

*Arise, ye prisoners of starvation!  
Arise, ye wretched of the earth!  
For justice thunders condemnation,  
A better world's at birth.*

No more tradition's chains shall bind you.  
 Arms, ye slaves! No more in shroud.  
 The world shall rise on new foundations.  
 You have been taught: you shall be all.  
 —*The Internationale*

New Germany's wood picture of Russia was no less an indictment, a challenge, and a threat.

"From West to East" is now the direction from the Rhine to the Volga, "From West to East" must proceed from Moscow to Tientsin. The "Russian" who created Peter and Catherine was a real Russian. Europe should never have been forced upon him. In the future, after the separation of the non-Russian territories (the Western provinces, the Ukraine, the Caucasus) he will have to be content to transfer his center of gravity to Asia. . . . Let him turn his "wood" to the East where there many be room for it, having first cleaned it of that admixture of ideas of Bakunin, Blank [sic], Bakunin, Tolstoi, Lenin, and Marx, called Bolshevism. In Europe, which is alien to him and which he hates, there is no room for him any more.

—Alfred Rosenberg, *The Myth of the Twentieth Century*  
 (Munich, 1930), p. 602

One or the other of these wild-dreams is likely to become reality before the twentieth century has passed its half-way mark. For the faithful follower of Der Führer, Bolshevism represented a "Jewish ferment of decomposition" awaiting Russia rotten and ripe for conquest. For the faithful follower of Stalin, Fascism represented the death agony of capitalism—but an agony considerably expected to make deadly blows against Moscow as its dying foreplay.

Moscow's problem in facing the hostile world of Western capitalism, along with the changing strategy and tactics adopted to meet the problem, can be stated in relatively simple terms. The fundamental purposes to be served were two: (a) the defense of the Communist divide against external attack, (b) the extension of Communism throughout Western Europe and the world. At times (a) appeared to be but a means toward (b). At other times (b) seemed to be nothing more than a function of (a). Hence the assumed divergence of purposes between the *Narkomindel* (Soviet Foreign Office) and the *Comintern*. But both appearances were illusive. As basic goals (a) and (b) were inseparable and had always been inseparable.

Means toward ends were adapted to the exigencies of an unstable international environment. Defense of the model required arms. It also required allies—Communist allies if possible, non-Communist allies if necessary. It also required that bourgeois enemies be split into hostile and friendly camps, though permanent friendship with either was precluded and ultimate hostility from both was assured. An elementary balance-of-power calculus required that collaboration be attempted with enemy States less dangerous against enemy States more dangerous. Defense, above all, required abstention from armed aggression. In war, attack is often the best defense. But any armed Communist attack upon any group of nations, however successful in its initial stages, would unite all potential foes in the bourgeois world against Moscow.

The promotion of the Communist world revolution required uncompromising advance whenever national revolutionary situations offered a chance of proletarian victory. It required strategic retreat whenever the superior forces of the enemy also made attack suicidal and victory impossible. It required delaying tactics of defense in fixed positions whenever the political terrain in a given country presented opportunities for the successful execution of such a plan. In most situations such tactics could succeed only if non-Communist allies could be found among other party groups and social classes. Such allies would desert in the face of any Communist advance toward revolution. They would demand retreat and passive defense as the price of their support. But when advance appeared impossible and retreat meant threatened disaster, such a balance might be worth its price as a means of preventing (or postponing) the complete suppression of a given national section of the Communist. Such shifts of strategy appeared to some to constitute vacillations. In reality they represented the procedure of all able commanders.

Both Lenin and Stalin found it necessary to utilize all of these devices and to shift rapidly at times from one to another. Lenin accepted German aid as a means of returning to Russia in the spring of 1917. A year later he sought Allied aid against German imperialism. When none was forthcoming, he accepted the conqueror's peace of Brest-Litovsk—and flooded the Reich with revolutionary propaganda. The Soviets were saved from German conquest by the victory of the Allied imperialists in the War—only to fall victim to blockade, intervention, and subsidized civil war engineered from London, Paris, Tokyo, and Washington. The Comintern (III) International was established in

March 1919 to summon the world proletarian to revolt against its oppressors and thereby to save Red Russia. Communist rebellion won short-lived victory in Budapest and Munich, but was crushed elsewhere. The Red Army saved the day, however, and all but conquered Poland in 1920. The danger was, for the moment, averted. The Soviet Union enjoyed peace without security. The World Revolution enjoyed hope without success. The "nationalization of capitalism" ended the possibility of revolutions abroad and confronted the Kremlin with new dangers.

Lenin died on January 21, 1924. Stalin succeeded. Trotsky was sent into exile for infractions of party discipline. "War communism" had been followed by the New Economic Policy (1918-21). This in turn was followed by the first Five-Year Plan. Disasters troubled on Right and Left, but the party marched on toward its goals: socialist industry, collectivized agriculture, safety and prosperity for the "Socialist Fatherland." During these years the postwar conditions of revolutionary success abroad were lacking. Victory never strikes proletarian areas unless a united and revolutionary working class has wide support from a revolutionary peasantry and a sympathetic lower bourgeoisie, and unless the attack is upon an aristocracy and plutocracy whose hold on the State machine has already been partly broken by bankruptcy, war, or other disaster. These conditions were lacking in the Europe of the 1920's. But a variant of the pattern emerged in China. Whether the Communists, acting alone in opposition to the Kuomintang, could thus have Bolshevized China must remain a moot question. The Communists preferred alliance with the Kuomintang and helped to bring Chiang Kai-Shek to victory in 1927. When Chiang then joined forces with the Shanghai bankers, the landowners, and the war lords to wage a struggle of extermination against his Red allies, the Communist revolution in China was doomed.

With the postponement of the World Revolution to the Greek islands, the task of the Kremlin became one of seeking international security for the USSR by other means and strengthening Communist parties in the bourgeois democracies—not for lenient reform, which had become impossible, but for electoral and parliamentary activities in competition with liberal and Social Democratic rivals. The danger of a possible renewal of Allied intervention dictated a policy of seeking security through some counter-weight to French hegemony over the Continent. The Germany of Rathenau and Stresemann was less dangerous to Moscow than the Britain of Curzon or the

France of Poincaré. Hence the Treaty of Rapallo (1922), the inauguration of intimate relations between the Red Army and the Reichswehr, and the promotion of Soviet-German diplomatic collaboration. The Comintern inevitably fell under a shadow, for even the impact of the Great Depression on Western capitalism nowhere produced the conditions needed for successful proletarian uprising. Communist parties flourished on mass misery. But while misery induced the proletariat to sparry or futile protest, it stilled the *Kleinbürger* masses to a dynamic rage easily deflected by demagogues away from the classes of wealth and title and onto a variety of scapegoats, including Communism.

The triumph of Hitler and the launching of the Fascist offensives after 1933 completely altered the terms of the problem and led Stalin to alter his strategy no less completely. The shift was less a function of social and political change within the USSR than a necessity imposed by a sweeping change in the balance of forces in the outer world. For the parties of the Comintern the issue now was not "To revoke or not to revoke!" but simply "To be or not to be!" Whichever Fascism came to power, it subjected Communist groups to continuous repression along with Socialists and liberals. Democratic capitalism still permitted them to exist and to recruit followers. In neither context was revolutionary action conceivable. But as between repression and survival there could be but one choice. Hence the tactic of the People's Front confirmed by the 7th Congress of the Comintern (Moscow, July 23-August 24, 1935) and the demand in all countries for common defense of democracy against Fascism in collaboration with liberals and Socialists.<sup>10</sup>

In the international field the menace of the Fascist Powers to the USSR was incomparably greater than any threat from France, Britain, or America. These Powers, moreover, were themselves menaced by the resurgence of Japanese, Italian, and German imperialism. Stalin, therefore, looked to them for aid in common defense, so Lenin had looked in 1918. But while Lenin had got no response from Wilson, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau, Stalin's appeal was heeded by Barthou, Doum, and their colleagues. Hence Soviet membership in the League, pacts with Paris and Prague, and championship of collective security and the indivisibility of peace. Just as political exigencies within the democracies required Communism to show itself for revolution and loudly for democracy, so diplomatic exigencies in the relations between the democracies and the USSR required Moscow



to sharpen the international status quo and become a defender of Versailles, Locarno, and the Covenant.

The new line was imposed from without rather than inspired from within. It nevertheless precipitated a major crisis within Communist ranks. Some party members were too deeply wedded to revolutionary stereotypes to achieve an adjustment to Stalinist strategy. They therefore opposed that strategy and rationalized their opposition in terms of a vague consensus with their own repertory of labels and symbols. Stalin's strategy in turn kept its own stereotypes and reemitted the darning of *divergences* in terms of other conventionalized epithets. Phenomenal bitterness was engendered thereby, for hate is always heaviest on hated most strongly than misdeeds. This bitterness confused the vision of many already bewildered Western observers and caused them to resort to fantastic explanations of a relatively simple and familiar phenomenon of revolutionary movements.

A review and critique of the clash, which spilled gallons of blood and oceans of ink, would not be germane to present purposes.<sup>12</sup> The peculiar interrelationship of forces is by no means clear in its details from available sources of information. At least three minority groups within Communist ranks were moved to violence (either on overt) against the Stalinist line. (1) the "Right Deviationists" who opposed hasty collectivization and rapid industrialization and in some instances forced a major showdown with the Eastern Powers even at the cost of economic and territorial sacrifices; (2) the "Left Oppositionists" who repudiated all balance-of-power strategy, denied any significant distinction between Fascist and liberal capitalism, and demanded uncompromising World Revolution; and (3) certain military and diplomatic circles which opposed pacts with the Western Powers and favored continued collaboration with the Reich and the Reichswehr—either on the assumption that the Germans could persuade Hitler to call off his crusade and join Russia against the West, or on the assumption that Germany was in any event inevitable (or that France and Britain would never oppose its *Drang nach Osten*), that a new *Ernst-Linow* was therefore inevitable, and that in time would be less galling if it were concluded forthwith. Since Stalin's leadership was for each group the prime obstacle, all were united in desiring his removal. Since his enemies had no mass following and no opportunity to recruit them, they were forced to resort to sabotage, wrecking, treason, and schemes of assassination. They accepted Radek's dictum: "Playing politics never pays unless you risk your head."<sup>13</sup>

The complex relationship between (1), (2), and (3) would fill many volumes. The relationships between each group included Leon Trotsky are still shrouded in mystery. His principal accusers were his confessed assassinations and agents on trial for their lives in the USSR. His principal defenders, apart from his own disciples, were the sponsors and members of the American "Commission of Inquiry," headed by Professor John Dewey, which held hearings in Mexico City in 1935 and demonstrated, at least to its own satisfaction, that some of the accusations of some of the accusers were false. Trotsky's early writings do not suggest that he would shrink from the tactics attributed to him because of racial or political scruples.<sup>22</sup> His later writings do not suggest that he would be fastidious about methods or allies in his efforts to remove Stalin.<sup>23</sup> His Opposition activities<sup>24</sup> and his establishment of a "Fourth International" to fight Socialism and promote World Revolution<sup>25</sup> do not confirm the impression that he had become a mere academic theoretician taking no part in the struggle for Stalin's overthrow. In any event he inevitably became a symbol for both the conspirator-spirit and the conspirators.

The Fascist Powers found in this situation an opportunity to pursue their familiar tactic of internal disintegration. A military plan of campaign against the USSR was not enough.<sup>26</sup> Here as elsewhere—and far more imperatively than elsewhere—it was necessary to organize espionage and sabotage and, if possible, promote treason, assassination, and rebellion. In 1933 Berlin reaped with a "Russian National-socialist" movement among the émigrés in the Reich. Later Alfred Rosenberg and the War Ministry groomed the "Heimarm" of the Ukraine, General Pavol Skoropadsky, for a resumption of his role of 1918: that of puppet-potential maintained by German arms.<sup>27</sup> But no Ukrainian "Mischkulnas" was possible unless the Soviet Ukraine should first be conquered by Nazi arms. No counter-revolution in the USSR was possible unless the Soviet regime should first be dismantled. The only possible techniques of disruption were those actually resorted to—i.e. sabotage and conspiracy with anti-Stalinist elements in the party, the Red Army, and the diplomatic service.<sup>28</sup>

On July 26, 1933 the OGPU or State Secret Police was abolished and replaced by a Commissariat of Internal Affairs headed by Henry Yagoda. On December 1, 1934 Sergei Kirov, sole of Stalin and party chief in Leningrad, was assassinated. Zinoviev and Kamenev were sent to prison for implication in the plot. Subsequent investigations disclosed a far-flung network of conspiratorial activities, ranging from

the transmission of military secrets to German and Japanese agents; to train wrecking, sabotage, murder-plots, poisoning-schemes, and other old and new devices of political terrorism. On August 19-21, 1936 Kamenov, Zaslavov, and fourteen others were parried on the basis of new evidence linking them with Trotsky in a plan to murder Stalin. All were executed. Other conspirators were tried, January 19-20, 1937, on similar charges, plus conspiracy to aid Germany and Japan in war against the USSR. Karl Radek and Gregory Solodukov were sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, and thirteen others were shot. In April Yagoda was arrested. Nikolai Yezhov was named his successor. At the end of May, Marshal I. B. Gerasimik committed suicide. In June 1937 Marshal Tukhachevsky and seven other high officers were court-martialed for treason and shot. In December Leo Karskian and a number of other diplomatic figures were executed for questionable dealings with Tokyo. The most sensational trial was held March 2-11, 1938. Nikolai Bukharin, Henry Tagovs, Abram Rykov, Nikolai Krestinsky, Gregory Gorkov, and thirteen others were executed, while Christian Rakovsky and two other defendants were given prison terms.

In all the trials all the major defendants confessed their guilt in full. The material and documentary evidence made public by the prosecution was meager. Details were conjectured. But the public records leave no reasonable doubt that those who were sentenced had in fact engaged in most of the activities of which they were accused. These trials were accompanied throughout the Union by numerous local trials, wholesale purges of suspects from the party ranks, and numerous executions for espionage and sabotage. By the summer of 1938 the purge was apparently terminated. By vigilance and ruthlessness Stalin's leadership preserved an authority in the Soviet State—and conceivably saved Moscow from the fate of Vienna, Madrid, and Prague.

Many of the impositions placed upon these developments abroad belong to legend and folklore. Trotsky and his sympathizers, along with many Socialists, propagated the thesis that Stalin was a Bonaparte, a "Thermidorian," and a moral monster bent upon liquidating all loyal "Old Bolsheviks" in the interests of a privileged, bureaucratic class. If Socialists accused Trotsky of plotting murder and conspiring with Fascist devils, Trotskyites accused Stalin of blood-lust and of selling Socialism into slavery for personal ambition. Stalin's politics were described as "bolshevism"; the Komsomol clique had "strangled the

Bolshevik Party" and transformed the workers' state into a "lesser evil-state"; the Third International had become a "stalling congress."<sup>41</sup> Fascists took comfort in the thought of Bolsheviks denouncing itself. Many liberals registered horror and accepted Trotsky's contention that the trials were a grotesque "frame-up." The confessions were dismissed as products of hypnosis, torture, or the "Russian soul." Solin was suspected of treachery. The USSR, as in 1918, was depicted a sailing into chaos. Many non-Fascists denied indignantly that the tactics which the Fascist Powers had consistently employed in all other enemy States could possibly have been applied against the USSR. Many more found it impossible to believe that the defendants could be guilty of the crimes to which they confessed. The simplest and most probable explanation—i.e. the one spread on the streets in the public mind—was incredulously laughed at scorn. These fantasies served the cause of the Kremlin's enemies in other capitals. But the end was surely a lesser one than that suffered at the hands of other traitors and Fascist agents by Durr, Dollfus, Barthou, King Alexander, Trifunovic, Jaksic, Schenckelberg, and Beron.

In effect the proposition that the end justifies the means is always questionable. To pursue the rule of every means of action has in its results. Moscow sought allies against its Fascist foes. It found what it sought. It contributed to People's Front victories in Spain and France. It helped to save democracy from its enemies in several crises and thereby secured continued relevance for Communist parties in a number of democratic States. It secured pledges of armed support against aggression from France, Czechoslovakia, and Outer Mongolia (March 21, 1936). It formulated treaties from without and frustrated the schemes of traitors and enemies within its borders. The price was high both in the blood of dissidents and in loss of confidence among Soviet sympathizers abroad.

The terms of the new program, moreover, were ephemeral. Anglo-French acquiescence in Hitler's restoration of the armed march on the Rhine doomed the work of Barthou and Lavalon. Léon Blum and his successors doomed the People's Front in Spain and France. By 1939 the USSR was threatened with the very disaster that the new policy had been designed to avoid—an armed Fascist march, with the Western Powers passive or siding the Fascist Triumvir.

This aftermath, however, does not prove that Solin's course was either naive or dishonest. Any alternative course would have brought nearer the danger of attack. Moscow's fight was a fight for

dime. Each year the USSR increased its population of 140,000,000 (1938) by more than 3,000,000 inhabitants. Each year the USSR came closer to Lenin's dream of a completely industrialized Socialist society with its great centers of wealth and power far beyond the reach of any invader and its armies invincible against any combination of foes. Within a few more years the Soviet Union, without allies, could defy the Fascist Triplex even if Tokyo ruled China, Rome dominated the Mediterranean, and Hitler had all the Balkans in his hands. Each year the Fascist imperialists looked upon their prospects of conquering Russia with ever more doubtful skepticism. Each year they perceived that the riches of the Indies and the treasures of Africa were slipping from feeble hands and could almost be had for the asking. This prospect might yet save peace for the Socialist Fatherland and head the rival hosts of the bourgeois at one another's throats. If war should come late, the armed legions of Communism might well be able to fulfill Voznesenov's promise of September 17, 1936: "When the enemy attacks the Soviet Union or Soviet White Russia or any other part of the Soviet Union, we will not only prevent his invading our own country, but will defeat him in the territory whence he comes." In this event the World Revolution would again become practical politics.

If the Stalinist line of 1934-8 failed to realize all the hopes which some of its supporters read into it, and if its cost in treasure, trials and purges seemed excessive, it is least delayed by a generous margin of years the task of armed combat for the USSR. In the swiftly changing scales of the balance of power, the men of Britain and France who assumed that time fought for the democracies against the Fascist States were victims of a major error. But the men of Moscow who assumed that time fought for Communism against the Fascist States were correct in their calculus. Here, *il ne faut pas dire*, lay the reason *d'être* and the justification for the decisions reached during the years of waiting.

## CAMPAIGN IN IBERIA

### 1. DEATH AT MADRID

In two Western democracies, France and Spain, the strategy of the "People's Front" against Fascist reaction resulted in electoral alliances which won victory at the polls. The French Communist and Socialist parties concluded a pact on July 27, 1934. The powerful Radical Socialist Party—neither socialist nor radical, but bourgeois to its core—later joined the alliance. In Spain, a similar pact was signed later on January 14, 1934, by the small Catalanist Party, the Socialists whose Left Wing was led by the revolutionary Don Francisco Largo Caballero, the Left Republicans of Don Manuel Azula, the Republican Union of Mariano Barrio, the Catalan Left of Lluís Companys, and, temporarily, the POUM (Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista) of Andrés Nin, who, as an ultra-Trotskyite, was redder than the Reds. The *Anarcho-Syndicalism* of Catalonia and Madrid held aloof. All conservatives viewed the alliance with alarm.

Both People's Fronts were dominated by middle-class liberals, with their Communist minorities adhering to a non-revolutionary line in accordance with the Comintern program. Both were tainted with the "Red" label by their Fascist enemies and suspected by frightened conservatives of serving social revolutionary purposes. Socialist criticisms in both denounced their Communist partners for abandoning the social revolution. Both were ultimately betrayed by their friends—the Spanish Front by its friends abroad, the French Front by its leaders at home. Both were ultimately beaten by the enemy against whom they had pitted their forces. The tragedy in Spain was more immediate and more pitiful: But the tragedy in France doomed Spain to agony and brought disaster to France as well—

the dignity and courage which ended by fire evoked among the Spanish masses.

In social structure, economic life, and political complexion, twentieth-century Spain resembled the France of 1789. The French Revolution had failed to transform Spanish society. Here, in a poor and sleepy land on the periphery of the moving forces in European society, a paternal and blind nobility, linked with an ignorant and grasping priesthood, could the new magistrates of industry and finance in grinding peasants and workers alike into the dust of ill-reward and unrequited misery. Liberals strove, as in the France of the Enlightenment, for the disestablishment of the Church, the division of the great estates, the overthrow of the monarchy. The latter goal was attained in April 1808, with the abdication of Alfonso XIII. But the Republic strove vainly against the inertia and resistance of an aristocracy and a clergy clinging to their ancient prerogatives. The bloated and pompous official corps, always monarchists at heart, opposed civilian control. Some 20,000 guardsmen resisted agrarian reform, for they held three-fifths of the arable land while millions of peasants were landless or limited to day holdings. Over 80,000 priests, monks, and nuns in a population of 14,000,000 clung to their privileges and their control over education. The Church insisted in the name of God that the monastic orders and ecclesiastical magistrates must keep their properties, which included vast holdings of real estate, banks, insurance companies, and public utilities.<sup>1</sup>

The parties which had sought liberal reform had been beaten by the Right in the elections of November 1933, and all but suppressed by the regime of clerical Gil Robles and reactionary Alexander Lerroux. The People's Front was the answer of the Left to Right reaction. In the election of February 16, 1936, three lists were presented: People's Front, Center, and National Front. The election machinery was in the hands of the Right. Hundreds of thousands of Anarcho-Syndicalists who sympathized with the People's Front refused on principle to vote. The popular vote gave the People's Front 4,206,136 ballots as against 3,783,008 for the Right and 681,247 for the Center. Many Centerists later joined the Left. Some of those who voted Right in February were monarchists or quasi-Fascists. Others were loyal republicans, though hostile to the People's Front. The distribution of votes was such that the Right won 142 seats in the Cortes, the Center 62, and the Left 169. The People's Front majority included 21 deputies from the Left Republicans, 21 from

the Center Left, 82 from the Socialists, and only 14 (out of a total of 473 seats in the Cortes) from the Communists. Socialists and Communists together (103) composed less than half of the People's Front majority. There were no Socialists or Communists in the Cabinet at any time between February and July 1936. Azula's liberals and their moderate allies controlled Cabinet and parliament alike. The Right opposition was dominated by the 52 followers of Gil Robles in the CEDA.<sup>2</sup>

The voters of February fared out of office reactionary President Niceto Zamora (December 20, 1931-April 5, 1936) and replaced him by Manuel Azula, who had been Premier since February. Santiago Casares Quiroga, a moderate liberal, held the premiership from May till July. But reform made slow progress. Nobles, priests, placemen, and army officers were deprived of their source of security, but not of their power to resist. Important peasants seized estates. Impatient workers fomented strikes. Impatient anti-clericals led mobs which now and again burned churches and monasteries. The Communists, to the disgust of Caballero's Socialists, opposed immediate socialization of land and nationalization of industry. They asked not for social revolution or proletarian dictatorship but for discipline, orderly reform, and vigorous support of political democracy. The mass of wealth and idle personnel to an enormous and inept social revolution in local districts. They therefore proposed to strike back. They secretly mobilized their forces to overthrow the People's Front while its leaders were confused, takeover, or indifferent.

The seeds of war, however, were sown not only by modern ruling classes that feared the People as a Great Enemy. They were sown as well by those abroad who had aims of their own to pursue. Spain's crucifixion was the handiwork of the Fascist regimes at Rome, Berlin, and Lisbon. It was not the result of alleged schemes of bloody revolution formulated by the People's Front. Still less was it the result of any "Red plot" hatched in Moscow.

The principal objectives of Fascist strategy were determined by Geo-Politics. The Western exit of the Mediterranean, on the "life line" of the British Empire from Liverpool to Calcutta, was dominated by Gibraltar and the internationalized zone of Tangier. But Algiers, on the European shore immediately west of Gibraltar, and Casablanca, on the African shore in Spanish Morocco, if adequately fortified and in Fascist hands, could render Gibraltar useless—or at least close the Straits to British and French shipping, so the guns of Gibraltar could



close them to German or Italian shipping. To the east are the Balearic Islands: Minorca (chief harbor, Port Mahon), Majorca (Palma), and Ibiza. A circle with a 150-mile radius drawn about Port Mahon will embrace Valencia, Barcelona, Marseille, Toulon, Corsica, Sardinia, and much of the coast of Algeria. If straight lines are drawn on a map from Sassari in Sardinia to Valencia, from Ajaccio in Corsica to Cagliari, from Marseille and Toulon to Algiers and Oran in French North Africa, from Barcelona to Bizerta in French Tunis, and from Castellon-de-la-Plana to Sicily or Malta, all these lines will intersect one another at the Balearics.

These islands flank the most important single artery in the French colonial empire, that from Algiers to the Riviera. The alternative route via the Atlantic is flanked on the north by Spain and Portugal and on the south by Rio de Oro and the Canary Islands, both Spanish colonies. Between 1912 and 1918, 700,000 African troops and 140,000 African laborers came to the defense of France by sea, chiefly from Senegal, Morocco, and Algeria. The plans of the French General Staff in 1918 contemplated the mobilization of 1,500,000 colored troops, of which about half would come from West and North Africa. Effective French control of the Balearics would enable enemy air and sea forces to cut communications between France and its chief source of military reinforcement. Control of Spanish Morocco would enable both forces to sever British and French communications between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Control of Spain, Portugal, Rio de Oro, and the Canaries would jeopardize French and British communications around Africa. Control of the Pyrenees would complete the immobilization of France insured by the remilitarization of the Rhineland.<sup>1</sup>

These considerations determined the policies of Rome and Berlin in Iberia. Economic interests were subordinated to the military calculus, as in every military regime. Hitler declared at Würzburg, Jan. 17, 1937: "Germany needs iron ore. That is why we want a Nationalist Government in Spain, so that we may be able to buy Spanish ore." But German buyers could purchase Spanish ore from Spanish sellers at about the same price regardless of the color of the regime at Madrid. Krupp, the *Wendlandtschale*, I. G. Farben, Rheinmetall, and other firms, some of them linked with the British Rio Tinto interests in European Pyrites, Ltd., were interested in Spanish iron, lignite, and sulphur for reasons of profit.<sup>2</sup> Certain Italian companies had similar interests. Fascism and Nationalism had an interest in

extending the Franco cult, debasing the democratic cult, and "saving Spain from Bolshevism." But for Durr and Fuhrer, ideology was but the façade, economics were but the sinews, of strategy. Profit and Propaganda are the tools of Power. And Power is ultimately national fighting capacity.

At no time was the Franco game in Spain aimed at German or Italian "sequestration" or even "occupation" of Spanish territory. Its aim was the creating of a Fascist Spain as a personal ally against the Western Powers. Such a regime could be installed in Spain only with the aid of Italian and German arms. It might confidently be expected to co-operate in future with Italian and German arms not out of gratitude but out of interest. It would need to defeat communists at home onto foreign enemies. It would by definition be militant, adventurous, imperialistic. Opportunities for glory and aggrandizement could be found only by co-operation with the Rome-Berlin axis. Such co-operation would be rendered impossible by annexation, which would inevitably arouse all Spanish passions to indignation. The goal was not annexation but the conversion of Spain into a Fascist State and an ally against France—and, if need be, against Britain.

The technique of the conspiracy is not a mystery, even if every detail are still unknown. On March 31, 1934, a Spanish monarchist delegation was received by Mussolini and Hitler in Rome. It Durr is reported to have procured arms and money for the overthrow of the Spanish Republic.<sup>1</sup> The Italian liaison with Spanish Fascist leaders became more intimate in the spring of 1935. Plans were laid in detail for Italian military aid to rebellion. Meanwhile the Thero-American Embassy in Berlin, with General Wilhelm Faeupel as its president, became a liaison between Spanish conspirators and the NSDAP. General Sanjurjo and young José Primo de Rivera spent several weeks in Berlin in the last spring of 1935. Plans were laid for the supply of war materials from the Reich.<sup>2</sup> General Rader, Nazi publicist, courtier official, and press consultant at the German Embassy in Madrid, was delegated by the Foreign Organization of the NSDAP, by the Propaganda Ministry, and by the Gruppe to watch the Spanish press, to influence right newspapers, and to act as liaison with Gil Robles and with Juan March, Spanish industrialist "rebarco long." In April, 1935, Thero Holckmann, failed importer in Barcelona, became leader of the Nazi party unit in Spain consisting largely of the German nationals (c. 15,000) resident in the peninsula. The German consular and diplomatic services were utilized to promote propaganda and conspiracy. Count Wil-

coach, the German Ambassador, was subordinated to the Foreign Organization of the NSDAP under E. W. Buhle. Millions of marks were poured into Spain, including quotas from the Fisher Bond, the Atlantic Front, and even the Winter Relief Fund. A network of spies and propaganda co-operated with Italian agents and Spanish plotters against the People's Front regime. By early July German arms were going regularly to the proper recipients. All these activities are a matter of undisputed documentary record. Posterity may learn more details of the Fascist conspiracy. Its existence is already established.<sup>4</sup>

The military plan was as simple as it was bold. On a given day rebel officers would lead their garrisons to revolt in Spanish Morocco and in all the chief cities of the peninsula. General Gated would fly from the Balearics to Barcelona to assume command in Catalonia. General Sanjurjo would fly from Lisbon to Madrid and become head of the new régime as soon as the revolting troops had seized the capital. General Mola would assume command in the North and General Franco in Morocco and the South. Since some resistance was anticipated, despite the paralyzing restraints of the contemplated coup, arrangements were made for employing the Foreign Legion and Moorish troops and for securing arms and planes from Italy and Germany. The date finally set was July 17.

But the plan went slightly awry in timing and in execution. On July 12, José del Castillo, a popular lieutenant in the Madrid police force, was murdered by Fascists. On the 15th his comrades kidnapped José Calvo Sotelo, moderate monarchist leader in the Cortes, and later left his bullet-ridden body in a cemetery gate. On Tuesday, July 16, both men were buried—Castillo's coffin draped in a red flag and Sotelo's in royalist trappings, with the dignitaries of the Church and the nation swearing revenge.<sup>5</sup> The bitterness precipitated by this double murder and the growing danger that the whole plot would be revealed led to the inauguration of the rebellion in Morocco on July 16. It had already been planned in detail.<sup>6</sup>

He who was to become Caudillo (i.e. chief, Duke, or Führer) was Francisco Paulino Hermenegildo Teófilo Franco, born December 3, 1892 at El Ferrol. He was the son of naval paymaster Nicholas Franco and Pilar Ramonelo y Pardo. These parents sent their son into the Spanish army. Francisco, Nicholas, and Ramon the sailor, who gained fame by flying the Atlantic and crashed to death in the Mediterranean, October 24, 1928. Francisco fought the Rif (1925-27) in the disastrous war with the rebel followers of Abd-el-Krim. By

virtue of ability and courage he became commander of the Foreign Legion in 1921. In October 1923, he married Carmen Polo y Martínez Válor, whose mother came from the Austrian nobility and whose father was a wealthy man of Oviedo. Franco was promoted to a generalship at the age of thirty-two. As director of the new General Military Academy, he studied strategy in Berlin, Dresden, and Vercennes. French Minister of War Maginot visited the Academy in 1932 and made Franco a Commander of the Legion of Honor. Franco bitterly opposed the Republic. His Academy was closed and in 1933 he was sent to the Balearics to keep him from temptation. Under Llorente he helped to organize the savage suppression of the revolt of the Asturias miners in October 1934. According to ex-King Alfonso's son Emilio, Franco told Alfonso in 1934 that he planned to take Madrid in a coup d'état. Alfonso, said Emilio, contributed 500,000 to the cause and other monarchists were equally generous.<sup>14</sup> Minister of War Gil Robles made Franco Chief of Staff. His activities in purging the officers' corps of liberals and posing anti-republican reactionaries in key positions were interpreted by Robles' resignation in December 1935.<sup>15</sup>

After the People's Front victory of February, Goded was sent to the Balearics and Franco to the Canaries because both were suspected of plotting rebellion. Before Franco departed he made plans with General Mola and Varela. He likewise conferred with Colonel Yagüe and José Primo de Rivera, leader of the Falange Española. His plans were jeopardized by the Cabinet's demands of variable duration from the army. On June 17, 1936, he threatened the Minister of War with rebellion if the demands were not halted.<sup>16</sup> The plot was perfected in its details before he left Spain. Early in July he wrote three letters in code from the Canaries to Madrid, giving food advice on the organization of the rebellion. At noon July 17, Yagüe sent a wire in code from Tetuan to Madrid: "The troops in Africa received on the 16th at 12.00 a.m." This was the signal previously agreed upon and now transmitted to Mola, Goded, Sanjurjo, Fajó, Salazar, Queipo de Llana, and Franco.

The future Caudillo was waiting at Santa Cruz de Tenerife. On July 18, José de Sanjurjo arrived to tell him that a airplane to carry him to Tetuan would come to Las Palmas the next day. Franco was ready. He declared that if the coup failed "there will be a long and bloody civil war." He proceeded to Las Palmas on the pretext of attending the funeral of General Beltrán. There in his hotel he received

ward of the Moroccan revolt. The plane had arrived on the 15th—the same day on which a squadron of twenty-one Italian bombers, part of the Royal Italian Air Force, was ordered to be ready for duty in Spain. The aircraft was British. In it were English "tourists": Major Hugh Pollard, his daughter Dora, and her friend, Dorothy Watson. Pollard told later: "My family is Catholic, and I could not allow my Spanish friends to be murdered by the Reds. I knew Franco was the man to save Spain."<sup>12</sup>

Señor Luis Bolin had traced the plane in London from the Olley Aircraft Company and persuaded Pollard to act as agent. The pilot was a Captain Bend. He and the young women knew only that they were to pick up "a certain person" in the Canaries. The plane had left Greydon on July 11, stopped for gas at Bordeaux, Oporto, and Casa Blanca, and reached Las Palmas according to schedule. At 2.15 p.m. July 14, 1936, Franco got aboard and the plane was off. First stop Agaña. Next Casa Blanca, 9.30 p.m., where Bolin joined the party. He later became Franco's press chief. All night long Franco talked and planned in his room in a small hotel. Off again at 4.00 a.m. Landing at Tetuan 7.00 a.m. July 15. He took command of the Moors and the *Fuerzas Leales*. That night he broadcast an appeal:

On taking the command of this glorious and patriotic army here in Tetuan, I send to the loyal garrisons and their country the most enthusiastic greetings. Spain has been saved. You may pride yourselves on being Spaniards. Have blind faith. Never doubt. Gather energy, without pausing, for the nation demands it. The movement is marching on. There is no human force which will stop it. I greet you with a strong and hearty embrace. Long live Spain!<sup>13</sup>

On September 19, 1936, the rebel National Defense Council installed Franco in the Episcopal Palace in Salamanca and named him head of the Government and Generalissimo of the "Nationalist" land, sea, and air forces.

But the coup became a civil war, for the first blow failed in the crucial centers. Saragossa, flying from Lisbon, was killed in an air crash on July 22. As Marshal General Fanjal led the troops in the Moroccan barracks to rebellion, the Cabinet turned the trade unions and established a people's militia which stormed the barracks and crushed the movement. At Barcelona the loyal forces also tri-

trampled after heavy street fighting.<sup>10</sup> Goded was captured and shot. Gil Robles fled to France and thence to Lisbon, where he became rebel purchasing agent. By August 2, the rebels held only the Spanish colonies, the western coast between Gibraltar and Portugal, and an uncertain zone in the northwest. Franco crossed the Straits to Seville and began an advance northward along the border. His Moors and Legionnaires took Badajoz on August 14, massacred several thousand prisoners in the bull-ring, and joined Mola's forces, which captured Irún and San Sebastián early in September. Italian troops landed in North African and Italian planes, tanks, and artillery poured in through Portugal and Spanish Morocco. The civil war was from the outset (and before the outset) an international war. But the coup had failed.

Those who had headed the rebellion in the great cities and seized arms to battle the invaders in the black mountains of Andalusia and Castile were promptly labeled "Reds"—by Franco's propagandists, by the Falange and Nazi press, by the "non-familists" of Franco, by the entire French Right, by most of the aristocrats and industrialists of England, by Beaverbrook and Rothemann and Hearn, by many Roman Catholics, and by all enemies of democracy everywhere. All the vast propaganda resources at the disposal of these groups were at once devoted to proving that Franco was saving Spain and Christianity from Bolshevism. The Communists had planned "mobilization" for August 1. "The military was to disappear," wrote Joaquín Ascaso, the Gaudillo's biographer, "in a mass slaughter, for which there had been charted a careful distribution of masses."<sup>11</sup> Gil Robles, on the day of the outbreak of rebellion and immediately before his flight, denounced the majority in the Cortes for plotting dictatorship and for forcing their opponents to resort to violence to free themselves from tyranny.<sup>12</sup> The Communists, declared other rebel apologists, had decided on February 17 to destroy churches and consular in Spain, organize a Red Army, and invade Portugal. By July, 1936,000 Red shock troops were trained, with another 100,000 in reserve.<sup>13</sup> The Reds had committed wholesale murder, arson, rape, and mayhem. Sir Auckland Geddes of the Rio Tinto Company offered proof that a Red revolt was in preparation. Calullens was plotting a "national soviet."<sup>14</sup>

With German thoroughness the NSDAP exposed the conspiracy in *Die Roetheuch über Spanien* (Anti-Communist, Nibelungen Verlag, Berlin, 1935, second edition: 25-300,000 copies). This extraordinary work, in the best tradition of Julius Streicher's *Der Stürmer*, was

modeled upon *Beaufort's Dispatch* by Adolf Eber (Eckart, Berlin, 1933), which "proved" by way of "documents" and hideous photographs of atrocities that the Communists had burned the Reichstag and were about to plunge all Germany into bloodshed when Hitler staged his eleven-hour ruse. The *Katholik* was gory with pictures of war crimes, bodies of twisted men, burned churches, mangled corpses, and Communist instruments of torture. It "proved" that the Communists ("Von Juden mit Juden") sought to launch the World Revolution in Spain as part of the Jewish world conspiracy against the white race. Franco, like Hitler and Doss, was saving his country from a fate worse than death. Thousands of Fascist sympathizers in all lands joined the chorus and at length convinced themselves and tens of thousands of others that the "Reds" were such brutes that they had not only committed innumerable atrocities and atrocities against all the decent people of Spain, but had even perpetrated self-inflicted horrors in order to make false accusations against Spain's services. Thus even anti-Hitler was destroyed by the Communists, the massacre victims of Belgium were myths, and the nightmare of Garmick was a product of Red arson.<sup>10</sup>

Such were the reasons from which Spain was being saved by Hitler and Mussolini and by Franco's motley assortment of Moors, Legionnaires, and Falangists supported by monarchists and clericals, graduates and capitulation, growth and shopkeepers sweating after glory. "We entered this struggle," said Mola, "simply because it was for us a moral duty. The terrible condition of the country compelled us to use force in order to restore law and order. Of course we sacrificed some of the principles of our political creed (Catholic unity, Corporatism, justice, traditional and legitimate monarchy), but today our sole aim is to save the life of our country, to insure respect for the Catholic religion, to exterminate the leprosy of Marxism and the thousand-times-worse leprosy of capitalism."<sup>11</sup> Politicians joined priests in giving application to a creedism which taught that voters who supported liberals were guilty of a mortal sin and that Darwinism, Protestantism, and Socialism were criminal creeds.<sup>12</sup> Leaders might know better. But followers believed with an inspired fanaticism which perhaps found its purest expression in the conviction of a simple soldier in the beleaguered Alcazar. "We believe: we have the Faith. They do not believe: they would stamp out the Faith. They think that it is in the hands. We pray: that is in the heart. . . . As I take my sin, I pray: as I throw a bomb, I pray. . . . The Reds think

Thinking is nothing. Presently they will give way. We believe. That exhausts *esperanza*,"<sup>16</sup>

But "they," who were guilty of thinking did not give way. Like the Roundheads of 1642, the unbattered farmers of 1793, and those who stormed the Bastille in 1789, they fought freedom's ancient fight. Their cause was to challenge the prerogatives of a proud nobility, a corrupt priesthood, and an ancient arbitrary justice. President Aranda carried on. The premiership passed to Cabelero on September 4, and passed in turn to the more moderate Juan Negrín on May 14, 1937. The Carabanchel "Fifth Regiment" became the model of the People's Army because it alone believed in obeying orders and subordinating politics to the necessities of defense.<sup>17</sup> Anarchist "organizers of discipline" and Trotskyite traitors were crushed in bloody street in Barcelona in May 1937. Thousands of anti-Fascist Italians, Germans, Frenchmen, and Americans (and a few courageous Britons) joined the cause as volunteers.<sup>18</sup> Those who fought at Madrid won the first fight against the penitents and the second fight against the rebel armies. They would have won their battle against invasion and rebellion, save that their enemies were to be rescued by one of their friends. That friend was the Premier of the Great Power which would be the first victim of the Fascist conquest of Spain. He was also a liberal, a humanist, a Socialist, and a Jew. He was the leader of the People's Front in France.

## 2. RESCUE BY BLUM

Léon Blum was born in Paris, April 9, 1872, son of an Alsatian merchant who found wealth in the alcohol business. His mother had a passion for justice. His blind grandmother, Mme Fleury, kept a bookshop frequented by liberal and radical lawyers, journalists, and students. Léon was brilliant, sensitive, shy. He studied law and after graduating from the Sorbonne with the highest honors (as 1894, became a member of the Council of State. Literature was his avocation and presently his life. He was an intimate friend of Socialist Lucien Herr. He became dramatic critic for *Jeun Juiv*'s *Revue*. He dabbled with novels and plays and wrote a book in defense of free love in 1907. In 1914, his notable work as *Grandfather as le Rayon* was completed. On the eve of Armageddon Juiv's was interrupted. Blum was shocked out of his ivory tower. He became secretary of the Socialist group in



parliament and *Chef de Cabinet* of Marcel Cachon, Minister of Public Works. In *Le Réveil de Paris*, December 1, 1917, he published an anonymous article attacking the Russian Communists for hurrying socialism through democracy and terrorism. In 1920 he was elected to the Chamber. When the Socialist Congress at Tours voted in 1922 to join the Comintern, Blum sided with the socialists. L'Humanité and the party machine passed into Comintern hands. The Socialist Party had to be reborn from the bottom. Blum turned his head to the right.

This strange, tall, Jewish figure—elegant, fastidious, almost effeminate—was an amateur but never an actor. His first wife, Luc Dahan, died in 1931, leaving him one son. He married Therese Paturel in 1932. With her he moved from his flat on the Boulevard Moutonroux to an apartment on the Quai Bourbon, 116 St. Louis.<sup>12</sup> His socialism was potent, doctrinaire, never brutal. His pacifism was optimistic and naive. "It is up to the democratic States," he wrote in 1932, "to eliminate the dictatorial governments by peaceful methods."<sup>13</sup> He warned France against Italy and the Fascist International, but in the same breath appealed to Italy and Britain to aid France should Hitler come to power in Germany. But Hitler would not come to power. Germany would respect the Comintern and the Pact of Paris.<sup>14</sup>

In 1934 he welcomed Comintern initiative in the formation of the People's Front.<sup>15</sup> The elections of April 28 and May 3, 1936 gave the Left 381 seats to the Right's 217. On June 4, 1936, Blum became Premier of a People's Front Cabinet of Radical Socialism and Socialism with the support in parliament of these parties and of the Communists as well. His induction into office was marked by a wave of sit-down strikes. After settling them, he pushed through the forty-hour week and minimum-wage legislation, completed the dissolution of the Fascist leagues, "redeemed" the Bank of France, and nationalized the munitions industry. But in the end the Front Populaire would stand or fall by its success or failure in foreign policy. In the end it failed and fell. Its fall was implicit in its first steps in dealing with Spain, for the war in Spain put Blum and his regime to its final test. In that test Blum the Man of Reason, and Blum the Democrat and Socialist, was judged in the scales of loyalty, wisdom, and courage in the service of democracy and of France. He was found wanting. In failing, he served the cause of France, Mussolini, and Hitler as well as if he had been a Fascist reactionary or a paid agent of the Ciphers. In reality his services were even more valuable, for no reactionary could have

secured popular support for the policy which Blum pursued. In France the situation had no need for a Franco regime. It could always find Left politicians to serve its purposes.

The Socialist deputies declared their solidarity with the Spanish republicans on July 24th. All the parties of the People's Front, with a few exceptions among the Radical Socialists, were sympathetic to the loyalist cause. The Right press, much of it in the pay of Mussolini and Hitler, openly supported the rebels. The People's Front had begun the Right and come to power on an anti-Fascist program. The Fascist States were openly aiding the Spanish rebels in an effort to destroy the People's Front in Spain in order to reduce France to impotence. What should Premier Blum and Foreign Minister Yvon Delboir do? Every consideration of ethics, politics, and strategy, every impulse of faith and courage, dictated adherence to the traditional course prescribed by international law for dealing with such situations.

When a recognized government in a neighboring State is faced with rebellion, it is the legal duty of all other States to abstain from intervention, to render no aid to the rebels, and to impose no obstacles in the way of the government in its efforts to re-establish its authority. Other governments may lawfully tell such a government or permit their citizens to do so. On no account must they permit arms leave their territory to reach the rebels. Blum could extend public aid to the Spanish Republic by granting it arms from French stocks. Or he could merely maintain the *status quo*—i.e. permit French citizens under existing law to continue selling goods of all kinds freely to Madrid and forbid them under existing law to give any support to Franco's forces. The former course would probably have enabled Madrid to crush the rebellion within a few weeks. The latter course would have led to rebel collapse within a few months, since Madrid possessed a large gold reserve, already had standing contracts with French arms-makers, and could readily buy enough arms in France to equipulate the numerous generals despite the armed aid unlawfully granted to them from Rome, Berlin, and Lisbon.

Blum rejected both alternatives. On July 15 he ordered the Cabinet to forbid all arms shipments to Spain, including unfilled contracts, on pending contracts. This action, called "non-intervention," was actually an act of intervention since it violated the rights of Spain under customary international law and under its treaties with France. It aided the rebel cause by depriving the Government of arms for its own defense from across the Pyrenees. Blum explained that this step

was the only means of preventing Germany and Italy from intervening openly (which they were already doing) and of forestalling German and Italian diplomatic recognition of the rebels (which they accorded on November 18).<sup>17</sup> He encouraged the French public to believe that this narrowed co-operation with the Fascist Powers was the only alternative to general war. The formula was familiar and was to be used again and again. There is only possible meaning could have been that Germany and Italy would attack France if Paris acceded to Madrid the treatment always hitherto accorded to recognized governments condemned by rebellion. That, of course, was nonsense. But the masses are easily frightened and soldiers inquire into the concrete meanings of magic words.

The mystery of Blum's motivation must be sought in his relations with London and in the psychic Nervosis of all Social Democratic parties and leaders. Lard had sacrificed French interests and collective security by blind subservience to Fascist Italy. Blum and his successor were to sacrifice French interests and collective security by blind subservience to Tory Britain. Blum and Delbos came to London to discuss Locarno on July 22nd. The Foreign Office had never known any French Minister "so easy to get on with." Blum and Eden grew enthusiastic in a discussion of Poincaré. The Man of Peace became the slave of Downing Street. He warmly welcomed Schacht in Paris two days after the Reich had doubled the terms of military service. He signed the Little Entente and refused to discuss any military cooperation with the USSR lest Britain's role be offended.

As for British policy in Spain, the ruling classes, the Tory politicians, and most of the diplomats, consuls, and other officials in or near Spain were at once moved to combine against the "Reds" and to warm sympathy for the "nice people" who supported the rebellion. Class affiliations were more potent than national or imperial interests. The British Embassy moved from Madrid to Biarritz, where the Marquis Merry Del Val, once Alfonso's Ambassador in London, represented Franco. Alfonso's Foreign Minister, the Duke of Alba, established himself in London as Franco's agent.<sup>18</sup> Downing Street continued to deal with the Republic as the Government of Spain. But there was no doubt as to the pattern of love and hatreds wind-on Spain among Britain's aristocracy, plutocracy, and officialdom. Since public sympathy was on the side of Madrid, it was necessary to employ the usual symbols to disguise actual hopes and intentions. Hence much talk of "on the one hand, on the other," "a choice between tyrannies," "near

complex," "socialist," "strict neutrality," "non-intervention," "peace," "general agreement."

There is no conclusive evidence that Downing Street "compelled" Blane to sponsor "non intervention"—i.e. intervention against Madrid. Such compulsion could have been effective only in case of an actual danger of a fascist attack on France accompanied by a direct or British desertion if Paris failed to heed London's command. There was no such danger. If there had been, Britain could not desert France even if it would. Did Blane estimate such danger or desertion? Perhaps. But he was not a fool. He did not need to be compelled. Like dozens of MacDonalds, Snowdens, Schoenbergs, Eberts, Mullers, Turans, Kautskys, Kautskys, et al., he was a desecrated first and a Socialist second. The blarney of socialism and democracy discards compromise, consultation, avoidance of risks, evasion of responsibilities, and ultimately betrayal of its own ideals. He must not challenge the Gauche even though they threatened France. The more they threatened the less must they be challenged. He must not challenge the Right, even though its price was in Caesar's pay. He must not provoke Downing Street, even if it did Caesar's bidding. Hence "non-intervention" to keep "peace." If friends and comrades and all vital interests and ideals were thereby sacrificed, he could shed a sincere tear. But he could not deviate from his course.

He therefore barred French arms to Madrid a full three weeks before London did likewise. He refused to heed the appeal of the Spanish People's Front on July 16. He faced bravely a great outcry against his policy. Socialists and Communists alike denounced him. His own paper, *Le Populaire*, turned against him. His pretence that his course was preventing Fascist intervention was hollow. On July 19, Quirón de Llano over the Berlin radio appealed to Britain, Germany, and Italy for arms and declared that France would "break with France" when he had won. On July 19, three Italian bombers, part of a squadron of twenty-one assembled July 15 and headed for Spanish Morocco to join the rebels, crashed in Algeria. On the same day Delbos expressed appreciation to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber for assurance of Italian "neutrality" which he had received the same morning. The French Right press screamed against the Spanish "Risks," compared Mola to Napoleon, rejoiced in conversions of Spanish Socialists and Communists, and declared that Hitler must not permit Blane to arm Madrid.<sup>10</sup>

On August 1, Blane announced that the Cabinet was addressing a

pressing appeal to other States "for the rapid adoption and rigorous fulfilment" of "common rules of non-intervention." Meanwhile, in direct or indirectness, the Cabinet reserved "liberty of action" on the issue has already in force pending international agreements.<sup>11</sup> The French Ambassadors in Rome and London suggested a three Power accord and a joint appeal to other governments. Britain agreed "in principle," but urged that other Powers be included. The Quai d'Orsay then appealed to Germany, Portugal, the USSR, and others. Berlin accepted (August 4) provided that Moscow should accept. Moscow accepted (August 5) provided that Portugal should accept and that foreign aid to the rebels should stop at once. Rome accepted (August 6), but Ciano asked whether the proposed ban would apply to individuals as well as governments and what measures would be taken to insure enforcement. On August 7-8, the French Cabinet drafted and distributed an accord proposing a general ban on the export of all war materials to Spain, including commercial planes and arms ordered before the outbreak of the rebellion, and suggesting as a sanction the exchange of information on all measures to be adopted.

A stormy Cabinet meeting followed in Paris on August 8. The Radical Socialists approved "non-intervention." The Socialists and Communists were bitterly opposed to the program of aiding Franco to smother the Spanish Republic. Blum insisted on his plan. The British Ambassador, Sir George Clerk, is reported to have called and threatened to suspend Britain's Locarno obligations if Paris drew back from its proposals.<sup>12</sup> Blum and his supporters magnified British pressure to justify their course to themselves and to their critics. The Cabinet agreed and announced that the French arms embargo would continue and would be extended to commercial planes ordered from private firms. Madrid protested at this act of intervention and at the proposed accord.<sup>13</sup> The Franco Powers delayed their replies while London and Paris begged them to "co-operate." Lisbon on August 10 demanded non-intervention by the USSR, respect for the international zone at Tangier, and outside protection for Portugal's Fascist regime in the event of a "Red" victory in Spain. Berlin warned Downing Street on August 11 that no German military supplies, public or private, were going to the rebels and that none would be sent. Simultaneously German planes went to Franco's forces in a steady stream and the commander of the *Destacamento* called on the *Carabida* at Gasta to express Nazi sympathy.

On August 15, 1936, without waiting for specific commitments

from other supplies, London and Paris exchanged identical notes providing for abstention from all intervention, direct or indirect, and declaring their intention to ban the direct or indirect export or re-export to Spain of all "arms, munitions, and materials of war as well as all aircraft, mounted or dismounted, and all ships of war." The ban would apply to all contracts in process of execution. Application was contingent upon acceptance by Germany, Italy, Portugal, and the USSR.<sup>11</sup> On August 17, the Reich passed grudging approval while denouncing as "Red piracy" Madrid's seizure of German aircraft and much of German ships. On August 19, Britain imposed an arms ban. On August 21, Portugal accepted "with its conditions and reservations, including the necessity of 'safeguarding Western civilization against all regimes of social subversion' and release of Lisbon from all obligations if any signatory consented to the raising of funds or the recruitment of volunteers (for the loyalists). Britain agreed to defend Portugal against any attack.

Rome accepted on August 21. Ciano refused the ban on "indirect" intervention, but declared that indirect intervention, which London and Paris had pledged themselves to avoid, included enrollment of volunteers and public subscription of funds. Italy thus held the democratic Powers to obligations which Italy refused to accept for itself. On the same day Berka protested to Moscow and Madrid against anti-Nazi radio broadcasts and the *Feldherrin Reichsleiter* issued a threat: "If they are not capable in Moscow and Madrid of seeing like modern civilized nations, then the facts must be made clear to the Bolshevik Jews in another definite." Germany accepted on August 23, also limiting the possible banning dates intervention and adding other ambiguous conditions. Hungary followed this example. German military service was extended from one to two years to "defense against Communism." Turkey and Yugoslavia, in obvious anxiety, held the accord to be of an exceptional nature, "not to constitute a precedent or result in even the implicit recognition of a principle (this was the principle which the accord expressly established) that a government cannot render to a legal government, on the demand of the latter, aid in the struggle against rebellion." One by one other European States accepted with a variety of interpretations and reservations. There was no single agreement but a multiplicity of replies and comments on the Anglo-French action of August 17. Each State imposed or pretended to impose embargoes on arms to Spain, with the loss of banned exports displaying little consistency.<sup>12</sup>

Thus, under the leadership of Léon Blum, at the initiative of the two democratic Powers, and in the sacred name of "peace," all Europe was unambiguously pledged to deny arms to the Spanish Republic in its struggle against Fascist attack. Denial of arms to the rebels was already an elementary obligation of customary international law. Denial of arms to Madrid was a departure from law and practice and a violation of the rights of Spain, as Livorno, Alberto del Vayo, Spanish Foreign Minister, and even Foreign Minister Monizelo of Portugal pointed out in the League Assembly of September 1936.<sup>17</sup> Professor Norman Paolard, overruling American legal authority on the issue, wrote: "To apply to unrecognized and irresponsible rebels the same principles that are applicable to sovereign States and established governments is to encourage rebellion and disorder and to weaken public law and authority. The law cannot long afford to do this."<sup>18</sup>

A price would be scored from France as a Power and from France as a democracy by the strategy Nemesis which here pursued Léon Blum and the *Front Populaire*. The Fascist League were already discredited,<sup>19</sup> but the imperio given by "non-intervention" to Fascist intrigues against the French Republic was enormous. Secret agents of the Berlin-Rome axis, with useful connections among the French politicians and pressmen, plotted the assassination of troublesome anti-Fascist exiles residing on French soil. Carlo Rosselli, editor of *Quotidien e Libertà*, published in Paris, was a thorn in Ciano's flesh. An agent of the OVRA, a police fanatic, was sent to France in December 1935 to kill Carlo. He failed. Rosselli fought for the loyalists in the Spanish war and infuriated Mussolini by urging all anti-Fascist Italians abroad to defend Madrid against E Duce. The loyalist troops which crushed the Italian brigade at Guadalajara were in part composed of Italian anti-Fascist volunteers. Rosselli also obtained from friends in Italy (and published in Paris) secret Fascist documents, including instructions to the Fascist press. Examples:

January 18, 1937—Offer no news of the bombardments of rebelled towns by the Spanish "nationalists," and above all deny that it is done by Italian or German rebels.

January 21.—Complete silence on the fact that the Hungarian Chief of Staff has been in Milan. Distance yourself completely from the Fascist movement in Switzerland.

February 10.—Begin and continue a strong campaign against Coochodovskia. Absolute silence on the fact kind for sending the dispatch of volunteers to Spain.

February 16—Telex on the irregularity of Kéroux leaving the Foreign Office. There was from London news of Kéroux's dismissal.

March 2—Do not reproduce facts about the moral reserves of the Bank of Italy published in the French papers. Suggests indirectly news of the arrest in Naples of the wounded volunteers coming from Spain and interrogated by our hospital ships.

April 7—Glean upon the Tagore episode in Soviet Russia and play up the supremacy and authority of the international Union.

April 11—Reproduce and amplify the news of the British Agency about how desirable it would be to train the suspicious quarters of London security of a revolution up. Add that Kéroux, if he had continued in office, would have provided for it. . . .<sup>40</sup>

On June 9, 1937, Carlo Rosselli and his brother Nello were murdered in the forest of Bagneres-de-l'Orne in Normandy by professional assassins, identity unknown.<sup>41</sup> It later appeared that this crime, along with others, was the work of a strange band of Fascist conspirators, the "Secret Committee for Revolutionary Action" (CSAR), partially composed by René Marz Dormoy, Minister of the Interior, in November 1937. The agents of the CSAR, popularly known as the Capoulets or "The Hooded Men," had high connections in the world of industry, finance, and politics. They got funds from Rome and Berlin. They got arms from Italy and Germany and from the Spanish steel factory in Toledo. They established secret armaments and plotted the overthrow of the French Republic by violence. On September 11, 1937, their hired gangsters bombed the headquarters of the General Confederation of French employees. The building was empty. Two guardsmen in the street were killed by the terrific explosion. The Confederation and the Ironworkers Association at once accused the Communists and the People's Front of the crime and charged that they were preparing a reign of terror to establish a proletarian dictatorship. This "Ruchung für" failed of its purpose.<sup>42</sup> The investigation left no doubt but that Rome and Berlin were plotting to unleash civil war in France as they had in Spain.

Such revelations produced no change in French policy. They bent upon officials are not moved from their course by shouts of murder. At the 14th National Congress of the Radical Socialists at Lille, October 27-31, 1937, the followers of Herriot, Daladier, Chamberlain, and Delbos accepted Jacques Kéroux's report on foreign policy, avowing the course which confronted France with disaster.<sup>43</sup> This course was irrevocably fixed by Léon Blum in August 1935, in successful defiance



of his followers. On September 3, 1936, "La Passionaria," the political Jeanne d'Arc of the Spanish People's Front and Communist deputy in the Cortes from Oviedo, spoke to 30,000 people at the Velodrome d'Hiver in Paris. (The *Antena Francesa*, August 19, declared that she had once killed a monk by hitting him through the throat.) In a moving address she appealed for aid from the people of France to save democracy in Spain. The crowd shouted again and again: "Peace for Spain!" On September 4, 30,000 workers demonstrated for Spain in the Place de la République. Blum was unperturbed. At Luna Park on September 6, he addressed his followers, who interrupted constantly with "Peace for Spain!" But by virtue of his oratorical powers he finally persuaded them through misrepresentation and burlesque and secured an ovation. He played upon their sympathies by depicting "non-intervention" as a personal tragedy for himself. "By giving an example we hoped to purge the honor of the other Powers. . . . There is not a single piece of circumstantial evidence to show that the agreement has been violated." Franco must keep his "word." For "peace" France must stand aside even if Germany and Italy intervened openly on Franco's side.

Do you think there is any one of your sentiments that I don't share? Do you think my heart is not torn when I think what is happening down there in Spain? . . . Undoubtedly the legal government that has arisen from the expression of universal suffrage, the government of the Spanish Republic would assure us complete neutrality on our Pyrenean frontier, while it is impossible to foresee the intentions of the rebel generals. On the one hand, security; on the other, danger. Certainly one can plead for rigorous observance of international law. But if certain Powers come to recognize the rebels as the regular government, should we undertake a competition of armaments on Spanish soil? In other words, if certain Powers furnish arms and planes to the [rebel] military forces, should France furnish them to the [Spanish] Popular Front?"

The answer was "No." Only thus could France have "peace." The bewildered crowd shriek in fear of war and cheered its leader. The tide was turned. The clamor subsided. The policy was fixed.

## 3. COMEDY IN LONDON

When gentlemen tell things which they know to be false to other gentlemen who believe them true, the result is deception. When the other gentlemen know that what they are told is false, the result, to outside observers, is hilarity. But when the first gentlemen also know that the other gentlemen know that what is said is false, the result is play-acting. And when all the gentlemen exchange statements which all know to be false, the play becomes a farce. The farce becomes delectable indeed when all the gentlemen pretend to one another that all the falsehoods are true.

As soon as minutes and memoirs are made public, it will become possible for historians of the future to reconstruct in detail one of the most diverting diplomatic farces of modern times: the proceedings of the London "Non-Intervention" Committee through which all the States of Europe supervised intervention in the Spanish war. Archæologists and classicists of days to come may find evidence in these records that the civilization of the twentieth century was, even in its decadence, not lacking in humor. They may conclude, however, that the quality and purpose of the humor were in themselves unadmirable symptoms of decline. In either case there far removed from the comic will experience huge merriment over the tale. If some of these clever valets posed at the time without smirk, this was doubtless due to the largeness of their own perspective.

This most satirical comedy can here be barely sketched, for the plot was almost unrecognizable, much of the action tedious, the mimes lengthy, the complications of motive, veilings, and decomplications incredibly intricate and fantastic. For potens purposes a few program acts will be sufficient.

On August 16, 1938, the Quin d'Orsay invited all States accepting the "non-intervention" proposals to form an international committee to supervise the application of the pledges assumed. Moscow, London, and Rome agreed. Berlin and Lisbon delayed, but under British persuasion Portugal yielded on September 2, and the Reich on September 3. The Committee assembled at the British Foreign Office on September 9. It consisted of diplomatic representatives in London of the twenty-seven participating States. Francis Baring was named Secretary. W. S. Morrison, Financial Secretary of the Treasury, was

elected President but was soon replaced by Lord Plymouth (Over Miller Windsor-Cleve). This gentleman (b. February 4, 1850), was not quite comparable in ancestral dignity to the Spanish grandees who served France in their own fashion. He was none the less a gentleman, for he owned thirty thousand acres, attended Eton and Cambridge, married Lady Irene Chetwode, and belonged to the proper clubs: Carlton, Badminton, Turf, Travellers, and Beaufort. He had served on the London County Council, 1907-19, and was a Conservative M.P. from Ludlow in Shropshire in 1902-3. He rose to the rank of Captain of the Gentlemen-at-Arms, 1907-9 and then became Parliamentary Undersecretary for the Dominions, 1909, for Transport, 1911-12; for Colonies, 1912-13, and for Foreign Affairs, 1914.

At the first meeting of the body over which Lord Plymouth was to preside with such conspicuous success, the Portuguese representative threatened to withdraw. When called upon to report as to the measures of "non-intervention" which their Government had adopted, young Prince Otto von Bismarck for Germany and Dino Grandi for Italy had come to report. The Committee therefore adjourned to September 14, when it drew up rules to discourage complaints over violations. Neither the Spanish Government nor the rebels nor private observers would be allowed to submit charges or evidence. This paintings would be reserved to signatory States. As for a mode of enforcing "non-intervention" pledges in the event of violations, none was provided. But this defect was not serious. The Committee never discovered any violations.

On September 15, Madrid in a note to the "non-intervention" Powers asked the "taking of the embargo on the export of arms to the Spanish Government and rigorous prohibition of the supplying of war materials to the rebels." Promises and proofs were transmitted to Berlin, Rome, Lisbon, and Geneva. Aerial refused to publish them. They were published by the Spanish delegation to the League on September 30. There was no response. Meanwhile an unsuccessful mutiny in the Portuguese navy caused Premier-donator Antonio de Oliveira Salazar to rush new aid to Franco, the victory of which mutiny was confidently expected in Lisbon to discourage mutiny everywhere. Caserta, near the Portuguese frontier, became a German air base, while Italian "volunteers" sank over Majorca and covered it into an Italian air base.

The Olympian calm with which these developments were viewed in London was really broken on October 7, when Samuel Ragan,

Soviet charge, issued a note from Moscow, protesting violations, denouncing *delinquents* of German and Italian arms to Franco, and threatening that "if violence is not halted immediately, it [the USSR] will consider itself free from any obligation resulting from the agreement."<sup>2</sup> This was clearly unparliamentary behavior. Downing Street was dismayed. On October 9, at the fifth meeting of the Committee, the Germans, Italians, and Portuguese delegates called Moscow names. Blum assured Eden that he would not support the USSR. A communiqué was issued after five hours of discussion. It disposed unsatisfactorily of the issue:

... The Italian representative, after having energetically refused and repudiated every single point of the allegations directed against Italy, declared all these allegations were entirely baseless and denied of any foundation whatsoever. This would only be proved by an answer which would be given in due time by the Italian Government. German and Portuguese representatives made similar reservations in regard to the positions of their respective Governments. . . . The Portuguese representative expressed his inability to take part in discussion of the matter without instructions from his Government. . . . The Committee decided that, pending receipt of a reply, it would be premature to discuss the proposal for appointment of a commission for investigation. . . .

In view of the fact that no concrete proposals were before the Committee on this occasion, no action could be taken on the statement made by the representative of the USSR.<sup>3</sup>

Plymouth politely declined all Soviet suggestions as to what steps for the obligations issued. The German note of October 10 had no repercussions at Moscow. On October 11, Ivan Mikheev, Soviet Ambassador, read a note proposing that the Spanish Government have resumed its right to buy arms. "In my view the Soviet Government is compelled to declare it cannot consider itself bound by the agreement for non-intervention in a greater extent than any of the remaining participants in the agreement." The other delegates preferred to be shocked and mystified. Ninty declined to elaborate. Two days later Downing Street issued a note listing alleged violations which might be worthy of investigation: three by the USSR, and one by Italy. Portugal again threatened to quit because of renewed anxiety over the issue of "Western Civilization." Charges and counter-

charges were exchanged. On October 18, the Committee voted almost unanimously (USSR alone in the negative) that the charges against Portugal and Italy had no foundation. Molotov repeated his formula, Gromov accused Moscow of contrary resolution. In the parliament's game of arithmetic, all members on both sides ultimately added up to zero.

By the end of October, while the Committee debated German and Italian charges against the USSR, the army of Moson, Istiara, and rebels which had pushed up the Tago from Caceres and made the loyalist siege of the Alcázar in Toledo, was advancing on Madrid in four columns, supported by a hundred German and Italian planes and forty Italian tanks. On November 3, a general assault on the Spanish capital was launched. A "fifth column" of rebel sympathizers was to strike when Franco should breach the defenses. But the anticipated blow happened. Some thousands of Germans, Italians, Frenchmen, Americans, and others, all united by an ungenial sympathy for freedom and a deplorable aversion to Franco, had reached Spain to defend the Republic and had organized themselves into an International Brigade under General Emil Kieber. Moscow, perceiving belatedly the import of "non-intervention" and fearful lest Franco's victory should discredit the People's Front policy everywhere and render Franco content as ally, had rushed planes, guns, and tanks to Spain. The Republican Cabinet moved to Valencia, but Franco's forces were suddenly within lap and thigh by the "Internationalists" who called the Spanish people's militia and saved Madrid from capture.

Dore and Führer were disappointed but not discouraged. On November 18, in identical communications, they recognized Franco's junta as the *de jure* Government of Spain.<sup>20</sup> China officially received Admiral Antonio Muga, agent from Burgos, whose credentials in turn convinced rebel recognition of the Italian conquest of Ethiopia. Albania, Salvador, Nicaragua, and other States followed the example of the Fascist Powers. In March 1939, General Wilhelm Fiepel presented his credentials as German Ambassador at Salamanca. Signor Roberto Casariego did likewise for Italy. In international law premature recognition of rebels which a hitherto recognized government is striving to suppress is always an act of unlawful intervention and is often regarded as an act of war: e.g. French recognition of the Arabian rebels, 1912, threatened British recognition of the Confederate States of America, 1861-3; American recognition of Panama, 1903; French recognition of Baron Wrangel's "White" regime in the

Gineza, 1910. Berlin and Rome were here considering an open act of hostile intervention against the Republic of Spain. But in the morphology of "non-intervention" this circumstance could be easily ignored.

Edin in *Christmas* on November 26, in a masterpiece of understatement, declared that "it is unhappily true that the agreement has not been as strictly observed by allies could be wished. That fact, however regrettable, does not cause us in any way to modify our decision in favor of the principle of non-intervention." On November 19 he mentioned that the Government would not grant belligerent rights to the insurgents in Spain nor, in the face of rebel shenanigans on Spanish shipping, concede any right of search and seizure. But it would introduce legislation forbidding British vessels to carry arms to Spain. (An act to this effect was passed on December 1.) On December 1, Ribbentrop replaced Bismarck on the Commission. French and even British opinion was increasingly dominated by the mockery. Some gesture was required. London and Paris therefore proposed on December 5 that a ban on volunteers be instituted, that consuls be permitted to check movements of arms and men, and that efforts be made to secure an armistice and prisoner exchange. Moscow agreed. Berlin was amiable. Downing Street and the *Quai d'Orsay* continued to plod (December 19 and 21)—perhaps on the assumption that the neutral success already achieved in creating observance of the ban on arms would be equalled in a ban on men.

On January 2, 1917, while German cruisers in Spanish waters flood upon loyalist merchant ships, Britain and Italy signed an agreement at Rome whereby each recognized that "incidents of entry to, exit from, and transit through the Mediterranean is a vital interest" to the other. Both disclaimed any desire to modify the status quo in the middle sea. Each would respect the other's rights and promote "peace" and "good relations." Accompanying letters between Paris and Rome specified that Italy had not and would not engage in any negotiations with France to alter the status quo in the Balkans or elsewhere in the western Mediterranean. Ciano had "no difficulty" on behalf of the Royal Italian Government in confirming the accuracy of His Majesty's Government's interpretation: namely, that so far as Italy is concerned the integrity of present boundaries of Spain shall in all circumstances remain intact and unmodified."<sup>10</sup>

The Empire thus having been used, Britain and France pressed Rome and Berlin for a reply to their suggestion on volunteers. On

January 7, Berlin expressed "unhappy astonishment" at British inaction, and alarm at "the uncontrolled access of Reichsmarine armaments to Spain." It proposed that all non-Spanish participants in the fight be ejected, "including political agencies and propagandists." Bonn concurred. By way of asserting British leadership, the London Cabinet banned all volunteering in England on January 10. Paris had meanwhile gathered troops and moved its Atlantic fleet toward Africa, whereas reports that 8,000 Germans were about to land in Spanish Morocco. Hitler told François-Poncet on January 11 that this was a mistake: the Reich had no designs on Morocco. The incident was "closed." Paris banned volunteering on January 12.

Two days later Rome and Berlin finally "reopened" the British question in separate moves, after Göring conferred with Mussolini in Casca in Rome. After further delays the London Committee adopted a new plan on February 14, 1937, whereby the Powers agreed upon the extension of "non-intervention" to prohibit volunteering as from midnight February 20-2. They would furnish information on means and enforcement and adopt a scheme of supervision as from midnight March 4-7. All the land and sea frontiers of Spain would be patrolled by agents of an "International Board for Non-Intervention in Spain" consisting of representatives of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and the USSR. "Observation" officers were stationed on land frontiers and on ships. They were authorized to report infractions (None was ever discovered.) After Moscow had graciously withdrawn, the four Western Powers agreed that British and French war ships should patrol the rebel coast, with German and Italian along the loyalist coast. On March 8 this extraordinarily complex schema was unanimously approved. On April 10 it went into effect. Meanwhile the United States co-operated independently by imposing its own arms embargo on Spain, in the name of the "new neutrality," on January 8, 1937. "President Roosevelt," declared France, "behaves in the manner of a true gentleman."<sup>41</sup>

But these parades, however innocuous, were displeasing to the Germans. Had speedy victory attended the Fascist cause, they doubtless would have been endured since they were not an obstacle to intervention but only another element of camouflage. Italian troops poured into Spain. One officer wrote in his diary, "January 7, 1937. Never knew the pleasure of an ideal depart from their Fatherland, on the most wonderful and the most useful adventure. The commander of the Naples Division conveys to us greetings from the Crown Prince. The

soldiers have been given medals with the image of the Christ, the Holy Mother, and the Holy Ghost. Tomorrow, if all goes well, we arrive at Cadix. The anxiety continues—after all, what is a prison ship. But our 'Papa' is protecting us. Warships—ours and foreign." "These troops of Il Duce, after missing in the capture of Malaga, were scheduled to do what Franco's Menes had failed to do: take Madrid by flank attack from the southeast via Bolnaga and Guadalajara. Mussolini on his way to Africa on a cruise passed a message to General Mola for distribution to the Italian 'volunteers'."

Above the Pole on my way to Libya I have received your dispatches in connection with the present battle which is proceeding in the direction of Guadalajara. I am following the incidents of the battle with unshakable confidence because I am sure the superior and daring of our legionnaires will break the enemy's resistance. To crush the international forces will be a great success, including the political aspect. Tell our legionnaires I am following their action hourly, and their efforts will be crowned with victory."

But victory eluded the soldiers. By a strange fate the propaganda with which loyalist planes showered the falling columns was written by Pierre Narra, who in 1911 was Mussolini's Socialist comrade and shared a cell with him when both had been jailed for sabotage.<sup>22</sup> Some of the "volunteers" deserted to the anti-Franco cause. As for the others, most loyalist planes showered them with bombs and bullets. On March 13, 1937, their demoralized column was turned into a costly rout, comparable in size to the one at Caporetto. For the third time Madrid was saved.

Grandi told the London Committee on March 21 that Italy would not even discuss the withdrawal of volunteers. They must remain until the war was over. He repudiated assurances from Marfey and Debona that Rome was not observing its obligations. On March 29, Dewasing Stuart and the Quai d'Orsay announced that no violations of "non-intervention" had yet been established, but that if any occurred, the greatest view must be taken of their consequences. Then, Csero: "The Italian troops which are not in Spain will stay there." Thus, the democracies: "There is no German or Italian intervention in Spain, but if there is we deplore it!"<sup>23</sup> On April 25, however, Grandi contemplated no "decisive" withdrawal of the troops not there. The "pursuit" began on April 28. There were casualties, not confined to



Spaniards. On May 11, a mysterious attack on the British *destroyer Hunter* off Almeria killed eight and wounded twenty-five. On May 12, *loyalist planes* bombed the Italian cruiser *Berliet* at Palma, killing six officers. On May 16, the German pocket-battleship *Deutschland* at Vigo was struck by *loyalist bombs*: twenty-three dead, eighty-three wounded.

This "Red outrage" was more than Hitler could endure. "Bolshes. acts" in process of liquidation are not permitted to cycle back. Nazi "force" demanded escalation. On May 31 it drove five German war vessels loaded three hundred shells into Almeria: thirty-five buildings destroyed, one hundred damaged, twenty dead—children, women, and men alike, scores wounded. Rome and Berlin simultaneously announced their withdrawal from the naval patrol and from the discussions in London. Eden expressed hope that the Reich would "take no action which would render the present grave situation graver still." Hall appealed to Berlin and Valencia for peace. Protracted negotiations followed, at London sought to induce Rome and Berlin to resume their "co-operation" in "non-intervention." On June 18, Italy and Germany returned to the sea patrol. London and Paris in a four-Power agreement consented to "consultations" on reprisals in case of future attacks on patrol vessels. This accord, however, was short-lived.

Meanwhile the "liberals" of Spain continued. The Franco forces moved to crush the Catholic Basques on the north coast who were loyal to Madrid but cut off from other Government territory by rebel forces. On April 26, the Basque "holy city" of Guernica was visited by German bombers, who first used small bombs to drive the inhabitants to cover, then demolition bombs to destroy their houses over their heads, then machine-guns to slaughter the fleeing refugees, finally incendiary bombs to burn the ruins. "A thousand died. The city was a smoking hell. Burgos explained that no rebel planes were in the air that day—the city had been burned by the 'Reds.'" On June 3, a rebel plane crashed on a hill near Vittoria. To this hill the bodies of those slain in the Franco war in Burgos had previously been brought. "A general in the plane was killed. His name was Mola. The vapours of the atmosphere and of internal-convulsions engulfed this advanced poetic junction. But on June 19 the Italian covered Bilbao.

On the same day Berlin announced that on the preceding Tuesday (June 17) and again on Friday the cruiser *Leipzig* had been smashed off Ocea by Spanish-Bolshevik submarines. "Torpedoes had struck

but had denied the truth. The *Fahar* flew from Godesburg to Berlin, while the *Naui* press screamed for vengeance. Ribbentrop in London demanded immediate "consolation" on consular measures. Naurath circled a note to Berlin. On June 21, consultation broke down because of British and French refusal to join in the naval demonstration against Valencia.<sup>10</sup> On June 23, Germany and Italy abandoned the naval patrol once more, this time permanently. Plans were expressed that they might now attack or blockade loyalist ports. "The situation," said Chamberlain to Clemens on June 25, "is serious but not hopeless . . . Let us try to keep cool heads."

When the London Committee met for the fifty-fifth time on June 29, 1937, Germany and Italy expressed opposition to any Anglo-French patrol of Spanish waters without French participation. Some feared that it might secure to the patrol if belligerent rights were granted to France. Downing Street was favorable. The Quai d'Orsay was unfavorable. Deadlock. Ribbentrop proposed the grant of belligerent rights, the end of the naval patrol, and the retention of land patrols and "observers." Grand agreed. The Committee did not. Portugal abstained "control" on its borders on July 3. Negotiations to Paris to plead for help. Delors determined to "open" the French frontier. Paris phoned London. London phoned Paris. Downing Street was willing to grant belligerent rights on condition of the withdrawal of "volunteers." George Lansbury interviewed Mancini in Rome and reported his conclusions: "If we can get the responsible government heads to sit around a conference table, many problems appearing insoluble may be solved." On July 20 the Quai d'Orsay announced that it would inform the Committee that it would suspend the right of search by consular officers on the Pyrenees unless Portugal resumed control. Rome and Berlin requested indignation. Portugal did nothing. Paris abandoned control on July 23.

In this crisis Downing Street came forward with a plan which was to keep the Committee busy in hazy debate for the next twelve months. The British proposals of July 14, 1937 contemplated the dominance of the naval patrol, the immediate cessation of land patrols, and the establishment of international officials in Spanish ports to ascertain whether ships were carrying observers. Both contestants should be granted belligerent rights, but their conduct was now to be limited to the list of justified goods adopted by the London Committee. They must grant free passage to ships carrying observers and flying the "non-intervention" flag, so long as such vessels were not

engaged in unusual service or blockade running, they must not interfere with shipping between neutral ports. The Committee should consider the possibility of constituting observers in Spanish airdromes to control illicit importation of aircraft. It should pass "a unanimous resolution in favor of the withdrawal from Spain of all persons" whose avocations might be recommended by a technical subcommittee. Belligerent rights should be accorded when "the Non-Intervention Committee place on record their opinion that the arrangements for the withdrawal of foreign nationals are working satisfactorily and that the withdrawal in fact has made substantial progress."<sup>12</sup>

Rome and Berlin now insisted that belligerent rights should precede the withdrawal of volunteers, while Paris and Moscow insisted upon the reverse order. London proposed two subcommittees to debate simultaneously. While the fog of debate grew thicker, the Casars became impatient. They denied belligerent rights for France in order that the rebel navy, aided by German and Italian units, might impose an effective blockade on loyalist ports without provoking Anglo-French protest. When that prospect became increasingly remote, Rome resorted to an alternative plan. During August "unknown" submarines all over the Mediterranean began torpedoing vessels bound for loyalist ports. Within four weeks twenty-five ships were attacked. Moscow accused Italy of responsibility. On September 6, Britain and France invited non-Powers to a special conference at Nyon "to deal with the immediate situation created by attacks recently illegally carried out against shipping in the Mediterranean by submarines and airplanes without disclosure of their identity."

What followed was a departure from the script of the play. On September 9, Rome and Berlin declined the invitation and suggested that the London Committee should deal with the problem. For the democratic victims of Franco's "pursue" to revive the pirates in order with them on means of suppressing piracy was not strange. For the pirates to reject the invitation was also not strange. But, the Casars having declined, London and Paris should have apologized in reconciliation with caution and suggested a "formula" and a subcommittee whereby piracy and non-piracy could be reconciled. Instead, they terminated the conference regardless on September 10, and pushed through a nine-Power agreement, signed at Nyon September 14, by representatives of Britain, France, USSR, Turkey, Egypt, Greece, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. It provided for joint naval action to attack and destroy submarines operating against shipping in a man-

are contrary to the rules adopted at London in 1930 and 1935. British and French fleets would operate on the high seas throughout the Mediterranean and in territorial waters as well in the western portion of the sea, while the other Powers in the east would patrol their own territorial waters. The signatories agreed to restrict the movements of their own submarines to facilitate destruction of "pirate" U-boats. A supplementary agreement of September 17 extended these arrangements to "pirate" aircraft and surface vessels.<sup>10</sup>

Duce and Falangé failed at this delicate Submarine shiftings caused in by *maigre*. Many surprised observers hailed Nyon as decisive: the democracies had demonstrated firmness of will, the danger-ships had yielded, the next step would be to demand positive non-intervention and insist on the withdrawal of Franco "volunteers." Paris and London proposed a three-Power conference with Marshall on September 14, to discuss withdrawal. Simultaneous developments at Geneva seemed to justify these assumptions, despite certain incongruities in the string. The English Assembly convened on September 13, 1935, with Jean Niyon in the chair. Agn. Khan, Indian gentleman, Muslim "god," machine engineers, and placemen beyond compare, was elected President. He supplied a 2,000 bottles of champagne at the official opening of the new Assembly Hall on September 15. The Secretariat had moved into the 102,000,000 Palace in 1934 and the Council in September 1936. The Council Chamber was adorned with murals painted by Sert and presented by the Spanish Republic, depicting the liberation of mankind from tyranny, imperialism, and injustice. Sert was now a Franco sympathizer. For the first time in the League's history Spain failed to re-decline to the Council on September 20. The Chinese delegates took an early leave from the Assembly facilities. The Spanish delegates did not appear. But the champagne was excellent. The League, like the Church, grew in physical magnificence while in spirit died. In new repulchre was a poorly hidden.<sup>11</sup>

And yet life stirred in the tomb-for the last time. China invoked the Covenant against Japanese aggression. The Far Eastern Advisory Committee of 1919 was re-convened with the United States participating. Japan was censured for aggression and for racial Englishness. A conference of the signatories of the Nine-Power Pact of 1922 was proposed. On October 2 the Assembly passed a resolution holding that "there are veritable foreign army camps on Spanish soil." "Immediate and complete withdrawal" was urged. "If such a result can-

not be obtained in the near future the members of the League and its action parties in the non-intervention agreement will consider ending it as intervention policy."<sup>10</sup> On October 2, President Roosevelt's Chicago denunciation of aggression and demand for their "quarantine" (October 6, the State Department condemned Japanese treaty-breaking).

All these developments, however, were quite deceptive. The main only that Anthony Eden was waging his last losing fight against his colleagues and superiors. Nyon was the last Geneva gesture of Anglo-French resistance to the program of the Rome-Berlin axis's Iberia. Objection was taken not to purpose but only to method. The Cause was to remain free to pursue their crusade in Spain. But they must be gentlemen enough to conform to the rules of etiquette—a land where non-Spaniards were their victims. No sooner was the Nyon "victory" won than Downing Street declared it change of heart of which Mussolini and Hitler were quick to take advantage.

On October 2, an Anglo-French note to Rome asserted that since the London Committee was "practically paralyzed," a three-Power conference to discuss withdrawal of volunteers should be arranged. Recognition of belligerency was held out as bait. If Duce declined on October 9, and demanded German participation and reference of the issue to the London Committee. Dithor cried: "We cannot wait." But on a hint from Britain he subsided. On October 13, London and Paris weakly agreed to submit the problem to the London Committee. Said Chamberlain: "It is not in the temperament of our people to bear defeat." The Committee met October 16 and proposed token withdrawals of volunteers as a step toward acceptance of the British plan of July 14. Rome asserted that only 40,000 Italians were in Spain. (Imperial estimates ranged from 40,000 to 50,000.) On October 19, Rome, Berlin, and London issued once more that belligerent rights must be granted before any withdrawal could begin. With the deadlock thus reinforced, the Committee returned to the stalemate point in a new form. Plymouth was authorized to approach Valencia and Burgos to obtain their consent for ceasing volunteers. Since this would require at least another year, Duce and Hitler viewed this outcome with complacency.

The date of the Nine-Power Pact also leaked out in facility. The proposed policy met in Brussels November 3, and adjourned November 14, after Japan had declined to participate or accept "mediation." The resolutions were ambiguous. No State would act to aid China. In

London's words, the Conference said to Japan: "Take your plunder and peace be with you." And to China: "Love your aggressor. Resist not evil."<sup>22</sup>

Unbeknownst Blum's program of "one speech forward and two steps backward" had fallen upon gray days. His "something spell" of the spring was a rusted from the original aspirations of the French "New Deal." The franc was devalued once more in June. Blum's Cabinet fell on June 21, 1935. He was succeeded by anti-Socialist Camille Chautemps of the Radical Socialist group. The new France Vichies, Georges Bonnet, already foreshadowed reaction. The full harvest of Blum's betrayal of Madrid would be gathered only later. In the summer of 1937 the ultimate end might still have been averted by a reversal of policy. As the aftermath of Nyon revealed, the Rome-Berlin axis was not yet prepared to risk armed defiance of London and Paris over the Spanish issue or any other. Six months later it would be too late. But no one in Paris would act without London's approval. And London's Tory leaders were already preparing to pay new tribute to the Czar.

Fascist's crusade therefore marched forward to new triumphs, with Lord Plymouth and his Communists following various claims of due which all the world had eyes to see: an imminent flow to rebel Spain of German technicians, engineers, armors, and artillerymen, of Italian troops by the thousands, of planes, guns, tanks, and munitions from both Italy and the Reich. Hitler made a gift to France of the broadcasting station and its staff which had been employed in Berlin during the Olympic games. Throughout rebel territory portraits of Caudillo, Franco, and Hitler everywhere appeared together. On August 21, Santander was taken by the invaders. The Italian Fascist press hailed its fall as a national victory. Marshal responded to Franco's telegrams:

I am particularly proud that Italian legionaries have during ten days of hard fighting contributed mightily to the splendid victory of Santander, and that their contribution receives assured recognition in your telegram. This brotherhood in arms, already close, guarantees the final victory which will liberate Spain and the Mediterranean from any menace to our common civilization.<sup>23</sup>

Gijón in the Asturias, last loyalist outpost on the north coast, fell on October 21. A loyalist offensive at Balakia in Aragon was halted.

The republican capital was moved to Barcelona on October 12. The beginning of the second winter of the war found Franco's final victory still far off, but his forces now held all the Spanish colonies and all of Western and Northern Spain. Madrid, like Shanghai, was a bloody ruin under constant bombardment. But a loyalist army, forged out of raw recruits in the furnace of battle, had emerged. It fought doggedly, bravely, and not without confidence. Its members knew that they could ultimately defeat Franco. They scarcely knew that Paris and London, in the end as at the beginning, would compel them, alone and abandoned, to fight Hitler and Mussolini and Salazar at all. For this lack courage and hope were not enough.

## MARCH DOWN THE DANUBE

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### 1. VIENNA'S LAST CHANCELLOR

THE GERMANS at Rome and Berlin had a common interest in the Fascist conquest of Spain. While they might differ as to method, they were agreed as to purpose. There was no question of intervention and none of imposing Fascism or Nationalism upon Spain. There was only a question of securing strategic bases and diplomatic collaboration from a friendly regime. That regime, despite its reliance upon Mussolini and Hitler for arms, represented an indigenous Fascism, blended of ancient nationalism and modern totalitarianism with a necessary admixture of the time-worn symbols through which men of large bank accounts, men of blue blood, and men in black robes have traditionally elicited obedience.

In Austria, on the contrary, the issue for Berlin was intervention. The issue for Rome was the maintenance of a buffer between Italy and the Reich. Rome would learn that the price of the German alliance was the surrender of Austria. Vienna would learn that those who rely upon gangsters for aid against gangsters must become either the slaves of their defenders or the victims of their enemies. But these issues had not yet been learned when Dollfus died and Schuschnigg succeeded to power.

The Nazi push of July 1934 failed because Hitler repudiated the pactless. He was not yet prepared to risk war and he had not yet succeeded in setting the stage for Anschluss without war. When Il Duce learned of the Vienna tragedy he ordered four army divisions to proceed to the Austrian frontier and announced that Hitler had betrayed his trust. In a telegram to Schuschnigg, who was in Italy, he asserted that the principle of Austrian independence must never be



defended "will more strenuously" and that those responsible for the death of Dollfus had incurred "the most condemnation of the civilized world."<sup>1</sup> He then sprang into his car and drove through the evening in Rome, some two hundred miles from Rome, to join his wife in comforting Frau Dollfus. He stalled and stumped in the villa garden until after midnight and resolved never to yield Austria to Berlin. The next morning he returned to his capital after escorting the Chancellor's widow to the airplane where he had ordered a plane to take her back to Vienna.<sup>2</sup>

Austrian appeals far and from the Powers thus evoked a tangible thrust from Rome which was sufficient to halt Dr. Fildert. Paris and London offered condolences and declarations. The only note note in the column of support came from Belgrade, where it was daringly feared that any Italian military occupation of Austria, even to thwart a German invasion, would oblige the Yugoslavs to march.<sup>3</sup> Since Hitler refrained from marching, Munich took no further action. When the failure of the putch and the news of Italian troop movements became known in the Reich, Hitler and his aides at once adopted a "cooler" attitude, despite unceasing rejoicings in the Nazi press over the murder on the Ballhausplatz. Hindenburg and Hitler sent condolences to Vienna. Hlaboda, who had indiscreetly asserted that the potichins were "returning" to Germany, was dismissed from his post. Dr. Rath was recalled from Vienna on the ground that he had not attended Wilhelmstrasse before requesting for a safe conduct for the rebels.

The crisis presented a welcome opportunity to dispose of Franz von Papen without shooting him. On July 26, Hitler addressed a letter to the arrachable Vice-Chancellor, noting Dr. Riedl's misconduct, declaring that the attack on Dollfus "is most sharply condemned and deplored by the German Government," and asserting that he desired "to bring back to normal and friendly paths our long unfortunate relation to the German Austrian State." He therefore requested Papen, who still had his "full and unqualified confidence," to assume temporarily the post of Minister to Vienna on special mission.<sup>4</sup> He informed Vienna of the decision on the 27th after he had announced the appointment. After considerable hesitancy, Austria accepted Papen on August 7 not as special envoy but as a regular Minister. It was understood at Vienna that Berlin would defend the Austrian Legion, disband the Austrian Nazi organizations in Munich, and discontinue press and radio attacks on the Austrian Government. On

August 7 the Austrian NSDAP executive in Munich announced that orders had been issued for the dissolution of the League. Papen arrived in Vienna on the 15th, presented his credentials, and left at once on a holiday. He did not return to his new post until October 1. Michael Hinko had assumed the functions of President von Hindenburg, who died on August 2, and secured the approval of the electors in a referendum on August 29. But the invalid ballots and the "no" votes constituted 21% of the total.<sup>1</sup> This was almost a defeat. New elections must be found to avert the crisis. But for the present they could not be found in Austria.

Schuschnigg took up the struggle for Austria's defense on the internal and diplomatic fronts. When Starheimberg returned on July 26, he persuaded Mikles to make him Chancellor. But on July 30, 1934, a new Cabinet was announced: Schuschnigg, Chancellor; Starheimberg, Vice-Chancellor; Minister of Security, and leader of the VF (Fatherland Front); Fey, Minister of the Interior and Special Commissioner for security; Baron Egon Berger-Waldenegg, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Buresch, Minister of Finance. An amnesty followed in December. At home the witchwood was to be eradicated. In search of new guarantees abroad, Schuschnigg visited Mussolini in Florence in August and found him great, charming, and ungrateful.<sup>2</sup> In September at Geneva the British Government, in accordance with a habit already well established, objected to proposals for any Anglo-French-Italian pact of guarantee to uphold the independence of Austria. Rome's suggestion that Italy be granted a mandate to act for the three Powers was repulsive to the Little Entente, which also opposed any scheme for a guarantee of Austria by her immediate neighbors. A final suggestion of a guarantee by all European States in the League was deferred. Here to begin Hitler could rely upon racial prejudices among his foes. In speeches to the League Assembly on September 12 and 14 Schuschnigg and Berger-Waldenegg both stressed the importance to the Powers of maintaining Austria's freedom and stability. The result, however, was merely a feeble reiteration of the vague obligations already incurred. On September 27, 1934, a pronouncement was issued:

After having proceeded to a fresh examination of the Austrian situation, the representatives of France, the United Kingdom, and Italy have agreed in the name of their governments to recognize that the declaration of the 15th of February regarding the necessity of maintaining the independence and integrity of Austria in accordance with the Treaty of Saint Germain is still valid and will continue to impose their common policy.

Despite German resentment at the publication of the official report on the July crisis, which was issued on the very day on which Papen returned to Vienna, Schuschnigg opened negotiations for the dissolution of the Nazis into the VF. He denied the fact later and made no mention of it in his memoirs.<sup>2</sup> His visit to Paris and London in February 1935 he found "highly gratifying."<sup>3</sup> But Downing Street still declined all commitments and the Quai d'Orsay feared to offend Italy or the Little Entente. Overtures regarding a possible Habsburg restoration received no encouragement. Despite these disappointments Schuschnigg steered a cautious middle course until his dramatic difficulties and achieved appreciable success.

The Heimwehr leaders were uncomfortable allies. Stuebenberg and Fey were despicable schemers, not even above trying to take political advantage of Schuschnigg's grief over the death of his wife in a motor accident on July 13, 1935. In October Schuschnigg made a bargain with Stuebenberg through which he was enabled to oust Fey from the Government and from the leadership of the Vienna Heimwehr. By the following spring Schuschnigg felt strong enough to initiate the liquidation of the Heimwehr organization. Stuebenberg warned on April 27 that the Heimwehr "will never be dissolved except over my dead body!" In an effort to discredit Schuschnigg, he made public the scandal of the bankrupt Phoenix-Wien Life Insurance Company whose late director had spent money recklessly in order to forestall an official investigation of his affairs. Schuschnigg's own Österreichische Lebensversicherung had received 2,000 schillings. The Chancellor, however, was equal to the occasion. He exposed the complete false-budget of the company, which showed that the Heimwehr had received 97,000 schillings.<sup>4</sup>

Stuebenberg replied by organizing demonstrations and by making a new bid to Mussolini for support. On May 10, 1936, he wired Il Duce, congratulating him "in the name of those who fight for Fascism in Austria and in my own name on the firmest and magnificent victory of the Fascist armies over barbarism, on the victory of the Fascist spirit over democratic dishonesty and hypocrisy, and on the victory of Fascist sacrifice and disciplined courage over demagogic falsehood. Long live the resolute leader of victorious Fascist Italy! Long live the victory of the Fascist idea in the whole world!"<sup>5</sup> Several foreign governments protested. Schuschnigg was alarmed. But Mussolini was unmoved. On May 13-14, 1936, Schuschnigg deprived Stuebenberg of all of his offices except that of patron of the VF

Liebig's Aid. Stauffenberg went to Rome in high dudgeon and declared that the fight was just beginning. But Schuschnigg abruptly appointed as Vice-Chancellor one of Stauffenberg's rivals in the Heimwehr, Kurt von Baurachle, who had earlier profited from Fey's dismissal by securing the post of Minister of Interior. Stauffenberg's last hopes were dashed when Mussolini, after granting him a two-hour interview, wished Schuschnigg his greetings and support on May 16.<sup>12</sup> The Chancellor visited the Duce at Rocca delle Condotti on June 2 and confirmed his victory.

In the interim Stauffenberg and Fey quarreled violently over control of the Heimwehr. On October 20, 1938, Schuschnigg decreed the dissolution of all the private armies, the Heimwehr included. Stauffenberg and Fey had no option but to acquiesce. The one went into business, the other resumed his too long interrupted avocations of sport and social gaiety. Schuschnigg might well congratulate himself on thus easily disposing of his strongest colleagues and of the army and ill-disciplined Fascist militia which they had led. He also felt relieved over the agreement with Germany of July 12, though in this case what he took for a new lease of life for his country proved in fact to be the first paragraph of a sentence of death. This, however, Schuschnigg could not foresee.

The clerical Chancellor viewed the future with optimism at the close of the year. He had apparently consolidated on a stable basis the "Christian Cooperative State" which Dollfus had built.<sup>13</sup> He had freed himself from the burden of an incoherent private militiaism. He had seemingly purchased protection from the results of the other Austrians in Berlin. He was hopeful for the new regime—authoritarian but not totalitarian,<sup>14</sup> German but still Austrian, democratic but not despotic. Schuschnigg's Austria was ruled, as Viktor Adler had once said of the Habsburg monarchy, by "Absolutismus gewillert durch Föderalismus"—absolutism tempered by an easy and tolerant eclecticism not lacking in charm.

"Personally I have found it hard enough. But the lot of the individual counts for little when what we are all concerned with is the whole."<sup>15</sup> Schuschnigg was lonely and in love with Countess Vera Fugger von Babenhausen, a blonde and beautiful young woman of unusual grace, married with four children by a previous marriage. But it was ecologically impossible and politically undesirable for him to wed a divorcee. Such an Austrian "affaire Shepstone" would give the Nazis a golden opportunity for mischief-making. Dollfus

Edward VIII, Schuschnigg renounced love for the sake of his political duties. He reorganized the Fatherland Front, reintroduced universal military service (October 10, 1935) with the consent of the Powers, secured amnesty for many political prisoners, and carried on the Dollfus tradition. "It is the love of Austria that always binds us closely."<sup>11</sup>

If in retrospect these hopes are seen to have been at all direct vain, and the confidence to have been without foundation, Schuschnigg's errors were no different in kind from those of the man captured with the defeat of European culture at Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay. Austria's tragedy was the microcosm of Europe's tragedy. Here, as in the Western whole, the Church of Rome sought to protect itself from enemies who were harmless by allying itself with friends who were wicked or helpless. It thereby opened the door to its demagogue, whom it hailed in the end as its "protector." Here too those of wealth and rule put the superstitions, prejudices, and forced interests of their class above their loyalty to the nation and to the democratic creed. Here too those with power to act shunned commitments, evaded responsibilities, and met exultation with compromise, perjury with trust, treachery with conciliation. Bound when they should have been guards, weak when they should have been strong, suspicious when they should have had faith, confused when they should have sworn boldly never to yield, the defenders of Austria were at last self-betrayed. Their defeat was at once Austria's death and the signal of Europe's doom.

On March 23, 1938, three additional protocols for diplomatic consultation and economic collaboration were signed at Rome by Mussolini, Schuschnigg, and Gieseler. Hungary revised Austro-Greek plans for a Danubian pact. Mussolini pressed Schuschnigg to consider an Austro-German rapprochement. The Chancellor was fearful, but had no choice. By early June, terms were agreed upon and approved by B. Dozi. On July 11, 1938, an Austro-German accord was announced. Its architects were von Papen and Guido Schmidt. Its text, if there was a text beyond the announcement, was not made public. But a communiqué was issued from Berlin and Vienna:

(1) Following on the declaration made by the Führer and Chancellor on the eve of May 1937, the Government of the German Reich recognizes the full sovereignty of the Austrian Federal State.

(2) Each of the two Governments considers the internal political situation of the other country, including the question of Austrian National Socialism, as

part of the annual effort of that country, over which they will exercise no influence, whether directly or indirectly.

(1) The policy of the Austrian Federal Government, both in general and regarding the German Reich in particular, shall always be based on principles which correspond to the fact that Austria has acknowledged herself to be a German State. That will not affect the Rome Protocols of 1934 and the supplementary agreement of 1936, or the position of Austria in relation to Italy and Hungary as her partners in these Protocols.<sup>17</sup>

Hitler, Mussolini, and Goebbels all exchanged telegrams of felicitation with Schuschnigg. Austria was pledged to act as a "German" State, but Hitler was pledged to respect Austrian independence and to refrain from supporting the Austrian Nazis. The compromise seemed good to Vienna and Rome. Berlin gave it a different meaning. Schuschnigg announced another amnesty, but sought to limit the scope of the concessions made. Dr. Guido Schmidt was appointed Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Dr. Edmund Glöckl-Horowitz was named Minister Without Portfolio. For Berlin, these Nazi sympathizers were spies and saboteurs cleverly introduced into the enemy camp. For Vienna they were symbols of reconciliation.

The risks and prospect were well called off. Trade negotiations were resumed. Schuschnigg began a series of visits to Berlin in November. Papan was promoted to ambassadorial rank. Neuschütz visited Vienna in February 1937. Nazis roamed in policy groups and were repressed by the police. Schuschnigg sought new support from Mussolini in Venice, but failed to obtain any guarantees. London and Paris remained silent. The "crisis" continued throughout 1937, but Nazi activities within Austria grew more intense in the summer and by January Austrian Nazis were openly boasting that Hitler desired a renunciation of the struggle: "Der Führer expects Neuschützism in Austria to attain at its own volition the unattainable goal he has set before it—liberation and Anschluss."<sup>18</sup> Schuschnigg's faith in the Czar at Rome and his new confidence in the Czar at Berlin were thus misplaced.

Austrian hopes for victory in any renewed contest with the Reich rested no longer on *il Duce* but on the chance that Paris and London would accept preventing German attack upon Vienna. It was beyond dispute that Hitler would never defy a firm Anglo-French veto on annexation if it were supported by the armed forces of Prague, Paris, and London. Such a veto was still within the realm of the possible in 1938, despite Anglo-French reluctance to assume definite commitments. By the close of 1937 the possibility had disappeared, thanks to

the complete triumph in London of those who preferred to yield Austria to Germany, as China had been yielded to Japan, Ethiopia to Italy, and Spain to both the Czar. The grave of Austria was dug in Downing Street.

## 2. EDEN TO HALIFAX

Money, and not morality, is the principle of commerce and commercial nations. But, in addition to this, the nature of the English Government forbids, of itself, reliance on her engagements; and it is well known she has been the least faithful to her alliances of any nation of Europe, since the period of her history wherein she has been distinguished for her commerce and corruption. . . . It may be asked, what, in the nature of her Government, warns England for the observation of moral duties? In the first place, her King is a cypher, his only function being to meet the allegory which is to govern her. . . . The real power and property in the government is in the great aristocratical families of the nation. The men of office being too small for all of them to swallow into it once, the control is external, which shall crowd one after another. For this purpose, they are divided into two parties, the *les* and the *plus*, so equal in weight that a small matter turns the balance. . . . As to engagements, however positive, entered into by the predecessors of the *les*, why, they were their enemies; they did every thing which was wrong, and to reverse everything which they did mean, therefore, to right. This is the true character of the English Government in practice, however different in theory; and it presents the singular phenomenon of a nation, the individuals of which are so faithful to their private engagements and duties, so honorable, so worthy, as those of any nation on earth, and whose government is yet the most unprincipled at this day known.<sup>12</sup>

This harsh judgment of British policy, written by Thomas Jefferson to Governor Langdon, March 5, 1800, was not different from the judgments passed by many Chinese, Ethiopians, and Spaniards during the half decade 1921-6. After February 26, 1938, such views came to be shared by many Austrians and Czechoslovaks—and, in pale and distasteful reflection, by a considerable number of Frenchmen, Americans, and even Englishmen.

Hypocrisy is sometimes defined as the tribute which sin pays to morality. The ancient ruling classes of Britain, like the new class of the constitution States, were in their own eyes honest and dispassionate at all times, for their eyes saw only the standards of their own making and were closed to all other criteria of judgment. The disciples of the new ideology strained severity of soul and purity of heart by fanatical acceptance of a novel and insolent *Weltanschauung*. The ladies and gentlemen of Britain long ago achieved comparable peace of mind by virtue of their inheritance of the folkways and mores of many generations of gentlemen and ladies born and bred to rule. These traditional standards of "good form"—widely cultivated at Eton and Harrow, Oxford and Cambridge, in Parliament and club-room, counting-house and church—were deeply rooted in the inmost being of all families of wealth and title and universally accepted by respectful multitudes. Any infraction of the code was unthinkably equivalent to the dissolution of personality, the collapse of society, the disintegration of the Empire, and the end of the world. True Christian gentlemen never admitted dissolution. The moralizations of British society were beyond question and had never been seriously questioned since the Great Rebellion. The Empire, acquired in periods of absence of mind, was a legacy forever secure by virtue of its (near) inscissible world navy and its (near) dominant world industrialism.

Only complete catastrophe could have shaken the self-confidence and complacency produced by the combination of immutable stereotypes. Any sudden change in the stereotypes would in itself have been equivalent to catastrophe. Any change of objective circumstances short of catastrophe produced no change in the subjective attitudes of self-evaluation or in the accepted picture of the outer world. Adaptation to an drastic environment might require compromise with those whose power appeared dangerous. Compromise was the traditional success-principle of those who otherwise had no principles but merely prejudices and interests. Compromise, moreover, might require encouragement to others to indulge in self-sacrifice when others were too bright and too generous for themselves than manifest duty. Adaptation to the somewhat slighted wishes and dreams of the masses might require that the highest good be occasionally disguised in garments recognizable by, and acceptable to, the lower orders who lived in outer darkness or in a world of indifference. Both of these recurring problems could always be solved by some move behind the scenes, coupled with daunting postures of moral earnestness, will-



unfashioned honesty, and vigourously modified stupidity. These details, also so sincere to be all but unconscious, were at no time indicative of insincerity or hypocrisy. They constituted proof not of inherent honesty, but of a rich heritage of social sensitivity and acumen in the arts of governance.<sup>20</sup>

In 1901-2, the rulers of Britain experienced several shifts of personnel in high places. George V died on January 30, 1901. Edward VII succeeded. Edward, preferring personal happiness to the empty pomp of royalty and being forbidden by Mr. Baldwin to have both, abdicated on December 30, 1901. George VI succeeded and was magnificently crowned the following spring. Meanwhile *figures* changed in the seats of power as well as in the seats of glory. Mr. Baldwin, busy with years of threescore and ten, retired to his countrywide and his pigs on May 28, 1907. Neville Chamberlain, two years his junior, succeeded. Ramsey MacDonald was called to his reward on November 9. At the Foreign Office young Anthony Eden resigned on February 16, 1908. Lord Balfour succeeded. The change of sovereigns had almost result in terms of policies. At worst, public disenchchantment was threatened. But the postings of monarchy came unsmoothed through the crisis. The change in Prime Ministers also represented no change of policies, for the two elderly gentlemen saw eye to eye. The change in Foreign Ministers involved an apparent change of policy which in reality was a shift of emphasis and method rather than of purposes or basic assumptions.

The new Prime Minister with whom Eden at last found it impossible to co-operate was the child of his name to hold high office. Joseph Chamberlain (1836-1904) was a wealthy Unitarian who made a sufficient fortune in the screw business in Birmingham to retire at the age of thirty-eight. His first wife died two years after their marriage at the birth of a son called Anson (1863-1917). The husband married his first wife's cousin in 1868. She died seven years later after producing him with another son, Neville, born March 16, 1869, and with three daughters. Joseph Chamberlain became Mayor of Birmingham and entered Commons at the age of forty. His third wife was an American, Mary Edmonst, daughter of Cleveland's Secretary of War. He became Colonial Secretary and aimed at the premiership, but never attained it. He opposed Home Rule for Ireland, championed protectionism and imperial preference, and for many years urged an Anglo-German alliance as preferable to any Anglo-French-British combination. He was not, however, an isolationist or a pacifist. "I can say for

said that I have always protested in the strongest terms against the policy of non-intervention or peace at any price, which I have believed to be an unworthy and ignoble doctrine for any great nation to hold. I have always thought that a great nation like an individual had duties and responsibilities to its neighbors, and that it could not wrap itself in a policy of selfish isolation and say that nothing concerned it unless its material interests were directly attacked."<sup>14</sup> He left office in September 1903, to launch a swift "reform" program which the elections repudiated in 1906—and accepted in 1909.

Austen went to Rugby and Cambridge, studied in Paris, and became Foreigner and near-Governor. He entered Commons in 1891 and moved by gradual steps to the Chancellorship of the Exchequer (1911) and leadership in the Conservative Party. As Foreign Minister in Balfour's first Cabinet, his first act was to reject the General Process of 1902, which would have involved definite British commitments in a general system of collective security. In the name of "special arrangements to meet special needs," he sponsored *Lancroix*, which brought him fame and a Knighthood of the Garter. With his monocle and tails he became the perfect model of the modern aristocrat, despite his bohemian ancestry. His dress was always immaculate. He once remarked: "Many years ago my father said to me: 'My boy, in two things in life pay the greatest attention—your frock coat and your manners. Frock coats are liable tocrease; manners, unless trained very carefully, are liable to increase. They both require "smoothing-down" occasionally.'"<sup>15</sup> In 1919 Sir Austen retired from the Cabinet. He viewed the new Germany with alarm and opposed the Hoeser-Laval deal, but welcomed the end of sanctions. He died on March 13, 1933.

Needle, like Austen, was brought up by his nurse, for his mother died in childbirth. Like Austen, he went to Rugby. After studying at Mason College in Birmingham, he went into an accountant's office. He was destined for business. His father sent the two boys to the Bahamas in 1898 to establish an experimental coal plantation. Needle became manager, with two Niggers in his employ. After 25-30 years of effort, the venture failed with a loss of £10,000 to Papa Joseph. This experience, says an admiring biographer, "developed his character" and was "an admirable preparation for Downing Street."<sup>16</sup> He next went into the metalwork and small-arm business in Birmingham. He was active in the Chamber of Commerce and was elected to the City Council in 1904, the same year in which he married Annie Cole. In 1915 he became Lord Mayor of Birmingham, which

office had been held by his father, five uncles, and a cousin. He was named "Director of National Service" in 1916 to promote swiftness by increasing the mobility of labor. The work failed of its purpose. He resigned seven months later. He entered Commons in 1918 and served under Bonar Law and Balfour as Postmaster General, Minister of Health, and Chancellor of the Exchequer. He was interested in widows' pensions, slum clearance, housing, and local government, and did capable work in these fields.

This apparently dull and unimaginative businessman was depicted by hostile cartoonists as a mean and calculating small trader or as a gloomy, grumpy martinet. With his lanky form and his drooping black brows and moustache he resembled the stout "allain" of nineteenth-century melodrama. Lloyd George once said of him "A good seven cluck of Birmingham in a less year." He named pantomimes both of money and of words. In the Tory reformist tradition, he desired to help the poor—provided they kept in their place and respected the privileges of their betters. After the general strike he did what he could to see that striking miners got no benefit from their action, for he was above all loyal to his class. He had no innate interest in foreign affairs. He paid a visit to Kenya in 1909, but was more concerned with fishing, hunting, and ornithology than with people. In the National Government he again became Chancellor of the Exchequer. In the midst of the budget debate of 1933 he wore a letter to *The Times* stating that he had observed a gray wagtail in St. James's Park.<sup>10</sup> In August 1934, in the midst of a grave illness, he spent hours trailing the song of a thrush in the garden of No. 10 Downing Street and discovered that it came from a striking blackbird.<sup>11</sup>

Mr. Chamberlain was not always so adept in making distinctions, though he himself developed considerable skill in the arts of mimicry. His poems were apparently so unconscious and sincere that they were always completely convincing. He was cold, non-social, without sentiment. His morning coat, wing-collar, and black trousers suited him as the cautious bourgeois gentleman. Birds and fish were his only "transcend" touches. His mother had died when he was five. He did not marry until he was forty-two. His nature suggested severe repression, but his inhibitions were so much more powerful than his impulses that he never disclosed his soul to others, and probably never to himself. Insipidity, indeed, was one quality of which no one could ever accuse him. He was a model of sobriety and calm calculation. To many the hidden man within was not a warm and en-

passive merchant or banker, but rather a descendant of the Scroogers, Boardmays, and Gledgrinds of Dickens.

He respected the porridge and admonished the masses to drink. His class was all, for his class was England and the Empire and the world. All his political motivations were conditioned by class loyalties and rationalized in terms of conventional and respectable slogans. Churchill, Hoare, and Sir Douglas Hogg were all under consideration in 1937 to succeed Baldwin. But Hogg was too Lards as Lord Plaidham. Hoare was not sufficiently recovered from disgrace. Churchill was too early or too late. Neville Chamberlain had antagonized several people, for he kept his sympathies and antipathies well concealed. He became Britain's first Prime Minister from Rugby. Since he lacked originality he took his foreign policy from Baldwin, Hoare, and Simon.

Since the pattern of their thinking coincided with the Chamberlain tradition, he carried on in the footsteps of brother Asquith and father Joe: avoidance of "ideological" controversies coupled with championship of prosecutors, Empire perfection, and an Anglo-German accord. It was his pursuit of the latter objective that brought the break with Eden, the fall of France, and the end of the Continental balance of power.

Discerning observers might have perceived slight but unmistakable signs of a shift in diplomatic orientation during the first few months of Chamberlain's incumbency. A conference of the Dominions, called to coincide with the coronation, closed on June 15, 1937. Its resolutions posited peace, non-aggression, international trade, disarmament, and the League, but declared that "differences of political creed should be no obstacle to friendly relations . . . and international appearances."<sup>14</sup> Neurath had been invited to London, but declined to come after the Leipzig episode. Chamberlain told Commons on June 27 that the European situation was "serious but not hopeless" and demanded the "utmost self-control." On July 27 Downing Street announced the signature of Anglo-German and Anglo-Soviet treaties for exchange of building plans and restriction on size and gun caliber of war vessels. Thousands of Spaniards died before Italian guns west of Madrid as General José Mola's troops drove against the rebels in Brunete. When Churchill and Lloyd George questioned the Cabinet on July 19 just before Commons adjourned, regarding German battleships installed around Gibraltar, the Ministers shrugged their shoulders. On July 31 Chamberlain, "wearing a light sporting jacket and a

junior soft fish hat," left for his vacation after writing "a personal letter of friendship to Mussolini" in reply to a "casual message from Rome." If Duce reciprocated, what these letters contained, who *asked* them, what their purpose was, England and the world were left to guess.<sup>12</sup> Perth and Cairo got on well. Lady Astor Chamberlain was prominent and useful in Rome, and wore a Fascist pin. Eden was "diffident."

September of 1937 found the Marquess of Londonderry again visiting Göring in Karin Hall, now enlarged to the dimensions of a palace. He had invited Göring to stay with him for the occasion, but Göring had written, March 14, 1937, that he would not come to England because he and the Reich were constantly being insulted: "I have the feeling that the present Government is so fanatically against Germany that any attempt [at an interview] would be useless at the present time." But he had invited Londonderry to Germany for the autumn hunting. Göring was most cordial but feigned reticence regarding the unwillingness of certain British to be "friends." Germany was therefore obliged to seek friends elsewhere. "The forthcoming visit [to Berlin] of D. Duce, he said, was entirely due to Mr. Eden and Sir Robert Vassall." Britain should grant Germany possession of Austria and of the German areas of Czechoslovakia and, therewith, military preponderance on the Continent, just as Germany granted Britain mastery of the sea. Only then could Bolshevism be vanquished. Papen, with whom Londonderry shot snags at Dess, was of a like mind. The Marquess was sympathetic.<sup>13</sup>

The diplomatic game hung fire on the eve of crucial decisions not yet reached. Tokyo defied the Western Powers. They expatriated at Brussels. The British Ambassador to China, Sir Hugh Knatchbull-Hopeton (whose car was apparently mistaken for that of Chiang Kai-Shek) was machine-gunned and gravely wounded by Japanese planes on August 16. Tokyo expressed "deep regret," but evaded demands for punishment of the guilty and compensation for the future. Eden feebly declared the reply of September 12 "satisfactory" and the incident "closed." The American gunboat *Panay* was sunk on the Yangtze by Japanese soldiers on December 12. British ships were bombed and burned in the Mediterranean and the Far East. On November 16 M. Henri Boncompagni, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French Senate, declared—though Tokyo and the Quai d'Orsay denied it—that France had agreed to halt arms shipments to

China after Japan had threatened to seize Hainan and blockade Indo-China.

Apart from the Nyon secured and verbiage at Geneva, no action was taken to halt the march of the aggressors. Even the greatest shocked contempt. On October 3 Rome revealed that more "volunteers" were leaving Sicily to aid Franco and that the scraps of Italian bombings at Majorca which were engaged in regular table on the coastal cities of Republican Spain were considered by Bruce Mussolini. This proceeding young man desired as much satisfaction from bombing Spanish babies as from burning Ethiopian peasants to death.

On September 24-5, 1937, B. Davis made his long-delayed visit to the Reich. To the music of trumpets and drums, the two Caesars affirmed their solidarity. No new agreements were announced, but there were hints at a Four-Power Pact and "appeasement" in the West at the price of Pacific victory in Spain and a free hand for Hitler in the East.<sup>26</sup> On October 15, Neurath delivered a note to Brandis, where it was received with "satisfaction," pledging German respect for Belgian neutrality providing Brussels agreed never to participate in any military action against the Reich. The United States was in full retreat from the "quarantine" mood of October 1936, in return for gold, silk, and toys, was supplying Japan with cotton, oil, scrap-iron, ore, guns, aircraft, and other commodities necessary for the conquest of China. On November 6, Rome joined the anti-Comintern. On November 8, the Japanese took Shanghai. On November 10, President Vargas established a quasi-Fascist regime in Brazil. On December 1, Tokyo recognized Franco. On December 11, the Japanese took Nanking, and Italy left the League. Meanwhile, on November 15, Downing Street sent Sir Robert Hodgson as agent to Salamanca, thus according *de facto* recognition to the Franco regime. Paris was paralyzed. Delors visited Warsaw, Bucharest, Belgrade, and Prague early in December, but the gesture was hollow. On December 18, King Carol appointed Octavian Goga Premier and gave his blessing to a pro-Nazi regime.

It was in such a setting that the momentous decision was reached in London to send a special embassy to Berlin. Simon, Howe, Halifax, the Marquess of Lifford (Philip Kerr), Sir Kingsley Wood, and, of course, Lord Curzon were enthusiastic. Chamberlain assented. He preferred to ignore the Foreign Office and its agents abroad. Secret conclaves of confidential advisers and the use of personal messengers

were most to his liking, the more so as the program he was developing would, if fully revealed, inevitably meet with censure both from public opinion and from the diplomatic bureaucracy. The opposition of the Halifax mission (1911) must be expected and must have better results. Edward Frederick Lindley Wood, third Viscount Halifax, Lord President of the Council, was selected for the role. The formula was transparent. He was a joint master of the Middleton House. Goring was German Master of the House. Goring invited him to his guest in a hunting expedition. He accepted.

This tall and slender lord, with big hands, cadaverous face, and bushy hat, was more gawky and fustianed in appearance than Chamberlain himself. He was born April 18, 1871, son of Charles Wood and Lady Courtenay. Three brothers born before him all died in infancy. The household was characterized by a deep Anglican religiosity. After Eton and Oxford, Edward married Lady Dorothy Osborn in 1902 and entered Parliament as a member from Ripon in Yorkshire. During the War he was a Major in the Yorkshire Dragoons. In 1910 he became Undersecretary for the Colonies and in 1914 Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries. In the same year he was named by Robert Borden and Governor-General of India and granted the title of Baron Ivis of Killybegs, Co. Down. As Viceroy (1918-21), Lord Ivis presided, without discord, sought consultation, and attempted to improve agriculture and education. He dealt openly with Gandhi and initiated the Round Table Conferences which he hoped, despite Tory ostracism, might lead to dominion status for India. He was patient, popular, and pious, and moved by a strong sense of moral duty—always a dangerous asset in a politician. He was rewarded for his services with a Knighthood of the Garter. In 1925 he returned to the Colonies as President of the Board of Education. He was later War Minister and, in 1933, Lord Privy Seal. He had four sons. His estate was good despite a lame left arm. He accompanied Eden on his travels—no notion the Foreign Minister, and none, from any sense about collective security.

Halifax's mission means Eden's defeat. He is reported to have opposed the suggestion when it was broached to him, October 13, at a party at the Chelsea Manor home of Lord Astor. Eden was at the Brussels Conference when Goring's invitation was accepted. Both he and Vandenberg opposed the visit. He had not been consulted. He returned, postponed, tendered his resignation (November 5), and then withdrew it. Halifax packed his bags. Lord Lansdowne later wrote to

Ribbentrop. "I think I may claim to have been partly responsible for passing the idea into Halifax's head that he should go over to Germany, and establish a definite contact with the Chancellor and others in your capacity."<sup>28</sup> "On the eve of his departure," wrote Londonderry, "I ventured to suggest to him (although I was careful to note that I felt sure that no advice that I could give would be necessary) that we should be as firm as possible. 'I should like to see the German proposals fully passed down to their program,' I said, 'and I think you might be able to get this from them.' . . . At the same time I felt that there was no time to be lost as the situation seemed to me to be rapidly deteriorating, and an understanding between Great Britain and Germany with all its vast possibilities was more than ever vitally necessary."<sup>29</sup> Halifax embarked on November 14, visited Göring's housing show, and spent an hour and a half with Hitler at Berchtesgaden on November 15. He returned and reported on November 16.

Since those who knew were silent, only surmises could be made as to what views were exchanged during these meetings at the Reich. Halifax was amiable and courteous. His purpose was not to argue but to discover Hitler's desires (whether he had read *Mein Kampf* is doubtful) and, whenever possible, to assent. Hitler had been loudly repeating demands for the return of the German colonies.<sup>30</sup> Such colonies had immense value and a potential use as blackmail, since the men of Wilhelm were prepared to surrender anything (so long as it belonged to others) rather than yield up any of the booty of 1918. Göring and Hitler doubtless assured Halifax that Germany must expand. Halifax doubtless assented. But German expansion must not be at Britain's expense. What? Austria . . . Czechoslovakia . . . Denmark, Bulgaria, perhaps the Ukraine? Halifax was amiable. By some accounts a bargain was struck. Hitler agreed not to raise the colonial question in some form for six years. Halifax agreed that Britain would interpose no objection to German expansion in Central Europe. But open violence must be avoided. A Western air port? Perhaps Germany might even consider returning to Germany, France? Paris must be induced to abandon Prague and Moscow. Colonies? The Belgian Congo and Portuguese Angola might be considered in lieu of Tanganyika. *The Times* had pleaded on October 27 for consideration of Germany's colonial claims. On November 19 it pleaded for consideration of Germany's claims in Central Europe. At the same time Mr. J. L. Garvin in *The Observer*, edited by Lord Aneur, urged that German demands be satisfied at the expense of



Austria and Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain said nothing. Halifax said only: "The door is open to friendly relations. Let's hope it stays open!"<sup>10</sup>

If such a bargain was not struck at Berlin and Berchtesgaden in November 1935, at least an "understanding" was arrived at. All subsequent decisions at Berlin and London for the next year rested on mutual confidence that the understanding was in fact a bargain. Chamberlain and Delbos came to London on November 23 to reconsider Anglo-French policy toward the Reich. The conference was strictly secret and the communiqué nevertheless the Minutes had "found fresh evidence of that community of attitude and outlook which so happily characterizes the relations between France and the United Kingdom"; the colonial question would require "much more extended study" and the collaboration of other countries (Belgium and Portugal); "non-intervention" in Spain was "fully justified"; the "gravity" of the Far Eastern situation was "fully recognized." There would be "co-operation," "appeasement," "free and peaceful negotiations." Delbos went on his travels—and reportedly urged Prague to make concessions to Germany. A French-Japanese commercial treaty was signed but Stojadinovich went to Rome and later to Berlin. Delbos returned empty-handed. On January 1, 1936, it was indicated that Paris (and perhaps Prague as well) would suspend all arms exports to Japan and Romania to bring them to reason. Goga scoffed.

Meanwhile Tory Britain and Nazi Germany moved obliquely toward peak anarchy and civil unrest. Braunmuller was pushed. New generals replaced old. At the end of December a shift of posts in the British Foreign Office crystallized observers. Sir Robert Vansittart was moved to a new position: "Chief Diplomatic Adviser" to the Foreign Minister. He was also rewarded the Grand Cross of the Bath. Sir Alexander Cadogan became new Undersecretary. Commentators observed he held the questions of whether this represented promotion or disguised demotion for Vansittart, whether Eden was planned or dismissed, whether Vansittart or Cadogan were here rewarded or punished for scorching the Halifax "line" or the Eden "line"—both of which remained in constant obscurity. But the tide was now turning fast and Des Fiches was not the man to read his chance. He was already moving toward Austria. Critics of his advance, however, were opposed to stalling chances, through either ignorance of the Anglo-German bargain or undervaluation of its worth, possibly in-

squarred by froth of Pöhl and Freges. They must first be dealt with.

At midnight February 4, 1938, after several days of rumored crises, Hitler announced a purge in the ranks of his entourage—this time not by blood but by resignation and new appointments. General Werner von Blomberg, Minister of Defense since January 1935, retired. He was in Capt on his honeymoon. Hitler took his post and designated General Wilhelm Keitel as his adjutant with Colonel rank. General Werner von Fritsch, Commander-in-Chief of the Reichswehr, resigned and was replaced by General Walter von Brauchitsch. General Ludwig Beck remained Chief of Staff. (He was replaced on November 1 by General Franz Halder.) Fifteen generals were retired, twenty-two generals and eight colonels were promoted or shifted. Göring was named a Field Marshal and thus given the highest military rank. Baron von Neurath, Foreign Minister since May 1932, resigned and was replaced by Joachim von Ribbentrop, then Ambassador to London. Neurath was retained in the Cabinet, however, as President of a new Council on Foreign Affairs which included Ribbentrop, Göring, Götlich, Hess, Brauchitsch, Keitel, Admiral Erich Raeder, and Dr. Hans Lammers. Several shifts were ordered in the diplomatic service. Hjalmar Schacht's long-announced resignation was accepted. He was replaced as Minister of Economics by Walter Funk. The Reichstag session which had been postponed from January 30 was scheduled for February 22.

Blomberg, by marrying his secretary, Erica Gröbe, had outraged the Prussian officer caste. But Hitler and Göring attended the wedding. Fritsch retired for "reasons of health." But his health appeared normal. He and other generals were reported on January 26 to have criticized Hitler for dangerous designs on Austria, movements in Spain, alignment with Italy and Japan, non-papalism, and party politics in the army. Fritsch was rumored to be under arrest. (He was released to live in October, but not as his old post.) Göring was denied the expected Ministry of Defense, since this would offend the Junker Rosenberg was denied the Foreign Ministry, since this would be offensive to foreign opinion and to the diplomatic bureaucracy. Ribbentrop, Brauchitsch, and Keitel were Hitler's men, but quite acceptable. Funk was acceptable to the industrialists. He was subordinated to Göring as director of the four year plan.

In short, in both diplomatic and military circles the major critics of a bold policy were replaced either by Party men or by more pliant liaisons against between the NSDAP and the services of which they

was in command. The cautious and (on the whole) West-oriented General Staff had repeatedly had its advice ignored by Der Führer. Hitler's rule of the Reichsmarine was beyond question. Hitler here dismissed also those who opposed the Tripartite and favored a rapprochement with Moscow against the West. Since corresponding elements in the USSR had already been liquidated, the prospects of an open Reich-Soviet conflict were increased. But before the USSR stood the Baltics, and Poland, and Rumania. Before these stood Czechoslovakia, and beside Czechoslovakia stood Austria. All things came to him who waits—provided he knows when to stop waiting and to strike.

Der Führer had of old the wisdom of the serpent in seeing the trend of distant events. In Bucharest Goga had gone sour and been replaced on February 20 by Miron Cozema, Patriarch of the Orthodox Church and legend for a royal dictatorship. The Iron Guard was at last disbanded. This un-buck, however, was more than overbalanced by developments elsewhere. The Spanish rebels retook Teruel on February 21. The French franc fell to 20 to the dollar, possibly under British pressure. Chamberlain resigned January 24. Blum tried to form a "National Ministry" and failed. Chamberlain came back, with no Socialists in the Cabinet, and won a vote of confidence on January 24, 25 to 2. But this unanimity was the product of fear, not of sympathy. Chamberlain repeated stereotyped formulas. Only Flaxman spoke out against him and urged that France follow Britain in abandoning Central Europe and the East to Hitler and making the best bargain possible with Rome and Berlin. His voice was prophetic. Chamberlain asked for special financial powers. The Socialists opposed them. A new Cabinet crisis was brewing.

In Berlin Eden was now being pushed to the wall by the Tory apostles of an alliance with Berlin. The Singapore base was opened February 24. But the Anglo-American-Japanese naval race could be used by Eden's enemies as an argument for "general withdrawal" in Europe—as long as others must pay the price of peace with the dictators. When Hitler broadcast *Schauinsland* into sweeping commitments on February 25, the Cabinet drafted instructions to Sir Neville Henderson to join France in a warning, but the instructions were first cancelled and then changed from a warning to an "expression of interest." American independence and integrity were no longer mentioned. Eden was again beaten. The Tory press, including *The Times*, insisted that Austria should be "written off."<sup>10</sup> On February

Mr Chamberlain and Eden conferred at length with Alexander Grandi. The Cabinet was urgently summoned to meet on Saturday afternoon, ostensibly to discuss an Anglo-Italian settlement. After a three-hour session the Ministers adjourned until Sunday afternoon to consider Hitler's scheduled speech to the Reichstag. Chamberlain urged immediate negotiations with both Italy and Germany. Eden was opposed to them, but was in a small minority.

On Sunday, February 20, 1938, Hitler addressed the Reichstag. Amid old clichés and new threats, he gave the Tories who were hankering after appeasement an unmistakable indication of his aims:

. . . With our country alone have we chosen to enter into relations. That State is Soviet Russia. We see in Bolshevism more now than before the invasion of human destructive forces. We do not blame the Russian people as much for this gruesome ideology of destruction. We know it is a small Jewish intellectual group which led a great nation into this position of madness. . . . Any introduction of Bolshevism into a European country means a changing of conditions. For these territories under Bolshevik leadership are no longer sovereign nations having a national life, but sections of the revolutionary center of Moscow. I know Eden does not share this view. Stalin shares it and admits it openly, and in my opinion Stalin himself is a more trustworthy expert and interpreter of Bolshevik views and intentions than the British Minister. We, therefore, oppose any attempt at spreading Bolshevism, wherever it may take place, with disdain, and wherever it threatens us with hostility. . . .

There are more than ten million Germans in states adjoining Germany which before 1918 were joined with the bulk of the German nation by a national link. Until 1918 they fought in the Great War shoulder to shoulder with the German soldiers of the Reich. Against their own fate will they were prevented by peace treaties from uniting with the Reich.

This was pointed enough, but there must be no doubt about one thing: political separation from the Reich may not lead to deprivation of rights; that is, the general rights of racial self-determination which were solemnly promised to us as a condition for the armistice. We cannot disregard it just because this is a case concerning Germany.

In the long run it is unbecomable for a World Power, conscious

of itself, to know there are racial comrades at its side who are constantly being afflicted with the severest suffering for their sympathy or unity with the whole nation, its destiny, and its philosophy! . . .

But just as England stands up for her interests all over the globe, present-day Germany will know how to guard its more restricted interests. To these interests of the German Reich belong also the protection of those German peoples who are not in a position to secure along our frontiers their political and philosophical freedom by their own efforts.

This claim to "protection" of Danubians abroad was left ambiguous, above a definite commitment to annex Austria or partition Czechoslovakia would render the Tory task more difficult. Dr. Fahren declared that Schoenberg had co-operated in removing "tribunal-standings and obstacles to final reconciliation." He denounced Bolshevism in Germany, asserted that colonial claims would be "refined from year to year with increasing vigor" and could not be abandoned by credits, declared that Germany would never return to the League, would recognize Manchukuo, and would hope for Japanese victory in China. He welcomed collaboration with Rome and Tokyo, and vehemently denounced freedom of the press in Britain.

If ever international agitation or poisoning of opinion should attempt to rupture the peace of the Reich, then steel and iron would take the German people and German homelands under their protection. The world would then see, as quick as lightning, to what extent this Reich, people, party, and those armed forces are fanatically inspired with one spirit, one will. . . .

In a recent speech Eden referred warmly to various forms of freedom in his country. There was one very special freedom which had been forgotten namely, that of allowing journalists to insult other countries, their institutions, their public men, and their governments. All this is too stupid to be taken seriously. But in the long run this will prove to be a serious mark on international relations. I gladly state that a section of the foreign press has not taken part in these infamous attacks against the honor of other nations.

Nevertheless, the damage wrought by such a press campaign was so great that henceforth we will no longer be able to tolerate

is without more objections. This crisis becomes especially evil when it obviously pursues the goal of driving nations into war."<sup>1</sup>

Since this press campaign must be considered as an element of danger to the peace of the people, I have decided to carry through that strengthening of the German army which will give us the assurance that these threats of war against Germany will not one day be translated into bloody facts. These measures have been under way since February 4 and will be carried out rapidly and with determination.

Under these circumstances it cannot be seen what use there is in conferences and meetings as long as governments in power are not in a position to take decisive steps irrespective of public opinion."<sup>2</sup>

For those with eyes to see, the terms of the Tory-Hitler truce were here stated unequivocally. The Reich would defer its colonial demands but not abandon them. The Reich demanded a free hand in Central Europe. The Reich expressly demanded the suppression of freedom of the press in Britain and a British policy which would not be subservient to public opinion. The Reich implicitly demanded Eden's removal, as did Mussolini.

Eden assigned the same night. Vincent Cranborne, his Parliamentary Undersecretary, resigned with him. Walter Elliot and William S. Morrison contemplated doing likewise but thought better of it. Eden's decision was apparently reached before Hitler's speech. His colleagues begged him during the afternoon to reconsider or to allege ill health as the reason. He refused. His letter to the Prime Minister, which he delivered in the evening at No. 10 Downing Street, declared that "the events of the last few days have made plain the difference between us as a decision of great importance in itself and far-reaching in its consequences. I cannot recommend to Parliament a policy with which I am not in agreement." His "difference in outlook" with Chamberlain had reached in an "unhappy partnership." Therefore, "with very deep regret," he was leaving the Cabinet, not without appreciation for past help, counsel, and friendship. Chamberlain replied ("My dear Anthony") that he and his colleagues experienced "the most profound regret." "The decision which you find yourself unable to accept is whether the present moment is appropriate for commencement of Anglo-German conversations. We had hoped you

would not feel this of sufficient importance to compromise a parring which is painful to all of us."

Chamberlain then sought to present the issue solely in terms of Italy, where the Fascist press rejoiced in a new victory. Eden gently corrected him in Commons on Monday, February 21. He noted that Rana had sent troops to Spain within a few days of the signature of the accord of January 8, 1923. No negotiations should be opened until promises were followed by performance, and withdrawal of volunteers was actually begun. It is "never right" to open negotiations because our policy "declares that it is now or never." But "I should not be frank with the house if I were to pretend that it is an isolated case as between my Right Honourable Friend the Prime Minister and myself. It is not. Within the last few weeks, upon one of the most important decisions of foreign policy which did not concern Italy at all, the difference was fundamental." Few doubted that this episode referred to in Germany and the *Dwang nach Osten*. Eden's case was simply put:

Agreements that are worth while are never made on the basis of a threat. . . . Of late the conviction has steadily grown upon me that there has been a too keen desire on our part to make terms with others rather than that others should make terms with us. . . . I do not believe that we can make progress in European affairs, more particularly in the light of events of the past few days, if we allow the impression to gain currency abroad that we yield to constant pressure.

Chamberlain declared: "To enter into conversations with Italy now would be regarded not as a contribution to peace, but as surrender to blackmail." Chamberlain in his long reply denied Eden's implications: "It is not necessary to enter upon a discussion of our relations with Germany, because it is not over there that this difference has arisen." He hinted at a Four-Power Pact: "The question is whether we are to enter upon negotiations or refuse even to contemplate them, and if there be anybody here who really wishes to obtain peace, do they think they can ever obtain peace by continuing a vendetta and even refusing to talk about their differences? . . . The peace of Europe must depend upon the attitude of four major Powers—Germany, Italy, France, and ourselves. . . . The League as constituted today is unable to provide collective security for anybody."

The debate continued on February 22. Lloyd George declared that

Messines had driven Eden out. Churchill asserted: "The day will come when, at some point or other, on some issue or other, we will have to make a stand, and I pray to God that when that day comes we may not find that through an unwise policy we have been left so weak that stand alone." The Labor motion of lack of confidence was lost, 158 to 157.<sup>10</sup> A dozen Conservatives abstained from voting. None voted against Chamberlain. Steps to open Anglo-Italian negotiations followed at once. On February 21 Richard A. Bader was named Chamberlain's successor, while Lord Halifax took over Eden's post. Labor snuffed the burning of a peer as Foreign Minister, but on February 21 Commons upheld the choice, 216 to 99.

The great adventure was launched. Within two weeks it would enter its end of Austria. Within two months it would require the final decision of Ethiopia and Spain. Within eight months it would require the end of Czechoslovakia, the collapse of the French bloc, and Nazi mastery of the Continent. All this was foreseen and desired by the little group into whose hands British foreign policy had now passed. The underlying assumption and moderation of the "Cavalier clique" will be considered in the next chapter.

### 3. AUSTRIA † MARCH 12, 1918

January 30, 1918 was the fifth anniversary of Hitler's appearance as Chancellor. Day after another day he had gazed out upon the misty mountains from the great windows of Hies Wachenfeld, his villa above Berchtesgaden near Salzburg. Beyond lay the Hohe Tauern, Österreich, the country of his birth and of his youth—stretching from the Dolomites to the Danube and from little Bassano-am-Isar, where his father had been *Bauer*, to Budapest on the Magyar frontier. His personal memories fortified the exigencies of Realpolitik, the need for circus and glory, the promptings of Deutschtum, and the *Dreing* with *Otto*. Five years was long enough to wait. In the fifth year must come *Deutschland*.

Hitler at Berchtesgaden had given him the impression that Britain would bless the venture and induce no response from the French Maitrelin who too heavily involved in Spain and too dependent on German support to restrain the veto of 1934. Just before Christmas Neurath dropped a line to Ambassador François-Poncet: "Germany cannot any longer watch idly the sufferings of our co-nationals in



Austria." "What method? Parach, conquest, invasion, some combination? Pragmatically Dr. Fikens must try his weapons and choose those which expediency might dictate.

At No. 4 Teufelstrasse, Vienna, a "Committee of Seven" had its headquarters. It had been established after July 11, 1935, to reconcile the Austrian Nazis and the followers of Schuschnigg and to incorporate the former into the VF. The seven consisted of Captain Josef Leopold, Dr. Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Dr. Hugo Jury, Dr. Josef Maunzacher, Dr. Oswald Menghin, and Dr. Leopold Tatz, secretary. Most of these men were Nazis. Their secret object was not reconciliation but revolution. Police spies reported suspicious developments at No. 4 early in January. They arrested people. No. 4 was raided and Dr. Tatz arrested. Captain Leopold was questioned and then released.

The plan thus revealed and frustrated was during. Agents provocateurs were to stage a riot before the German Embassy in Mauthausenstrasse. A shot would be fired at General Maff, the military attache. Blame would be placed on one Walter Leibescher, a Legation and a renegade Nazi who had served the anti-Nazi cause by publishing memoirs of his experiences while a member of the Austrian Legion in the Reich. The attack would arouse indignation in Germany, especially infantry circles, and thus pave the way for German intervention. Himmler was apparently consulted and suggested a slight change in technique. Papan should be the target, the Communists should be blamed. The request was prepared in various versions. Disorders should be provoked, followed by a march of the Austrian legions over the frontier to save the country from the "Red Menace." Or the Reichswelt Division near Munich, under General von Reichenau, should invade Austria. One of the plans was signed "R.H." (Rudolf Hess?). In either case Austria should be "liberated" by January 30, 1938.<sup>16</sup>

The scheme was raised by the police chief, Frisch and Neuwirth, moreover, was opposed to such adventures. They were purged on February 4. Papan, on his way from Vienna to Berlin, appeared at Berchtesgaden two days later. He had another suggestion. Schuschnigg should be invited to a conference and thereafter into captivity. Papan returned to Vienna on special mission on the 6th and gave to the Chancellor an invitation from Hitler. Schuschnigg hesitated. His Foreign Secretary, Dr. Guido Schmidt, advised acceptance. He had long been an upholder of Pan-German unity. Under pressure from Hitler Schuschnigg had named him to his post in July 1936. He had

visited Hitler in November 1936 and returned in Göring's private plane. Later, between visits to foreign capitals at Schuschnigg's side, Schmidt returned repeatedly to the Reich. Schuschnigg accepted on February 20. Great secrecy was maintained, but Mussolini learned of the arrangement. Realizing that Hitler had not overruled him and facing the worst, II Duce cast his "now or never" plea to Chamberlain.<sup>22</sup> In London the pending Berchtesgaden discussion was spoken of in Tory circles as the prelude to an Anglo-German census and a Four-Power Pact.<sup>23</sup> Schuschnigg returned from Vienna to Salzburg, accompanied by Schmidt, Dr. Fiedrichshelz, his secretary, Major Riedl, his aide, and Helmut Weber, who stayed in Salzburg. They passed the night in the city. The next morning at the frontier Schuschnigg's bodyguard of six detectives was turned back and replaced by a company of Black Guards, under one Captain Spitz, an-Herzowitzer officer and Austrian renegade.

Thus to Hitler's villa, in the legendary shade of Berches the Evil Fairy, came the last Chancellor of Austria on Saturday, February 12, 1938. He brought with him the documents of the Treibhaussee plot, doubting hoping to use them at least for bargaining purposes. Hitler affably showed him about the house and garden. They then dined with Schmidt and were presently joined by Fildersnap. Hitler spoke slowly and calmly and then, as was his wont, more and more excitedly as he warmed to his theme. He charged that Schuschnigg had failed to fulfill his duties as a German. Schuschnigg grew nervous. As a chamberlain, he craved signatures, but signing was forbidden at Berchtesgaden. When Hitler finally stopped, he quietly referred to his documents and presented his protest. Der Führer was furious. What had he to do with the Committee of Seven? The lawyer-like Chancellor cited more evidence of conspiracy. Hitler argued and stammered loudly. Schuschnigg threatened to leave. For the lunch hour had arrived. Two other guests entered: General von Reichenau and General von Kessel. Their staffs followed. The atmosphere of the meal was military. After luncheon Hitler stopped discussing and presented demands. Schuschnigg refused. The irreducible demands were three: amnesty for all imprisoned Nazis and for the Austrian Legion, the appointment of Nazi sympathizers as Ministers of Justice and Interior (Seydewitz must get the latter post); full political freedom for the Austrian Nazis. If Schuschnigg accepted, Hitler would renounce Austrian independence. If he refused, the Reichswehr was ready to march. Schuschnigg hedged, left the room to phone Müller, and returned to

any other working could be decided without a full Cabinet meeting. Miklas had told him to leave Buchenwalden at once. Hitler informed him that he had two days to decide. After hours of consideration Schoeneberg was exhausted. He left a heavy man.<sup>21</sup>

In Vienna President Miklas objected to granting Seyss-Inquart the post of Interior and Public Security, which, in his hands, would mean that the police could no longer be relied upon to act against a possible Nazi uprising. On Tuesday came an ultimatum from Berlin: schools at once or face invasion at midnight. The fractious Chancellor tried to call Miklas and got no answer. He had long since been abandoned by Paris and London. He capitulated. At 1.00 a.m., February 16, the Cabinet was "reconstructed": the portfolio of Interior and Public Security went to Seyss-Inquart, with Michael Stohr as intermediary buffer between the new Minister and the Chancellor; Dr. Adamovich became Minister of Justice; Glase-Hoegenstein remained Minister without Portfolio; Guido Schenck was elevated from Secretary to Ministry of Foreign Affairs. An amnesty released Dr. Tass, Anton Randler, and every other imprisoned Nazi.<sup>22</sup>

The "Trojan Horse" was within the walls. Seyss-Inquart, a Salzwagen German, had for years been Schoeneberg's "friend" and a secret emissary of Hitler.<sup>23</sup> Glase-Hoegenstein was openly sympathetic toward Nazism. He was a Landsmann of Der Fuhrer, having also been born in Bremen, but he had risen to the rank of colonel on the Austro-Hungarian General Staff and had been a virulent Catholic and Legitimist before becoming a Nazi. Seyss-Inquart went at once to Berlin to confer with Hitler and Himmler. Berlin bided "hold" Austria and turned it a customs union and military co-ordination. The British and French press minimized the importance of these developments, but deep anxiety began to pervade Jewish and Catholic circles in Vienna. The ever indiscreet Papen spoke publicly of a new Mitel Europe under German control. At least a few outside observers perceived the drift of events. Arturo Toscanini announced his withdrawal from the Salzburg music festival.

Austria's cards were thus running out. Hitler's speech of February 26 contained no pledge to respect Austrian independence, but only a reference to the accord of July 11, 1934. Schoeneberg, remembering up belated courage, replied on February 24 before the Austrian Corporate Parliament. He declared that the July agreement must be kept. All pledges would be fulfilled. But "thus far and no further." Cheers. Enthusiasm. The last flash of life in the

VF. Austrian industrialists rallied to the Chancellor.<sup>22</sup> In a pointed issue Theodor Cardinal Inzecker, Archbishop of Vienna, appealed for faith in Austria's freedom. Seyn-Inquart, known as a pliblicist. When he visited Graz on March 1, leading bands of Hitlerites, 15,000 strong, many of them in SS-uniform uniforms, marched past him in an illegal parade as he attended their Nazi salutes. On the same day Goebbels spoke in Berlin in celebration of the third anniversary of the creation of the new German Air Force:

We shall because the honor of our species, nothing shall stop us from our reserved recklessness. . . . I went in this army from man with a will to deeds. . . . And when the Führer in his Reichstag speech exhorted his proud recklessness and uttered the proud words that we would no longer tolerate that impudent German national comrades should be oppressed beyond our borders, then you know as soldiers of the Air Force that, if it must be, you must back these words of the Führer to the limit. . . . We are burning with eagerness to prove our invincibility.

Seyn-Inquart granted the Nazis of Styria the right to wear swastikas and shout "Heil Hitler!" The Cabinet repudiated his overtures. Seyn-Inquart had plans to visit other provinces "to lay the foundations for an unflinching organization of the Nazi movement throughout Austria." Most estimates place the number of organized Nazis in Austria at not over thirty-five per cent of the electorate. For the drift of events caused many neutral and timid souls to prefer loyalty to the prospective victors.

Schuschnigg, now perceiving that nothing could save the situation but desperate measures, made a last despairing gesture in hope of rallying support to his lost cause at home and abroad. He negotiated with proletarian leaders (four years no less!) to secure working-class support. The Nazi radio screamed: "Dr. Schuschnigg and the Burgomaster of Vienna have formed a Popular Front with the Communists in order to set Marxist hordes at the throat of the people."<sup>23</sup> By March 9 the negotiations promised a favorable outcome. Schuschnigg felt that a pliblicist was inevitable. He had begun planning for it on February 15. Before he knew it before the Nazis were in full control and Goebbels's propaganda machine got into operation. Mussolini declared later that he had advised Schuschnigg against a pliblicist. On Wednesday, March 9, 1938, the Chancellor unexpectedly announced from Innsbruck that a nation-wide referendum would take

place Sunday on the question of Austrian independence. The Berchtesgaden accord would be fulfilled, "but not as soon beyond it." The "German peace" would be kept, but "I demand from no one that he should get up with tenderness." In his anxiety he permitted the terms of the plebiscite to be fixed by his adjutant, Guido Zernatto, in a form as fantastic as Hitler's own electoral intrigues. There would be no voting lists. Only those over twenty-four could vote—no exclude the Nazified youth. Women would bring their identification papers and vote publicly. All ballots would be marked "Yes." Those wishing to vote "No" must bring their own ballots. On Thursday the rules were changed to permit secrecy, with both "Yes" and "No" ballots of the same size. The negotiations with former leaders of the Social Democratic trade unions threatened to break down on the rock because of the stubbornness of Hans Staud, the leader of the Catholic Government-controlled union. But there could be no doubt that almost all workers would vote "Yes." Colonel Wolf for the Legation and Emil Frey for the suppressed *Heimwehr* pledged support to Schachinger.<sup>1</sup> With an impressive majority certain to be obtained, the Chancellor prayed that he might yet find sources of support for the salvation of his regime.

He reckoned without Berlin—and without Paris and London. Ribbentrop arrived in the British capital on March 9 for a brief visit. Halifax appealed to the British press for "restraint." On Thursday Ribbentrop visited Halifax, the Duke of Kent, and the Archbishop of Canterbury. On Friday he saw the King and lunched at No. 10 Downing Street with Chamberlain, Londonderry, Hoare, Halifax, Simon, Inskip, Colclough, and (surprisingly) Churchill—and their wives. No hint was forthcoming as to the progress of these "expedient negotiations" for an Anglo-German entente. While Ribbentrop was wooed and dined by his hosts, Berlin prepared to strike. On Thursday Friedrich Frick and his Cabinet resigned because of the refusal of the Socialists to grant him special powers. Blom tried vainly to form a new ministry. All day Friday France was without a government. On Thursday rebel troops in Angoulême captured Belletan in a great offensive which would carry them to the sea. Paris was helpless and hopeless. Rome was silent. London was acquiescent. Another golden morning had arrived.

The preparations were laid. On March 9-10 the German press switched and the German radio sent out strange news. "The Kärn-

movement is in the hands of a Committee such as "The Vienna Committee are calling a general strike." "In Vienna German nationals are being grossly mistreated." "Czechoslovakia is supplying the Red mob in Vienna with artillery to support an immediate Bohemia uprising." "In Austria the plebiscite campaign was well under way, with the wide distribution of placards, posters showing the death mask of Dollfus, and a new paper of the VF, *Volkstrotz*. A VF parade poured through Vienna Friday morning. Tracts and placards scattered leaflets. "Red Österreich! There can be no Home without Freedom! Our flag will stay Red, White, Red!" But by four o'clock it was rumored that the plebiscite would be postponed. By six it was clear that it would be abandoned. The *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* came out for the last time with only this news. The radio played *valtures*.<sup>2</sup> A great fear came. . . .

Now crowds flooded through the capital, many of them paid by the German travel bureau in the British Hotel. Most pamphlets declared "The hour of liberation is at hand. Our leader, Adolf Hitler, will bring work and bread to German Austria. He is coming himself. Austria will become German. The Danube will flower. Comrades, do not fail to listen to the radio tonight. The Leader will make an important statement."<sup>3</sup> Confusion reigned in the Chancellery. There was no news. By late afternoon the radio was booming every five minutes, between *valtures*: "The plebiscite will not take place!" The crowds vanished from the streets—soon to reappear in uniform. A Jewish shopkeeper in Postellengasse cried hysterically over and over: "I won't give my children to Hitler," and had to be taken to a hospital. The silence of the dispatcher fell over the city, shot through by the low drizzle of songs cheering and by faint cries of anguish and terror.

What had happened? At noon on Friday March 11, 1938, Oskar Herrmann, fresh from Berlin, delivered a German ultimatum to Schoeneberg: call off the plebiscite or face invasion. At four o'clock another ultimatum arrived by plane: resign by 7:30 or face invasion. Schoeneberg, now at war and, aided in vain to reach Munich if Duce had gone along, Official London was busy maintaining Ribbentrop. Fate was partitioned. To be or not to be? To fight or not to fight? Decried and alone, Schoeneberg might have emulated the Vienna workers of the February days, or the tortured victims of Tokio in China and of Rome in Sicily, or the

defence of Madrid. But the role of hero or martyr was impossible for him and his regime. He surrendered. Shortly before eight o'clock Schuschnigg's voice, slow and sad, came over the radio.

"This day has confronted us with a tragic and decisive situation. I have to give my Austrian fellow countrymen the details of the events of today. The German Government today handed President Miklas an ultimatum with a time limit ordering him to nominate as Chancellor a person designated by the German Government and appoint members of an Austrian Government on orders of the German Government, either else German troops would invade Austria. I declare before the world that the lives launched in Germany concerning dissolves by workers, the shedding of streams of blood, and the creation of a situation beyond the Austrian Government's control are far from A to Z.

The President has asked me to tell the people of Austria that he has yielded only to force. Since we were not prepared, even in this terrible situation, to shed blood, we decided to order the troops to offer no resistance.

The inspector-general of the army, General Schikowsky, has been placed in command of the troops. He will issue further orders to them.

And so I take leave of the Austrian people with a German word of farewell uttered from the depths of my heart: "God protect Austria!" "

There followed, in the tempo of a death march, the Austrian national anthem, then the opening bars of the Seventh Symphony. . . . Later came the voice of Septuaguar, breathless and trembling, ordering the Austrian army to make no resistance. Beethoven's Fifth came next and then Schubert's Unfinished Symphony and Mahler and Johann Strauss. To the great music of the great past a world of song and laughter, of culture and *Gewaltigkeit*, died and passed into the night.

Around the north broke forth a howling bodiam of murderers, grave-diggers and ghosts, jigging a grisly dance *maistre* over the corpses. At 11.15 the Austrian radio broke forth into the *Herrn Weid* *Ein* while Nazi *maistre* marched, shouted, and plundered Jewish shops. Secret S.S. Standard 99 of the Black Guard had already oc-

just the Chancellery and other public buildings. At 1:00 p.m. it is supposed from the balcony on the Ballhausplatz that Miksa § appeared a new Cabinet-Chancellor. Seyn-Inquart, Vice-chancellor. Glorie-Harvenau, Welfare. Dr. Hugo Jury, other Ministers. The survivors of Schuschnigg's Cabinet, save Guido heads, fled or were arrested. Schuschnigg, dodging flight, was an a prisoner to the Bebelplatz Palace. Seyn-Inquart at once ordered Hitler to send German troops into Austria to preserve order within its free. Austria is Nationalsozialist . . . One People, One Job, One Leader. Had to our Leader? That Hitler!"

Even after midnight one faint hope remained, for Berlin was not that far. German troops, planes, tanks, trucks, were poised on the frontier and had expected the order to move in the early evening. At nine o'clock Herr Thierack, German Minister in Prague, called Foreign Minister Kaizer to ask whether Czechoslovakia was taking. He later telephoned with the same question. At 3:00 p.m. on Saturday morning, March 12, he phoned once more. Such is the answer: was negative. German troops crossed the Austrian border in the Tyrol at 3:40 a.m. and began pouring into Austria at 27 points shortly after that.<sup>14</sup> Had Prague dared to veto the German march, Berlin would have fired round or war. If war had been set, Prague could perhaps have involved Paris and Moscow and reform Warsaw, Belgrade, Bucharest, and ultimately even a return London in an anti-German coalition. The Reich in March did not face such a combination. Six months later it would be ripe—and the coalition would be gone. Prague would do nothing without Paris. Paris would do nothing without London. London did do nothing. For loss of a nail a shoe was lost, for loss of a shoe a horse was lost, for loss of a horse, a man was lost, for loss of a man . . . The penalty of Prague's mistake was death.

German troops appeared on the Danube on Saturday, March 12, I exchanged greetings with the Italian guards. Hitler attended dinners and banquets and here gave Anschluss his grandeur will never forget. . . ." On Saturday, in the company of Kind I Hildebrand, Hitler crossed the bridge at Braunau-am-Inn, where his father had collected customs duties. The ecstatic inhabitants lined his path with flowers and occupied up handfuls of sacred dust behind his car. At Linz he was met by Seyn-Inquart. At Linz he felt the multitudes that he had fulfilled a "divine mission!" On early morning he visited the graves of his parents at near-by




Landing while German bombers roared overhead carrying more and more troops and officials to Vienna. Miklas resigned. Austria was annexed. Seyss-Inquart was named *Statthalter* of the Danemark. *Der Führer* entered Vienna in triumph on Monday, March 14, amid scenes of delirium. After speeches, parades, demonstrations without end, he flew back to Berlin on Tuesday night.

A plebiscite and Reichstag election in Great Germany was ordered for April 10. "Do you approve of the reunification of Austria with Germany as accomplished on March 13, and do you vote for the list of our Führer Adolf Hitler?" Hitler opened the campaign at Kitzbühel: "This time it is a holy vote." Floods of cronyism swamped the Reich. Joseph Burckel, charged with responsibility for the campaign in the Danemark, attended seminars to the Archbishop and bishops of the Church. Withholtz consulting the Pope, Theobald Cardinal Inhaber and his fellow prelates issued a letter endorsing National Socialism and urging all to vote "Ja." The Archbishop sent a copy in his own hand to Burckel, signed "Hail Hitler!" It was broadcast all over Germany. Pius XI reprehended Trautner and obliged him to make a partial retraction—which was suppressed by the Nazis oncomers. Trautner welcomed Hitler, praised Anschluss, and declared that God had fore-ordained *Der Führer's* struggle against Bolshevism. (On October 3, 1938, Trautner's palace was raided by Nazi agents which smashed most of the furniture and sacred objects, threw a prize from a widow, and threatened the Cardinal with sinews or worms.) On April 10, 99.08% of all the voters of Great Germany and 98.71% of the voters of the Danemark voted "Ja." "

*Se macht glorie Austria!* On the night of doom, thousands fled to Czechoslovakia or Hungary, including Frieda Daffner and her children. But the borders were soon closed and thousands were jailed or thrown into concentration camps. Schuchanigg was made a captive and threatened with trial for "treason." It was rumored in the spring that he had been persecuted to marry his Communist Vice, with his brother acting as proxy, but this was later denied. The last Chancellor was granted no access to the outer world. Major Emil Fey, once Vice-Chancellor and proud leader of the *Heimwehr*, was found dead to death in his home, along with his wife and son and even his dog! "Solchids!" Neundörfer-Straussner unfroze a *Kitz* fair. Schuchanigg was in Switzerland. Plavetta and Holmstuber, who had slain Daffner, became heroes. Jews were robbed, tortured, and compelled to scrub gutters and sidewalks.

# DRANG NACH OSTEN

The map on the following two pages was circulated throughout Germany in March 1938 by the Nazi Party locals immediately after Anschluss and was subsequently withdrawn in the face of protests abroad. The only frontiers designated as satisfactory ("Reich borders as racial frontiers") are those between East Prussia and Poland, the German and Hungary, and Northwestern Germany and the Netherlands, though the new frontiers of truncated Czechoslovakia would now doubtless be included in this category. The shaded area within the USSR corresponds approximately to the region under German military occupation at the time of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March 1918). The legends read as follows:









Swiss took their lives. Egon Friedel, author and actor, leaped to his death. Professor Nobel of the Vienna medical school committed suicide with his wife. Göring called a hole to open itself and asked "spontaneously" Sigmund Freud was persuaded to go to England. Art, literature, music, and science were discarded. Austria was liberated. The Archbishop of Canterbury voiced his approval on March 10, while Lord Rothermere expressed "the gratitude of Europe to Hitler."<sup>10</sup>

The War did nothing. Halifax cried: "Horrible, horrible, I never thought they would do it!"—though he had implicitly sanctioned the doing four months before. Persons were made to Wilhelmstrasse, which bluntly rejected them, and to Ribbentrop, who blithely took his leave of London on Monday, March 14. Chamberlain intimated "severe condemnation," "profound shock." There was talk of rallying to the League, to France, to Czechoslovakia, but this was short or nationalistic. In Paris Blum formed a new Cabinet on March 13 with the post of Foreign Minister awarded once more to the charmed and durable Joseph Paul-Boncour. On April 6, by a vote of 313 to 49, the Senate rejected a bill authorizing a capital levy and raise by decree. Blum resigned. Daladier succeeded, with Bonnet as Foreign Minister. French finances and the interests of the natives were temporarily buttressed thereby, but for French diplomacy the transition was one from disaster to catastrophe.

Thereafter despair sharpened with frantic efforts to snatch booty from the burning. A few consequences that Czechoslovakia was now doomed began to pervade Prague. The Spanish revolution fought its way to halt the rebel drive to the sea, while French borders massacred thousands in Barcelona, and Perch and Chase conferred amiably in Rome. In the East, Poland delivered a forty-eight-hour ultimatum to Lithuania on March 17, demanding full satisfaction for the shooting of a clergy and a restoration of relations, broken off by Karmas after the Polish seizure of Vilna in 1918. Lithuania had no option but to yield. French power east of the Rhine was a ghost. Paris might propose, but the Third Reich would dispose. Its future triumphs, like its past victories, would be won with Tary aid.

## PEACE BY PURCHASE

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### I. RESCUE BY CHAMBERLAIN

THE foreign policy of Britain's "National Government" since 1931 has been a mystery to most observers.<sup>1</sup> Mr. Stimson was repulsed at the onset by Sir John Simon's refusal to respond to American proposals for joint action against Japan. During the ensuing years Downing Street yielded the hegemony of Eastern Asia to Tokyo, the mastery of the Continent to Germany, and control of East Africa and the middle Mediterranean to Italy. Each year the mystery deepened, for each year British power and goodwill sank to lower depths. The power of Britain's potential enemies grew closer each year to the point at which the equilibrium would be irretrievably upset and Britain would be dealing with rivals at once more powerful than the Empire and hungry for Imperial riches. When this point was reached in 1938, policy at Whitehall exhibited no change. Then, as before, every effort was made to mask or condone the aggressiveness of the Fascist Troika and to obstruct all attempts on the part of their victims or rivals to offer collective resistance. *Châloner?*

The problem here posed is a fascinating study in semantics, behaviorism, and psychiatry. It cannot here be explored in all its myriad ramifications. Any effort to formulate a pattern of words which will name accurately (and therefore "explain") the complex phenomena under observation must fail of its purpose if the words are simple labels and cease, if successful, to be equivalent to a colored history of modern England—a task outside the limits of the present enterprise. Simple formulas are untruths or half-truths be-

case they billed the observer to much of the pertinent data. "Pro-fiduous Affairs" is a familiar stereotype of Irishmen, Frenchmen, Hindus, and Americans. "Rashard" is a stereotype employed by those formulating policy to justify or disguise what is done or undone. "Peace-at-any-price," "muddling through," "fark," "man-dacity," "insupidity," "conspicuity," "ferm," "underdormance," all suggest other familiar patterns of response, all alike useful as apologetics or in-dormments, but unhelpful as analysis.

The diagnosis here advanced is that the mystery of Tory Britain, with all allowances for unique local characteristics, is but another instance of a widespread behavior-phenomenon in Western Europe in the age of its cultural decay. That phenomenon is one which has been repeatedly referred to in these pages. In its consistency, per-sistency, and universality, it approaches the cosmic majesty of Dargay, Fack, or Nemada. As data of social science, it may be variously de-scribed in the various current vocabularies.

In the terminology of Marx: ruling classes threatened with expro-priation create and employ instruments of violence which are in-tended to protect the power and privileges accruing from their established control of the instruments of production. If the organizers of violence perform their assigned tasks, the ruling classes are saved. But if they turn upon their powers, the ruling classes may be destroyed by their own possessions, particularly when they are caught in a web of insalvable social and economic contradictions. In the terminology of Pareto: economic class menaced by counter-classes from the social schismata employ military class to safeguard their status at the apex of the social hierarchy. But if the military class usurps the positions of the economic class they are called upon to defend, this mode of de-fense proves fatal. In the terminology of Ivan Parlov and John B. Wansan: organisms give negative responses of flee or rage (i.e. tro-phies of withdrawal or hostile approach) to environmental threats against the affective symbols to which they have been positively con-ditioned. They achieve adjustment either by modifying their own symbol-systems and habit-patterns, by fleeing from or destroying the sources of danger, or, when neither of these adjustments is possible (as in the present case), by relying upon others to cope with the threats. But if the others switch signals and indulge in negative or destructive overt behavior against those threatened instead of against the threateners, the adjustment becomes objectively futile (however subjectively satisfying it may be) and the original organisms perish.



In the terminology of Freud, personalities afflicted with anxiety by virtue of sexual conflicts induced by external danger project their aggressions onto external objects. Such aggressions are violent in proportion as they are denied verbal expression or repressed below the level of consciousness. Such projections, when followed by overtly hostile acts, greatly heighten repressed impulses in a fashion socially approved and satisfying to the ego, and therefore amenable to conscience—i.e. super-ego controls. When inhibitions or circumstantial obstacles thwart such overt discharge of aggressions, various discharges may be achieved by encouraging others to attack the hated object. But if the aggressions of others are turned backward upon the instigators, the result is disastrous both subjectively and objectively.

These varying formulations attempt to indicate motivations, descriptive conditions, and suggest cures. The process may appropriately be stated at greater length in less technical language. The rulers of Britain, like all nobilities, plutocracies, and priesthoods in the entire middle decades of the twentieth century, lived under the shadow of a great fear, social revolution from below which would seek to abolish nobilities, plutocracies, and priesthoods. They therefore viewed with alarm all propensities on the part of the lower social orders to limit or assail the privileges of their superiors, whether in the name of democracy, socialism, syndicalism, Communism, "People's Front" or merely "Social Democracy" or "Labor." They viewed with approval all devices which would promote "order, hierarchy, discipline" and cause the masses to respect and obey the classes.

Britain's oligarchy was not objectively menaced by domestic proletarian unrest. The Labor party was no threat, for its leaders could be counted upon to disown their own alleged aims in a crisis, as in the General Strike of 1926 and the panic of 1931. The elaborate paraphernalia employed by Fascist regimes to deflect mass movements into safe channels and to evoke mass respect and obedience was therefore not required in a society in which the masses had never challenged their barriers for the past three centuries. The symbols of monarchy, nobility, property, and religion were as efficacious as ever in slaking loyalty from the common man, whatever his deprivations or miseries.<sup>1</sup> But the oligarchy suffered from subjective insecurities which magnified alleged dangers to its position: its wealth and power, moreover, rested ultimately upon a world-wide Empire. That Empire was potentially menaced—in Africa, the Near and Mid-

in East, in India and in China—by an old Imperial goal which was now a new class enemy. This enemy was conceived in word and deed to the ultimate destruction of the patterns of inter-class, inter-racial, and international relations of which the oligarchy was the beneficiary. This enemy, moreover, ruled the largest, most populous, and potentially most powerful of the Great Powers. The "bear that walks like a man" was now the master of the "socialist Fatherland," which challenged all anarchy, all capitalism, all imperialism. The oligarchy was not short-sighted, even if its inner doubts caused it to magnify the danger. It correctly envisaged the USSR and the Comintern as the most menacing of all threats to its values and its way of life—even though the recognition was at times unconscious and open acknowledgment of it was rare.

The destruction of the Soviet counter-force was a constant object of the oligarchy after 1917. The first effort (1918-20) failed. Unsuccessful intervention and blockade were followed by "peace" and a secret treaty. Subsequently there came to power in Rome, Tokyo, and Berlin regimes sworn to defend "civilization" (i.e. other oligarchies) against "Bolshevism." These regimes also threatened the Empire. And their domestic methods, while admirably effective, were ungenerously. Nevertheless, in word and deed, they threatened Moscow first. But these threats to Moscow could not be implemented unless they acquired the economic and military means for launching their projected crusade. Since the USSR a war, anastrophe, and pestilence, the war lords of Japan could not challenge it so easily unless they first had in their hands Manchuria and most of China. They must, therefore, be prevented to "save China from Bolshevism" and, if need be, acquire hegemony over Eastern Asia. For similar reasons the Third Reich could not move forward against the masses without first securing mastery of Central Europe. Fascist Italy, moreover, must be strengthened in Africa and the Mediterranean as a useful ally of the crusaders.

The stipulations of this logic led to certain obvious conclusions in diplomacy and strategy which were not products of meddling, capriciousness, or weakness but of simple Realpolitik. They did not emerge all at once, like Minerva from the brow of Jove, nor were they acted upon with perfect consistency. Their contours shifted with changing circumstances. They sprang not from any single mind nor from any group of "conspirators," but rather from the progressive adaptation of accepted assumptions to the unfolding problem. Once the first

steps were taken, other steps followed until the shape of the design—now became clear with a cold hard logic of its own.

The USSR must be isolated. The ties between France and her Eastern allies must be broken. France must be immobilized, for any French involvement in the dash to come would, for geographical reasons, equal British involvement—which was precisely what was to be avoided. The immobilization of France required the strengthening of Germany and Italy to a point at which Paris could not challenge them. Hence revitalization of the Rhineland, threats to French communications in the Mediterranean, and Fascist victory in Spain were all useful devices to supplement British efforts to keep France neutral. A neutralized France must be induced to grasp Hitler's *carte blanche* in Danubia, Balkans, and the East. By the same logic Italy must be helped to checkmate France, and Japan must be permitted to impose as well as China. Hence all efforts from Geneva, Paris, or Washington to thwart the march of the anti-Communist crusaders must be subverted. In the end the Fascist Triplets must attack the USSR. The Western Powers must remain neutral. The oligarchy and the Empire would thereby be armed, for Communism could not defeat such a combination of foes. It would either be driven back to the Urali or would, by desperate resistance, exhaust itself and its resources alike to the advantage of British interests.

This program could never be openly acknowledged by Tory officials because the manner whom the oligarchy ruled (and even some members of the oligarchy itself) had unfortunately been conditioned to respond favorably to such shibboleths as "indivisible peace," "collective security," and "League of Nations." The problem here was one of winning elections at home by the subtle manipulation of such popular slogans without permitting them to achieve any implementation abroad. The electorate, moreover, must be kept from disillusionment and induced to support the program without being aware of its purposes or implications. In the supreme test of political skill, the oligarchs were not found wanting. Mass fear of "war" and man attachment to "peace," "fact," "compromise," "reason," "co-operation," "friendly relations," and "general appeasement" could be utilized to create approval for policies designed to reach "indivisible peace," "collective security," and "League of Nations." The trick was neatly turned by constant employment of the necessary stereotypes to disguise the intent and direction of the course embarked upon.

A variety of other motivations strengthened the decision. The course, despite its difficulties, was essentially one of inertia. Inertia is always easier than action. The Russian Revolution, moreover, like the French Revolution, represented Archaism, Immorality, Murder, and Theft. The Tories of Chamberlain looked upon it much as Edmund Burke had viewed the France of 1793. They stood for Religion, Morality, and Property. These values Fascism was sworn to protect. The new course, furthermore, landed an arms race. Many of the oligarchs held stock in arms companies. To use public funds for private enrichment was not unusual, provided the funds went for "national defense." The corporation of which Chamberlain himself was once director, the Birmingham Small Arms Company, had once handled all British army contracts.<sup>7</sup> The unacknowledged slogan of the new day was: billions for defense, not one penny for collective security. By 1938 the budget of the three defense departments, plus costs of air-raid precautions, had climbed to £182,500,000. It was planned to spend on defense during the next five years more than £1,500,000,000.<sup>8</sup> Such expenditures helped to reduce unemployment and restore national prosperity. The stockholders in companies producing arms, munitions, aircraft, and ships were not aware of serving the cause in this fashion. They included many aristocrats and numerous dignitaries of State and Church.

The course itself was not without its dangers. It was inevitable, for if the Ottomans were granted mastery of Europe and Asia, such mastery could not later be taken from them. Should they ultimately utilize their power not to attack the USSR, but to exact concessions from London and Paris or, horrible story, to inaugurate the partition of the annihilated colonial empires, their demands would have to be met or a new course of costly and dubious resistance would have to be embarked upon. Hence the necessity for more and more armaments. Even in this unhappy eventuality, however, there was still a margin of safety. The colonial possessions of Belgium, Portugal, the Netherlands, and even France could be utilized to appease Fascist hunger, for these States would no longer be in a position to defend themselves. If the Empire should itself be hard pressed, reliance must be put on Anglo-American solidarity. This last defense was based upon no whimsical conception of American folly, but upon the realistic promise that the United States, for its own security, could not afford to permit the Fascist Triplets to attack the Empire.

There were other risks. Should the Triplets attack the USSR and

win, it might achieve invincibility and then turn against the Empire. Should the Empire attack the USSR and lose, Moscow might spread Communism over Europe and Asia and inevitably attack the oligarchy and emancipate its subject peoples. In this case American aid would be indispensable for salvation. Should Moscow and the Empire by some improbable miracle come to terms and make common cause, all might be lost. These risks were of such a character that the gamble might prove fatal. But the oligarchy was unable or unwilling to adopt any alternative course.

In the playing of the game another consideration of crucial import dominated every move. This too flowed from the premises. The purports must not be permitted to destroy themselves. Should they attack Moscow prematurely, should they launch aggression against other States under circumstances in which a potent coalition against them might emerge, should they face defeat in any war, it would be imperative for Downing Street to rescue them. Rescue might prove difficult. They must therefore not be allowed to run needless risks. Others must not be allowed to oppose them effectively. If they accomplished their own destruction, not only would they become useless for protection against Moscow, but they would open the door wide to World Revolution. In this event the exact gamble would be lost, for Fichte's *déclaré* might well mean Comintern victory in Japan, Italy, and Germany alike. Consequently the rulers must over and over again be rescued from their own rashness. Even if they became enemies of Britain, they must still be rescued—for their defeat would mean the victory of an enemy far more dangerous and formidable.

This Nemesis, which the oligarchy perceived it would never have to face, had already been faced by other oligarchies with discouraging results. Italian aristocrats and entrepreneurs, German Junkers and industrialists, American businessmen and nobles had all bought peace and protection against the Boas of Bolshevism by subordinating the interests of the Czarist. Something they had got from their bargains, but in each case they had found themselves encircled at the end by those whom they had rescued and got less power to save them. The Church at Rome, with all the wisdom of the centuries behind it, had faced the same dilemma and fallen into the same trap. To grow absolute and omnipotent as *Fascism* is a means of salvation from Communism was, by this showing, almost as dangerous as to surrender to Communism forthwith. But from this too there was no escape route

the burglar was struck. Those whose form of patriotism indicates and whose activities over property and privilege drive them to correspondence with the brute power of the new barbarians are in the end undone—by their allies if not by their enemies.

Whether this too was to be the fate of Tory Britain was a question partially answered in 1918. For the oligarchy there was no abandonment of the road which it had taken. Its past has shaped its future in a world beyond all changing. If Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton, so too was the ultimate fate of the Empire there decided. Those incapable of adaptation must either make old formulas work, or perish. The oligarchy was incapable of changing its code, its creed, or its way of life. Half a century ago Ralph Waldo Emerson described its spirit with remarkable accuracy and insight:

Truth in private life, untruth in public, marks these home-loving men. Their political conduct is not decided by general views, but by natural intrigues and personal and family interests. They cannot readily see beyond England. The History of Rome and Greece, when written by these scholars, degenerates into English party pamphlets. They cannot see beyond England, nor in England can they understand the interests of the governing class. "English principles" mean a primary regard to the interests of property. . . .

The foreign policy of England, though ambitious and lavish of money, has not often been generous or just. It has a principal regard for the interests of trade, checked however by the astronomical bids of the ambassadors, which usually purchase its sympathy with the continental Courts. It unconsciously the persecutor of Poland, it betrayed Greece, Sicily, Prussia, Greece, Turkey, Rome, and Hungary. . . .

Their mind is in a state of arrested development,—a divine cripple like Vulcan, a blind amputee like Huber and Sanderson. They do not occupy themselves on matters of general and lasting import, but on a corporeal civilization, on goods that perish in the using. . . . There is a cramp limitation in their habit of thought, sleepy routine, and a tortoise's instinct to hold hard to the ground with his claws, but he should be shaven on his back. There is a drag of inertia which resists reform in every shape.\*

To undertake here to identify all the principal movers in the oligarchy, to assess each role, to present all the data in support of the

hypothesis would require many more pages than this book contains. A partial picture must suffice. To quote old voices first, including some which later changed their tune, Lloyd George in a speech at Yarmouth, September 21, 1933, declared:

If the Powers succeed in overthrowing Hitler in Germany, what would follow? Not a Conservative, Socialist or Liberal regime, but extreme Communism. Surely that could not be their objective. A Communist Germany would be infinitely more formidable than a Communist Russia. The Germans would have how to run their Communism effectively?

In Commons, November 26, 1934, Lloyd George stated:

In a very short time, perhaps in a year or two, the Conservative element in this country will be looking to Germany as the bulwark against Communism in Europe. She is planted right in the centre of Europe, and if her defence breaks down against the Communists—only two or three years ago a very distinguished German statesman said to me: "I am not afraid of Hitler, but of Communism"—and if Germany is seized by the Communists, Europe will follow, because the Germans could make a better job of it than any other country. Do not let us be in a hurry to condemn Germany. We shall be welcoming Germany as our friend!

In 1934 Mr. L. Lawson wrote in the *Fortnightly Review*:

Whereas formerly German statesmen looked both to the East and to the West, Hitler at present looks to the East only. . . . No one who studies the map of Eastern Europe can doubt that there are immense possibilities of a German-Polish compromise at the expense of others. The idea of including Ukraine within the Western European system, and moving Russia on towards the East is certainly wrong. . . . With Ukraine as part of a democratic federated system there would, it is hoped, come into existence a grouping of States with which Great Britain could be on friendly terms. The moment is long overdue for the creation of some such grouping in Eastern Europe.<sup>1</sup>

Mr. L. S. Amery, former Colonial Minister, wrote in *The Forward View* (1933): "The first condition of European peace today is the frank acknowledgment that Germany's ambitions are now her own affair and nobody else's" (p. 71). "The time has come for such a re-

vision of the Continent as will get rid of all these chances (more particularly 15 and 16) which give an encouragement to the Russo-Siam rivalry of the League" (p. 171). "The doctrine of the inevitable collision of war is, of course, pure nonsense" (p. 172). "We do not regard ourselves as one of the nations of Europe" (p. 185). "It would be as concern of ours . . . to prevent Japanese expansion in Eastern Siberia" (p. 188).

The great press magnates of Britain have seldom disguised their preferences. Baron Baringbrook (William Maxwell Aikin), born in Canada, where he made a fortune of a million pounds before he came to London, to become private secretary of Bismarck, bought up the *Daily Express* and pushed it to a circulation of 1,000,000 by 1909 and 1,500,000 by 1918. He also owned the *Evening Standard*. Lord Rothermere (Harold Sidney Harmsworth, brother of Lord Northcliffe) owned the *Daily Mail*, with almost two million readers, and the *Evening News*. A perusal of the files of these journals will leave little doubt as to the picture of the world in the minds of their owners. In January 1904 the *Daily Mail* and the *Evening News* shouted "Hurrah For The Blackbans!" and called upon the patriotic youth of Britain to join Sir Oswald Mosley's "Fascists." But this line was soon dropped. Tory Britain had no need of domestic Fascism to achieve its purposes. Rothermere, who once gained circulation by Russ-baiting, soon became an advocate of Hungarian revisionism and a defender of Hitler.<sup>24</sup>

Mr. G. Ward Price, the *Daily Mail's* Continental correspondent, in his eulogy of the Czar, *I Knew Their Dictators* (1918), wrote:

The last time the Russo-Slav conflict broke out, Britain and France were dragged into it. On that occasion Russia was backing Serbia against Austria. She is now backing Czechoslovakia against Germany. If this current feud flares up again, it would be well to deliver it into these regions where it can do least harm. Humanity and common sense alike suggest that the broad steppes of Little Russia are a more suitable locality than the densely populated centres of civilisation in Western Europe.<sup>25</sup>

The Astor family, ascending originally from northern Germany, constituted a liaison between the press, the aristocracy, the plutocracy, the Foreign Office, and the United States. Viscount Astor is the son of a wealthy American who migrated to England in the "immigrant decade" because the American press insisted on writing flammish articles



on his golden birthday. The Viscount stood for Ebor, medical research, agriculture, scientific nutrition, horse-racing, charity, and hospitals. In 1906 he married Nancy Wether Loughness of Virginia, first woman to be elected to Commons. She succeeded her husband as M.P. for Plymouth when he came into his lordship in 1919. She stood for charity, wealth, Christian Science, socialism, opposition to reform of the divorce laws (though she herself was divorced from her first husband, Robert Gould Shaw), motherhood, and lavish expenditure in St. James's Square and Clarendon Manor. Lord Astor owned *The Observer*, edited by J. L. Garvin, an elderly Irishman passionately devoted to an Anglo-German mixture and Anglo-American co-operation. Lord Astor's younger brother, Major John Jacob Astor, who served in India and lost a leg in the war, bought *The Times* from Lord Northcliffe. He and his editor, Geoffrey Dawson, made the respectable "standard" an authoritative organ of Downing Street and the oligarchy.

The *Harpies of Lombardury*, owner of many mines and large estates, deferred from most of his collaborators in a somewhat naive propensity to state his convictions in print, with the aid of Lady Desborough and Mr. G. Ward Price. Their

I would like to take this opportunity of expressing my particular gratitude to Herr Hinder, Field Marshal Göring, Herr von Ribbentrop, and Baron von Neurath for their repeated kindness and hospitality to me and members of my family, as well as for affording me many interesting sources of information (*Observer and Germany*, 1938, p. 9).

Herr Hinder's conciliatory gestures have been disregarded and his offers brushed on one side, and German arguments have been rapidly and efficiently built upon a model which those who claim to speak with authority in the Reich want a despised ally merely to make that country irrelevant on land and sea and in the air. Herr Hinder has repeatedly solicited the good-will of England and the friendly co-operation of the German and English peoples. The time may well be not far off, should the present unsatisfactory and uncertain state of Anglo-German relations be allowed to continue, when the Germans will be able to depart with the hope of any understanding with us and to reflex out along a course of Weltpolitik friendly arrangements to Great Britain and her many imperial and commercial interests. It is to even

such an unfortunate necessity as this that I have made every effort to convince the people of the country of the value and importance of a friendly understanding between Britain and Germany (pp. 4-5).

Our Foreign Office appears to condemn the associations with Communism and Bolshevism through our affiliation with France, while paying but little regard to the robust attitude of Germany, Italy, and Japan which wholeheartedly condemn Communism and Bolshevism. Bolshevism is a world-wide doctrine which aims at the internal disruption of all modern systems of Government with the ultimate object of what is termed World Revolution. That Germany, Italy, and Japan condemn Bolshevism is an attitude of mind which is not properly appreciated in this country. . . . We fail to recognize that the present condition of Spain is mainly the result of Redmachinations. We conclude erroneously with the reflection that, owing to the Conservatism of the French peasant, Bolshevism will not prevail to any marked extent among the urban industrial population of France, although the Communist representation in the Chamber has increased to the number which Herr Hitler personally prophesied to me over two years ago. Belgium is showing signs of Bolshevism. And Germany sees herself surrounded by Bolshevist countries and militarily and economically harmed as with what may well be disastrous consequences. We watch this movement with uneasy equanimity. We share in our weight under "non-intervention" on the side of the Reds in Spain, Belgium and France for the time. And we wonder why Germany so lately appears more resolute and challenging as their strength and prestige increase (pp. 11-12).

I was at a loss to understand why we could not make common ground in some form or other with Germany in opposition to Communism. . . . The anti-Communist platform was (and still is) invaluable (p. 115).

Lord Lansdowne blessed Hitler's designs on Austria and Czechoslovakia and hoped merely "that they may be realized in a peaceful manner."<sup>12</sup> Lord Lansdowne early became a warm friend of Hitler, to whom he entertained lavishly, and distinguished and influential company, at his house in Park Lane. His liberalism did not neglect Diego Gaudin. With Baldwin, however, he made little progress, being finally forced to resign the Air Ministry. Chamberlain was more accessible

Other distinguished lads and ladies saw the world much as London-derry saw it. The Marquis of Latham, a millionaire bachelor who was once secretary to Lloyd George and later Governor of the National Bank of Scotland, was also a Christian Scientist—with important Catholic connections. He envisaged "peace" as terms of a Tappan-Nesbit exchange and a return of the German colonies. Mary (Baroness) Ravensdale, sister-in-law of Sir Oswald Mosley, Lady (Austen) Chamberlain, usually resident in Rome, Lord Redesdale, whose beautiful blonde daughters, the Honorable Mrs. Diana Guinness and the Honorable Miss Daisy Vassily's Freeman-Mitford, were intimate friends of Der Führer (Mrs. Diana Guinness married Sir Oswald Mosley in Munich on December the fourth 1931.), Lord Swinton (Sir Philip Cunliffe-Liver), Lord Hailsham (Sir Douglas Hogg), and of course Simon, Hoare, and Halifax were none of them as fundamental disagreements with the views already suggested.

The "Anglo-German Fellowship," inspired by Ribbentrop and installed in Uniforum House of Lord Leverhulme, Governor of Lever Brothers, helped to bring together like-minded industrialists and aristocrats, such as Andrew Agnew of Shell Oil, controlled by a noted anti-Bolshevik, Sir Hiram Dowdall; Lord Barnby of Lloyd's Bank, Sir Josiah Stamp and Sir Robert Kenderley of the Bank of England, F. C. Thorne, banker, Lord MacGowan of Imperial Chemicals, Sir Josiah, however, admired Eden and was a dissident. "I believe Hitler manifests another alarm over the danger of a spread of Bolshevism. It does make a good flag to wave, though, doesn't it?" In 1935 the Fellowship sent a mission to Berlin to confer with Göring. It included Thorne, Arthur Guinness, and a former Cabinet member, Lord Mount Temple, whose first wife was the daughter of Sir Ernest Cassel, a German-Jewish banker." Lord Mount Temple was head of the Anti-Socialist Federation and, until November 1934, president of the Anglo-German Fellowship.

"The City" (London's Wall Street) was on the whole in sympathy with this association, though some of its members had doubts. Said Lloyd George, February 21, 1932: "A Chamberlain of the Exchequer must make allowances for the political bias of the City. They have always been against a progressive Government. They have always been tolerant of the faults of a reactionary Government." Said Baldwin on July 2, 1936, at the Anniversary Dinner of the City of London Conservative Association. "We know our destination, and although we may not take the direct course, we always have that port

in view. Our aim is common. Our methods may differ according to the men we are in and according to the winds that blow. But I feel confident that however great our difficulties we shall be judged at any rate with a kindly criticism in the City of London."<sup>12</sup> He was not in error. The great banking magnates did see the world in terms of investment wisdom, the measure of Bolshevism, the traditional power of British capital, and the sturdy virtues of the new Czar. Mr. Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank of England, was as much a man of shadows as Sir Basil Zaharoff, the arms magnate. But his influence was great and it was seldom thrown against the views of the oligarchy. In Tory Britain, however, as in post-War Prussia and Russia, the true representatives of Imperialism were less the men of money than the men of title.

On the periphery a circle of patriots, publicists, and pacifists served the cause, willingly or unwillingly. Dean Inge of St. Paul's preached Anglo-German reconciliation, praised Nazi "patriotic education and disciplined self-sacrifice," condemned Britain's defense of Belgium and France in 1904 as "careless folly," and found only virtue in Hitler, Mussolini, and Franco.<sup>13</sup> The Archbishop of Canterbury, Cosmo Gordon Lang, took a similar position, but was troubled at the Nazi program of November 1936: "Would that the rulers of the Reich could realize that such excesses of hatred and reflect put upon the friendship which we are ready to offer them an almost incalculable wound."<sup>14</sup> Many Britons visited rebel Spain and praised France for saving the land from Bolshevism.<sup>15</sup> The Laborite pacifists, like George Lansbury and James Mason, were of substantial aid in "educating" the public to the need of consensus for "peace." Simon and Hoare, Halifax and Chamberlain, Cudgou and Sir Neville Henderson, the Ambassador in Berlin who praised the Third Reich and publicly denounced criticism of it by his countrymen,<sup>16</sup> were all grateful for such help.

Among other places where these congenial souls from time to time gathered was Cliveden Manor, sumptuous Thames estate of Lord and Lady Astor. Here, at pleasant week-end parties, the mighty men of money, title, and power met in happy discussion. On March 25-27, 1938, Chamberlain played "musical chair" here and discussed the problem of neutralizing France and pursuing rapprochement with Rome and Berlin. The "Cliveden Set" became known as "Hitler's Second Foreign Office," though Lady Nancy indignantly denied all such allegations. To postulate a "Cliveden conspiracy" is quite un-

necessary and would be quite unnecessary. Clarendon was nearly a cheerful rendezvous for ladies and gentlemen whose views coincided. There were, to be sure, occasional doubts and difficulties. Even Lansdowne found the Germans "difficult." And Halifax could say: "I often think how much easier the world would have been to manage if Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini had chosen to have been at Oxford."<sup>11</sup> (Cf. Sir Francis Lacey: "Had Hitler and Mussolini been cricketers, I do not think we should have had all this trouble that is going on in Europe today.")<sup>12</sup> But "then" had to be "then," and those who met at Clarendon and elsewhere were never in serious disagreement as to how Property, Religion, and the Empire should be safeguarded in a dangerous world.<sup>13</sup>

## 1. CIRCUS IN ROME

Dovering Street pursued "appeasement" on three fronts during 1938. In the Far East negative action sufficed. To deny all aid to China, to paralyze all motion at Geneva, to thwart all efforts at Washington or elsewhere to restrain the aggressor was enough to satisfy the war lords of Tokyo. The appeasement of the Czar at Rome and Berlin called for more active steps. After Austria came Czechoslovakia. Dovering Street's task of splashing Prague from its orbit, paving the way for surrender without war, and compelling Paris to accept the consequences was not an easy one. For these things time was needed. Meanwhile II Duce must be pleased and Paris must be induced to participate in the process.

The aftermath of Anschluss did not interfere with the enterprise, but rather increased Tory anxiety to carry it to a rapid conclusion. On March 17, 1938, Liddell confirmed Moscow's obligations to Geneva, Paris, and Prague, warned that Czechoslovakia was in peril, and proposed a conference to consider collective means of "checking the further development of aggression and eliminating an aggravated danger of a new world war."<sup>14</sup> He urged that the United States attend as well as Britain and France, Germany, Italy, and Japan were not to be invited.<sup>15</sup> The British Cabinet decided on March 22 that no new commitments to act against aggression should be assumed. Chamberlain addressed Commons on March 23 and laid down the line of Tory policy for many months to come:

I cannot imagine any events in Europe which would change the fundamental basis of British foreign policy, which is the maintenance and preservation of peace. However, that does not mean nothing would make us fight. . . . Our existing commitments which might lead to use of our arms for a purpose other than our own defence were, first of all, defence of France and Belgium against unprovoked aggression. It was also our treaty obligations to Portugal, Iraq, and Egypt.

The question now arises whether we should go further. Should we forthwith give assurance to France that in the event of her being called upon by reason of German aggression on Czechoslovakia to implement her obligations under the Franco-Czech treaty we would immediately employ our full military force on her behalf? Or should we at once declare our readiness to take military action in resistance to any forcible interference with the independence of Czechoslovakia and invite any other nation which might desire to associate themselves with us in such a declaration?

From consideration of these two alternatives a clearly emerges that under either a decision as to whether or not the country should find itself involved in war would automatically be removed from the decision of His Majesty's Government and the suggested guarantee would apply irrespective of the circumstances by which it would be brought into operation and over which His Majesty's Government might not have been able to exercise any control. The position is not one which His Majesty's Government could see their way to accept in relation to an arm where their vital interests are not concerned in the same degree as they are in the case of France and Belgium. It certainly is not a position that results from the Committee. For these reasons His Majesty's Government feel themselves unable to give the joint guarantee suggested.

But while plainly stating this decision I should add that where peace or war is concerned legal obligations are not alone involved and if war broke out it likely would not be confined to those who have assumed such obligations. The (British) proposal appeared to involve less consultation with a view no argument than concerning of action against an eventuality that has not yet arisen. . . . [This] would aggravate a tendency toward conti-

Influence of exclusion groups of nations which must be inimical to the prospect of European peace. . . .

His Majesty's Government will at all times be ready to render any help in their power toward the solution of questions likely to cause difficulty between the German and Czechoslovak governments. In the meantime there is no need to discuss the use of force or, indeed, to talk about it. Such talk is to be strongly deprecated. Not only can it do no good; it is bound to do harm.<sup>22</sup>

Downing Street thus rejected Moscow's proposal, and declined any commitment to aid Czechoslovakia against German aggression or to aid France in the defense of Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain defended "non-intervention" in Spain despite "repeated infringements"—"less than one quarter." He found "inconspicuous" in the negotiations with Italy and, in the midst of plans for accelerating defense plans, expressed "full reliance upon the honesty of the Italian Government to make good their assurances." "Apprehension in Europe is an objective to which the efforts of all men of good will should be directed." This façade was flimsy but sufficient. Italians, Frenchmen, and Americans gave thanks that the Prime Minister was committed to "peace."

Meanwhile the conversations in Rome were well advanced. The path was smoothed by new commercial accords signed in London.<sup>23</sup> In an age in which Nemesis, goddess of retribution, wrought many misdeeds of irony, one of her most striking achievements was her choice of Britain's spokesman at Ciano's court. To the dictator who defied the League went, as agent of the Power which destroyed the League, the man who more than any other man (save one) had made the League. His mission was to complete the destruction of that which he had helped to create and, by way of plugging holes, upon Ciano, to arrange for the use of the League to maintain the League's demise upon Ciano's plan.

In 1919 Woodrow Wilson, founder of the League of Nations, had approved the appointment to the post of Secretary-General of Sir Eric Drummond, younger brother of the Earl of Perth. This quiet Scotsman, shy and efficient, was Roman Catholic by faith and a born secret by profession. He had entered the Foreign Office in 1908. He served as private secretary to Grey (1901), to Asquith (1901-13), and to Balfour (1913-15), who called him "the perfect private secretary." In London and later in Geneva he organized the Secretariat so skill-

fully that the first international civil service, which was the very basis of the United League system, was from the onset established upon solid foundations. On June 30, 1931, at the age of fifty-seven, he retired from his post after fourteen years of invaluable service and was succeeded by M. Joseph Avenal.

Shortly thereafter Baldwin appointed Sir Eric Blakeney Ambassador to Rome. In 1909, on the death of his brother, he became the sixth Earl of Perth. His task in 1932 was to make it clear to Mussolini that the work of demobilization which had been so successfully begun. If he ever felt qualms of conscience or twinges of regret, if he ever experienced any sense of loyalty to the dream of a new world order which he had helped to implement or any pang of grief that he should make himself the instrument of the betrayal of Wilson's vision, he kept his sentiments closely concealed in his diplomatic dispatches and his tightly rolled umbrellas. He was not to guess why. To the end he was the perfect lieutenant.<sup>18</sup>

On February 12, 1938, three days after Eden's resignation, Perth gave the Fascist salute as he boarded a train in Rome. He conferred at length in London with Chamberlain and Halifax and returned to Ciano's city on March 6. After Ciano had concluded consultations with Josef Beck, he met Perth on the 10th and fixed the agenda of the discussion. Rome and Berlin had already "accepted" the British plan for the withdrawal of volunteers from Spain. Italy had reaffirmed her pledges of January 2, 1937. Anarchism was a distraction but not an interruption. The swing of Franco's forces towards the sea encouraged hope for a speedy Fascist victory on the peninsula. On St. Patrick's Day Sir Eric gave thanks to the saint who had cleansed Ireland of snakes and perhaps to the Cradle who was cleansing Spain of "Bolshevism." The cleansing was indeed well on its way. On St. Patrick's Day German and Italian bombers raided Barcelona twelve times within twenty-four hours: 300 men, 145 women, 116 girls, boys, and babies died. The mangled bodies were laid out in long rows in the morgues. The white and bloody faces of the children were frozen in fear and uncomprehending wonder. In New York Patrick Cardinal Hayes, in his first formal press conference in seven years, publicly prayed for Franco's victory.<sup>19</sup> In Rome Sir Eric and Count Ciano amiably continued their discussions.

While the Fascist party praised the Italian legionnaires in Spain as "an essential factor in victory," Perth met Ciano for the fifth time on March 13. These days have they met again—with many meetings



thereafter. No minutes of the negotiations were published and no communications issued. But by April 1 it was intimated that an accord had been reached.<sup>12</sup> Chamberlain had no thought of "breaking" the Rome-Berlin axis. As a "realist," he knew that the axis was unbreakable despite the strain put upon it by *Armistizio*. Its durability was due to the Tory policy of appeasement. Since II Duce had successfully worried much from Britain by acting alone, it was clear that he could wait more with German support behind him. On April 1 Chamberlain in Birmingham confirmed his refusal to pledge Britain to the desire of others. Halifax in Bristol declared that "only harm is done by the perpetual use of the right of the Opposition to hurl provocative language at those responsible for the government of other countries."

On April 13 Franco's forces reached the sea at Vascos, thereby cutting Catalonia off from the rest of republican Spain. On Saturday, April 14, at 6.30 p.m., Perth and Ciano smoked their signatures to a series of documents under a glare of arc lights in the Hall of Victory of the Palazzo Chigi. At the same time Mr. and Mrs. Chamberlain, having spent a week-end the previous fortnight at Glendon, began an Easter holiday in the north of Scotland as guests of Lord and Lady Londonderry. All was right with the world. God was in His heaven. Hitler was in Berchtesgaden, contemplating his coming birthday. The Fascist, Nazi, and Tory press were all in a joyous mood. The *London Sunday Pictorial* carried a bold headline "NO BAD NEWS!"—"While millions of people forget their worries and went out to be happy, Britain and Italy were shaking hands. . . . All Europe welcomed it. The burden of two desperate years is relieved."

The complete agreement of April 15 will be found in the appendices of this volume.<sup>13</sup> Chamberlain and Mussolini exchanged congratulatory telegrams. The Ciano-Perth letters on Spain concluded in abandonment of British insistence on the withdrawal of Italian volunteers, since they pledged Rome to evacuate only after "the termination of the Spanish civil war." Perth specified, however, that "a settlement of the Spanish question" was "a prerequisite of every later stage" of the agreement. But Britain would take steps at Geneva to bring about general recognition of Italian title to Baluchistan. Italy would reduce effectiveness in Libya to peace strength and would become a party to the naval treaty of March 15, 1936. A "good neighbour" agreement between Britain, Italy, and Egypt provided for the suppression of border raids and efforts of deserters and refugees to organize armed bands. London and Cairo would then prevent Ethiopians in the Sudan, British

Somaland, or Kenya from crossing the frontier to oppose Italian control of their native land. Boundaries would be defined. Information would be exchanged on the distribution of military, naval, and air forces and bases in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Mediterranean, and Africa south to 5° latitude (running through Tanganyika) and west to 10° longitude (the Casablanca line). Both agreements would respect the integrity and independence of Yemen and Saudi Arabia and would not to prevent any third Power from acquiring sovereignty or privileges within these States or in any islands of the Red Sea. They would use their good offices to keep peace between Saudi Arabia and Yemen and avert any outside intervention. Britain here guaranteed Italy a position of equality in Arabia. The two Arab kingdoms hence, for all practical purposes, lost Anglo-Italian protection. In return Rome recognized London's possessions over Hadramaut, the vast desert hinterland of Aden, and confirmed British water rights in Lake Tana. Hostile propaganda would be eschewed. Italy would not enroll Ethiopians for military service aside from local policing and defense and would grant British missionaries access to Italian East Africa. Both Powers reaffirmed the Suez convention of October 19, 1885, for unrestricted use of the Canal at all times.

Chamberlain and Mussolini thus made a compact of which the victims were to be Ethiopia, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Spain, and the League of Nations. A Spanish "settlement" was expected somewhere. France announced that the war was won on April 19. But since the defeated Italians were not generous enough to recognize their defeat, the conflict went on. Heretofore Italian intervention on behalf of France had the express mission of Downing Street. Rome intimated that the pledge not to employ African natives for European military service depended upon a similar pledge from France (Italian East Africa had a population of less than 1,000,000; France's African colonies had almost 40,000,000 inhabitants). Rome's secret to a reduction of troops in Libya was a renunciation of blackmail. Indeed, most of the Italian commitments were pledges to desist from threats which ought at any time to easily answered. Britain pledged itself to do things (e.g. permit French victory in Spain, recognize the conquest of Ethiopia, and concede Italian rights in Arabia) which, once done, could not be undone.

There is no evidence to suggest that the Quai d'Orsay was consulted about the details of the accord before signature. London made it clear that it expected Paris to follow its example. Paris was willing.

Georges Bonnet was Foreign Minister in Edouard Daladier's "vert-rouge" Cabinet. By May the franc had fallen to thirty-four to the dollar. France was Britain's worst. Ciano received Charge Jules Moudot on April 19. On the same day President Roosevelt declared that "this government has seen the conclusion of an [Anglo-Italian] agreement with sympathetic interest because it is proof of the value of peaceful negotiation."<sup>18</sup> On April 20 Cordell Hull recognized Italian title to Ethiopia. (France gratitude for that gesture would be forthcoming in September in improved plans by Il Duce for the complete partition of the Czech Republic.) British War Minister Leslie Hore-Belisha visited Rome on April 13 and conferred with Mussolini and Ciano. Rome and London pressed Paris to seal the Pyrenean frontier to ensure Fascist victory in Spain. Paris yielded.

On April 17 Daladier and Bonnet went to London to be told what French policy should be. After seven hours of conference and much talk of wedding the London-Paris axis into an "alliance," a communiqué was issued on April 20. It asserted that the Ministers had examined the results of the Ciano-Perth accord:

The French Ministers approved this contribution to European appeasement. The British Ministers for their part expressed hope that conversations which the French Government have just opened with the Italian Government would lead to equally satisfactory results.

Hope was expressed also that Mediterranean appeasement would lead to withdrawal of volunteers from Spain. As for Central Europe the two governments "found themselves in general agreement on a line which could most profitably be undertaken with a view of ensuring peaceful and just solutions of the problem." The Far East and the forthcoming meeting of the League Council were likewise discussed. "The two governments decided to continue as far as may be necessary contacts between their general staffs which were agreed upon by virtue of the London exchange of letters of March 19, 1934." "It was recognized once again that Great Britain and France are bound to one another by a close community of interest" and that they must "continue to develop their policy of consultation and collaboration for defense not only of their common interests but also of those ideals of national and international life which have united their two countries."<sup>19</sup>

On May 2, 1938, Chamberlain showered praise on Il Duce and declared that a "settlement in Spain" could now yet be defined. Comintern approved the Rome accord, 318 to 108. On the same day Hitler

arrived in Rome to return Mussolini's visit of the preceding September. No new agreements were announced. No revealing statements were made. But there was a list. Dr. Fuhrer brought with him Ribbentrop, Goebbels, Hess, Frick, Himmler, Lammers, Minsener, Borm, Keitel, and others. Mussolini trained his legions in the government and rechristened it the *papa Romano*, much as Hitler long before had copied the Fuhrer salute and called it the "German greeting." All alien Jews in the Eternal City were beheaded or jailed. All houses, roads, yards, and streets were searched for weapons. No less than 40,000 plain-clothes men were brought in to guard and chase the visitors. Along the new triumphal way from the railroad station to the King's palace the van ruins of ancient Rome and huge new symbols of Fascism and Nationalism were floodlighted and embellished with flags and banners. Columns of red fire flared in every archway of the Colosseum as Hitler drove by with the King-Empire of Italy. Dinners, lunches, receptions, and speeches reaffirmed the solidarity of the Caesar. Hitler departed on May 9. He visited Florence and was greeted at the Brenner by Seyss-Inquart. In Berlin half a million people basked his return amid fireworks. Goering declared that the war was now "won" and that it was "a depopulation of the earthly gods that two such mighty empires should have met in a friendship destined to be everlasting."

As the festivities ended in Rome, a funeral began in Geneva: the next meeting of the League Council. The new task assigned to the League by Pash and Ciano was to give League sanction to the League's brutal British solicitude for overtures required that Geneva approve the first instrument of Ethiopia. On April 11 Downing Street had requested that the agents include the "clarification" of "the intolerable situation" presented by the fact that some States had recognized the Italian conquest while others had not. The objective was to scrap the "Sincere Doctrine" resolution of March 13, 1932, and thereby prepare the way for the execution of the Ciano-Pash accord. In a pathetic effort to avert the inevitable, Haile Selassie presented Greek and Turkish recognition of Italy's title and, on April 23, made a "token payment" of 10,000 Swiss francs to the Secretariat on Ethiopia's defaulted dues. Anglo-French efforts to exclude Ann Tamm, spokeswoman for the Noyes, failed. He was supported by distinguished advisers, including Norman Angell, James Britton, and Herbert Stanley Jevons. Though ill and weary, Haile Selassie came in person on May 11. On the 12th a tragic debate took place. Halifax asserted:

We must not be afraid to face the facts squarely. . . . When, as here, two ideals are in conflict—on the one hand the ideal of devotion, unflinching but unpractical, to some high purpose, on the other hand the ideal of a practical victory for peace—I cannot doubt that the stronger claim is that of peace. . . . Nothing is gained and much may be lost by refusal to face facts. Great as is the League of Nations, the ends it takes to serve are greater than itself and the greatest of these ends is peace. . . .

#### *Blade Belows answered*

The Ethiopian people, to whom all assistance was refused, are climbing alone their path to Calvary. No translation has been spared the victim of aggression. All resources and procedures have been used with a view to excluding Ethiopia from the League as the aggressor demands. . . . Will law win its splinter forces? Or force as against law? . . . Many Powers threatened with aggression and feeling their weakness have abandoned Ethiopia. They have uttered the cry of panic and fear: "Everyone for himself." . . . The source of these weak peoples is their very weakness. It is a certainty that they would be abandoned in Ethiopia has been and between the two evils they have chosen one which the fear of aggression led them to consider the lesser. May God forgive them. . . .

I am of course aware that in justification of the action it has taken the British Government urges lofty preoccupations. . . . But there are different ways to maintain peace. There is the maintenance of peace through right and there is peace at any price. Ethiopia firmly believes that the League has no freedom of choice in this matter. It would be committing suicide if after having been created to maintain peace through right it were to abandon that principle and adopt instead the principle of peace at any price, even the price of submission of a member State to the foot of an aggressor.

The Council abided by the choice it had already made: outside Halifax failed to obtain a General resolution. But Council President Wilhelm Muntz of Latvia announced that "the great majority of members feel, despite regrets, that it is for individual members to decide as they choose." Four delegations objected: New Zealand, Bolivia, China, and the USSR. Unanimity was lacking. Russia held

that Haifas contemplated resigning—whether from disgust at Italian or from shame at his mission as one knew. But if he thought of it, he thought better of it. Drawing Street held that Mussolini's announcement was sufficient to justify acceptance.

Before the Council adjourned on May 14, other developments at Geneva followed the pattern of panic and awe. Wellington Koo's petition for aid to China led to an empty resolution "tarnished" (according to members) to carry out the vague pledges of October and February. No aid was forthcoming. Another resolution (China and the USSR abstaining) granted Swiss demands for absolute neutrality and a release from all military obligations. When the Council ignored Augustin Edwards's demand that all coercive provisions be deleted from the Covenant, Chile gave notice of withdrawal from the League.<sup>12</sup> Adolfo del Vayo, at the close of an able speech, offered a resolution which recalled the Assembly resolution of October 4, 1917, and invited the members to end the policy of "non-intervention." Haifas was furious. Street was pained. The meeting was adjourned to permit of secret discussions. Street urged Vayo to withdraw a resolution. He refused. Street planned Delistien. He then voted against Vayo's motion, though France and Britain had supported the October resolution of which the motion was but a corollary. The British, Polish, and Romanian representatives joined him. Only Lénine and Vayo voted for it. The other nine members abstained.<sup>13</sup>

The shame of Britain—bold, hawk-nosed politician concerned chiefly with keeping his post—was the shame of France. The French-Italian negotiations crumbled. Il Duce declared at Genoa May 14: "The Spanish Front is dead and buried. . . . [In Spain] Italy and France are on opposite sides of the barricades." Paris expressed "regret." Rome threatened Tene. Moscow warned the Quai d'Orsay of desertion if it asked Mussolini to conquer Spain. Delistien declared on May 19: "France is fully capable of ensuring the integrity of her frontiers and her empire by herself."

On May 16 the "non-intervention" Committee accepted a plan for counting and restricting volunteers from Spain, to be accompanied by restoration of border controls and followed by the grant of belligerent rights. "Progress" was rendered difficult by offers of Fascist planes to cut off all supplies to the loyalists by bombing French railroad centers (Carbón, May 26, and Grita, June 3) and by attacking British and French shipping in Spanish ports. Drawing Street protested hotly to Buzon. British opinion was aroused, but the

Cabinet declared the situation to be very "complex." Halifax resumed his vacation. Chamberlain went fishing.

In celebrating solidarity with France, Rome listed Málaga, Gades, Cádiz (?), Bilbao, Santander, and Turis as Italian victories. The Fascist press admitted Italian casualties in Spain larger than those suffered by the Italian troops which had conquered Ethiopia. Rome pressed London to press Paris to seal the frontier. London complied. Paris complied. Rome pressed London to hasten a "settlement" in Spain in order to put the April accord into effect. On June 11 the non-intervention Powers once more accepted the British plan while Downing Street ignored new bombings of British vessels. Roach denounced Barcelona chartered on June 13 to bomb "the points from which the raiders come." But it took no action. By the end of June thirty-six British men had been killed and fifty-nine British vessels bombed. Chamberlain and Perth appealed to Mussolini, who promised to exercise "discreet influence" on Franco. Hodgson returned to London for consultation on June 30. Chamberlain asserted on July 7 that he would run no risks of war to protect "profit-making" in the Spanish trade.

"Non-intervention" culminated in a new formula approved by the London Committee on July 5, 1938. This formula was a long-delayed realization of the British proposal of July 15, 1937. In its brevity and bald simplicity it was the Committee's masterpiece. It consisted of 126 paragraphs, spread over 80 pages of fine print. An "International Board for Non-Intervention in Spain," working through two commissions, would supervise the withdrawal of volunteers at the rate of 1,000 per day from the side having fewer and 1,000 plus X from the other in proportion to the total number. The volunteers must first be counted by the commissions. "On the hundred and first day the Commission will begin the task prescribed in paragraph 41 below of verifying that no foreign volunteers remain unevacuated, and the Commissions will submit to the Board for the International Committee their reports of verification not later than the one hundred and forty-ninth day after the final adoption of the Resolution referred to in paragraph 15 above." An elaborate schedule of activities was prescribed up to the 149th day. Each Commission would have a staff of seven men. Details, definitions, costs were set forth minutely: 60,000 volunteers would cost £1,200,000 to evacuate; 150,000 would cost £1,400,000, intermediate numbers would cost intermediate amounts. Two funds would be set up. Britain, France, Italy, and

Germany would pay monthly installments, set out in detail. Belligerent rights would be granted when "substantial progress" had been achieved and when *civis* volunteers should have been evacuated from the side having formed and "when a proportionately larger number of foreign volunteers have been similarly evacuated from the Spanish party forced by the Joint Commission. . . . to leave the larger number of foreign volunteers" (1902, p. 193).<sup>17</sup>

The fate of this proposal was doubtful. Baptes was alone. Barcelona accepted in principle, but charged that Rome was sending new aid to the rebels. Rome feared that Italian armies had shut down 350 hospital planes since the beginning of the war. Chargé Jules Blondel called upon Ciano on August 9 to assure him that no French aid was reaching the Barcelona governments, either officially or unofficially. He protested against reports to the contrary in the Paris press and against Rome's recent decision to refuse passports to Italians wishing to visit France. Ciano demanded pressure on Italy to end aid to France. On Sunday, August 7, less than two weeks after Chamberlain had urged Commons that Italy had "kept faith," Chargé Sir Noel Charles called Ciano's attention to the difficulties Paris was experiencing in meeting criticism of its "closed frontier" policy in view of reports of additional Italian aid to the rebels. Ciano smiled blandly.

The full contents of Paris's message for Anglo-French diplomacy was revealed when France rejected the London plan. The rebel reply was apparently submitted to Sir Robert Hodgson for transmission to the Committee on August 17, but not made public in London until the 25th. At times of its desire "to offer the world obvious proof of its effective collaboration in the laudable efforts of the Committee," Baptes agreed to the withdrawal of *civis* "volunteers"—subject to equal (not proportionate) evacuations from each side and a prior (not subsequent) grant of belligerent rights. It also consented "as an extraordinary concession" to inspect two-way ports in the enemy zone for vessels carrying foodstuffs. This was offered as proof of a "generous attitude toward foreign commerce" and of "the lofty humanitarian ideals which inspire the National Government." But no right to search foreign ships and draw up its own contraband list must be unconditionally recognized. Proportionate withdrawal was said to present difficulties which would "annul and nullify the proposal." The enemy could not be trusted to refrain from "dishonest" practices. Even equal withdrawals would require additional guarantees "in order to avoid the risk of pursuing developing



was a fact." Spain's land frontiers should be unconditionally closed. But it would be impracticable or intolerable to permit observers to pass or send news. "National Spain is fighting for the defense of Western civilization in a bitter and vicious war. . . . It solemnly reiterates its former affirmation that it is fighting for the protection and independence of the country and does not consent, and will never consent, to the slightest mortgage on its soil, or on its economic life, and that it will defend at all times, to the last handful, its territory, its provinces and its colonies, if anyone dares to make an attempt against them."<sup>1</sup>

There is no reason to suppose that Franco or his supporters believed that this rejoinder had the slightest chance of acceptance by the loyalists or by any of the non-Franco or non-Fascist members of the London Committee. It was intended to scotch the whole project of withdrawing volunteers by ensuring protracted "negotiations" under the sign of Downing Street while new Italian aid should be rushed to the scattered rebel armies. This hope was not disappointed. Lord Plymouth conferred at once with Foreign Office officials. Berlin and Rome lavished praise on the rebel reply. London intimated that in reprimand would not be allowed to interfere with Anglo-Italian "friendship" despite further postponement of a Spanish "settlement." New British queries were met in Rome with an admission that fresh Italian troops and war supplies were going to Spain. But the supplies were necessary for the provisioning of the forces already there. They could obviously not be abandoned. Had not London agreed in April that they should remain until the end of the war? The new troops were not reinforcements, merely "replacements." Downing Street toyed with the notion of summoning the Non-Intervention Committee, abandoned it, and finally suggested that Secretary Hemming might go to Spain—to "explain" the plan in more detail to Franco, to "discuss" the rebel reply with Burgos, to urge "compromise," to . . .<sup>2</sup> But by this time the Spanish tragedy and the London comedy had still been superseded by a new and world-shattering crisis in Central Europe.

## 1. DEATH OVER PRAHA

When the perils of ruin harmonized with the concours of nature, when they incarnate in fire and color the cultural misery of dreams

ages and peoples, they become ruins and poetry in stone. Such a city was the ancient capital of the Kingdom of Bohemia, eloquent with the ancient echoes of the centuries. Such a city was the modern capital of Czechoslovakia, vibrant with the songs of today's generation and tomorrow's children. Along the banks of the Vltava, with its flowing blue water rushing northward toward the Elbe, grew a graceful town of domes and spires, blended of bizarre Gothic towers and baroque or rococo palaces and churches. Beyond the Charles Bridge, a structure of once suggestion of a fortress, a fairyland, and a place of worship, rose the crowning hill of the Hradcany with its great castle overlooking the sea of roofs and enclosing the mighty cathedral of St. Vitus. Here in picturesque scenes spoke long epochs of peace and strife, stretching from the dim past of party and persecution to what once promised to be a future of freedom and faith.

This city—Praha to the Bohemians, Prague to the Germans—lies in the center of a plain, ringed on the east by the Adlersberge and the Řípské hory of the Sudeten chain, on the north and northwest by the Královské, and on the west and southwest by the Břevenský. The southeast lies open toward the plains of Moravia and Slovakia. Into this basin in the age of the great migrations came the westernmost of the Slavic peoples, the Bohemians or Czechs, with their simpler kinsmen, the Slovaks, hard behind them. Into this basin between the sixth and the thirteenth centuries came Germans from the north. The national Teutonic backwash against Slavdom—constituting the original Drang nach Osten—flowed eastward in three parallel streams. Poland lay between the Prussians and the Silesian channels. Bohemia lay between Silesia and the Germans. Germans were welcomed in the cities of Bohemia as merchants and artisans. Other Germans, later called "Bohemians," settled as farmers or townsmen in an irregular fringe of territory just within the mountain walls.

The Bohemian kings were also electors of the Holy Roman Empire. Germans and Slavs lived most of the time in peace under their rule. In the days of the Hussite wars, Czechs pushed Germans back toward the ring of highlands. In the sixteenth century Germans again pressed in upon Czechs. But it was only unity that the two groups fell short of one another. So long as Bohemia was an independent kingdom the relationships between Czech majority and German minority were never relationships of domination and oppression. At times the rulers in the Hradcany wielded power far beyond the chains of institutions around the plains. Under Wenceslaus II (1278-1305) the Bohemian

Crown embraced most of what is now Poland and all of Hungary, including Transylvania, the Banat, Croatia, and Slovenia. Charles IV (1346-79) ruled Bohemia, part of Bavaria, and the Mark of Brandenburg including Potsdam and Berlin. But none of the German princes to the south ever extended their power into Bohemia. The Sudetens for long centuries were subjects of the Bohemian king. But they nevertheless subjects of the sovereigns of Bavaria, Saxony, or Prussia.

In 1546, however, the Bohemian Crown passed to the Habsburgs. And in 1618 there began in Bohemia the bloody strife between Catholics and Protestants which was to continue for thirty years and lay much of Central Europe in ruins. When Czech Protestantism was crushed at the White Mountain at the onset of the conflict, Bohemian independence perished with it. The plain became part of Austria, with the ancient mountain frontier becoming in the nineteenth century the border between the new German Reich and the Dual Monarchy. Vienna governed Bohemia and Moravia. Budapest governed Slovakia and Ruthenia. The Austrians were gentler in rule than the Hungarians, but in both cases the Slavs became subject peoples.

Political reconstruction came during the First World War. Emigrants formed the Czechoslovak National Council, which in 1918 became the provisional government of a republic not yet born, but recognized by the Allies and dependent for birth upon Allied victory. Its foundations were laid in an agreement signed at Cleveland (May 26, 1918) between representatives of the Council and the Slovak Associations of America, a convention signed at Pittsburgh (May 30, 1918), and a resolution at Geneva (November 12, 1918) voted by the first Czechoslovak Government. At the Paris Peace Conference, Slovakia and Ruthenia were separated from Hungary and awarded to Prague. A new frontier was drawn between Czechoslovakia and Austria. No German territory was annexed by the new State, save a tiny area near Trochen in Upper Silesia, disputed between Berlin, Warsaw, and Prague. Some of the Sudetan leaders raised their voices for restoration of Austrian rule. A few looked longingly to the German Republic. Robert Lattin, among others, opposed their incorporation into Czechoslovakia. Despite the views of the Quai d'Orsay and the French General Staff, even some Czechs desired the wisdom of excluding all the Sudetens in the new Bohemia. But their economic life was inseparably linked with that of the Czechs. Czechoslovakia, moreover, would be a geographically integrated and defensible State only

within its historic mountain fastness. Hence the old borders were allowed to stand. The Sudetens, who had for three centuries been ruled from Vienna, thus became subjects of Prague once more as they had been for five centuries before.<sup>10</sup>

The role of the establishment and the development of the Czechoslovak Republic has been too often told to need retelling here.<sup>11</sup> Despite Nazi hostility and Tory misrepresentation in the year of doom, the decision of the new rulers in the Hradcany to the death of liberalism stood out in Central Europe as a shining beacon amid a ruling sea of intolerance and oppression. After 1913 Czechoslovakia remained an island of democracy with all of its neighbors in one fashion or another engulfed by the cult of the new Caesar. Its leaders and its people remained true to the liberal faith, both in the conduct of their internal affairs and in their foreign policy. They looked to the creed of Wilson and to the great Western democracies for the pattern of their political practice. They looked to Geneva, to the Quai d'Orsay, and to Downing Street for security and leadership in the establishment of an ordered coexistence of nations. If in the end they were undone through treason at home and betrayal abroad, the cause lay in the circumstances that their State was small and weak in a world of giants, and they lived in a Europe in which the wages of brutality and violence were power and the wages of generosity and tolerance were death.

Three men led the Czechoslovakia to independence. None was a demagogue or dictator. All were scholars and gentlemen of humble birth. The first Czechoslovak Government, established abroad in October 1918, was headed by Milan Štefánik, Thomas Masaryk, and Eduard Beneš. On October 28 Masaryk formally proclaimed the independence of Czechoslovakia in Washington. He became its President, with Dr. Kravský as Premier, Beneš as Foreign Minister, and Štefánik, a Slovak leader who had long lived in France, as Minister of War. Štefánik, who spent the closing months of the year of liberation with the Czechoslovak Legion in Siberia, was killed in a plane crash in May 1921 on his return to his native Slovakia. Masaryk and Beneš represented the Republic at the Paris Peace Conference.

Thomas Garrigue Masaryk was the son of a coachman and a cook. He survived apprenticeship to a locksmith and a blacksmith and embarked upon an academic career. His first book was a sociological study: *Suicide as a Mass Phenomenon*. He became a professor in Prague and married an American girl, Charlotte Garrigue, whom he

met in Leipzig and whose name he adopted as his own. He repeatedly jeopardized his academic career by championing unpopular causes. He was assailed as a champion of the Jews, an enemy of the State, a non-Christian, and a free lover. He contended, often at personal risk, to expose falsehood and to champion justice and truth. These qualities, coupled with a brilliant mind, earned him fame. He taught at many other places at the University of Chicago and later became a warm admirer of Woodrow Wilson. His political career began at an age when most men have retired from active life. He was sixty-eight when Czechoslovakia became independent. For seventeen years he served the Republic as President. He retired in December 1933 at the age of eighty-five. At his funeral on September 21, 1937, President Roosevelt expressed the feeling of all who knew him: "As we think of that great life, a life so abundantly full, a life which covered nearly a whole century, we think of the amazing wealth of intellectual work and of achievement that is represented, we reflect upon the stress of that great life's pilgrimage, and slowly into our hearts there enters calm, clarity, certainty, firmness, and pride."<sup>10</sup>

Masaryk's successor as President of Czechoslovakia was he who for seventeen years had been Foreign Minister of the new State. Edward Beneš, born in Koutany, May 28, 1884, was the child (youngest of six) of a Bohemian peasant family. He met Masaryk at the University of Prague in 1904. He later studied at the Sorbonne and *l'École libre des Sciences Politiques*. During the war he remained in Paris. If Masaryk was Plato's philosopher-king of Czechoslovak independence, Beneš was the practical diplomat and administrator. If Masaryk demonstrated that a philosopher can be a politician and still remain an honest man, Beneš demonstrated that a politician can be a diplomat without selling his soul. "I never feel more of myself except when I am speaking the truth," Beneš spoke truth. But he and his State came at last to grief and he went alone and unwept into exile, to follow Masaryk's earlier steps to America and to the University of Chicago. This final pilgrimage away from the tomb of his hopes and toward a new shrine of freedom was necessitated by the fact that the Europe which he had served so well had become a citadel of falsehood.<sup>11</sup>

Among these falsehoods was the legend, sedulously cultivated in Tory and Nazi circles, that Czechoslovakia was "a monstrosity of a country" made up of incongruous nationalities with Czechs opposing subject peoples and the whole "owned by Moscow" (Lord Rothermere to Winston Churchill, August 10, 1938). Neither the intellect-

not of aggression nor the rationalizations of betrayal could alter the truth which Masaryk, Beneš, and their countrymen served with unwavering loyalty. As the request of the Quai d'Orsay, Czechoslovakia had concluded alliances with France, Britain, and Yugoslavia, and, following the French example, a similar entente just with the USSR. Praga trusted Paris, as Moscow trusted Paris. Praga and Moscow fulfilled their obligations. Paris did not. All trusted London, even after London had proved unworthy of trust. No less an authority than Lord Halifax could say in a document of post-mortem eulogy: "If only Great Britain would say clearly and unambiguously for all to hear that she would stake any unprovoked aggression against Czechoslovakia, no such unprovoked aggression would be made" (House of Lords, October 3, 1938). Chamberlain and Hitler refused such a pledge on March 12, 1938, and refused it themselves because those for whom they spoke desired Czechoslovakia's ruin at the hands of Hitler. The Republic was betrayed not by its leaders nor by its people nor by Moscow nor even by the Third Reich, but by the spoilers of "ap-proposals" who deceived the Tory-Nazi masses.

Praga's treatment of the non-Czechoslovak peoples within the Republic was, without qualification or exception, the most generous and the most democratic accorded by any of the States of Europe, new or old, to the minorities under their control. As in Poland, the minority peoples totaled a third of the whole population. Among 3,440,000 inhabitants in 1939, the Czechs and Slovaks numbered 2,070,000 (60.2%), the Germans 3,131,000 (22.7%), the Hungarians 821,000 (23.7%), the Ruthenians 144,000 (4.2%) and the Poles 21,000 (0.3%).<sup>14</sup> Since the new State was unitary, not federal, the Slovaks did not receive the measure of autonomy which some of their leaders believed them to be entitled to under the Pittsburgh agreement. The Ruthenians grumbled little since their lot was infinitely better than that of their co-laborers in Poland and Rumania. Some Poles preferred Warsaw to Praga, while some Hungarians yearned for reunion with Budapest. The Slovaks had never been ruled from Berlin, nor a threat any reason to believe, even at the end, that a majority of them voluntarily agreed to annexation by the Reich. All these peoples, almost alone among the minorities of Europe, enjoyed full rights of citizenship and suffrage, equality before the law, freedom of speech, press, and assembly, and their own schools, churches, and cultural institutions. Over a period of twenty years all honest and informed observers concurred in Anthony Eden's judg-

ment of October 7, 1908: "There is no German minority in Central or Eastern Europe that is enjoying today privileges equal to those the Sudeten Germans always had."<sup>42</sup>

The growth of Czechoslovakia's doom must be sought not in the "injustice" of Versailles nor in the "prejudices" of "oppressed" Sudetens, but in Nazi Pan-Germanism and the Drang nach Osten and in the progress of Downing Street and Chamberlain. For the rulers of the Third Reich, Czechs and Slovaks were but "Eastern European sub-humanity" beyond the pale of "Aryan" justice and "Nordic" law. A divine mission summoned Der Führer to enslave Bohemia as he had despoiled Austria. Said Herr Frank, Minister of Justice, in 1937: "We are under the great obligation of recognizing as a holy work of the spirit of our folk the treaty signed with Adolf Hitler's name. Hitler has received his authority from God. Therefore he is a champion, sent by God, of German Rights in the world."<sup>43</sup> The fulfillment of the mission was possible only with British collaboration. With patience and chicanery and Tory aid, all things were possible. Thus Chamberlain.

It is not only moral, but necessary, that the nation's leaders should watch jealously that national forces of our country remain united at a time—of which we believe that the race is aware has come—in which the world is being reconstituted. It is necessary to proceed slowly. A good chess-player moves cautiously. There are problems which cannot be circumvented. They will be solved some day, as, for example, the fact that Germany is the only Great Power without colonies. It is not possible to say when, just as little as one could say when Austria would be incorporated, or the Rhineland occupied. All this takes place step by step at a time when we run the least possible risks. . . . The risks become smaller the more powerful we become. . . . A competition has arisen with the definite intention of competing for the wealth of victory and to demand and regain the place in the sun which we lost by our weakness.<sup>44</sup>

The instrument of Nazi imperialism in Czechoslovakia was the *Sudeten Deutsche Partei* (SDP). This late creation was the embryonic league of various Sudeten factions. In 1919 both the German bourgeois party groups, favoring annexation, and the German Social Democrats, favoring autonomy, refused to take part in the government at Prague. But in 1921 the bourgeois groups split into "Nagelbrenner"

(Nationalists and Nazis) and "Agrarians" (Agrarians and Christian Socialists), with the latter prepared to co-operate in the Czechoslovak Cabinet and parliament. In 1915 the Agrarians polled 500,000 votes in the Sudeten districts and the Nazis only 140,000. The Agrarians joined the Cabinet in October 1918. When the Christian Socialists withdrew four years later, the German Social Democrats replaced them. Thus the great majority of the Sudeten voters, prior to the onset of the Great Depression, supported the parties committed to loyal collaboration with non-German groups within the framework of the Republic.<sup>10</sup>

In view of the fact that political consciousness is a product of misery, it is scarcely strange that the peripheral or marginal members of social groups are more addicted to extremism than those securely at its centre. Neither is it remarkable that impoverishment and despair breed revolutionary hysteria. The name and many of the symbols of "Nationalsozialismus" originated in pre-War Bohemia among the borderland Sudetens who were more ardent Pro-Germans than were the Austrians or Polesians. After 1918 many of them badly needed their new lot. They were at no time exploited or oppressed, but the exclamations of Prague in the first flush of recovered independence did not assuage their indignation. Since the Sudeten towns were dependent for prosperity on international markets, they suffered severe hardships from the world-wide economic collapse after 1929. Their distress was no worse than that of the depressed areas of England or that of many American industrial centres. They enjoyed access to public funds and to work-relief projects along with the other peoples of the Republic, though distribution was based upon the size of the minority rather than upon the amount of unemployment prevailing among them. Many Sudeteners attributed their ills to the Czechs, so many Germans attributed theirs to Jews, Maschias, Slavs, or Freemasons. Misery replaced the ranks of the Agrarians and swelled those of the Nazis. This trend was accelerated after the Nazi conquest of the Reich.

On October 1, 1934, Konrad Henle, chief of the Sudeten Turnverein, issued a manifesto asking support for a United German Party. This hitherto obscure leader had organised a *Hilfsverein* in October 1913 after the "voluntary" dissolution and orderly entry of the NESAP in Czechoslovakia. He was smooth-faced, bespectacled, bespoken, and scarcely a Marxist. This somewhat dull and plodding war veteran and bank clerk had accepted an appointment as a grass-  
 10. See also the excellent study by J. H. M. G. van der Stoep, *The German Minority in Czechoslovakia* (London, 1961).



ric instructor at the Reichsberg Turnvereins and, by virtue of administrative skill, had become head of the association of German gymnastics societies, which had long been hotbeds of ultra-nationalism and anti-Semitism in rivalry with the liberal Czech Sokol organization. In the national election of May 1913 the *Deutschnationale* took the name of SDP and won 40% of the Sudeten vote. Heuklen refused to be a candidate, but he now had 44 deputies in parliament, constituting the second largest single party in a legislature of many small groups.<sup>44</sup>

Heuklen first met Hitler at the Olympic games of 1936. Their relations were not then cordial. Heuklen's demands for autonomy were, at least at the outset, genuine demands for self-government within the established framework of the Republic. His supporters were in part sincere converts and in part cynical or even hostile persons won to his service by the kinds of pressures upon dissidents which Nazi organizers were adept at applying. The *Leitender Führer's* voyage from loyal advocacy of autonomy to pretended advocacy is a mark for Hitler and finally to open union (September 15, 1938) proceeded by gradual and secret steps.<sup>45</sup> He was much influenced by an agreement of February 18, 1937, between the German Activities and Premier Milan Rastka, whereby most of the Sudeten demands were granted, at least on paper. He proposed that each nationality be organized into a National Corporation on totalitarian principles. This move, however, alienated some of his followers, as did the homosexual scandal and suicide of his aide, Herr Rastka. How many of his followers desired that which he never publicly intended to until the late spring of 1938—secession and annexation to the Reich? How many followed out of fear? How many took the SDP program of "autonomy" at face value? How many followed without reason but merely for the joy of cheering and marching along with their fellows? These questions admit of no answer. By the time of Austrian Anschluss Heuklen was already in the habit of making frequent visits to the Reich. What plans were laid, what plots were hatched, no outsider could say. But the SDP had in fact become what its outworn predecessor had been: a camouflaged arm of the NSDAP, directed from Berlin through the Foreign Organization under Ernst Wilhelm Bohle. As such it was an instrument of propaganda, espionage, and potential rebellion to serve the purposes of the Third Reich.

Heuklen had long had friends in London, including Sir Robert Vondráček. To many influential Britons he seemed to be a sincere and honest spokesman of "self-determination." These contacts were to

achieved before Hodan made his peace with Hitler by becoming a secret protagonist of Sudeten secession. They were continued after the largest warcrack. They played no inconsiderable role in implementing the Tory-Nazi rapprochement. Hodan and Hitler were as divided as the Tory oligarchy in employing democratic camouflage to serve the purposes of anti-democratic *Maréchalpolitik*. A fortnight after Austria had been done to death in the name of "self-determination," and six months before the "Peace" of Munich, Major Asier's Geoffrey Dawson in *The Times* (March 21, 1938) foreshadowed the shape of things to come in Bohemia:

If we were to involve ourselves in war to preserve Czech sovereignty over these Germans, without first clearly ascertaining their wishes, we might well be fighting against the principle of self-determination. A dangerous situation thus exists, the remedy for which is to ascertain the wishes of the Sudeten Germans. The best means of doing this would be an international plebiscite, on the lines of that held in the Saar territory in January 1935.

Before the assault on Austria, Hodan told parliament (March 4): "If we are to be faced by the necessity of defending ourselves, Czechoslovakia will defend, defend, defend." During the assault Prague remained passive. Göring and Neurath gave assurances that the Reich had no hostile designs. Chamberlain in *Commons* on March 14 declared: "His Majesty's Government take note of, and in no way undermine, the definite assurances given by the German Government regarding their attitude." His refusal to pledge Britain to defend or Prague and his warning to Berlin not to resort to war could have (for Hitler) but one meaning: if Berlin would refrain from force, London would make it as pleasant as it desired without force. *Der Führer* appreciated that Chamberlain might require encouragement through threats of force. Such threats might at first be intended, but eventually would merely drive the Prime Minister to new postures on Prague. Such threats would later be welcomed as a means of moderating passions effective and convincing. Pains and the British public that "concessions" were essential for "peace." "It is now widely taken for granted," wrote Sir Arthur Wilson, "that, sooner or later, Germany will bring the Czechs under her thumb by indirect means. . . . The fate of Austria made European capitals less, rather than more, afraid of war. Why, it is asked, should Germany risk coming to blows when she is getting all she wants by bluff?" "

British Minister Basil Cochrane Newson reported to London on March 24 that Beneš had received favorably informed British suggestions for "concessions." The German Christian Socialists withdrew from the Cabinet and, following the example of the German Agrarians, joined the SDP, which hitherto had 55 deputies and was the largest single party in the State. On the same day Father Andrej Hlinka, leader of the Slovak reactionaries, demanded Slovak sovereignty and asserted: "We are in the midst of a decisive struggle against internationalism and Bolshevism."<sup>1</sup> Four days later a French newspaper reported from Berlin that Germany would demand that Prague terminate its alliances with Paris and Moscow and grant autonomy to its German, Polish, and Hungarian minorities as a step toward unification of the border areas by Berlin, Warsaw, and Budapest.<sup>2</sup> Hlinka announced that his Cabinet would prepare a nationalist program guaranteeing increased rights to all minorities. Berlin welcomed Lord Besset's suggestion in the British press of a plebiscite to determine whether the Sudetens should accept autonomy, acquiesce in the same *quo, et quo* for annexation to the Reich. Journalists in London and Paris reported that official opinion in both capitals favored "autonomy" and "neutralization" for Czechoslovakia if only these steps would appease Berlin.<sup>3</sup>

Such a combination of pressures against the Republic encouraged Hitler to proceed with his program. While Paul-Boncour, on the eve of the fall of the Blum Cabinet, negotiated faintly with Warsaw, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Moscow concerning the defense of Prague, Beneš proclaimed an *Exerzt* annexity in a vain hope of pleasing the Little Entente. On April 22, 20,000 Hungarians demonstrated in Budapest for the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in the name of "self-determination" and "defense against Bolshevism." On April 24, Himmler presented to an approving Congress of the SDP at Karlsruhe a new program of demands:

1. Complete equality in the areas of Sudeten-Germans and Czechs.
2. Recognition of Sudetens as a corporate group.
3. Definition and recognition of Sudeten interests.
4. Immediate administration of such districts in all departments of public life.
5. Legal protection for Sudetens living outside of Sudeten districts.
6. Removal of injustices inflicted since 1918 and compensation for damage caused thereby.
7. Recognition and enforcement of the principle: German officials in German districts.

2. Full liberty for Sudeten to join German Volkstum and German Fatherland."<sup>10</sup>

Hindenburg's speech at Kassel had all but discarded the pretence that the SDP was still seeking autonomy. Armed threats and defiance, he demanded that Prague reject "the atrocious Czech historical myth," abandon all idea of a Slavic bulwark against the Drang nach Osten, and relinquish the French and Soviet alliances. Assassins with the Reich was for the first time clearly lined up. Goebbels' propaganda machine gave full support to Hindenburg's imperatives. The Vienna Reichspost (April 15) predicted that Czechoslovakia would not last another year. On April 17 a German Cabinet member told the press: "If the Czechs resisted that France and England do not care to squander the life-blood of their soldiers for a foreign State, the Czechs too would soon quarrel with Germany by ending the Sudeten region."<sup>11</sup>

After April 14 the central issue was whether Hitler would wait for Dönitzing Street to wear down Czech and French resistance or would resort to force at once. The visit of Daladier and Bonnet to London at the end of April was followed by suggestions that the British and French Governments would do all in their power to induce Prague to adopt a course likely to forestall German intervention. Anglo-French "representations" were made at Prague and Berlin on April 28, but their purport was not revealed. On May 13 it was announced in Prague that Hindenburg had organized a "Stormtroop" corps of the SDP, so be known as the "Freiwilliger Deutscher Schutzbund." It was announced in London on the same day that Baron Mount Temple had arranged for Berlin to visit the British capital.

Hindenburg's visit to London, May 13-14, 1938, is a curious episode in a drama of fear and threat. Thanks to the pleas of Minister Jan Masaryk, he was not received by any Cabinet members. He met Sir Robert Vignacourt and went to a tea party arranged by Laurence Harold Nicolson and attended by Cranborne. He spent three hours with Winston Churchill and Liberal leader Sir Archibald Sinclair, both of whom found him "moderate" in mood. All circumstantial evidence points to the conclusion that the visit was arranged by inner circles in Berlin and London to convince the British Opposition of Hindenburg's "innocence" and of the "justice" of the Sudeten demands. Vladimir Polakovic ("Angor") reported in the New York Times of May 14 that Chamberlain was prepared to buy peace from Hitler at the cost of colonial concessions and the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. Hindenburg pronounced himself satisfied with his journey. On

his return, despite an invitation to confer with Hodza on the nationalistic situation, he proceeded to Vienna on a mysterious and probably unaccountable mission. Municipal elections throughout Czechoslovakia were scheduled for May 12, May 29, and June 12. On the basis of Hirdle's report from London, Hitler apparently decided upon an immediate blow.

The May crisis of 1938 was a consequence of *Der Führer's* desire either to experiment with preparations for a lightning attack on Prague "by way of seeing whether the French bloc had already disintegrated under Tory and Nazi pressure—or to give Chamberlain new inducements to hasten a settlement on Berlin's terms. On Friday, May 21, while Halden was telling Jan Masaryk that Prague must make further concessions, Sir North Henderson called at Wilhelmstrasse to inquire about reports of German mobilization on the Czech frontier. He was assured by Ribbentrop and Keitel that all troop movements were "benigna." On Saturday morning Henderson called again and received no satisfaction. During the course of the morning three events threw the Continent into a panic: (1) on the border near Eggen two Saxons, George Hofmann and Nikolaus Becker, were shot to death by Czech guards while attempting to flee into Germany, (2) Hirdle's party announced its refusal to negotiate with Hodza, (3) Prague, in hourly expectation of an ultimatum or an invasion from Berlin, called out 80,000 reserves and moved 400,000 troops to the frontiers. Peace hung by a hair.

There is some reason to believe that Prague's first news of the mobilization of several German divisions (a fact which Hitler in September vehemently denied) came from Jan Masaryk, who secured his information from the Foreign Office, which got it on Friday from the British Intelligence Service in the Reich. Henderson in Berlin had had a falling-out with Ribbentrop. When he got no answers to his queries, he ordered special trains for the evacuation of British subjects—thus warning Berlin unmistakably of war. Whether he took this action on his own initiative or on orders from Downing Street is not yet known. Bonnet had received reports from François-Poncet of German mobilization. His preoccupation with "breast money" and his own political ambitions precluded solicitude for French diplomatic influence. Under British pressure he was already moving toward the desertion of Prague. But desertion could not be consummated under the conditions which Hitler had created on May 21. Time was needed and a long preparation of public and demonstration. The Czech

counter-move forced his hand. Paris announced support of Prague. London, caught off guard, had no option but to support Paris.

German, Polish, and Hungarian inquiries in Prague claimed the explanation that troops had been sent to the border area solely to "keep order" during the elections. Following the receipt on Saturday evening of alarming reports from Hindenburg, Chamberlain summoned his Cabinet to an extraordinary Sunday session. Prague was prepared to fight and not to yield. Berlin and Rome cut telephonic communications between Paris and Prague, but Deladier and Berthot assured Krofta that France would fulfill her obligations. If Paris fought, Moscow would fight. Hitler and Chamberlain, perceiving that Hitler was attempting to confront them with a new fait accompli before their own preparations at home were complete, and realizing that Britain could not remain neutral in a general war precipitated by a Nazi invasion of Czechoslovakia, indicated that London would support Prague and Paris. A "war council" was held at Berchtesgaden, Sunday evening, May 21, attended by Hitler, Göring, Giebbels, Ribbentrop, and the heads of the Reichswahr. In the face of Franco-Czech and Anglo-French solidarity, the decision was for "peace." The German troops were withdrawn from the frontier on Monday. The "crisis-point" was averted.

On Monday, after Hitler had urged such a step as Godes, Cuno pleaded for moderation with German Ambassador Macdonald. The Nazi press turned and raged. Hitler, far from un-bluffed and outnumbered by a prospective victim and by a united front against him, recoiled. Chamberlain announced in the House of Commons that Hodon would confer with Hodta after all, that His Majesty's Government in full co-operation with France had urged upon Prague "the need for taking every precaution for the avoidance of incidents and for making every possible effort to reach a comprehensive and lasting settlement by negotiations with representatives of the Sudeten party." He added that Downing Street had "expressed to the German Government the urgent importance of reaching a settlement if European peace is to be preserved" and had expressed its sincere desire that the German Government should co-operate." Assurance had been received. "The situation appears to have somewhat eased."

Hodon also expanded on Monday and agreed to meet Hodta. His prior demands that he be granted safe-conduct and immunity from arrest for treason and that Hodta come to confer with him in Karlsbad were refused. On Tuesday, however, he broke off the talks and re-

turned to his home in Aach. On Wednesday, amid flaring torches of "blood and soil," he attended the funeral at Eger of the two "martyrs," whose Hitler honored with wreaths. The Nazi press denounced Chamberlain, Berlin made new protests at border violations by Czech aircraft. Prague made counter-charges. The Italian press stated that Germany had suffered a "defeat." On Saturday Sudeten deputies resumed discussion with Hitler. Czechoslovak troops remained on the frontier. On Monday, May 30, the Republic decreed military service for all citizens between six and sixty. In the municipal elections Hitler's followers contested or carried over 80% of the Sudeten votes into supporting SDP candidates, but the Government parties maintained their position elsewhere. Czechoslovakia thus refused to be "written off" without a struggle.

Chamberlain then failed, thanks to Czechoslovak and French courage, in his first attempt deliver Czechoslovakia to Hitler. He was compelled to do what he said he would not do: defend Czechoslovakia against Nazi aggression. British military observers on the scene watched the Bohemian border for new incidents. Harcourt told G. Ward Price (*The Daily Mail*, May 14) that the "solution" of the Sudeten problem must be sought through economy, or through a plebiscite on annexation to Germany, or, "temporarily," through "direct action" by the Reich. But he happened to deny the interview after German Minister Essener in Prague had been reprimanded from Berlin. Hitler was not prepared to risk "direct action" as long as Paris, Moscow, and London were prepared to go to Prague's defence.<sup>10</sup>

Downing Street was willing to surrender Czechoslovakia to Der Führer, once this was essential for the execution of the Nazi program, to which the Tory leaders had given their blessing. But the giving must be disguised as "general appeasement." It must not involve risks of war among the Western Powers. It must be presented to British and French opinion, however, as the only alternative to war. Meanwhile, the further demagregation of the French blue must be delayed and steps must be taken to ensure that the Drang nach Osten would move toward Moscow and not toward England. On July 3 a French-Turkish pact of friendship was signed, along with a joint declaration regarding the Sanjak of Alexandretta in Syria. Turkish troops marched in, two days later, to share control with French forces. The League of Nations Commission, charged with supervising a proposed election and the transformation of the Sanjak

1920 as autonomous area, hurriedly retired. It was rumored that Turkey would permit British, French, and Soviet hostages to pass freely through the straits in time of war in return for partial or complete Turkish control of Alexandria. By financial pressure, London compelled Berlin on July 1 to pay Austrian debts to British creditors.<sup>22</sup> Governing Britain likewise guaranteed a £1,000,000 credit for British exports to Turkey and granted a £4,000,000 loan to Ankara for purchase of British arms.<sup>23</sup>

Meanwhile Premier Svyatlovich had visited Ciano in Venice in mid-June. Through exchanges of notes on June 22 among Switzerland, Italy, and Germany, the Fascist Powers heeded Bern's advice from all League sanction obligations and promised to "respect" Swiss neutrality. Bloody closing broke war in Palestine. At Evian on July 3 delegates from thirty-two governments met to discuss the problem of refugees from Germany and Austria in accordance with Roosevelt's suggestion. Myron C. Taylor, head of the United States delegation, was elected permanent president on July 5. He denounced "human dumping" and urged that a permanent refugee organization be established to facilitate emigration. A committee, presided over by Earl Winterton, with George Rabbin of the United States as director, was subsequently set up in London. But the problem created by Fuchs and Rosenberg grew at geometric progression, while "volunteers" gave only in arithmetic progression. No State would share open its doors to penniless refugees or punish the practice of intolerance by retaliatory measures. Thus encouraged by democratic conscience in its persecutions, Berlin insisted upon robbing the remaining German Jews of all their goods before permitting them to depart. "Appeasement" required that international measures to aid the victims of the Nazi pogrom should not offend the persecutors, since it was obvious to all right-thinking Britons, Americans, and Frenchmen that the "co-operation" of the persecutors was essential for the "peace" of their victims.

This logic applied to the Czechoslovak Republic as late than to the German Jews. Milor Ausor and Geoffrey Dawson draw the necessary conclusions, skillfully disguised in the verbiage of right thinking. The fact of Prague was clearly forecast by *The Times* of June 3, 1938:

Czechoslovakia . . . will affect the most urgent problems to European diplomacy, and the letters which continue to reach this office bear witness to the earnest taken in its solution by British



public opinion. One which was published yesterday from the Desk of St. Paul's was typical of many, and an effective expression of the view that the Germans of Czechoslovakia ought to be allowed by plebiscite or otherwise to decide their own future—even if it should mean their separation from Czechoslovakia to the Reich. With this view the majority of Englishmen probably agree. . . . The rigid application of the principle of self-determination everywhere is obviously impracticable, but for the rectification of an injustice left by the Treaty of Versailles the Sudeten Germans have an unobscured case. There is also a great deal to be said for it on another count, for it would afford a welcome example—always supposing that the Sudeten Germans want to be transferred—of peaceful change. In the past there has been too much rigidity in maintaining the status quo to a point at which only violence could alter it. . . .

For all these reasons (economic and strategic) it is easily intelligible that the Czech government might not willingly agree to a plebiscite likely to result in a demand for the transfer of the Sudetens and the loss of their territory for the Republic. Nevertheless if they could see their way to it, and to granting a similar chance to the other minorities, Hungarians and Poles, the rulers of Czechoslovakia might in the long run be the greatest in having a homogeneous and contented people. . . . If it was an injustice that these minorities should have been included in the new Republic, that injustice would be removed, and the neighboring States which risk a racial incense in their kinsmen would have to look after them themselves and would lose any sort of claim to interfere in the affairs of Czechoslovakia. It would be a drastic remedy for the present ills, but something drastic may be needed.

"Drastic" indeed would be the remedy of turning over to the Hun empire an area whose leaders and people had been giddy off an orbit beyond a democracy to which and freedom and a freedom both in the words of those solemnly pledged to protect them. The list of the betrayed was long and growing longer: Harbin, Peking, and Nanking; Jerusalem, Geneva, and Addis Ababa; Madrid, Valencia, and Barcelona; Shanghai, Canton, and Hankow; and, most recently, Vienna. None would be the city of the Highway by the waters of the Nilethos.

## DESIGN FOR GIVING

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### I. RESCUE BY RUNCIMAN

GLAZEN CARRIE in Forfarshire houses many ghosts, among them disquieting those of Berquo and Malcolin, King of Scotland, done to death by Macbeth, Thane of Cawdor. Near the close of the fourteenth century, by grace of Robert II, Glazie passed to Sir John Lyon of Forfarshire. One of his descendants, Sir Claude George Bower-Lyon, later fourteenth Earl of Strathmore and Kinghorne, married a daughter of the Cavendishes and Bertrams in 1881. She bore him six children. The Countess's child destined above others for fame and fortune was a girl christened Elizabeth. In her youth she met and married a brother of the Prince of Wales, the Duke of York. In the fulness of time Wales became Edward VIII. For love of a lady Edward VIII shortly became merely Duke of Windsor. Elizabeth's husband then became King George VI. In June 1938, while a pathetic handful of Londoners celebrated the Duke Windsor's forty-fourth birthday, the aged Countess of Strathmore and Kinghorne lay on her death-bed. On June 13 she joined the ghosts of Glazie. Within six days of her passing her daughter Elizabeth Regina was to have gone to Paris with George Rex on an elaborate State visit. But occurring was now an order: M. Albert Lebrun, President of France, sent condolences and assumed no participation.

Politics was in the summer doldrums. Aside from the Mistress of Glazie, there were two deaths of the once great Samuel Insull, born in Britain and enriched in America, died in Paris on July 13. Dowager Queen Marie of Romania, granddaughter of Queen Victoria, died at Sinaia two days later. Winston Churchill failed in Commons to secure a postponing of the case of Duncan Sandys, Conservative M.P. who

was at odds with the War Minister as to whether he was subject to prosecution under the Official Secrets Act for revealing, from confidential sources, the hopes and losses of defense measures. Hitler decreed compulsory civilian service for national defense, but few abroad perceived the import of his move. Two citizens were dragged on in China and Spain. Bergen awarded to Count Ciano a Knighthood of the Order of Isabel the Catholic, and to General Göring a Grand Knighthood and the Collar of the Great Imperial Order of Red Annona. Mr. Chamberlain exchanged letters with Premier Daladier. He declined in Commons to make them public. They were private, he said, and only showed once more "the close accord between the two governments." All this was dull. Far more exciting were the gaily preparations for the royal visit. For once the festivities would be unclouded by any political storm. The Prime Minister would say home.

In mid-July a distinguished British guest arrived in Berlin to attend an astronomical congress. He had recently conferred with the Prime Minister. But since he held no official post, these contacts were merely those of friends. He was also a friend of Göring, Ribbentrop, and Hitler. The guest was the Marquess of Londonderry. His visit bore fruit. On July 17 something described as "a personal message from Chancellor Hitler to Mr. Chamberlain" was delivered to Viscount Halifax by Captain Fritz Wiedemann, *Der Führer's* aide-de-camp, who had been a captain on the Western Front in the company in which Hitler was corporal. He desired no high posts or honors, but he enjoyed Hitler's confidence as did few in *Der Führer's* entourage. He had been in England for several days on one of his periodical visits of exploration. He wanted until the day before the departure of the royal party for Paris to deliver his message. All officialdom denied until the morning of the 19th that he had seen anyone of Cabinet rank. But then it was conceded that he had spent twenty minutes with Halifax on the preceding day at the Foreign Minister's house in Eaton Square.

The message, it was rumored, was one of greeting and good-will bespeaking hope for an improvement of Anglo-German relations and for a "non-violent solution" of the Sudean problem in Czechoslovakia. The Foreign Ministry had expressed thanks and replied in kind. On the same day, it was later learned, Ambassador Herbert von Döberitz conveyed similar "assurances" in a call upon Sir Alexander Gidgen. On July 19 George and Elizabeth were received with pomp and

popularity in Paris. Madame Lehmann carried. King and President exchanged words of mutual friendship at a State banquet in the evening. The Queen wore the ank and badge of the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honor, bestowed by the President. The President wore the Collar of the Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath, bestowed by the King. The guests and the crowds were overflowed. On the same day Wiedemann flew back to Berlin, where Sir Nisde Henderson had been conferring with Baron Ernst von Witzenecker of Witzeneck and where it was taken for granted that Wiedemann had gone to London to discuss British policy toward Czechoslovakia.

Mystery surrounded these moves. The Wiedemann visit was the overtone to a drama more wonderful and fearful than any yet played on the diplomatic stage. What passed between Halifax and the Kaiser? Contemporary press accounts surmised that Wiedemann had urged a Czechoslovak "isolation" through a four-power pact, and that Halifax would urge this upon France. It is probable, though this cannot yet be documented, that the essential features of the *St. Germain* settlement of September 29 were agreed upon in London on July 16, if not before. At all events, Bonar Law met the royal yacht *Endymion* at Boulogne and conferred privately with Halifax on the train to the capital. In their formal addresses Lehou and George VI affirmed that "it would now be impossible to recall a period when our relations were more intimate," though happily "our attitude does not exclude any other friendship." Whether Halifax thus only suggested to Bonar the price of this intimacy is uncertain. Chamberlain, it was rumored, had for some time been exchanging views with Fisher through secret and unknown intermediaries. Czechoslovakia, it was reported, would not be permitted to stand in the way of an Anglo-German rapprochement. All that was needful was that Downing Street carry the Quai d'Orsay with it in any "general settlement." Paris must "admit" Prague to make "concessions." And Paris must not allow Prague to stand in the way of "appeasement."

Chamberlain kept silent. His only admission to Commons was that Prague had recently granted facilities for the attachment of two "observers" to the British Legation, and the observers had denied German reports of Czech mobilization. On July 18, while the King and Queen attended art museums and garden parties and saw *Salome* at the Opéra, Halifax conferred with Deladier and Bonnet at the Quai d'Orsay in utmost secrecy, with no secretaries and no interpreters. So careful was their discourse that the guests at the royal

London were kept waiting. A communique spoke of "a spirit of mutual confidence," "action of pacification," and "complete harmony of views." The press opened that Halifax had brought a plan from Hitler for the "solution" (*liquidation*) of Czechoslovakia, had refused French plans for a military guarantee of Prague, and had indicated that there would be no British aid if France defended its ally.<sup>2</sup> Deladier and Bonnet summoned to the discussion Chamberlain, Blum, and Herriot as well as Ambassador Charles Corbin and Czech Minister Stefan Osvobodi—essentially to persuade Halifax to join France in pledging defense of Czechoslovakia. If such was their purpose, they failed. Halifax was doubtless convinced that his French "friends" would yield if confronted with overwhelming threats and pressure. It later became known that at this conference Halifax suggested that Britain might act as "mediator" in the Czech-Soviet controversy.

On Friday, July 11, while King George dedicated a monument to the American war dead and took his leave, it was reported from London that Chamberlain had transmitted to Dalman an Anglo-French rejection of a German proposal that the four Western Powers "withdraw" the Czech-Slovakian issue. Then, it was hinted, was the plan which Wolfram had brought to Halifax, and Halifax had taken to Paris. Dalman returned to Berlin "on a holiday" as the British sovereigns came back to their capital. The proposed procedure was precisely the procedure to be employed two months later. Hints of German proposals for "neutralizing" Czechoslovakia were also current on July 11. If Chamberlain "rejected" such suggestions, was his rejection genuine or *pro forma*—or was it perhaps merely an appeal for delay? He scarcely did not tell Dalman, then or later, that Britain would fight to prevent a four-Power dissolution of Czechoslovakia. He needed time to win Paris and the British public to the sacrifice. A "semi-official" account declared that no new suggestions were made, that Dalman merely voiced Germany's desire for a peaceful solution, and that Chamberlain promised British "good offices" at Prague. On the 12d Lord Cochrane Newton, British Minister to Czechoslovakia, saw Premier Hladky for the second time in twenty-four hours. He urged maximum concessions to Soviet demands.<sup>3</sup>

Paris professed ignorance of the alleged suggestion of a Four-Power Pact, but indicated that any such proposal was unacceptable since it would watch the League, exclude the USSR, and sacrifice both French and Czech interests. The Quai d'Orsay called Ambassador Andel

Foreign Minister leaves from Berlin for consultation. Prague and Paris, perhaps, suspected that Downing Street was in accord with Wilhelmstrasse. What Berlin would demand in the way of sacrifice would depend upon Berlin's estimate of London's willingness and ability to persuade Prague (and Paris) to yield. Chamberlain could give assurance of willingness but not as yet of ability. Potsdam on Prague was apparently designed to emphasize the seriousness of the issue and the necessity for compromise—if need be, through the services of a British intermediary. In Paris on July 14 Horvath, after conferences with Deladier and General Marie Gustave Gamelin, Chief of the French General Staff, said that "it looks as though the two general staffs are at one. The French Tableau and the British Union Jack seem as one flag."<sup>4</sup> Was the British War Minister entertaining delusions about British military support to Paris in defence of Prague? Hardly. Was he seeking to impress Hitler with Anglo-French solidarity as a means of moderating German demands? Perhaps, though such a gesture was pointless if Hitler already felt certain that London would never defend Prague. Was he seeking to convince Paris that France could rely on British support if France yielded to British "suggestions"? Probably. Lieutenant General Horst von Moltch expressed the opinion in Berlin that the Little Entente had already ceased to be a military factor, that Britain and France would give no aid to Czechoslovakia, that the USSR could give none, and that Prague must draw the necessary conclusions.<sup>5</sup>

On July 15, 1938, Nazi leaders in Vienna staged a performance of the patch in which Dollfus was slain and paid honor to the shaven "martyr." On July 15, 1938, it became known in London that Chamberlain had asked Viscount Ransiman to go to Prague to urge new concessions. The idea of sending an "impartial mediator" to push Prague into concessions acceptable to Berlin was said to have originated during the week of the Wiedemann visit. Ransiman declared that Hitler had suggested Ransiman's name to Deladier and Oswald in Paris, that they had objected, and that he had agreed to designate him merely as an "adviser."<sup>6</sup> Prague had obviously been consulted in advance, for on July 15 Benes and Hofba agreed "in principle" that Ransiman should serve as "adviser"—not as "arbitrator," which would imply an obligation to accept his recommendations.

On Tuesday, July 18, Chamberlain addressed Commons on the eve of adjournment. He reviewed the old clichés and added: "Let not anyone in this country or elsewhere imagine that if we are seeking

peace we are willing to sacrifice, even for peace, British honor and British vital interests." (The interests of others were not mentioned; definitions of "honor" are notoriously flexible.)

The easy ending between France and ourselves is the happier because I think it is generally recognized that it is not directed against any other nation or combination of nations. It is, in itself, a solid basis of peace and unity strengthened and confirmed by the conversations which took place between Viscount Haldane and the French Ministers in Paris. There is no mystery about them. There have been no secret undertakings and no secret commitments on either side. There was a general discussion of all matters of common interest to the two countries generally and a complete agreement on them . . .

In the case of Czechoslovakia it is very difficult for the people of the country . . . to arrive at a just conclusion as to the rights and wrongs of the dispute between Czechoslovakia and the Silesian Germans. . . . There is no truth in the rumor that we are hushing the Czech Government. Indeed the very opposite is the truth. . . . Regarding the rumor that we had urged the Czech Government to submit their proposals to Hindley before putting them before parliament, certainly we did so. We did so for the very reason that if by any chance an agreed settlement could be reached between Hindley and the Czech Government before any motion was put before parliament, obviously that would be the best solution of all. I do not think that a great amount of pressure was required of us to induce the Czech Government to do something that it has been anxious to do all along. . . .

Nevertheless, as time has gone on, it has begun to appear doubtful whether without some assistance from the outside such a voluntary agreement could take place. . . . In response to a request by the Government of Czechoslovakia we have agreed to propose that a person with the necessary experience and qualities should investigate the subject on the spot and, if need be, to suggest means to bring negotiations to success. Such an investigator or mediator would, of course, be independent of His Majesty's Government and in fact be independent of all governments, and would act only in his personal capacity. . . . Lord Runciman is not in any sense an arbitrator—he is an investigator

and mediator. Lord Rancian will separate himself with all the facts and the views of the two sides. He will, no doubt, see them separately and later may be able to make some proposal to them which may help them. His position is not unlike that of a man who goes down to water in saving a strike, who has to see two sides when they have come to a point where they cannot get any further and he is there as an independent and impartial person. . . .

If only we could find a peaceful solution of this Czechoslovak question I should myself feel the way open again for a further effort for a general appeasement—an appeasement which cannot be obtained until we can be satisfied that no major causes of difference or dispute remain unsettled.

This explanation of the grounds and purpose of the Rancian mission was of questionable validity at a number of points. To say that Chamberlain "requested" the mission was to introduce no Prague who had come from Berlin or to present Czech acquiescence to British pressure or Czech initiative. Officials in Prague denied that any "request" had been made, but said that Rancian was welcome. Chamberlain's description of Rancian's function masked the fact (which was nevertheless obvious to all) that he was being sent to Prague with the full authority and prestige of the British Government behind him. To present the whole enterprise as an impartial quest for truth and justice in Czech-Slovak relations was to obscure the fact that its origin lay in the relations between Prague and Berlin and Berlin and London. Chamberlain did not conceal his desire for "appeasement" with the Reich. He spoke of the naval treaty of 1915 as, on Hitler's part, "a notable gesture of the most practical kind in the direction of peace, the view of which, it seems to me, has not been fully appreciated as leading toward a general appeasement." The Prime Minister made no suggestions as to who should pay the price of this "appeasement," nor did he venture to point out that the "general European appeasement" which he sought was in reality nothing more than a *Tory-Nazi* outcome, to be obtained by giving other people's property to Hitler. Such an admission would have evoked indignation. Mr. Chamberlain would find it necessary for his purposes to evoke fear, pain, and terror, for these would create new enthusiasm for "appeasement." But indignation would be in bad taste.

Hallas in *Lords* on July 18 sought to confirm the impression



already created "justice" in Czechoslovakia must be achieved "by peaceful means," Runciman, he asserted, had first announced when being told of his mission. "I quite understood you are seeing me about a small boat in mid-Adantic," I replied, "That is exactly the position." A "just and reasonable settlement" could be obtained if both sides were "generous" and "constructive." Conversations adjourned on July 29 for a three-month respite after a wrangle over the Cabinet's inaction in the face of repeated attacks upon British ships in Spain. Windermere turned up in Paris on the same day amid more rumors of German suggestions for a Four-Power Pact. Runciman raced in preparation for his labor. Among those named as his advisers were Frank Ashton-Gwatkin, chief of the economic department of the Foreign Office, R. J. Stopford of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Geoffrey Peter, formerly his parliamentary private secretary, and the Henderson of the consular service.

The "free-lance" himself, stout, experienced, cheerful, arrived in Prague on August 2 with Lady Runciman and a mountain of baggage and engaged fifteen rooms in the Alhambra Hotel. Before leaving Cowes, where he had been yachting, he prayed in Holy Trinity Church. Ambassador David Low deplored him, as an angel arriving at the "Czechoslovak mission" with nothing to do: there are one olive branch—"made in Birmingham, slightly used." The British Legation staff and therefore the Czech Cabinet turned out in top hats to meet this "jeanily private person." His first public utterance thanked the Bohemian leaders for meeting him at the station. He spoke German, but no Czech.

The problem of Runciman's private conception of his mission is insoluble in the absence of any autobiography from the Viscount himself. His background furnishes certain clues. He was the son of a shipping magnate. As a business man before 1904, when he was an ardent advocate of Anglo-German rapprochement, he added greatly to his family's huge fortune. As plain Mr. Walter Runciman he had served since the war as President of the Board of Trade. In 1930 he helped reorganize various shipping companies facing bankruptcy or moribund. In 1937 he inherited his father's peerage. He was fond of tracking Sunday school and had sailed twice around the world in his yacht *Sanderson*. Top hats, morning coats, and dinner-party were his afflictions. He was intensely wealthy and set eyes on social and international questions with Chamberlain and the Tory oligarchy. He had been a member of the Asquith Cabinet and a friend of Sir

Edward Grey. Upon his arrival in New York in 1917 he had declared that Britain would not "bribe anyone to leave her shores. You know well enough what it means to those who pay tribute—demands for more and more tribute." But he spoke then of British colonies, not of Sudetenland. His high wrinkled brow, his stolid bold head, his anxious pleading eyes, and his thin-lipped smiling mouth suggested a certain winsome quality, not belied by his manner and speech. Whatever his own bias may have been, there is no reason to suppose that Hitler or Chamberlain entertained any doubts as to the sincerity outcome of his mission. Even Prague and Paris had suspicions. He was sure, whether he knew it or not at the outset, to recommence the non-violent pursuit of Czechoslovakia.

On the day of Ranciman's arrival the German press warned of "border violations" by Czech aircraft and hinted at more retaliation. Ranciman conferred on August 4 and 5 with Braun, Kootha, and Hadin and, among the Sudeten leaders, with Franz Peters, Ernst Kundi, Heinrich Schickelmeier, and Dr. Wilhelm Scheitowsky. Then and later he also saw German "Activists" (anti-Nazi) leaders as well as spokesmen for the other minorities, but his major conferences were necessarily with Hitler's subordinates, someone in the Alcron Hotel and sometimes in Sudeten towns. He talked at length with the Little Fuhrer at Barthelmeau Castle on August 17. Lady Ranciman and Adrian-Gawlik accompanied him. The German Consul, Herr Hirsche, and Hitler's deputy, Karl Hermann Frank, participated. All were guests of Prince Max Hohenlohe of Landshut. No reporters were admitted. No communiqué was issued. On August 18 Hitler talked once more with Adrian-Gawlik in Marienbad. It was reported that Ranciman had found him to be a "man of straw" who was obliged to refer all questions to his superior (i.e. Hitler) for answers. Dr. Vojtech Masek, Czech Minister in Berlin, returned to Prague on August 17 and again on August 24, but apparently did not see Ranciman personally. The British minister spent entire hours with Sudeten representatives.

While the utmost secrecy was preserved regarding these negotiations, it is clear that the Nazi spokesmen began and ended all discussions by insisting upon the Karlsbad program of April 14. This was sufficiently vague to enable Hitler's subordinates and superiors to reject successive offers as inadequate, and sufficiently precise to leave little doubt but that Hitler's purpose was the disruption of the Republic or at least its reduction to military impotence. Any surrender

to demands for "autonomy," "corporate personality," "compensation," and "Nazi *Wohlfahrtsbeitrag*" would mean the establishment of a state-within-a-state governed in accordance with totalitarian principles of dictatorship and anti-Semitism. By no conceivable formula could such "autonomy" be reconciled with the liberal principles of equality, toleration, and parliamentary democracy to which Czechoslovakia was committed. The state-within-a-state, which would control the Czech fortifications, would, moreover, be governed from Berlin. Hitler's Sternmarschale were already arming police factories in a *Sudetenhilfs* already crowning with secret agents of the Black Guards and the Gestapo.

Between the preservation and the destruction of Czechoslovakia there could be no compromise. Benes and Hodia were willing to grant everything short of what would endanger the security and integrity of the Republic. Hodia and Hitler appeared unwilling to accept anything short of what Prague could never grant. Runciman nevertheless pursued his efforts. Since he was quite unable to bring about any diminution of the Nazi demands, he was perforce obliged, as the only alternative to an admission of failure, to do what he could to wear down Czech opposition to them. "We will never go to Berchtesgaden!" cried Czech patriots. "Because," added the wit "Runciman has brought Berchtesgaden to Prague!" Benes and Hodia were ever fearful of calling down upon their heads the wrath of patriotic opinion, which valiantly opposed any suicidal surrender. The publications of the Czech officers' corps declared on August 12: "Those who have consecrated themselves as the first to die have the right to give a warning. The State's authority must not under any conditions be divided, reduced, or undermined—not through one single deed, not through one single word meant!"<sup>1</sup> Despite such pressure the Cabinet made necessary concessions and diverted incentive plans, culminating in "Plan No. 4," the memorable "last word" of September 7. All in vain. All concessions were rejected as utterly inadequate.

The plan was drafted Monday, September 5, and presented to the Hodia cabinet on September 7. Article I conceded to the *Sudetendeutsche* access to all types of public and semi-public employment in proportion to their numbers. Article II guaranteed proportionality in the departments of education, social welfare, and public health, and in the letting of State contracts. Article III provided a loan of a billion crowns on liberal terms, to be raised before the end of the year, to alleviate distress in depressed areas, those quarters of the world

go to industries in the Sudeten districts employing Sudeten workers. Article IV specified that police functions would be divided between local police and the State gendarmerie. Article V promised further negotiations to cover all new cases of alleged injustice or inequality. Article VI provided for a new language law to insure absolute and practical equality of the Czechoslovak, German, Polish, Hungarian, and Ruthenian tongues.

As regards autonomy, Article VII envisaged the establishment of cantons, within each of which local agencies of government would be elected by proportional representation and secret ballot. These bodies would have jurisdiction over all local functions not essential to the unity and security of the Republic. The cantonal laws would be drawn on the basis of nationality, geography, economic life, and extent of cooperation. All citizens in all cantons would receive full security for their national rights and specific statutory protection of their personal and property rights. Pending new local laws, the State would provide funds for payment of cantonal executive officials. Article VIII provided for national sections in all important State departments. Article IX recommended moderation by propaganda in order to restore an atmosphere of co-operation. Article X declared the plan an indivisible whole, intended for immediate realization. A final article provided for the drafting of necessary laws by a Commission on which the Government and the Parliament should be equally represented.<sup>8</sup>

The merit of this program lay in the circumstance that it would presumably compel Hradka and Hitler to make public their choice: either they were bent upon disintegration of Czechoslovakia, in which case they would reject it, or they were genuinely concerned with "justice" and "equality" for the Sudetens, in which case they must accept it. The Kachlad demands were herewith accepted—provided that their phraseology should be given a liberal-democratic interpretation rather than a totalitarian interpretation. But here precisely was the never-to-be-compromised conflict. In principle and practice, in prejudice and factual fact, Hitler and Hradka desired above all else precisely three things: the destruction of political democracy; the destruction of tolerance and equality in racial and political relationships; and the destruction of the integrity of Czechoslovakia. The fact was by now so obvious to all that further discussion of Sudeten "grievances" became absurd. Only two alternatives were left: Britain, France, and the USSR must defend Czechoslovakia against Nazi

Imperialism and most ready to clear their determination to do so that Hitler would know, beyond all doubting, that aggression against Prussia would mean general war, or they must stand aside and avowage the only democracy in Central Europe and the only remaining barrier against German domination of the Continent to the fate already suffered by China, Ethiopia, Spain, and Austria.

In the first case, Hitler must await retreat (as Lord Halifax conceded on October 3), for he was not yet prepared to face a world in arms against him. If, contrary to all reasonable expectation, he nevertheless attacked, the war to come would be one in which the Western democracies would be fighting for a cause as worthy as any that ever moved men to face danger in the service of a moral ideal. And it would be a conflict in which the chances of crushing for all time the Prussian menace would be enormously enhanced by the circumstances that China and Spain could still be saved, that Moscow would be fighting on the side of Paris and London, that Rome might still be untroubled, and that America's sympathy and respect for the Anglo-French cause would be at a maximum. In the second case—"peace" by surrendering Prussia to the enemy—all these advantages would be lost. The Third Reich in that event would be ingrafted on the dimensions of an invincible colossus bestriding all Europe. Britain must henceforth do Berlin's bidding; France must accept reduction to a shorn State, cowering before an implacable master as, on *Der Tag* to come, after resistance to a foe pre-ordained to conquer. This was the choice posed to the West in September of 1938 by the renubackbiding Czar at Berlin and by the mild-mannered President on Marston Hill. The tragedy of all that was to follow arose from the fact that the men of Whitehall were already Czar's bondsmen.

Randall's own motivations throughout his mission are still matters of mystery. The principal piece of evidence now available regarding them is Document 3a of the British White Paper, *Correspondence respecting Czechoslovakia*, issued by the Cabinet on September 29, 1938 (Cmd. 5847, Miscellaneous 57). This letter from Randall to Chamberlain was dated September 21, 1938. It opens with a message which perhaps protests too much: "When I undertook the task of mediation in the controversy between the Czechoslovak Government and the Sudeten German party, I was, of course, left perfectly free to obtain my own information and to draw my own conclusions. I was under no obligation to issue any kind of report. In the present circumstances, however, it may be of assistance to you to have the final views,

which I have formed as a result of my Mission, and certain suggestions which I believe should be taken into consideration, if anything like a permanent solution is to be found." Upon his arrival, the issue had been one of urgency. "The question of self-determination had not yet arisen in acute form." Between the SDP sketch of June 7, embodying the Karlobad demands, and the Czechoslovak draft of the same/other minute, the gap was considerable. Direct negotiations were suspended on August 17. But Plan No. 4 was communicated to Benáček on September 3 and to the Serbian leaders on the 10. "In my opinion—and, I believe, in the opinion of the more responsible Serbian leaders—this plan embodied almost all the requirements of the Karlobad eight points, and with a little clarification and extension could have been made to cover them entirely."

From this point on, declared Raschman, the Serbians expressly sought pretenses for rejecting the plan. They broke off negotiations once more on September 13. Raschman acquiesced in (if he did not encourage) this intransigence and asserted, honestly or as a postulate, that circumstances were now changed and facts must be faced. "It is quite clear that we cannot now go back to the point where we stood two weeks ago, and we have to consider the situation as it now faces us." His factionists at most said "were, in fact, at an end. . . . The Reich had become the dominant factor in the situation, the dispute was no longer an internal one. It was not part of my faction to accept mediation between Czechoslovakia and Germany."

In view of the circumstance that his appointment followed just upon the visit of a German emissary to London and that his final conclusions had reference only to Berlin-Prague relations and not to Serbian-Czech relations, this statement might appear to be of doubtful sincerity to some. But of "mediation" he understood to imply bargaining and compromise, the statement is quite correct. For Raschman's new function, in effect if not in design, was to secure acceptance of the most extreme German demands, with no bargaining or compromise. He went on in his letter to accept responsibility for the end of negotiations in inextinguishable terms:

Responsibility for the final break came, in my opinion, not upon Hans Gieseler and Hans Frensch and upon those of their supporters inside and outside the embassy who were trying their to achieve and reconstructional success. I have much sympathy, however, with the Serbian case. It is a hard thing to be asked by an alien race. (What should have been better than a British ambassador?) and I have been left with the impression that Czechoslovak risk in the Serbian case

for the last twenty years, though not actively oppressive and certainly not "barbarous," has been marked by intolerance, lack of understanding, petty intolerance and discrimination, to a point where the movement of the German population was noticeably moving in the direction of north.

This "revolt" against a rule that was conceded to be neither oppressive nor intolerant Lord Rensselaer attributed to Sudeten masters of Czech promises ("I cannot say how far this interest is merited or ignored"), to "major grievances" (the encroached areas), and to "local irritations" such as ignorance of German by Czech officials, settlement of Czech farmers in Sudeten districts, building of schools for the children of "these Czech invaders," alleged discrimination against German firms in State contracts and against Sudeten unemployed in provision of relief work. "I believe these complaints to be in the main justified. Even as late as the time of my Mission, I could find no readiness on the part of the Czechoslovak Government to remedy them on anything like an adequate scale." The Viscount ventured no definition of adequacy.

It was at this point that the tone of the Rensselaer letter perceptibly changed. It is possible that the second portion was written long after the first, or appended at the suggestion of Chamberlain. The same letter, however, is dated September 12, on which day Prague, faced by division, yielded to Anglo-French demands for the cession of the Sudeten areas to the Reich. Rensselaer's conclusions appear to be less an outgrowth of his study of Sudeten-Czech relations than an admission of the cogency of the Tory-Brian estimate and a plausible rationalization of a decision already arrived at by the Prime Minister on the basis of considerations having nothing to do with Sudeten "grievances" or with Rensselaer's observations in Sudetenland.<sup>1</sup>

Rensselaer's ultimate purpose was to justify a decision already reached. This he sought to do in the balance of his letter by defending the Sudeten demands for "self-determination" and by emphasizing the necessity of partition for the sake of "peace." These two considerations were quite distinct. The second was related to the first only by the fact that Hitler demanded annexation under threat of war—after he had reason to believe that such a demand would be looked upon favorably in London. But since Rensselaer could not say "Might is Right" nor suggest that Tory Rinspöckish required partition, he was obliged to present his "conclusions" in such a fashion as would suggest to the uninitiated that the Sudetens were "oppressed" (though he had already said they were not), that Hitler's heart bled for them, and that

"justice" demanded their "liberation" from Czech "tyranny" and their union with the Reich. The defences ask Runciman performed to the best of his ability.

The Sudeteners had had a feeling of "hopelessness." But Nazi victory in the Reich had given them new hope. "I regard their turning for help towards their kith and their eternal doom to join the Reich as a natural development in the circumstances." (The third person plural consistently lumped all Sudeten together, "kithmen" conceded the fact that the Sudeteners had left Germany almost a thousand years previously, and "joined the Reich" obscured the circumstance that the Sudeteners had never been citizens of Germany nor of any German state.) "I did my best to prevent" a movement within the Czechoslovak State, "but not without misgivings. . . . I felt that any such arrangement would have been temporary, not lasting." (This is as near as Runciman came to conceding that he favored partition from the outset.) But "when I left Prague on the 15th September, disorder and disturbance in the Sudeten areas, which had never been more than sporadic, had died down. . . . Unless, therefore, Herr Madair's *Freikorps* are deliberately encouraged to cross the frontier, I have no reason to expect any possible renewal of violence and disturbances." (To anyone else this would suggest that most of the Sudeteners, once freed from Nazi repression and protected by the SS or Police, would live peacefully with their Czech neighbors and that the price of peace was vigorous action to prevent intervention from Germany. But not so Runciman.)

As the SS or Police are extremely unpopular among the German inhabitants, and have constituted one of their chief grievances for the last three years, I consider that they should be withdrawn as soon as possible. I believe that their withdrawal would reduce the causes of struggle and disharmony. Further, it has become self-evident to me that these frontier districts between Czechoslovakia and Germany where the Sudeten population is an important majority should be given full rights of self-determination as soon as it can be done in a practical way. It is the best way as well, that it should be done promptly and without procrastination. There is no danger, even a danger of civil war, in the movement of a mass of uncertainty. (In the preceding paragraph the Viscount had written that there was no danger even of disturbances, without intervention by the Third Reich.) Consequently there are very good reasons for a policy of immediate and drastic action. Any kind of plebiscite or referendum would, I believe, be a sheer futility in respect of these predominantly German areas. A very large majority of their inhabitants desire independence with Germany. The inevitable delay involved in calling a plebiscite vote would only serve to excite popular feeling - with perhaps more dangerous results. I consider, therefore, that these frontier districts should or must be transferred from Czechoslovakia to Germany, and, further, that



measures for their peaceful transfer, including the provision of subsistence for the population during the transfer period, should be arranged forthwith by agreement between the two Governments.

In this wise Ransman, whose function was "not to attempt mediation between Czechoslovakia and Germany," closed his report on his mediation between Munich and Berlin with the conclusion that Germany should be given part of Czechoslovakia! By this device, he feared, the "honest, peaceable, hardworking, and frugal folk," Czechs and Germans alike in the areas where both would have to continue to live together, would be enabled to "settle down quietly." Plan No. 2 should be applied to the areas which German minorities left within Czechoslovakia. How Czech minorities would fare within the enlarged Reich was not a matter in which Ransman expressed any interest. He next went on (and here the master hands of Hitler and Chamberlain were obviously at work) to suggest the relocation of the ramp Czech State to the position of a vassal of the Reich.

It is necessary permanently to provide that the Czechoslovak State should live at peace with all her neighbours and that her policy, internal and external, should be directed to that end. Just as it is essential for the international peace of Europe that her policy should be securely neutral, so an analogous policy is necessary for Czechoslovakia—not only for her own future security but for the peace of Europe.

In order to achieve this, I recommend—

(1) That those persons and persons in Czechoslovakia who have been judged as encouraging a policy antagonistic to Czechoslovakia's neighbours should be forbidden by the Czechoslovak Government to continue their activities, and that if necessary, legal measures should be taken to bring such persons to an end.

(2) That the Czechoslovak Government should so conduct her foreign relations as to give assurance to her neighbours that she will in no circumstances attack them or enter into any aggressive action against them arising from disputes in other States.

(3) That the principal Powers, acting in the interests of the peace of Europe, should give to Czechoslovakia guarantees of assistance in case of unprovoked aggression against her.

(4) That a commercial treaty on preferential terms should be negotiated between Germany and Czechoslovakia if this proved advantageous to the economic interests of the two countries.

Here, more than a week before Munich, were the essential terms of the entire Munich accord and of most of its aftermath. Ransman's four recommendations, translated into the broad terms of the "practical politics" of which Hitler and Chamberlain were past masters,

quest in addition to the partition of Czechoslovakia: (1) the suppression by the Czechoslovak Government of Communists, Socialists, Slovaks, and Jews, (2) the end of Prague's defensive alliance with Paris, Belgium, Bucharest, and Moscow, (3) a meaningful gesture of an international guarantee against "unprovoked" aggression for a neutral State which would be utterly defenceless, wholly incapable of resisting any German demands, and therefore quite unable to "provoked" aggression or to become a victim of unprovoked aggression, (4) Czechoslovakia's economic submergence by the Third Reich.

All these things came to pass within a few weeks after Runciman proposed them. He had recommended them after his superiors had already decided upon them. If his function was to encourage Hitler, to wear down Prague's resistance, to assist Chamberlain and his colleagues to ease their consciences and complete their deception of the British public, he performed his work well and is deserving of all the credit stretching to a difficult, dishonest, and dishonorable task carried to success with discretion. If his function was anything other than that the verdict of the future may be otherwise upon Lord Runciman of Dundee.

## 1. THUNDER IN NÜRNBERG

On August 20, 1938, at the Foreign Ministry of the Little Entente assembled amicably at Belgrade in Yugoslavia, Admiral Nicholas Horthy, Regent of Hungary, Pástor Bela Imredy, Foreign Minister Károlyi de Károly, and War Minister Eugene Benak left Budapest for the Reich. Imreedy and Károlyi had visited Rome exactly a month before to affirm Hungary's solidarity with the Fascist Powers. Seyss-Inquart gave the party a royal welcome in Vienna. On August 22 Horthy and Hitler proceeded from Berlin to Kiel to review the new German battle fleet, comprising one hundred and ten modern fighting ships, including thirty-seven submarines, led by the dreadnought *Gneisenau*. Frau Horthy was granted the honor of christening a new cruiser, the *Prinz Eugen*. The visitors next proceeded to Heligoland, reconstructed as an impenetrable marine fortress, and were fixed at Flensburg on their return.

At a State banquet in Berlin on the 24th, Hitler hailed the new "prominent historic frontier" between Hungary and Great Germany and rejoiced in their "intimate collaboration with a friendly Italy" as

a "safe and worthy pledge for a just and general peace" (On the same day the Hungarian Supreme Court confirmed a three-year sentence for subversive political activities passed upon Major Ferenc Salasi, leader of the Hungarian Nazis.) On August 23 a great military parade was reviewed by the Magyar Regent. Foreign military attachés gaped at the sight of four samples of a new weapon: a gigantic field gun, mounted in four detached sections and capable of assembling within two hours. Other new howitzers, tanks, and armored cars testified to undiminished Teutonic prowess in the arts of slaughter. On the 25th Horthy visited Potsdam and there, on his return journey, stopped at Nürnberg. Here he was received cordially by Rudolf Hess and Julius Streicher, who was beginning a new research project to prove that the Pope was stained with Jewish blood.

These nerve-shattering displays of German armed power were obviously not designed merely to impress the Hungarians. It was hoped that a wider audience would take note and be intimidated. At Kiel the Little Entente Ministers attempted belatedly to bring Bucharest out of the Nazi diplomatic orbit. On July 31 the Italian Emperor had granted Bulgaria freedom from the military restrictions of the Treaty of Neuilly in return for a non-aggression pact. The Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, Baron Andor Beneszy-Bakach, came to Kiel to confer with Sayadinevich who conferred in turn with Krieva and Postolau-Carmen of Rumania. Offers were forthcoming. The Ruman phoned Kanya at Kiel. On August 23 an accord was announced.

The permanent council of the Little Entente meets with satisfaction the negotiations conducted throughout the past with Hungary made it possible to reach agreements resulting in Hungary and the Little Entente members pledging mutually to refrain from the employment of force of any kind against one another, and in the three Little Entente members recognizing Hungary's equality in the matter of armaments. . . . The permanent council of the Little Entente, expressing its satisfaction in the results already achieved, hopes that any delay in the matters of the concerns concerned her also of all States of the Danube Basin a full arrangement soon will be reached.<sup>24</sup>

This capitulation was the swan-song of the Little Entente. On August 31 Germany announced that Hungary's pledge to conclude non-aggression pacts would not be regarded as "effective" until Czechoslovakia solved her "minority problem" to Budapest's "satisfaction." This Hungarian pressure upon Prague was the first fruit of the Berlin visit. The Hungarian Premier announced on September 4 that his Government would introduce military conscription, establish con-

peasantry labor camps, organize a national militia, inaugurate new state benefits programs, attack "revolutionary Nazi influences," and undertake agrarian reforms through the division and leasing of large estates to small farmers. The last measure, whether an empty promise of a program of action or not, was highly acceptable to the feudal aristocracy of the Kingdom. It was desired necessary to prevent the impoverished and land-hungry peasantry from flocking to the Nazi banners. As for the rest, merely asserted: "I will lead you from now on with a firm hand. . . . Our friendship with Italy and Germany is directed against no one. . . . [But] especially in Czechoslovakia, where minorities are in the majority, we will demand increased rights for Hungarian groups. . . . Our country must build a modern strong army so that Hungary's armed forces are again respected among the nations."<sup>12</sup>

In Berlin, as in Budapest, policy toward Prague during August and September of 1938 was a logical outgrowth of a sequence of discoveries closely related and found true. Haken had discovered that all the Western Powers were willing to buy peace with Japan at China's expense. Mussolini had discovered that Britain and France were prepared to buy peace with Italy at the expense of Ethiopia and Spain. Hitler and Horthy had discovered that two members of the Little Entente were prepared to buy peace with Germany and Hungary at the expense of the third member. Did it not then also follow that Britain and France could be induced to buy peace with Germany at Czechoslovakia's expense? The French Right had argued such a course for months. Most British Tories, many Liberals, and even some Laborites had advocated this form of "appeasement" for years. All were agreed that Czechoslovakia was not worth the life of a single British soldier. "A monstrosity," asserted Lord Rothermere. "If you or anyone else," he wrote to Wickham Steed, August 20, "are so foolish as to believe Great Britain and her dominions will fight for the Moscow-owned Prague Government, you are laboring under some strange delusion."<sup>13</sup>

Such monstrosities as these were music to Dr. Fisher's ears as reverend as the cloudy choirs of Wagner. Sweet too were the pipings of Roushew of Oxford. Downing Street was already Hitler's ally. British inquiries in mid-August about German military preparations were pro forma. Rothermere refused even to discuss them with Henderson and deplored British "unwisdom" to Prague. The position that Berlin and London were not acting in unison had to be pos-

served in order that the British public might believe that Chamberlain was seeking "justice" and "improvement." Hence the need of gestures of discretion. Hence also the need for Nazi "thanas," Tony "wisdom," emergency trips to the Reich by the Prime Minister, and, finally, a great "war panic" to enable Downing Street to do Hitler's bidding in the name of "peace."<sup>14</sup> There 'was' war in the modern manner at Changchung, July 31, between Japan and Russia, Hitler gave Hirohito "moral support"; twice August 1st, happy ending with Russia quiescent and Tokio's demands against Bolsheviks remaining unmet upon Helsinki, Dredlock at Prague. Time for thunder.

A double obligato to Rancman's melody of trained strings now began to whistle and shrill in an ever rising crescendo. One theme of the counterpoint displayed the master hand of Ghibelli, the other those of Göring, Himmler, and the Reichswarte. The Nazi Pageant-goals Mittelstadt opened a great overture of roaring brass in the German press against Czech "persecution" of the Sudetens to convince all Germans and all Nazi sympathizers abroad that the esteemed and noble Tatars of the Soudland were being barbarously tortured by fascist Slavdom. "Unparalleled Cruelty of the Czech Murder Bandits!" "Incredible Brutality!" "Murder Unmasked!" "Bombs to Death!" "German Woman Scared, Wounded War Veteran Knocked Down!" "A Fire is in Red Spain!" "Czech Communists Brandishes the Torch!" "Czech Children Throw Beehive Clust!" "Czechs Walk to Wale in Blood!"<sup>15</sup>

Simultaneously, with a shattering roll of drums and a deafening blast of bugles, the Nazi melody machine was set in motion in all its fabled symmetry. Amid such a cacophonous uproar, dark with threats of doom and death, it was assumed in Berlin that the imperishable Beres would follow, that Bonner and Dülcker would drink in fear, and that all would agree with Downing Street that Prague must yield. The Berliner Tagblatt screamed that "Rascals" were at work on Czech fortifications. Nazi radio broadcast raged against the "Czech" murderers of Wenzel Salaris, who was finally crushed in a cell bored on August 3 by Robert Hinder, an Austrian Social Democratic émigré. Three days later, at an "anti-Communist" mass meeting in Berlin, Hans Kerts, Sudeten member of the German Reichstag, declared that Czechoslovakia must be regarded as the "enemy of Europe" until its alliance with Moscow was liquidated. The Nazi authorities rushed hundreds of thousands of conscript laborers to the Rheinland to complete the fortifications against France, German

reservists were called into service. Trucks and motor-cars were requisitioned for a gigantic "food mobilization." By the end of August it was estimated that the Reich had over a million troops under arms. Göttele continued to scream as the German press "New Czech Terror Wave!" "Cowardly Attack!" "Another Czech Murder!"

As August passed into September the threatening drums of doom sounded ever more menacingly. On August 14 the Germans arrested for espionage Captain Thomas Kordock, British passport officer in Vienna. Promises by Henderson brought his release and repatriation. The Nazi press demanded that Henderson force Prague to yield. On August 24 Adolphe-Graffen paid a flying visit to London to confer with Lord Halifax. Before he returned, Deputy French published a Sedanist party proclamation on August 25 censuring instructions to "forge the right of self-defence" and urging members of the SDP to resist attacks by "Mardist reaction." It was rumored in Berlin and Prague that the Reich had warned various capitals, including Belgrade, Bucharest, and Moscow, but not including Paris, that Germany might soon be obliged to act to "sponsor" the Sedanist demands. The Cabinet in London apparently reached a decision to deliver an informal warning to Hitler against any resort to violence and to increase British pressure on Prague. The first talk was entrusted to Sir John Simon, Chancellor of the Exchequer. He spoke on Sunday, August 27, in Lunenburg, Scotland. He urged peace, friendship, and appeasement but asserted that British policy had been "fully and accurately declared in Mr. Chamberlain's speech in Parliament on March 23 of this year. That declaration holds good today. There is nothing to add or to vary in its content." In short, Britain would still remain no commitments to defend Czechoslovakia or to aid France in defending Czechoslovakia. But "the beginning of a conflict is like the beginning of a fire in a high wind. . . . Who can say how far it would spread or how many may be called to bear it out?" Sir John concluded.

We are convinced that, given good will on all sides, it should be possible to find a solution which is just to all legitimate interests. And there is no need to emphasize the importance of finding a peaceful solution, for, in the modern world, there is no limit to the readiness of war. This very case of Czechoslovakia may be critical for the future of Europe: there would be impossible to secure a truce to the disturbance that a conflict might involve, and every one in every country who considers the consequences for

to bear that in mind. . . . What [Secretary Hall] said and what President Roosevelt said a few days later in Canada meet twice a responsive echo in many British hearts. The British Government, therefore, have used their influence with all sides in the Carthagenian dispute to urge the adoption of rapprochement in efforts to reach a solution. . . . Lord Runciman . . . is not an arbitrator nor a judge—he is a mediator and friend . . . He is at Prague at this moment in no sense as a representative of the British Government but as a representative of all men who desire justice and love peace. . . . There is some reason for hope, because all the peoples of Europe hate the horrors of war, and nowhere can a government be so indifferent to the thoughts and opinions of its people as to ignore their feeling that these things ought to be avoided.”

On Monday, August 18, Sir Neville Henderson arrived suddenly in London. Chamberlain called the Cabinet into session for Tuesday. As it met, Hitler appeared unexpectedly at Kehl, opposite Strasbourg, on a sudden “inspection tour” of the Rhineland fortifications facing the Maginot Line. General Joseph Vailleux, commander of the French air forces, had been cordially received by Hitler and Göring in Berlin on August 18. Now, however, the wave of fear was spreading. Henderson conferred with Halifax, Simon, Vansittart, and Chamberlain. The French Cabinet moved to suspend the forty-hour week in key industries and reinforce troops on the frontier. Stocks and foreign currencies tumbled on Wall Street. The plan for the autumn maneuvers of the British fleet, announced on Saturday, provided that forty battleships would leave the Channel ports on September 4 and proceed to Invergordon, Scotland, facing the North Sea. . . .

The British Cabinet meeting of Tuesday, August 19, closed with the announcement that Henderson would return to Berlin with new instructions. “The Ministers expressed their entire agreement with the action already taken and the policy to be pursued in the future.” The purpose of action, policy, and instructions was kept a close secret. Henderson reached Berlin on Thursday, but did not see either Hitler or Ribbentrop. On August 21 it was reported from Prague that a British compromise plan had been presented to Henlein and to the lower council of the Cabinet. On September 1, at Runciman’s request, Henlein saw Hitler and Ribbentrop at Berchtesgaden, while Deputies

Frank and Schelenberg saw Bonn as the Czech capital. On the said Rautenhan indicated that the deadlock was broken. The Rautenhaner commission asserted that Der Führer had received Hinkler's report "with interest." "There resulted a complete accord as their judgment of the situation." "The *Münchener Fremdenblatt* issued a new appeal to the West for neutrality: "It is impossible for Germany to have on its frontier a small State containing 1,500,000 Germans which has anti-German alliances. Under the Monroe Doctrine, the United States would be opposed, of course, to similar alliances concluded by one of its neighbors with a non-American Power." "Hitler was reported to have sent Hinkler back to Prague with counter-proposals. The British mediators were evidently anxious to reach a settlement before the Nürnberg Congress of the NSDAP, scheduled to open on September 3. The oldest rule of their society was "Plan No. 4" of September 7, already reviewed. In the light of Chamberlain's admission that Downing Street, far from "bending" Prague into concessions, had urged full consideration and delay, the hypothesis is plausible that Chamberlain, Henderson, Norrison, and Rautenhan welcomed the "Plan" chiefly because of its lateness, in the certain knowledge that Hitler would reject it and that the war panic was already sufficiently far advanced to make possible the "solution" which they were already committed to.

On Monday, September 3, 1938, as the Government of Chile suppressed an armed Nazi rebellion and Paris called out reserves, the tenth annual Parteitag of the NSDAP opened in Nürnberg. This was the "Congress of Great Germany." The sessions between 1921 and 1937 had been dedicated variously to Victory, Will, Freedom, Honor, and Labor. Once more the hundreds of thousands of the faithful gathered to goose-step and applaud. Once more Der Führer and his aides drew strength and confidence from the engineered echo of their own oratory. Once more the literally female make-up was moved to frenzied enthusiasm by flags and uniforms, standards and banners, music and lights and pagentry of power beaming all reason and backsliding to death and perdition. Der Führer's latest proclamation, read as usual by Adolf Wagner, mentioned Czechoslovakia only by inference: "Party comrades! Have you realized that ever, Belshazzar danger of the destruction of nations rises above the world? A thousandfold, we see the solution of the Jewish virus in this world pest? But Great Germany is strong and invincible and has great and strong Powers as friends. Thanks to security, the Reich is now in-



ment to any bloodbath. Thanks to God and National Socialism, the bloodless victory in Austria had been won. . . . Heiden arrived at Nürnberg's Doerscher Hof and conferred into the small hall with Dr. Fritze, as did Ernst Engelke, German Minister to Prague. Fritze refused from accepting or rejecting "Plan No. 4." Dr. Ernst Engelke refrained from endorsing it.

At this point Major Amos's "thunder" prematurely burst a bombshell. It was surprising only to those who had forgotten that early in May, at one of Lady Amos's luncheons, Chamberlain had told American correspondents that Czechoslovakia should cede Sudetenland to the Reich. But British memoranda, like French, are short. At Palais de Chaillot on September 4 Bonnet had declared that France would "remain faithful to all its pacts and treaties." On Sunday, September 5, *The Times* had asserted that any grant of autonomy to the Sudetens would transfer "their personal spiritual allegiance from the head of their own State to the Führer of the neighboring Reich, the Prague government would not be master in its own house." This therefore could not be granted. "No armed government," began the bombshell editorial of September 6, "would sell its life into the hands of its own people. . . . (But) the Germans are going beyond the mere removal of disabilities and do not find themselves at ease within the Czechoslovak Republic." The conclusion!

In that case it might be worth while for the Czechoslovak Government to consider whether it should exclude altogether the subject, which has found favor in some quarters, of making Czechoslovakia a more homogeneous State by the inclusion of the fringe of alien populations who are contiguous to the nation with which they are mixed by race. In any case the wishes of the population concerned would seem to be the decisively important element in any solution that can hope to be regarded as permanent and the advantages to Czechoslovakia of becoming a homogeneous State might conceivably outweigh the obvious disadvantages of losing the Sudeten German element of the borderland.

The *New York Times* went enthusiastic. But the balance of the British Press went indignant. Poles were horrified. Ambassador Götlin asked for an explanation from Halifax. Jan Masaryk called to protest. All seemed correctly that *The Times* was speaking for the Foreign Office. Halifax now Dawson. The "suggestion" was obviously pre-

anxious, for the war *pink* had not yet reached the necessary stage of hysteria. Beverbrook and Hoffmeyer agreed that the partition of Czechoslovakia might, after all, be the best means of preserving peace. The Trades Union Congress and the Labor Party, in a joint statement of September 2, championed the indivisibility of peace and called for a strong defense of Czechoslovak integrity as well as for an immediate re-opening of Parliament. Even some of the unopposed Tories were shocked. On the evening of September 2 a communique was issued from No. 12 Downing Street: "The suggestion to the effect that the Czechoslovak Government might consider as an alternative to their present proposal the retention of a large of alien population in their territory in no way represents the views of His Majesty's Government." At the same time the Foreign Office declared that the proposals of Plan No. 4 "do appear, in the official view, to represent a basis upon which future negotiations between the parties might well be conducted." At least they should be conducted "in a spirit of mutual good will."

A second bombshell was curiously enough manufactured out of a riding crop. On Tuesday morning, September 3, at Moravia Square (Hilfstrich-Platz) a Hakenkreuz crowd gathered in ugly mood outside the courthouse where eighty-two Nazis were being held on charges of arms smuggling. When increased police sought to clear the square, Deputy Ernst Mai was lightly flicked on the shoulder by a policeman's riding whip. Neither he nor any other member of the crowd was injured. When the news reached Prague, however, the SED deputies, headed by Herr Karch, who were about to resume discussions on the basis of Plan No. 4, declared that in view of this "outrage" no further negotiations were possible. In view of the "unexampled excesses of the Secret Police and the beating of Sudeten deputies," it was clear that the government was not in earnest and "does not control the pressmen sufficiently to begin discussions in detail in the present circumstances."<sup>10</sup> A Sudeten delegation called upon Runciman and Hodza to protest while the Nazi Press screamed in renewed horror against Czech "terrorism." Horkin came back to Prague, but returned to Nürnberg the following day. The negotiations were never resumed.

Thursday, September 8, thousands of Hakenkreuz demonstrated in Sudeten towns, singing the *Heist Wiesel Lied* and *Deutschland über Alles* and shouting "Hail Hitler!" "Perish the Jews!" "One Volk, One Reich, One Future!" Runciman saw Bonn. All letters were con-

called in the French Atlantic fleet. Rome, which had hitherto kept silent, unofficially warned Pagan to accept the Karthaus program and to turn actual cuts to prisoners off and from Paris and Moscow.<sup>12</sup> Halifax canceled his projected visit to Geneva. Chamberlain called a Cabinet meeting for Monday and conferred with Halifax, Simon, Wood, and Malcolm MacDonald, Colonial Secretary. Henderson visited Göring at one of his hunting lodges near Nürnberg.

Runcie had it that Halifax, Vansittart, and Cadogan, with the possible support of Rensselaer, favored a British endorsement of Plan No. 4 and a clear warning to Hitler that Britain would fight beside France if the Reich attacked Prague. Chamberlain, Simon, and Hoare, with the probable approval of Henderson and Newton, opposed further commitments. On Saturday, September 10, the *Daily Mail* disclosed that the Cabinet had decided at midnight to tell Berlin "in precise and formal terms" that Britain would not stand aside if Czechoslovaks were attacked. Henderson would deliver a note to this effect in Nürnberg within a few hours, "probably to Adolf Hitler himself." Henderson on the 9th canceled plans to go to Berlin and decided to remain in Nürnberg, thereby giving credence to the report. But at 12:15 p.m. on Saturday, Downing Street issued an official denial: "In view of statements which have appeared in the last day or so regarding reported decisions of the Ministers it can be stated authoritatively that no such statements should be regarded as authentic." A Foreign Office spokesman said that no new note had been sent to Germany and no new instructions had gone to Henderson. Acland and Churchill were consulted by Chamberlain, but evidently learned nothing. It was finally declared that Henderson had neither had nor sought any interview with Hitler, but "there is every reason for the British Ministers to feel assured that the views of His Majesty's Government have been fully conveyed in the proper quarters."<sup>13</sup>

This was, for once, the truth. But the "view" remained a secret. Runcie alleged that Ribbentrop had said to Henderson's "waitings" on the ground that he knew most of the British official mind than the Ambassador and was certain that Britain would not fight. There is no reason to believe that any "waitings" were contrived, apart from advice that Hitler must refrain from open force and give Downing Street time to secure acceptance of his demands without force. Henderson's reports of Saturday were said to be startling. On Friday Anthony Eden visited the Foreign Office for the first time since his resignation and spent a half hour with Lord Halifax. He

made a longer visit on Sunday. On Monday morning, on the eve of Hitler's first address at Nürnberg, he published a letter in *The Times*, declaring: "It would be the gravest of all impositions from a standpoint of the mind of the British people the world were again to be plunged into conflict." He declared that it was his own view that "a settlement of the Sudeten problem by conciliation is of the utmost urgency in view of the growing realization of the far-reaching consequences of any resort to a decision by armed force in Central Europe." Chamberlain thus warned Eden's collaboration in his efforts to convince the British public that Hitler was threatening war and that the Cabinet was leaving no stone unturned to preserve "peace." Der Führer was at no time a victim of any "misunderstanding" of Tory policy. Another pondered "warning" was issued Sunday night in the form of a statement to the press from an anonymous but "responsible" spokesman of Downing Street. The Foreign office perhaps desired a more warning. But Chamberlain could not. It merely said that British security was intimately bound up with that of France, Britain had the sympathy of the United States, Hitler had been fully informed and, since he had repeatedly professed his desire for peace, his sincerity would not be doubted.<sup>1</sup> With that the British Government wanted to hear Der Führer's words from Nürnberg. These developments had but one meaning for Hitler: he could now count on Tory support for the partition of Czechoslovakia. The only condition imposed was that he refrain from force—but pretend to be about to resort to force.

The hurried meetings of the diplomats in other capitals over the week-end were veiled in secrecy. The secret sessions of the League Council and the 19th Assembly continued in Geneva. Under German pressure Warsaw apparently agreed not to support Prague and Paris. Under Anglo-French pressure Warsaw agreed not to support Berlin. Jugoslavia and Romania also sought neutrality, though Lorrain and Bonnet at Geneva evidently pushed Foreign Minister Petrucci-Correa into a position in which he dared not reject outright suggestions that Bucharest enter pending the passage of Soviet troops to defend Czechoslovakia. In Moscow Czech Minister Zdeněk Fierlinger expressed full confidence in Soviet military support. Tokyo gave "moral support" to Berlin. Roosevelt denied that he had given "moral support" to London and Paris. The western neutrals decided under pressure not to insist upon the deletion of Article 16 from the Covenant. Hitler was reported to have prepared a plea to the League

Assembly, comparable to his plea to the Council in May regarding Ethiopia, in which he would propose the cancellation of Article 16 and the resurrection of Article 19 as a means of facilitating the non-violent partition of Czechoslovakia in the name of "practical change."<sup>10</sup> If he had any such intention, it was thus denied as premature.

Meanwhile developments within Czechoslovakia moved toward a climax. In a broadcast address in Czech and German on Saturday evening, September 30, President Benes spoke with moderation and hope: "I am talking to you as a people who want security and peace and who agree on human dignity and good will. . . . We are endeavoring to guarantee the individual against the whole, minority against majority, and freedom of thought and national rights. . . . Our democracy is proud of having always been a disciplined democracy and it is proud that this claim has been maintained by self-control of all its citizens. . . . Let us observe calm and keep quiet and have faith in ourselves, in our country, in our state, and in our future prosperity. Let us be ready to make sacrifices, but let us be optimistic even in a time of great difficulties. Above all, let us not forget that faith and good will move mountains and that they will bring us happily out of all present European troubles."<sup>11</sup> Nazi provocateurs now moved heaven and earth to precipitate bloodshed in order to justify invasion. Czech police were terrorized and fired upon in many Sudeten towns. Viscount Runciman was at Pouchad Castle, spending the week-end with Count Othmar von Czernin von Chadenet. Late Sunday morning he was visited by two Sudeten deputies, while a mob beneath the windows shouted: "Hail Hitler!" "We want a plebiscite!" "Free us from Czechoslovakia!" "You are the liberator of three and half million Sudetens!" Runciman from the balcony made his first and last public utterance during his mission. It consisted of two sentences: "Men and women of Bohemia, you live in a beautiful country—perhaps one of the world's most beautiful. May God grant that this beautiful country have peace and that you will all continue to live in it as one!"<sup>12</sup>

At Nuremberg the *Fürstling* of the NSDAP moved from danger to distress in great words of fabricated fanaticism. The objective of the stage managers was less to mobilize the patriotic furor of the Germans behind Dr. Fuhrer (that had been long ago achieved) than to impress the outer world with fear. On Thursday Hitler permitted an anonymous person to be quoted: "We will never make war on the Czechs, but if the lives of our German brethren are not safe, the day may

come when we shall consider that the Czechs have started a war with us. In such a case, of course, we shall remember that attack is the best method of defense. . . . Business keeps dilly-dillying. . . . Hindenburg brings nothing but woe." "Dark hours were dropped by "unofficial" Nazi spokesmen that Hitler would be content with nothing less than Southern Anschluss. On Friday night, September 2, he addressed fifteen-district leaders on Zeppelín Field. "At a time when there are clouds on the horizon, I see about me these millions of unflinching, my financial, National-socialists, whose leadership you commend and for whose leadership you are responsible. Just as I could rely blindly upon you in the days of our struggle, so today again Germany and I can depend upon you." "

On Saturday reports were disclosed that 200,000 German troops were massed in Austria opposite the Czech frontier. More panic abroad. Pro forces denied from Berlin. Hitler spoke to 20,000 Hitler Jugend. "Germany will stand united, come what may. . . . When Providence takes not from my people, I will lead to the next Father a country welded by iron bonds." Goebbels denounced "democracy and its offspring Bolshevism" and asserted that Czechoslovakia was a "Communist stronghold in Central Europe," with a president who owed his election to Communist vote. Göring raged and waved his arm for an hour and a half before 15,000 members of the *Lebensfront*. He declared that he had hoarded food-supplies to resist blockade and had conscripted labor for work on the western fortifications.

Present demands require increased hours of labor. It will be necessary to work ten hours or even more. . . . but only for the glory of the Reich, not for private profit. . . . Germany is getting stronger every year and no one can stop us. . . . Our arms industries not going at high pressure in every branch. And we have the advantage of having started first, well ahead of the others. . . . Trust the Future and do not waver. I do not deny that there is a crisis. A great segment of Europe is becoming human beings. The democracies of course are looking for the cause of this crisis outside the framework of the life of Europe. But we know what is going on. This miserable peeping race without culture—no one knows where it came from—is oppressing a cultured people and behind it is Moscow and the central mask of the Jew Devil. The democracies believe all lies and are talking about war. . . . It would be better for England to estab-

It is peace in that little Jew state of hers down there . . . We have done everything for peace. The Italian-German friendship is firmer than ever. Our two countries together with Japan in the Far East are the only bulwark against Bolshevism . . . Our fortifications in the West will halt any Power under the sun. . . . Remember that as long as the Father and the nation are one, we are invincible."<sup>12</sup>

This effort was apparently too much for the corpulent Field Marshal. He was reported on Sunday to be suffering from bronchitis and leg inflammation and to have retired to the country for rest upon his physician's advice. Hitler addressed 100,000 Black Guards and Stormtroopers, including not only new divisions from the Quartermaster but some of Hindenburg's henchmen. He was violent, but still vague. By Monday afternoon all the world was waiting in fear for his closing address, which, many believed, was to decide the issue between "peace" and "war." But Hitler's sole function here was to aid Chamberlain in crack Czech, French, and British nerves. This required convincing oratory. Hitler was an artist. In the closing portion of his long address at Nuremberg on Monday evening, September 17, 1938, Der Führer led his battalions of bayoneted words to the attack, reinforced by withering cross-flows of applause and blinding demonstrations of hysterical cheering. Over all the other waves of the Western world came a roar like unto that of the Beast of the Apocalypse. It was mingled the hoarse voice of implacable fanaticism, with a lie on a throat in every breath; the fierce mob-shout of defiance and death; the awe-draping outbursts of tremendous hand-clapping; the hypnotizing and heart-riveting monotony in every phrase of "Sieg Heil! Sieg Heil! Sieg Heil!" From tens of thousands of throats came a hoarse screaming as appalling as the rattling outbursts of the orator of doom. Never did a Hitler sign luxury with more terrifying effect:

. . . Today we again see plotters, from Damascus down to Baghdad, fighting against the Nazi State. . . . We are being insulted today, but we thank God that we are in a position to prevent any attempt at plundering Germany or doing her violence. . . . These [Bolshevik] Germans, too, are creatures of God. The Almighty did not create them that they should be succumbed by a State construction made at Versailles to a foreign power that is hostile to them . . . They are being op-

passed in an inhuman and unbecomable manner . . . brutally struck . . . terrorized or mistreated . . . pursued the wild beasts for every expression of their national life. . . . I can only say to representatives of the democracies that this is not a matter of indifference to us. And I say that if those tortured creatures cannot obtain rights and assistance by themselves, they can obtain both from us. And such must be made of depriving these people of their rights. . . . (Last May the late Benes and the *current* Government in Prague decided to use brute force against the Sudeten.) In order to make this demonstration plausible before the elections Dr. Benes and the Czech Government *invented* the lie that Germany had mobilized troops and was about to invade Czechoslovakia. . . . The Jewish fabricators of these plots had hoped to bring about war by this means. . . . The Prague Government needed this lie as a pretext for their own monstrous work and various opposition in influencing the election. . . . You all understand that a Great Power cannot submit a second time to such a bare attack. In consequence I took the necessary precautions . . . on May 21

I may assure you that since May 21 the most gigantic fortifications that ever existed are under construction [in the West]. . . . On the construction of the defenses there are now 150,000 workmen in Dr. Todt's army. In addition, there are, further, 14,000 workmen and 100,000 men of the labor service as well as numerous engineer and infantry battalions. . . . Before the beginning of winter Germany's fortifications in the West will be finished. Their power of defense is already in existence to its full extent. . . . These most gigantic efforts of all times have been made at my request in the interest of peace. In no circumstances shall I be willing any more to regard with unbroken tranquility a continuation of the oppression of German compatriots in Czechoslovakia. . . .

I demand that the oppression of 1,500,000 Germans in Czechoslovakia shall cease and be replaced by the free right of self-determination. We would regret it if thereby our relations with other European nations should suffer harm. However, we are not to be blamed. . . . I am not willing to allow a second Palestine to be created here in the heart of Germany by actions of other statesmen. The poor Arabs are deluged and perhaps degraded. The Germans of Czechoslovakia, however, are neither



*downed our defenses. . . . We all have a duty now to bow again to a foreign will. May this be our pledge, so help us God!*"

Der Fuhrer thus committed himself, on September 15, 1938, to the "liberation" of the Sudetens by the Reich. Did this imply a danger to risk a world war if Prague's offer came to her aid? Perhaps. Certainly Hitler and Chamberlain desired Benes and Deladier and the British and French peoples to think so. But more probably it implied that by September 15 Hitler had received secret assurances that Chamberlain was confident of inducing French and Czech surrender and would order the Runciman report closed with a recommendation of partition. Benes would not fight to defend Czechoslovakia. This Hitler knew long before September 15. The gamble that he took was also Chamberlain's gamble. They wagered that under the impact of British pressure and German threats, Paris would abandon Prague, and Prague would yield.

## 1. THE HOME OF THE EVIL FAIRY

Hitler's Monday blast from Nuremberg was Downing Street's cue for raising the curtain on the next act of the play which the man from Birmingham and the man from Braunsau had written between them. On Tuesday London and Paris pressed Benes to accept worded German demands for a plebiscite. Since a plebiscite could have but one outcome under the conditions of terrorism which the Hosselstubs had already created, this was a proposal for the partition of Czechoslovakia. British and French opinion were to be appeased by the vocabulary of democracy. But the war threat must be dramatized before public assent could be counted upon. Chamberlain called in the Defense Ministers to confer with the "Inner Cabinet," consisting of four old men: Simon, who had condoned the Japanese conquest of Manchuria; Hoare, who had condoned the Italian conquest of Ethiopia; and Halifax, who had condoned the German conquest of Austria.

In Sudetenland Hossels now attempted a punch-and-mug with direct failure. On Tuesday the SDP issued an "ultimatum" demanding within six hours the lifting of martial law in the German districts and the withdrawal of troops and police. When Hodas and Benes ignored the ultimatum, the Hossels' leaders summoned their fol-

lower to revolt. Some responded with attacks upon barracks and public buildings which were supplied from the Reich. The issue was never in doubt. After a day of confused fighting, in which some square were killed on both sides, Czech troops restored order everywhere. The would-be partisans led by the thousands to Germany, where they were received as "refugees" from the Czech "invasion." On Thursday, September 15, Hradka issued a proclamation denouncing Anselmus. Prague ordered his arrest for treason. He fled at once to the Reich, accompanied by Deputy Franch, and left his somewhat bewildered and already defeated followers to wage the "just battle" to which he called them. If Berlin and London had entertained hopes of consummating the partition of Czechoslovakia in this fashion, they were now disillusioned.

The British Prime Minister had already taken the necessary next step. On Wednesday night Downing Street released an official statement:

The Prime Minister has sent the German Führer and Chancellor, through His Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin, the following message: "In view of the increasingly critical situation, I propose to come over as soon as to see you with the view to trying to find a peaceful solution. I propose to come across by air and am ready to start tomorrow. Please inform the earliest time at which you can see me and suggest a place of meeting. I should be grateful for a very early reply. NORMAN CHAMBERLAIN." The Führer and Chancellor has replied to the above message that he would be very ready to meet the British Prime Minister on September 19. The Prime Minister is, accordingly, leaving for Germany by air tomorrow.

Chamberlain left Hauxton airport, west of London, early the next morning for Munich. He took with him William Strang, Chief of the Central European Department of the Foreign Office, and Sir Horace Wilson, who was to be his constant companion and secretary during the following days. Halifax was pushed into the background. Wilson had long been the Prime Minister's "industrial relations adviser," comparable in role to Sir Frederick Leith-Ross (economic adviser) and Robert Vassiner (diplomatic adviser). Like them he was a man of shadows, neither businessman nor politician, but a kind of both. He seldom visited the Continent. But he knew much of press and publicity. His dry, callousness face was not that of a diplomatic Machiavelli, but that of a behind-the-scenes manipulator of propaganda. Such an expert Chamberlain now needed above all others.

He had no need to visit Hitler to ascertain his desires or intentions. He had the whole apparatus of the British and German foreign ser-

know he disposed to discover them. Moreover, he already knew them—and approved. Hitler had no need to invite Chamberlain to discuss his intentions or desires. He already knew them—and approved. But the execution of their bargain was war, which neither one wanted or desired, required war crimes, pain, and death to produce French surrender and British acquiescence. For this the decision to fly to the Reich was the perfect device. The sixty-nine-year-old Prime Minister took to the air for the second time in his life (everybody and the first three) to march past from the jaws of hell. This was unprecedented, stunning, and thrilling. Great crowds cheered at Whitehall and Hinton.

Chamberlain's Cabinet colleagues were won to approval and to praise of the Prime Minister's "courage." Ardies and Stickle were summoned to Downing Street and gave their blessing. On the 15th it was announced that Parliament would be called into special session to hear Chamberlain's report. This move likewise served a double purpose of heightening fears of war and silencing possible criticisms of Chamberlain's "personal diplomacy." In Paris there was immense excitement and enormous relief. Daladier immediately claimed credit, writing that he had phoned Chamberlain in the afternoon to suggest some "exceptional procedure" to maintain peace.<sup>16</sup> That the Premier of France should take pride in having proposed a visit which was to reduce the Republic to shame and impotence was a tribute to Chamberlain's perfect planning.

Czech and Slovak brought fuel for the flames of fear which Chamberlain was fanning. Dark hints were dropped in Tokyo of actual support of Germany and Italy—and of the liquidation of Anglo-French interests in the Orient. Mussolini's *Popolo d'Italia* printed an open letter to Runciman declaring "a Czechoslovak nation does not exist" and demanding submission for all nationalities under Prague's rule. "You could make it known that England will think seven times before going to war to conserve that monstrous fiction of a State. . . . The game is absolutely not worth the candle." Here was a new challenge to all Britons and all Frenchmen. Were they to make a war of unconscionable losses against a formidable coalition simply for the sake of denying to the Sudeten a right of "self-determination"? Nervous. The thought was appalling. "Good old Neville!"

While Mrs. Chamberlain prayed in Westminster Abbey, her husband landed at the Munich airport at 1.00 p.m., Thursday, September 15, 1938. He was cheered by a large crowd and greeted by Rits-

betrop, Hindenburg, Herbert von Datzon, and Count Ernst von Wittenbeck. A special "bomb-proof" train (Hitler's own) took the party up into the Alpine valleys, where station crowds did much cheering, and finally brought them to the Grand Hotel at Berchtesgaden. Dr. Otto Meißner met the guests with four cars which climbed the steep ascent to Berghof, Hitler's mountain home in Oberschönberg, some eight miles distant and more than half a mile higher than the town. On arrival a company of Black Guards presented arms before the spacious building. Hitler walked down the stairs in the rain to exchange cordial handshakes and smiles with his British friends.

Here amid the Alpine peaks nestled Hitler's chalet, opposite to the modest Hotel Wachenfeld, far above the valley named in folklore as the dwelling-place of Berchta, female demon and fearful fairy often invoked to frighten Bavarian children. From here Hitler had many times looked with longing over his coveted Austria. Here the Nazi politicians had frequently congregated for party conferences. Here Frau Berghof, half-sister of Der Führer had long kept house. Here her daughter had met Uncle Adolf and had taken victim to her martyrdom and had won her life. Here had come at various times the Duke of Windsor, David Lloyd George, the Marquess of Londonderry, Lord Halifax, and other British dignitaries. Here Schenck-Schiff had come to suffer humiliation and to bear name of murderer. Here the men from Birmingham and the men from Bremen needed the face of Goebbels to their mutual satisfaction.

The Berchtesgaden "conference" of September 12, like wicked fairy Berchta, was a myth. But myths are indispensable in high politics no less than in fairy tales. From 5.00 to 8.00 p.m. the discussion went on amid humorous tapscotch and apophony, each man using his own native tongue and employing a Nazi aide as interpreter. Chamberlain remained only long enough to preserve appearances. There is no reason to doubt that the "understanding" had been agreed upon long before, with only the details of execution remaining to be worked out. The irrefutable contradiction was non-contradictorial but provided more to come.

Berchtesgaden, September 12, 1938. The Führer and Reich Chancellor had a discussion today in Oberschönberg with the British Prime Minister, to the course of which a comprehensive and frank exchange of opinion on the present situation took place. The British Prime Minister will return to England tomorrow to confer with the British Cabinet. New discussions will take place in a few days.

Chamberlain later told Congress (September 28) what he wished Congress and the world to believe took place

At this first conference, which lasted three hours and at which only an interpreter was present besides Herr Hitler and myself, I very soon became aware the situation was much more acute and much more urgent than I had realized. In courteous but perfectly definite terms, Herr Hitler made it plain he had made up his mind the Sudeten Germans must have the right of self-determination and of returning, if they wished, to the Reich. If they could not achieve this by their own efforts, he said, he would assist them to do so and he declared categorically that, rather than wait, he would be prepared to risk a world war. . . .

So strongly did I get the impression that the Chamberlain was contemplating an immediate invasion of Czechoslovakia that I asked him why he had allowed me to travel all that way, since I evidently was wasting my time. He said if I could give him there and then the assurance the British Government accepted the principle of self-determination, he was quite ready to discuss ways and means of carrying it out. If, on the contrary, I told him such a principle could not be considered by the British Government, then he agreed it was no use to continue our conversations. I was of course in no position to give these and then such assurance, but I undertook to return at once to consult my colleagues if he would refrain from action hasty and I had had time to obtain their reply. That assurance he gave, provided, he said, nothing happened in Czechoslovakia of such a nature as to force his hand, and that assurance has remained binding ever since.

I have no doubt now, looking back, that my visit does prevented an invasion for which everything had been prepared, and it was clear to me that with German troops in the position they then occupied, nothing anybody could do would prevent an invasion unless the right of self-determination was granted, and that quickly, to the Sudeten Germans. And that was the sole hope of a peaceful solution.

Chamberlain's purpose in explaining the conference, like his purpose in making the visit, was to build up an impression of crisis and imminent war which could be averted only by the partition of Czechoslovakia. This "solution" had to be served up as a peace palatable to democratic men. Hence the references to "right of self-

determination" (which was nonsense) and "returning to the Reich" (which was falsehood). For the rest, the bargain was already closed. Whether Chamberlain did in fact experience any private anxiety lest Der Führer punish his pact by an armed attack upon Czechoslovakia may never be known. If this was indeed the case, the Prince Minister must have welcomed his worry as much as he disliked it, for it made it easier to spread fear in England and France with his mouth open his constituent.

His most serious problem lay less in any likelihood of sudden violence from the Reich or of dissent from his colleagues than in the possibility of French resistance. The defense of Paris had been breached, but full capitulation had not yet been wrenched from the defenders despite their demoralization.<sup>21</sup> Chamberlain's plane landed in Hesse airport early Friday afternoon. He emerged with a broad smile and an air of confidence. He received an ovation. The German Chancellery greeted him warmly: "I hope you feel that you have been successful. At any rate, you have conquered the hearts of my countrymen." "They were very kind to me," replied the Prime Minister. "Very kind. I have had a great time. Why, people even ran out to wave at the plane flew over them!" To reporters he declared: "I feel satisfied now that each of us [he said Hitler] fully understands what is in the mind of the other. . . . I would advise you not to accept prematurely any unauthorized report of what took place in the conversation. I shall be discussing these talks tonight with my colleagues and others—especially Lord Runciman. Later on, perhaps in a few days, I am going to have another talk with Herr Hitler. Only this time he has told me it is his intention to come half way to meet me—to spare an old man another such long journey."

Runciman returned by plane from Prague the same day. "It may not be necessary for me to go back," he said on landing. "It is a very delicate situation. Everything is on the lines of the gods." He was reported to have brought a memorandum from Brown rejecting all proposals of union or placiation. Chamberlain conferred with Simon, Hoare, and Halifax in the evening. Halifax had conferred earlier in the day with Dino Grandi and the Earl of Perth, as well as with the Archbishop of Canterbury and two Labor leaders, Asquith and Arthur Greenwood. A delegation from the National Council of Labor, consisting of Sir Walter Citrine, Herbert Morrison, and Hugh Dalton, warned that labor would consistently oppose any plan for a Sudeten placiation. This was severely disheartening, but suggested the

the war panic had not yet been pushed to the required degree of frightfulness.

In remote Geneva the 19th Assembly had come together with many delays and absences. Its irreducible deliberations were unscripted, unhearsed, and unending. Among the foreign ministers of the Great Powers, only Laval was present, though Bonnet made a brief visit. Geneva had withered away to the point at which it was no longer useful even as a façade. Earl De La Warr, Lord Privy Seal, came in haste from London on September 17 to urge that the resolutions article be diluted, "Each case must be considered on its merits." Even in case of flagrant aggression, there is "no automatic obligation to apply either economic or military sanctions," but only an obligation to consult. Each State must judge for itself whether it would act against an aggressor. The Earl hastened back to London without waiting to hear Dr. Wellington Koo's pathetic plea that the members invoke Article 17 against Japan, apply an arms embargo against the aggressor and grant aid to his victims in accordance with previous resolutions, and take action to deter Tokio from continuing to use "barbarous methods of warfare." He pleaded against shoring Article 17 and asked whether the League was "no more than an Egyptian mummy dressed up with all the luxuries and splendor of the living but devoid of life." Silence prevailed.

In all that followed, the League was indeed a mummy, for its slow-moving procedures, already pointed by Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay, were never resorted to even for the purpose of lending respectability to the new betrayal of Woodrow Wilson's dream. On September 19, the Council did indeed ask Tokio to assume membership for the avoidance of its "dispute" with China. On September 22 the vote declined to discuss the fate of the bank with the sheep at Geneva. Britain again asked an optional and discretionary interpretation of Article 16. The Council held on the view that sanctions were applicable to Japan. None was attempted. Tokio warned of reprisals. On the 24th the Assembly passed a resolution hoping for European peace and associating itself with Roosevelt's message. On September 30 the Assembly resolved to urge the Government from the Treaty of Versailles and adopted a report permitting the League to deal with any "war or threat of war" without constraint. On the same day the Council resolved that sanctions against Japan were discretionary, invited an investigation of Chinese charges of Japanese use of poison gas, and appointed a committee (Belgium, France, and Iran) to "take

and of the influx of foreign volunteers by the Spanish Republic. All of this was verbiage. Lénine kept urging support of Czechoslovakia and confound with French and Russian representatives, all to no purpose. He threatened to appeal to the League on behalf of Czechoslovakia, also to no purpose. To rely on Russia to lift a difficult situation for a Livonian. The missionaries had performed their work too well.

To return to London: Chamberlain met the full Cabinet on Sunday morning, September 17, and again in the afternoon. No statement was issued, but reports suggested a division of opinion. A small group, comprising Alfred Duff Cooper, Malcolm MacDonald, and perhaps Halifax himself was said to oppose the Chamberlain-Hitler plan on the ground that it would constitute a betrayal of Czechoslovakia and of the Czech, Jewish, and democratic minorities in Sudentland. Another faction opposed Chamberlain's suggestion that Britain should "guarantee" a threatened Czechoslovakia, possibly not understanding that such a pledge would be meaningless save as a cheap gesture. Simon, Hoare, and Sir Kingsley Wood were reported to be opposed to any British commitment beyond the Rhine. After five hours of discussion and a further visit of Grinich to the Foreign Office the Cabinet adjourned. There is no reason to believe that Chamberlain took all of his colleagues completely into his confidence. Had he done so the institution of the "inner Cabinet" would have been unnecessary. Like God, the Prime Minister moved in mysterious ways his wonders to perform.

On the next day Chamberlain invited Deladier and Bonnet to come to London on Sunday. Here and hereafter Chamberlain acted as the intermediary for conveying Hitler's demand to both Prague and Paris. That the intermediary was also collaborator was not fully appreciated at the Czech and the French capitals. That the collaborator had in Bonnet a secret co-collaborator was likewise not suspected. The King interrupted his holiday at Balmoral Castle to receive Runciman in the capital. Chamberlain received Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy. Most observers in Paris immediately ascribed a "wrong" French stand in favor of Czechoslovakia's integrity. Herlein immediately announced the formation of a Sudent "Frontpage" along the Czech frontier: "Bones pained in lying. . . . He is too much of a coward to acknowledge that his policy has collapsed. . . . Knowing full well the consequences, he joins Bolshevik-Hitlerian border warfare, in the shape of half-killed Czech soldiery, loose upon the



Frenchmen. . . . We therefore assume for ourselves emergency rights." Prague replied by proclaiming a state of emergency throughout the country. The official Polish press issued a cheering for annexation of Czech Silesia, anticipating correctly that the outcome of Chamberlain's program would be the partition of Czechoslovakia. At the door of No. 10 Downing Street sat a black cat—an omen of "good luck," said many. For whom?

Sunday, September 18, 1938, will ever be memorable to future ages as Europe's doomsday—not because a threatened war broke out, but because a short war was "averted" by a bargain which in its ultimate implications spelled the demise of Western civilization on the Continent. In a broadcast at noon Premier Rados appealed to his countrymen for courage and "determination to defend what is ours." He rejected a plebiscite and vowed Prague's resolve to seek peace by negotiation while "defending completely the integrity of the State." In Tehran, which he visited for the first time since his assumption of Czar's mantle, Mussolini told a cheering throng that the Czechoslovak problem demanded a "realistic" solution. Chamberlain, as a "flying messenger of peace," had appreciated the gravity of the situation. "If a line-up of universal character is brought on for or against Prague, let it be known that Italy's place is already chosen. . . . The world of Hitlerism has for sixteen years been the irreconcilable enemy of France." But all roads led to London. The *Daily Mail* carried an interview with Hitler at Berchtesgaden by G. Ward Price in which *Der Führer* expressed confidence in Chamberlain's "sincerity and good will" and asserted that "this Czech trouble has got to be ended once and for all and ended now." Germany had been obliged to double its air force because Czechoslovakia was an ally of Soviet Russia. Germany had quailed the Maginot Line and built a better one. But no German wanted war with either France or Britain. "This infernal Czech tyranny," however, must stop. "Stop it now!"

On Sunday morning Deladier and Bonnet flew to London and were met at Croydon airport by Chamberlain and Halifax. With unconcealed humor the Premier exclaimed to the Prime Minister: "What a magnificent gesture your air trip to Germany was!" After conferring with Ambassador Curzon the French valises drove to 10 Downing Street amid cheering crowds and there went into conference with the "three Catholics" plus Vandiervein, Cologan, Rostkman, and Ad-

con-Gentiles. From 11.00 to 1.30 they talked and again from 3.30 to 7.30 and from 9.30 till after midnight. Police kept watch on rolling crowds in Whitehall. Amid cries of "No concessions to Hitler!" and "Stand by the Cross!" Miss Ellen Wilkinson, Labourist, declared: "We say to Neville Chamberlain—we do not trust you. We believe you went to Germany to fix up the sale of liberties of Czechoslovakia." This effervescence was unobscene, but not serious. More important as a reflection of public sentiment, and as a device to steer that sentiment in the desired direction, were the prayers for peace all over the Empire. The Archbishop of Canterbury read the call, having doubtless been advised to do so by Halifax on Friday. The King prayed in Windsor Castle. The Queen prayed in Castle Park Church. Mrs. Chamberlain prayed with a grief strong in Westminster Abbey at the tomb of the unknown soldier who had apparently died to make the world safe for hypocrisy. Hour after hour the discussions at No. 10 Downing Street went on. Jan Masaryk, Czech Minister, presented a note in the afternoon asserting that no "solution" would be valid without Czechoslovakia's assent. Harsh cries are often heard.

What went on behind closed doors during these hours of world-wide anxiety and heartbreak can only be surmised from the prior and subsequent decisions reached. In his official explanation to Commons of September 18 Chamberlain declared that Runciman, on the evening of September 16, had recommended the "solution" embodied in his letter of September 11. But France had then to be consulted. Therefore Daladier and Bonnet had been summoned to London.

During these conversations, the representatives of the two governments were actuated by the desire to find a solution that would not hang about a European war and therefore a solution which would not automatically compel France to take action in accordance with her obligations. It was agreed that the only means of achieving this object was to accept the principle of self-determination.

Accordingly the British and French ministers at Prague were instructed to inform the Czechoslovak Government that continuance within Czechoslovakia of districts mainly inhabited by Sudeten Germans would imperil the interests of Czechoslovakia herself and all hopes of peace. The Czechoslovak Gov-

contract was asked to agree immediately to direct the transfer to the Reich of areas inhabited by a population of more than fifty percent Germans.

The Czechoslovak Government were informed that to meet their natural desire for their security in the future His Majesty's Government would be prepared as a contribution to the pacification of Europe to join in an international guarantee in regard to new boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression. Such a guarantee would safeguard the independence of Czechoslovakia by substituting a general guarantee against unprovoked aggression in place of the existing treaties with France and Russia which involved reciprocal obligations of a military character. In agreeing to that guarantee His Majesty's Government were accepting a completely new commitment. We were not previously bound by any obligations toward Czechoslovakia other than those involved by the Covenant of the League.

This tale told nothing of the Sunday discussions of September 18 which preceded the decision. It is scarcely likely that the British were obliged to spend the whole day and half the night haggling over their French guests' surrender. Delorier had sincerely been advised by Chamberlain of the necessity of sacrificing Czechoslovakia long before this day. But the sore-bruise and ill-served French Premier with the weak mouth had been already intimidated and demoralized. His visiting Foreign Minister was Chamberlain's agent in consummating Delorier's disintegration. The debate centered not on the principle of partition but rather on the best method of consummating the betrayal of France's allies and presenting it to the world in plausible guise. Delorier and Bonnet apparently insisted upon the façade of an Anglo-French "guarantee," since this would be helpful in securing public assent in France. Chamberlain and his colleagues at first declined, since such a pledge might be disowned in the High Tory press. Both sides knew that the move had no relationship to "protecting" what would be left of Czechoslovakia. With the invasion barriers of Switzerland surrendered, Prague would henceforth be completely at the mercy of Berlin. Since it could offer no resistance to future Nazi demands, it could never become an object of future "aggression." But Parliament and public had to be placated. The result was compromise: the guarantee would be "international" rather

than Anglo-French, it would operate only against "unprovoked" aggression, it would thus leave loop-holes of escape in the event that anyone in the future should take the guarantee seriously. There such a cheap and easy guarantee could be regarded by its perpetrators as "good politics"—as an effective means of eliciting popular acquiescence in their respective countries—could only mean that the guarantee in Downing Street had explicit confidence in the stupidity, moral irresponsibility, and unaccountable thirst for peace-at-any-price of the vast majority of British and Frenchmen. This confidence—in the day judge—was not misplaced.

After minutes past the milestone which divided Sunday from Monday (and divided one epoch from another) the conference ended. The Ministers emerged in a pouring rain. The black cat and the seconds had sought shelter. Deladier lightly tossed the text of a communiqué—in total empty of all content. It read:

After full discussion of the present international situation representatives of the British and French governments are in complete agreement as to the policy to be adopted which aims at promoting a general solution of the Czechoslovak question. The two governments hope that discussion it will be possible to consider a most general settlement in the interests of European peace.

But the secret was out. The press of all the world on the morning after disclosed the substance of the Anglo-French demands upon Prague. They were passed to the Czechoslovak Government on Monday.

*The Anglo-French Proposals presented to the Czechoslovak  
Government on September 16, 1938*

The representatives of the British and French Governments have been in consultation today on the general situation, and have considered the British Prime Minister's report of his conversation with Lord Halifax. British Ministers also placed before their French colleagues their conclusions derived from the account furnished to them of the words of his Majesty by Lord Runcorn. We are both convinced that, after these events, the point has now been reached when the further maintenance within the limitations of the Czechoslovak State of the dispute merely tolerated by Stokholm Council cannot, in fact, maintain any longer without impeding the interests of Czechoslovakia herself and of European peace. In the light of these considerations, both Governments have been compelled to the conclusion that the maintenance of peace and the safety of Czechoslovakia's real interests cannot effectively be secured unless these issues are now transferred to the British.

It is thus clear either by direct transfer or as the result of a plebiscite. We realize the difficulties involved in a plebiscite, and we are aware of your eloquence already ascribed to the cause, particularly the possibility of fan-

making suggestions if the matter were raised on the basis of an *ad hoc* principle. For the reason we anticipate, in the absence of indication to the contrary, that you may prefer to deal with the Sudeten Deutsch problem by the method of direct transfer, and so a case by itself.

3. The case for transfer would probably have to include some *ad hoc* case for some of German minorities, but we should hope to arrange by negotiation provisions for adjustment of borders, where circumstances render it necessary, by some international body, including a Czech representative. We are satisfied that the transfer of smaller areas based on a higher percentage would not meet the case.

4. The international body referred to might also be charged with questions of possible exchange of population on the basis of right to opt within some specified time-limit.

5. We recognize that, if the Czechoslovak Government is prepared to renounce the demands proposed, involving material changes in the constitution of the State, they are entitled to ask for some assurance of their future security.

6. Accordingly, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would be prepared, as a contribution to the pacification of Europe, to join in an international guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression. One of the principal objectives of such a guarantee would be the safeguarding of the independence of Czechoslovakia by the substitution of a general guarantee against unprovoked aggression in place of existing treaties which involve individual obligations of a military character.

7. Both the French and British Governments recognize how great is the anxiety that inspired of the Czechoslovak Government in the wake of years. For losses that come to nations both in Europe in general and in particular to Czechoslovakia himself they have felt it their duty jointly to set forth freely the conditions essential to secure it.

8. The Foreign Secretary must reserve conversations with His Majesty not later than Wednesday, and unless if possible. We therefore feel we must ask for your reply at the earliest possible moment.<sup>24</sup>

This ultimatum, so far as I have been able to discover, is completely without precedent in the annals of diplomacy. Never before in the history of the Western State system has a Great Power in alliance with a small Power, upon whose sovereignty and independence the security and prestige of the Great Power rested, collaborated with another Great Power (in virtual alliance with itself) to present to its small ally demands for its own sake at the behest of a third Great Power, or even the potential enemy of all three. Some imperfections, being fatal, can only be attempted once. The ultimatum was couched with threats, veiled with empty promises, and masked once with formulas of direct interest for British and French home consumption. The object of the exercise was to safeguard "European peace" and—*rehabilitate Czechs*—"the safety of Czechoslovakia's vital interests." Fugate's objection to a phibacter were used to justify demands for

crisis without a plebiscite. Prager's surrender of its alliances with France, the USSR, Rumania, and Yugoslavia were depicted as a small loss compared to the great gain of an international guarantee. A forty-eight-hour time limit was implied. The threat of detection was not put in writing. This was unnecessary. Bosen, Hodia, and Kozdra would understand. If not, Newton and de la Cruz would tell them.

The men of the Hierarchy were not quite capable of comprehending so appalling a piece of perfidy. They groped in bewilderment at the news of what they could only term, in broken voices, "the greatest betrayal in history." On Monday morning the French Cabinet unanimously endorsed Sunday's decision, though Paul Reynaud, Georges Mandel, Henri Queuille, and Cécile Campenon were reported to have opposed the plan. Stefan Gonsky emerged from an hour's talk with Bosen at the Quai d'Orsay haggard of mind and with his eyes filled with tears: "They have condemned my country without a hearing." Bosen heard much as apologetic explanation to the French Prime, declaring that "all regrets about the past are now useless." The Cabinet was voting "meaning and misery to millions of homes" and would try to make the surgical operation on Czechoslovakia "as painless as possible." Newton and de la Cruz called on Bosen in the morning to warn him against any hasty action. The ultimatum was officially presented at 2.00 p.m. Prager inquired of Paris as to whether France would honor its obligations in the event that Czech rejection of the ultimatum should be followed by German aggression. No answer was forthcoming. The Czechoslovak Cabinet met in the evening to formalize its painful decision. At Rome Sir Noel Charles, British Charge, called on Ciano. Paris returned to his post on Tuesday. The French Press commented on attacks on Prager.

On Tuesday, September 22, Hitler received Horthy and Raeyr at Berchtesgaden to discuss Hawkey's demands. Ambassador Lipdi called at Wilhelmstrasse with regard to Poland's demands. Horthy enjoyed a honeying trip with Goering in East Prussia. Mussolini at Udine cried: "We prefer to be feared rather than loved and we care not if we are feared because we have nothing but contempt for those who hate us." While the veterans gathered, Prager prepared his answer. In the evening Newton and de la Cruz were handed a note. It postulated, pleaded for reconsideration, recalled Prager's loyalty to her allies, warned that France would be imperilled by German domi-

refusal of a renewed Czecho-Slovakia, and proposed arbitration under the German-Czech treaty of 1925. Within a few hours, after phone conversations between London and Paris, the Western Powers sent to Prague a new ultimatum rejecting the Czech answer and demanding an immediate "yes" or "no." De la Caze was instructed to warn Prague of the danger of a "negative or history attitude." *Austin's Times* declared accordingly that Czecho-Slovakia later "will come to believe the ultimate gain will be more real than the immediate sacrifice."

At 1.15 a.m. on Wednesday Bessie received the French and British Ministers with their urgent demands. They made it clear that if Prague rejected the ultimatum, France and Britain would not come to Czecho-Slovakia's defense in the event of a German invasion. At Bucharest it was learned that Rumstein's willingness to give transit to Soviet troops for the defense of Czecho-Slovakia was contingent upon French defense of Prague. The USSR was not bound to aid Czecho-Slovakia without French support. Litvinov nevertheless considered such aid despite French repudiation of the alliance. He told the League Assembly on Wednesday that the USSR had refrained from all intervention and advice in the negotiations between Prague and the GGP and that it considered it quite "undesirable" that Prague should be asked to make concessions "in order that we should be set free from the necessity of fulfilling our obligations under the treaty bearing our signature. Neither did we offer any advice in the contrary direction." Prague had never doubted Moscow's determination to carry out its pledges.

But when, a few days before I left for Geneva, the French Government for the first time inquired of my Government as to its attitude in the event of an attack on Czecho-Slovakia, I gave the French representatives at Moscow, in the name of my Government, the following perfectly clear and unambiguous reply: "We intend to fulfill our obligations under the pact, together with France, to afford assistance to Czecho-Slovakia by the way open to us; our War Department is ready immediately to participate in a conference with representatives of the French and Czecho-Slovak war departments in order to discuss measures appropriate to the moment. In an event like this, we shall consider desirable that the question be raised in the League of Nations, if only as you under Article 11, with the object, first, of mobiliz-

ing public opinion, and, secondly, maintaining the position of certain other States whose passive aid might be extremely valuable." We said further that it was necessary to exert all means of avoiding an armed conflict and we considered one such method to be immediate consultation between the Great Powers of Europe and other interested States, in order, if possible, to decide on the terms for a collective demand. This is how our reply was framed.<sup>11</sup>

Subsequent efforts were made by British and French leaders to excuse their own conduct by casting doubts on Moscow's sincerity. In fact, only the USSR remained loyal to its promise. Those promises were reiterated at Geneva on September 11. The pledge of 1935 was to defend Prague if Paris defended Prague. Moscow had already concentrated more troops near the Polish-Rumanian frontier than were contained in the entire Polish army. Rydz-Śmigły and Beck were panic-stricken. Rather than risk Russian invasion they were ready to join Paris, Prague, and Moscow against the Reich.<sup>12</sup> Bucharest was already prepared to join the coalition. Britain would have had no option but to join if Paris defended Prague. There is no evidence, save the word of Neville Chamberlain, that Hitler was prepared to challenge such a coalition to war, since his defeat would have been a foregone conclusion. But it was precisely such a defeat—above all, a defeat in which the Red Army might play a major role—that Chamberlain and Deladier were most anxious to prevent. The Hindenburg and the Kremlins already knew that Paris would not defend Prague. Should Moscow then act alone?

For Moscow to act alone might have been to play directly into the hands of Hitler and Chamberlain. Any diplomatic or military initiative by the USSR might have rallied Tories everywhere to support of *Der Führer*. The Government at Prague, moreover, was as much anti-Communist as the Government at Paris or London, despite Dr. Götlob's allegations. Yet if Prague relied with Moscow's help—or even alone—there was a possibility that popular sympathy in both France and Britain might turn out the Cabinet in office and force intervention, thus creating a great coalition à la Barthou. But Rudolf Bressi, leader of the reactionary Agrarian Party, threatened to summon Nazi aid if Berlin summoned Soviet aid. Britain might have arrested him for treason, and, with Russian and commonwealth French involvement probable, might have killed all in one outrageous stroke.



But he was weary of barragans. He yielded. The *Nemesis* of the West was again at work. Capitalism to Fischer, even if it is more suicidal, was deemed preferable to starvation if salvation could be had only with Communism aid.

After many hours of agonizing debate the Prague Cabinet surrendered at 3:30 p.m., Wednesday, September 12, 1938. An official communiqué announced the decision:

... We had to depend upon our friends' help, but when we were threatened with force it became evident that the European states had become so remote that our friends refused us to purchase freedom and peace by sacrifices, inasmuch as they could not help us. Two Great Powers told us with the full weight of their conviction and authority that only by territorial sacrifices on our part could security and peace be secured. We wished to suggest a mechanism of the dispute by arbitration, but this suggestion was rejected by others. England and France, two democracies, informed us that arbitration could not solve the difficulty. It was their opinion that peace and freedom could not be established by such procedure. They informed us that they could not assist us in the event we were attacked by Germany and they were of the opinion that a conflict would have been inevitable had Czechoslovakia refused to cede the northern of the German population.

Inasmuch as Russia was willing to come to our help only on condition that France came first and, moreover, only when the League of Nations should have determined that Czechoslovakia was attacked and that Germany was the aggressor, we found ourselves facing the threat of war menacing not only the West but mankind as a whole. . . . The President of the Republic and our Government could do nothing but accept the suggestion of the two Powers. . . . Nothing else remained, because we were alone. . . .

At 5:00 p.m. Krofa received the missions of France and England and presented to them the Government's answer to the demands which they had presented to the President of the Republic at 1:00 a.m. In its answer the Czechoslovak Government assumed responsibility for a formal solution of the nationalistic problem in the manner which the missions proposed on September 12. . . .<sup>10</sup>

Krofa's note declared that Czechoslovakia sorrowfully accepted the terms under "extraordinary pressure." It explained the promised guarantee and the safeguarding of Czechoslovakia's vital interests and assumed that no invasion would be tolerated until the international commission should fix the new frontiers with Prague's collaboration. Vain hopes! Angry crowds walked through Prague denouncing Berlin and demanding war. In a radio address Hago Vorechka, the new Minister of Propaganda, declared that the Cabinet had no alternative: "It is a case without parallel in history that our allies and friends should impose conditions upon us which are usually

imposed upon vanquished enemies. It is not a lack of courage that induced our Government to take the decision which grips our hearts. . . . God knows that more courage is needed for living than for committing suicide. . . . We resolved to offer ourselves as a sacrifice for world peace, just as Christus sacrificed Himself on the Cross for the benefit of mankind. We shall not blame those who left us in the lurch, but history will pronounce a judgement about their days."<sup>1</sup>

On Thursday morning Premier Hohen resigned. A new Cabinet, in which Karel Kramar retired his post, was formed by one-eyed Gers and Jan Syrovsky, Inspector-General of the army. Gers pleaded for calm and unity. Representatives of all parties from Communists to Fascists addressed a great multitude before the parliament building in support of the "Government of National Defense." Anger and despair at betrayal gave way in some circles to dimmed hopes that the nation would still be permitted to fight to preserve its integrity.

Chamberlain prepared to return to the Reich to make Hitler a gift of Sudetenland. The Polish and Hungarian envoys called at Downing Street on Wednesday with demands for shares of the loot. Kramar received an ultimatum from Warsaw demanding Teschen and threatening invasion. Mussolini reiterated his demands at Treviso. Litvinov at Geneva declared that Paris and London had ignored offers of Soviet aid and were granting "honour" for sub-vending. In Britain and France relief at "peace" was already giving way to a sense of outrage. Winston Churchill returned from Paris and called upon his countrymen to realize the scope of "the disaster area which we are being led." He declared that the capitulation was "a complete surrender of the Western democracies to the Nazi threat of force" and would force twenty-five German divisions to dominate the Western Front. Sir Archibald Sinclair said: "Do not let us permit justice and self-determination." Labourers organized a campaign of protest. In a Wednesday address to the English Speaking Union at Stamford-on-Avon, Eden mildly denounced the Cabinet's action. The French Socialists and Communist parties adopted resolutions demanding the destruction of Czechoslovakia and demanding a special session of parliament. *Le Temps* began to waver in its enthusiasm for surrender. Impending Cabinet resignations were rumored. It had clearly become necessary to involve the war party in order to insure public acquiescence in the gifts to Hitler which Chamberlain had promised at the shade of Bertra.

## 4. THE HILL OF THE PAGAN GODS

By all canons of reason the "crisis" should have ended with the Czech capitulation of September 21. Why did it continue and become even more acute? The libeled explanations of Neville Chamberlain and his associates are well known: Hitler at Godesberg made new demands. He asked immediate German military occupation of the areas to be ceded. He also insisted upon humiliating conditions of cession and upon the cessation of districts of mixed or doubtful language. Prague rejected these demands. Paris and London did not insist on their acceptance, but regarded them as unreasonable. Hitler refused to yield. All Powers therefore prepared for war. But at the last moment, in response to desperate appeals, Hitler agreed to a four-Power pacty and accepted terms which were a compromise between the Reichsgauleiter and the Godesberg demands. Thus "peace with honor" was saved at the eleventh hour.

That Hitler insisted upon wide immediate and immediate military occupation is clear, though here as always his demands were a reflection of his anxieties regarding race. Thanks to Chamberlain, he knew that the risks were small. That Chamberlain was in some measure surprised and shocked by these demands is probable, but by no means certain. He perhaps feared that *Der Führer* was, after all, some sort of madman who was resolved to use naked force quite needlessly because he loved as bestary. He perhaps feared that Hitler preferred war without victory to victory without war and was bent upon breaking the terms of their bargain. On the other hand the question of the precise scope and mode of Czechoslovakia's sacrifice was not a matter of serious concern to a British Prime Minister who had already decided that the Czechoslovak Republic must go and had compelled Paris and Prague to accept the principle of partition. Even the questions of a time limit and of immediate occupation were not in themselves of sufficient magnitude to justify what seemed to be a belated decline to fight. That Hitler was prepared to fight over such details is most doubtful. That he desired Chamberlain to believe that he intended to fight is less doubtful. That Chamberlain believed him is possible. But that Chamberlain intended that Britain should fight or prompt France to fight over the tempo and procedural details of Czech partition, after he had long since decided not to fight and not to

permit France to fight over the principle of partition, is as utterly repugnant as to approach the perpetration.

The much advertised discrepancy between the Buchenwalden and the Gothenburg demands, moreover, was mythological. If such a discrepancy existed, Chamberlain could readily enough have demonstrated its existence by making public the minutes, notes, or memoranda exchanged at Buchenwalden. But the White Paper of September 27 and Chamberlain's speech of the same day contained no such material. Aside from questions of time and method, the Anglo-French ultimatum, 19 Paper of September 19 contained nothing incompatible with what Hitler asked at Gothenburg. Chamberlain relied upon simple affirmation of the discrepancy. He conveyed the impression that the Buchenwalden proceedings were informal and oral and involved only the "principle" of "self-determination" and not the details of its application. If no details were agreed upon, there could be no "discrepancy" between two alleged sets of demands. If details were agreed upon and subsequently departed from, this fact could be readily shown by publishing pamphlets and public to compare two sets of documents. This was precisely what was not permitted. Here, then, a presumptive evidence, albeit negative and circumstantial in character, that the discrepancy was a fiction, probably concocted by Hitler and Chamberlain in concert. In the Munich accord Hitler was freely granted immediate military occupation—by stages, to be sure, but occupation would be by stages in any case. In terms of territory he received more than his numerous stated demands. There was no "honourable" and no "peace with honour." Why, then, the new crisis?

The most plausible hypothesis is not that Chamberlain was shocked, confused, and befuddled, first making new demands, then shrinking back from the brink of war, and finally yielding before threats of hostilities. His masterly management of the entire drama all but precludes these possibilities. Neither is it likely that a decision for war was reached and then rescinded because of the advice of armateurs that the Reich was already invincible. Chamberlain never contemplated war with Germany, regardless of Hitler's demands on Prague. Hitler never contemplated war with France and Britain. The two men understood each other and were agreed that the demoralization of a non-existent war danger would be desirable for an effect upon British and French opinion. About September 21 fear of war and relief at surrender gave way in the democracies to shame, scorn, and indigna-

not. The Prime Minister was cognizant of Adolphe Laguein's dictum: "You can fool some of the people all of the time, and all of the people some of the time, but you cannot fool all of the people all of the time." The partition of Czechoslovakia, already assumed to be the diplomatic sphere, could not be carried through to a successful conclusion without parliamentary and public support in the democracies. That support was crumbling before a rising flood of poems or the beguyl. Should Hitler launch a local war against Prague in the knowledge that Chamberlain and Daladier would not intervene, this flood might sweep both men from office and precipitate Anglo-French intervention. Here was the actual cross. How to meet it? A simple accord with Hitler on the basis of the Berchtesgaden demands and the London ultimatum would be inadequate, for these were already the objects of heated attack. A simple acceptance of "new" and "more extreme" demands would serve only to raise the tide of indignation and still further jeopardize the whole scheme.

The solution of the double dilemma was a work of genius. Hitler must be contained against even a local war, though he must continue to play as belligerent a role as possible in order to spread new alarm in the West. Prague must finally be broken into accepting any German demands, but must first be encouraged to play a role of resistance — also to spread alarm inside West. Above all, a new threat of war must be manufactured in order that indignation at surrender might again give way to public panic at the prospect of Armageddon. The terms of the original "surrender," moreover, must be made to appear "just" and "honorable" by comparison with alleged "new" terms which Hitler was supposed to be insisting upon under threat of immediate hostilities. The "new" demands must be "contained" even by the Quai d'Orsay and Downing Street — for gestures of resistance would increase and aggravate the war panic. The peoples and parliaments of Britain and France must be brought to the very brink of war and then marched back at the last possible moment through apparent "concessions" by Hitler, ending possible a settlement on the basis of the "original" demands, which would now appear eminently reasonable, desirable, and even welcome as an escape from an appalling prospect of universal slaughter and destruction. Such a settlement not only would be accepted but would be hailed with wild enthusiasm in both the democracies if it could be presented in the guise of the major phrases which Czechoslovakia had already found so useful: "general settlement" and "European appeasement."

In short, the steps from Godesberg to Munich were prearranged, as were the steps from London to Berchtesgaden and from Berchtesgaden to Godesberg. This is not to say that the man from Bremen and the man from Birmingham went out between them the whole rest of the play, with acts and scenes ready timed and each player, including the dupes and duresses, assigned his precise role and his precise lines. This was conspiracy. As fellow politicians the two men understood each other without this. And if they played between themselves their own little game of cat-and-mouse-then, this play-within-a-play was also part of the larger plot. Authorship of the screenplay was mixed. Hitler was ably assisted by Eichenberg, Reichenow, Kellert, and others, with the colored hand of Goebbels indicated at certain points. If Duce was likewise helpful, Rydz-Smigly and Horthy furnished comic relief in ghasts. Chamberlain was aided by Sir Horace Wilson, by Brown, Hosen, and Halden, and by Vianumart and Cadogan in uncertain measure. He was also aided by Bennett Deladen, the baker's son, who roasts. Roosevelt was given a front seat among the spectators, half-persuaded that the play was real, and seduced to his seat and clip at the proper moment—*par reconnoître* his actors. Lénine sat in the last row of the gallery, unable to change the playbill or warn the audience that most of what it beheld was optical illusion produced with mirrors. But almost alone among the onlookers he found the lines familiar and knew how the plot would run out.

Act II opened on Thursday, September 12, at Godesberg on the Rhine, between Bonn and Köln. This famous health resort—named "Meat of the Gods" in ancient days—boasts numerous modern hotels and a castle built in 1100 by Archbishop Tonderich I. Der Führer stayed always at the Dreesen, which he had already visited no less than sixty-seven times. It was on the terrace of the Rhine Hotel at Godesberg that he had stood at midnight on June 19, 1934, gazing moodily at the crowd of merry-makers, nursing to Goebbels at his side for comfort, and at length receiving dispatches and phone calls from Göring in Berlin. It was from Godesberg that Hitler and Goebbels went to the airport at Bonn and soared off southward into the black night. Munich-bound, to begin before dawn the fearful butchery of friends and colleagues which was to give the day the name of "Bloody Saturday." To the Hotel Dreesen Hitler now came again. Chamberlain, sitting on the stage: "If you don't concede the first time, try, try again," flew from Herten to Köln with Wilson

and Spring. On alighting at half past noon, he was again received by Ribbentrop, Dulacq, and Henderson. He visited the Hitler headquarters and was driven to Bonn and then across the river to Godesberg, where he put up at the Pfauenhof. After lunch he mounted *Arco*, the mountain, crossed the Rhine once more by ferry, and proceeded up the opposite bank to the Dreisen, where Hitler met him on the balcony, attended by Goebbels, Ribbentrop, and Keitel.

The first "conference" lasted from 4:10 to 5:15. Chamberlain issued a communique, promising attention to the matter and appealing for calm and order in Czechoslovakia. Amid deep mystery and a fog of guess speculation, the discussion was resumed on Friday at the Dreisen, interrupted, continued by a running exchange of letters between the hosts, and then continued later in the evening and brought to a conclusion at 1:30 a.m. Saturday with a communique referring to a "deadly crisis," a "German memorandum" to be transmitted by Chamberlain to Prague, and "sincere thanks" from Dr. Fuhrer to the Prime Minister for his efforts for "peace." Sir Hanson made cryptic statements and announced that the Prime Minister was flying back to London Saturday morning. The exchange of letters across the Rhine, with nothing of their content as yet made public, led to a growing sense of a reprieve. Both German and British sources wrapped the conference in deep mystery, nicely calculated to spread fear. After the close of the midnight conference Chamberlain increased the mystery by declaring: "I cannot say it is hopeless."

The fabrication of a new war panic proceeded apace. On Friday evening Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay suddenly informed the Czechs that they could not "continue to take responsibility of advising them not to mobilize." In a cruel frenzy of fear and hope, President Benes issued a call for general mobilization at 10:25 p.m. Troops moved to the frontier. The Nazi Press urged against the Czech "terror" and printed false reports about loss of life in border fighting. Vladimir Potemkin, Acting Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, had unwittingly contributed to the panic by handing a note to the Polish Charge at 4 a.m. Friday warning Warsaw that Moscow would denounce its non-aggression pact with Poland if Polish troops invaded Czechoslovakia. Exactly twenty-four hours later the French Government ordered partial mobilization after Daladier had issued a statement the preceding evening stating that the discussions had been broken off and declaring: "In the event of Czechoslovakia's being the victim of unprovoked aggression, France will immediately take the necessary

measures of submission." Half a million troops were called up and aerial resources were pushed.

It was in England that it was most important to evoke new paroxysms of terror over the annals of war. On Thursday, fourteen gas-mask stations were opened in London. All citizens were ordered to report for fittings except children under five "for whom other arrangements are being made." Great crowds gathered for fittings. London hospitals made arrangements to receive their patients to make room for air-raid casualties. Radio announcers gave reassuring instructions to bewildered citizens as to how they might escape sudden death. Schoolchildren were evacuated from schools in Whitehall. Schoolteachers were told to work instructions for the evacuation of their pupils from the capital. Some spoke of removing the whole population of the world's largest metropolis to country districts. Country gentlemen were asked to billet children. Lady Londonderry hurried down from Scotland and opened her Park Lane home as a receiving station for women transport drivers. By Sunday the ABC (Air Raid Precautions) was broadcasting baritone songs in cinema theaters, on bulletin boards, and from loud speakers on trucks. Thousands of men all over England were piling sandbags around public buildings and—most fearful of all—digging huge holes in most of the public parks. That yew-tree grove, a windwardward, would be covered over with corrugated iron and earth and would constitute civilian shelter during raids.

The undertakings who ordered these measures were of course acting in good faith. The Cabinet members who planned the terror-campaign were not, though it is impossible to say how many of their colleagues were taken into confidence by Chamberlain, Simon, Hoare, and Halifax. These measures for the most part had no relevance to actual defense against air raids. There is no recorded instance of an airplane attacking civilians with gas bombs. They are much non-responsive and wholly ineffective. The spraying of mustard gas offers greater possibilities, but against the horror-shocks are unnecessary and evokes no effect. Terrifying in public parks and the distribution of gas masks are laughable as protection against air attack. But the populace, knowing nothing of the hoax, did not laugh. It recoiled in a cold sweat—which was precisely the effect which Chamberlain desired to achieve.

The Prime Minister flew back to London on Saturday and met his inner Cabinet at 9.35 and the full-Cabinet at 9.50. The next of the final



"German Memorandum" was issued on Sunday, the 19th. The other documents exchanged across the Rhine were reproduced in the White Paper issued September 28. Chamberlain's note to Hitler of Friday morning objected to Dr. Fuhrer's demand for immediate military occupation of Sudetenland. "I do not think you have realized the impossibility of my agreeing to put forward any plan unless I have reason to suppose it will be considered by public opinion in my country, in France and, indeed, in the world generally as carrying out the principles already agreed in an entirely fashion and free from the threat of force." Military occupation would be deemed "an unnecessary display of force. . . . The Czech Government would have no option but to order their forces to retreat." But if the threat of invasion were removed "I would urge them to withdraw their forces."

Hitler's long reply was more shriller. It assailed Prague's "madness," "will to destruction," and "ruthless and barbarous" opposition of the Sudetens. "What interests me, your Excellency, is not the recognition of the principle that this territory is to go to Germany, but solely the realization of this principle, and the realization which both puts an end in the shortest time to the sufferings of the unhappy victims of Czech tyranny, and at the same time corresponds to the dignity of a Great Power. I can only emphasize to your Excellency that these Sudeten Germans are not coming back to the German Reich as victors of the graces or benevolent sympathy of other nations, but on the ground of their own will based on the right of self-determination of the nations, and of the irrevocable decision of the German Reich to give effect to this will." The Sudetens must have the immediate "protection" of Berlin. Prague was unworthy. It had accepted the principle of partition only to gain time. If it is impossible "we have the clear right of Germany in Czechoslovakia accepted by way of negotiation," Germany is "determined to extract the order possibilities which then alone remain open to her."

Chamberlain's brief rejoinder asked Hitler to submit the memorandum and map embodying the demands which he would put on to Prague in his capacity as intermediary. "Since the acceptance or refusal of your Excellency's proposal is now a matter for the Czechoslovak Government to decide, I do not see that I can perform any further service here, whilst, on the other hand, it has become necessary that I should at once report the present situation to my colleagues and to the French Government. I propose, therefore, to return to England."

The Godenborg Memorandum (Document No. 6 of the White Paper) opened with new ideas regarding the "completely undesirable" situation of the Sudeten, the consequent "danger to the peace of Europe" and the necessity of coming "without any further delay." The crisp short-ordered the areas to be asked at once and in great haste to be subject to a plebiscite; Czech forces must withdraw and German military occupation must follow "without taking account as to whether in the plebiscite there may prove to be in this or that part of the area a Czech majority"; evacuated areas must be "handed over to Germany on the 1st October" with all military, economic, and traffic installations and essential lines; Prague must discharge all Sudeten political prisoners and all Sudetens in the army and police; plebiscites must take place, by German "permission," before November 15 under an international commission, with all residents as of October 15, 1938 permitted to vote; both parties would withdraw their military forces from plebiscite areas; a simple majority would decide sovereignty.

These exchanges set the stage for the new crisis. Hitler had made "new" demands. Chamberlain had objected, but he would transmit them to Prague, where they would be rejected. Hitler would then march and war would be on—unless . . . ! Benes, Syrovy, and Kratoch were to all appearances completely deceived by the play. The Czech reply of Sunday, September 12 (Document No. 7) is the only paper in the collection whose authors can be suspected of honesty. It asserted that the Memorandum constituted a "de facto ultimatum" going "far beyond what we agreed to in the so-called Anglo-French plan" and depriving Czechoslovakia "of every safeguard for our national existence. . . . Hitler's demands in their present form are absolutely and unconditionally unacceptable to my Government. Against these new and cruel demands my Government feel bound to make their own resistance, and we shall do so, God helping. The names of St. Wenceslas, John Hus, and Thomas Masaryk will not be a nation of slaves. We rely upon the two great Western democracies, whose wishes we have followed much against our own judgment, to stand by us in our hour of trial."

Downing Street released the text of the Memorandum on Sunday and the Czech reply on Tuesday. It asked Prague on the 15th whether it would consider participating in a conference of Powers to discuss methods of applying the Anglo-French plan. The French Cabinet met Sunday afternoon, unanimously rejected the Memorandum, and pledged support to Prague. Deladier and Bonnet flew to London, to

they had done a week previously, with General Gamelin this time accompanying them. The British Government met at midnight. The Anglo-French conversations adjourned at 12.40 a.m. Monday and were resumed at 12.00. Prague agreed to a conference, but asked (Document No. 8) "for definite and binding guarantees to the effect that no unexpected action of an aggressive nature would take place during the negotiations, and that the Czechoslovak defense system would remain intact during that period." Chamberlain had said in his query to Peeper that although the Memorandum was Hitler's last word and he doubted very much "that he could induce Herr Hitler to change his mind at this late hour," he might nevertheless make a last effort to persuade Der Fuhrer "to consider another method of settling peacefully the Sudeten-German question, namely, by means of an international conference attended by Germany, Czechoslovakia and other Powers which would consider the Anglo-French plan and the best method of bringing it into operation." The Prime Minister now sent a personal letter to Hitler via Sir Horace Wilson (September 16, Document No. 9) noting that Prague will accept the Anglo-French plan but had rejected the proposal for immediate evacuation and German occupation, as Chamberlain had anticipated. He proposed, since they were "in complete agreement as to the imperative necessity to maintain the peace of Europe," that a German-Czech pact be arranged to discuss the method of territorial transfer, with British participation if desired. The alleged imminence of Armageddon was underlined by a Monday statement from Downing Street to the effect that if Germany should attack Czechoslovakia "the immediate result must be that France will be bound to come to her assistance and Great Britain and Russia will certainly stand by France."

This apparent repudiation of the whole Chamberlain policy since March was not what it seemed to be. Halifax was to my letter (October 1) that a British guarantee of Czechoslovakia would prevent any aggression. There is no reason to doubt the validity of this statement, nor any convincing evidence which would suggest that Hitler was prepared to invade a Czechoslovakia guaranteed by Britain. The declaration of September 16 was not such a guarantee, for Czechoslovakia had already been surrendered. It was merely another warning to Hitler to give Chamberlain time to complete the surrender and another device to enhance the war panic by strengthening (for the moment) the will to resistance at Prague and Paris in order that the prospect of hostilities would be dramatically impressed upon the

following consideration of the issues. The declaration of September 16, coupled with Anglo-French approval of Czech institutions on the 13rd and the Czech rejection of the Godalberg Memorandum on the 15th, served this purpose admirably.

Other devices followed in rapid succession. Daladier, Bonnet, and Gamelin returned to Paris and asserted that France would now defend Czechoslovakia in case of an invasion. On Monday evening Hitler in the Berlin *Spiegelglas* breathed fire and blood mire. He denounced Benes as a liar and scoundrel, declared German patience exhausted, and demanded surrender by October 1. "If this problem is solved, there will be no further territorial problems in Europe for Germany. . . . We do not want any Czechs. . . . We are resolved! Let Him Benes choose!" Roosevelt was finally prevailed upon to intervene, either by British suggestion or by his own pressure anxiety. He cabled a plea to Hitler and Benes not to break off negotiations. Argentina expressed support. Daladier and Chamberlain expressed thanks. Benes expressed gratitude and devotion to pacific settlement. Wagner broke off negotiations with Prague. Mussolini in Vienna pleaded with London and Paris to abandon Prague before it should be too late. Alone among the potentates, Mussolini issued no public orders for military measures. To some observers this signified that, despite the Rome-Berlin talk, he would come for neutrality, to others that Duce and King went to odds, and to still others that Mussolini had no need to frighten his subjects as a means of securing apprehension for a bargain to which Italy would at last be merely an accessory.

On November 30, 1938, Count Ciano told the Chamber of Deputies that a secret embassy of Hitler had conferred with Il Duce near Venice on September 13 and that, on September 18 at 7.30 p.m., Der Fuhrer had informed Mussolini of his "decision" to invade Czechoslovakia at 2.00 p.m., September 21. Ciano had then ordered partial mobilization without publicity. Plans had been made for a conference at Munich on September 29 to co-ordinate German and Italian military action. Hitler, declared Ciano, had assented to the Munich "peace" parley only on condition that Mussolini come in person. How much of this tale is true there is at yet no means of knowing. Rome had much to gain by pretending that complete solidarity between Rome and Berlin had prevailed and that both Powers had prepared for general war. Even if the Foreign Minister spoke truth, the inference that Hitler had actually decided upon war against Prague is not necessarily warranted. Another inference is equally plausible:

Berlin, having found threats of war completely effective in serving Chamberlain's purposes and inducing public panic at London and Paris, now no longer (and possibly much besides) in convincing Rasse himself that the Reichswarrior was about to march. If Duce would strenuously forbid Italian participation in any general war, he had assured repeatedly on the public platform of Coochodewaldia and his utterances were as much pleadings as threats. A notion that Berlin was ready to march, however devoid of foundation it might be, would therefore use him to new efforts for "peace"—which, in conjunction with Tory efforts, would facilitate the realization of Hitler's program.

Tuesday, September 15, brought new accusations and alarms. "How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is," declared Chamberlain in a broadcast, "that we should be digging trenches and firing gas masks because of a quarrel in a far away country. . . . I was taken completely by surprise" by Hitler's demand for immediate military occupation. "I must say that I find that attitude unreasonable." But we cannot involve the Empire in war for a small nation confronted by a big and powerful neighbor. "If we have to fight it must be on larger issues than this. I am a man of peace to the depths of my soul. Armed conflict between nations is a nightmare to me. But if I were convinced that any nation had made up its mind to dominate the world by the use of its force, I should feel that it must be resisted." This gem of ambiguity was as perfect in its content as was the weary and worried tone of the voice in which it was delivered. The Prince Minister calmed fear of war by suggesting that Hitler was "unreasonable" and perhaps must be resisted. But he left the door ajar for the second betrayal. The issue of Coochodewaldia was not "large" enough to fight over. This situation would have been intolerant if it had involved any risk of offending public apprehension. But with all the drama and transport of the world ever thrashing and thrashing with war panic, this risk was slight. By Tuesday, and still more by Wednesday, everyone throughout the Empire and the world was utterly convinced that war was just around the corner. So firmly fixed was the conviction that few asked the question as to how war could come over an issue of whether Hitler should get Sudetenland a little sooner or a little later. Those who asked were thrown into new panic by dark hints that Der Führer was perhaps after all a madman.

The Reichswarrior was willing enough to play the role. In a long reply to Roosevelt he reviewed the grievances of the Sudetens and all

Germany in a vast of floating persons, thereby making a significant contribution to the new art of employing human beings as an instrument of national policy. He concluded: "It does not rest with the German Government, but with the Czechoslovak Government alone, to decide whether it wants peace or war." In a reply to Chamberlain via Sir Horne (September 12, Document No. 10) Der Führer denied Czech allegations of a discrepancy between the Berchtesgaden and the Goebbeling demands. "I must openly declare that I cannot bring myself to understand these arguments or even admit that they can be regarded as seriously put forward." From one point of view this was not playing cricket, since the whole essence of the war aims which was essential to the Chamberlain-Hitler program was this alleged discrepancy. But it had already been so denigrated that no one any longer had doubts. Therefore it was perhaps useful to have Hitler say it as a further means of playing upon the median mind. Der Führer went on at length to insist on immediate military occupation, to rebuke Prague for treachery and deception, to urge that Britain and France ally Czech fears as to the scope of the German occupation, and to express regret in talk of any "attack" on Czech territory or any infringement of "independence" or any "economic rift."

In these circumstances, I must suppose that the Government in Prague is only using a ploy for the recognition by German troops in order, by diverting the mind and object of my proposal, to nullify their force in other countries, in particular in England and France, from which they hope to secure universal support for their aim and thus to achieve the possibility of a general machine organization. I must leave it to your judgment whether, in view of these facts, you consider that you should continue your efforts, for which I should like to take the opportunity of once more anxiously thanking you, to speed such measures and bring the Government in Prague to reason in the way last hour.

Adolf Hitler

On the same Tuesday, September 12, Chamberlain called Benet and Newton left a new memorandum with Krofta. These communications were not made public, since their purpose was to reassure Prague rather than the British public. They declared that even if the Czechoslovak Republic fought for its integrity and even if other Powers came to its aid, the ultimate result would still be the union of Sudetenland to the Reich.<sup>1</sup> Such a threat appeared to mean that even if Germany should be defeated in war by a Grand Alliance, Downing Street would still insist on the partition of Czechoslovakia and the reduction of the Nazi Empire southwards. The latter objective was indeed a major consideration behind the Tury program. But London

never fall well that Hitler would never challenge such a Grand Alliance to war, since defeat would be certain, and that if he did, any annexation of new territories by the defeated aggressor would be wholly untenable. But even a local German-Czech war would almost inevitably become a general war with the British in the end Britain—and Moscow administering part of the beating. This would inevitably ruin all Tury hopes. Hitler must therefore be reasoned. Even a local war must therefore be averted. It could more easily be averted by action at Prague than at Berlin, since Czechoslovakia was the weaker party and had already been browbeaten into accepting the principle of partition. Hence the threat to Prague on September 17. Hence also the warning to Hitler on September 16.

Wednesday, September 18. All France in panic; all England digging graves in parks and donating gas masks, shadders, trenchers, barbers, all the frenzied modelling-travelling-marching hymens of blind, shrieking flights before the hot breath of the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse, conjured up out of the misty deep by the ceding crop of the rain from Beaman and the rolled black umbrellas of the rain from Birmingham. Down brawls were twice redoubled with the news that the British fleet would scuttles before the day was done (Dad Cooper had heard the order shortly before midnight and Chamberlain had approved in the morning) and that Hitler would demand Czech surrender by 2.00 p.m. Thursday and, if unsatisfied, would send his legions across the frontier on the morrow. Roosevelt sent messages to Rome, Tokio, and Moscow asking that they use their influence for peace. German fleets in foreign ports were ordered home. The Europe, approaching the Channel, was ordered back to Bremerhaven. British naval reserves reported. The playing fields of Eton were dug up for shelters. Wide eyes yawned the part of hell. . . .

Cormons assembled at 2.45 p.m. The members already had available the White Paper issued the same day, consisting Runciman's strange lines, which were found strange and all found persuasive because all were filled with a wish to believe. The other documents spoke for themselves. The brink of war was no more to read between the lines. Chamberlain in black formal coat and inevitable wing collar, with solemn face and furest air, looked more the moridian than ever. He began a long address from detailed notes, now and again wringing his thin hands in anxiety. Few doubted but that he was at last telling all and preparing the nation and the world for the shock of war. . . . Unhappily our hopes have not been fulfilled.

Today we are faced with a situation which has had no parallel since 1914." He returned with fair contempt to Czechoslovakia "with its heterogeneous population" and expressed regret that Article 19 of the Geneva Convention had not long since been used to achieve "peace by agreement." In July there was deadlock in Prague and fear that Berlin might intervene.

For His Majesty's Government there were three alternative courses that we might have adopted. Either we could have threatened to go to war with Germany if she attacked Czechoslovakia, or we could have stood aside and allowed matters to take their course, or, finally, we could attempt to find a peaceful settlement by way of mediation. The first of these courses we rejected. We had no treaty obligations to Czechoslovakia. We always refused to accept any such obligation. Indeed, the country, which does not readily resort to war, would not have followed us if we had tried to lead it into war to prevent a minority from obtaining autonomy, or even from choosing to pass under some other Government.

The second alternative was also repugnant to us. However remote this territory may be, we knew, of course, that a spark once lighted there might give rise to a general conflagration, and we felt it our duty to do anything in our power to help the contending parties to find agreement. We addressed ourselves to the third course, the task of mediation. We knew that the task would be difficult, perhaps even perilous, but we felt that the object was good enough to justify the risk.

There was no mention of actual issues or real alternatives but only the plausible pretence of the "honest broker" seeking justice. He reviewed at length the Runciman mission, putting new layers of old colors on the portrait which the Viceroy had already painted. By September 14 war threatened. "In these circumstances, I decided that the time had come to put my operations plan which I had had in mind for a considerable period in a hot resort. . . . I resolved to go to Germany myself to interview Adolf Hitler and find out in personal conversation whether there was yet any hope of saving the peace. I knew very well that in taking such an unprecedented course I was laying myself open to criticism on the ground that I was departing from the dignity of the British Prime Minister, and to disappointment, and perhaps even resentment, if I failed to bring back a satisfactory



agreement. But I felt that in such a crisis, where the issues at stake were so vital for millions of human beings, such considerations could not be allowed to count. . . . I confess I was astonished at the warmth of the approval with which this adventure was everywhere received, but the relief which it brought for the moment was an indication of the gravity with which the situation had been viewed." (Here Neville the playwright, Neville the actor, and Neville the critic were agreed: "Very good, Neville, very good.")

There followed Barthelsgaden and Vienna and a Cabinet meeting "attended also by Lord Rotherham, who, at my request, had also traveled down Prague on the same day." Rotherham recommended Soderin "self-determination"—"at once"—plus Plan No. 4 for what would be left and assimilation "as in the case of Switzerland." But France must be consulted. France agreed. Chamberlain to Prague followed. Chamberlain called it "advice." We took account of the probability that the Czechoslovak Government would find it preferable to deal with the problem by the method of direct transfer rather than by means of a plebiscite, which would involve various difficulties amongst other considerations in Czechoslovakia." Prague agreed. "The Majesty's Government were profoundly conscious of the immense sacrifices to which the Czechoslovak Government had agreed, and the great public spirit they had shown. These proposals had carefully been put forward in the hope of averting a general disaster and saving Czechoslovakia from invasion. The Czechoslovak Government's readiness to go to such extreme limits of concession had assured her of a measure of sympathy which nothing else could have secured."

Poland and Hungary had now made demands. Not critical. Too bad. "However, on the 12nd I went back to Germany to Gothenburg on the Rhine when the Chancellor had appointed a meeting place as being more convenient for me than the person Barthelsgaden." Warm welcome. Demonstrated desire of the German people for peace. Explained Anglo-French plans for transfer and guarantee. No objections from Hitler, but he said others, including Italy, must join and no non-aggression pact with new Czechoslovakia would be possible until other matters were settled. He found proposals too delivery and review. He submitted memoranda.

Here, Members will recall the perplexity in which I found myself, faced with this totally unexpected situation. I had been told at Barthelsgaden that if the principle of self-determination

were accepted Hans Hilfer would discuss with me the ways and means of carrying it out. He told me afterwards that he never for one moment supposed that I should be able to come back and say that the principle was accepted [ironical laughter]. I do not want even Hilfer to think that he was deliberately deceiving me—I do not think so for one moment—but, for me, I expected that when I got back to Godesburg I had only to discuss quietly with him the proposals that I had brought with me, and it was a profound shock to me when I was told at the beginning of the conversation that these proposals were not acceptable, and that they were to be replaced by other proposals of a kind which I had not contemplated at all.

What to do? "I withdrew, my mind full of forebodings. . . ." In view of language difficulty, some comments on paper seemed wise. Exchange of letters. Memorandum and map. "I spoke very frankly. I dwelled with all the emphasis at my command upon the risks which would be incurred in insisting on such terms. . . . Language and manner . . . of . . . discussion . . . would profoundly shock public opinion in neutral countries and I bitterly reproached the Chancellor on his failure to respond in any way to the efforts which I had made to secure peace." At the end, in private, "he repeated to me with great earnestness what he had already said at Berstinghausen, namely, that that was the last of his territorial ambitions in Europe, that he had no wish to include in the Reich people of other races than German. . . . He wanted to be friends with England and thought if only the Sudeten question could be got out of the way so that he would gladly resume conversations. It is true, he said 'There is one unresolved question, the Colonies'" (Münster "Spiegel" [laughter].) ". . . There are not subjects for idle laughter. . . . He said . . . 'but that is not a matter for war. . . . There will be no mobilising about that.'" Transmission of memorandum. Quick rejection. Pledges to Prague. "In reply we told them [the French] that if as a result of their obligation, French forces became actively engaged in hostilities against Germany, we should feel obliged to support them." Sent Sir Horace Wilson to Berlin "to a last effort to procure peace." Letter, Wismar, August. "I believe he means what he says." The Polish Minister now approached his chance:

I felt impelled to reveal our most last hope—the last last—to the Chancellor. I sent him the following personal message:

"After reading your letter I feel certain that you can get all evenings without war and without delay. I am ready to come to Berlin myself at once to discuss arrangements for meeting with you and representatives of the Czech Government, together with representatives of France and Italy if you desire. I feel convinced that we could reach agreement in a week. However much you distrust the Prague Government's intentions, you cannot doubt the power of the British and French Governments to see that the problem was carried out fairly and fully and honestly. As you know, I have stated publicly that we are prepared to undertake that they shall be so carried out. I cannot believe that you will take the responsibility of starting a world war which may end civilization, for the sake of a few days' delay in solving this long-standing problem."

At the same time I sent the following personal message to Signor Mussolini:

"I have today addressed my appeal to Herr Hitler to abstain from force to settle Sudean problems, which, I feel sure, can be settled by a short discussion and will give him the essential security, popularity and power for both Sudean and Czechs during transfer. I have offered myself to go at once to Berlin to discuss arrangements with German and Czech representatives, and if the Chamberlain desires, representatives also of Italy and France."

"I trust your Excellency will inform the German Chamberlain that you are willing to be represented and urge him to agree to my proposal which will keep all our peoples out of war. I have already guaranteed that Czech promises shall be carried out and full conditions full agreement could be reached in a week."

In reply to my message to Signor Mussolini, I was informed that instructions had been sent by the Duke to the Italian Ambassador in Berlin to see Herr von Ribbentrop at once and to say that while Italy would fulfill completely her pledges to stand by Germany, yet, in view of the great importance of the request made by His Majesty's Government to Signor Mussolini, the latter hoped Herr Hitler would use his way to postpone action which the Chamberlain had told Sir Horace Wilson was to be taken at 2 p.m. today for at least 24 hours so as to allow Signor Mussolini time to re-examine the situation and endeavour to find a peaceful settlement. In response, Herr Hitler has agreed to postpone mobilization for 24 hours.

Whatever views Lord Marchmont may have had about Signor Mussolini in the past, I believe that everyone will welcome his gesture of being willing to work with us for peace in Europe—

Shortly before this point of interruption, Lord Halifax in the balcony received a Foreign Office envelope from a special messenger who had dashed up the stairs. The hour was 3.45. Halifax

ripped it open, read a paper signed "A. C." (Alexander Cadogan), showed it to Baldwin, and then moved to bring it to the Prime Minister. He continued to Sir Herbert Wilson, who looked on Lord Dunsford, Chamberlain's Parliamentary process secretary, who seized the message, ran downstairs, and handed it to Simon, who looked at it and passed it to Chamberlain just as the House was applauding his reference to Munich. He looked at the message and beamed:

That is not all. I have something further to say to the House yet. I have now been informed by Herr Hitler that he wishes me to meet him at Munich tomorrow morning—

A wild bedlam of cheering, shouting, stamping, clapping, and frantic waving of White Papers swept the House, contrary to all its rules, in one of the most unrestrained and spontaneous demonstrations of joy in its history. The Prime Minister went on:

He has also invited Signor Mussolini and M. Daladier. Signor Mussolini has accepted and I have no doubt M. Daladier will also accept. I need not say what my answer will be. (An Hon. Member: "Thank God for the Prime Minister!") We are all patriots, and there can be no hon. Member of this House who did not feel his heart leap that the crisis has been once more postponed to give us once more an opportunity to try what reason and good will and discussion will do to solve a problem which is already within sight of solution. Mr. Speaker, I cannot say any more. I am sure that the House will be ready to adjourn now to go and see what I can make of this last effort. Perhaps they may think it will be well, in view of the new developments, that the Debate shall stand adjourned for a few days, when perhaps we may meet in happier circumstances.

Chamberlain was smiling, pale, breathless, exhausted, and, at the end, in tears. All the appropriate emotions were conclusively suggested. Simon also wept. The Opposition was as enthusiastic as the Government. Arches accorded the proposal to adjourn. Sinclair expressed relief, gratitude, and hope. Mr. Munro, Labor's militant pacifist, approved and declared his party "at home for peace to anyone." George Lansbury wished Chamberlain "God-speed." "I take wish to say on behalf of my friends anywhere, and, I believe, on behalf of millions of people in this country, how very grateful we are that he has

taken the initiative than he has, and how we wish and hope and pray that success will crown his efforts." One lost and lonely voice in all the House was raised in protest—that of Labor's "wild man," Willie Gallacher.

No one desires peace more than I and my party, but it must be a peace based upon freedom and democracy and not upon the cutting up and destruction of a small State. I want to say that the policy of the National Government has led to this crisis. (How, Mr. Speaker, "Not") Yes, and if there is peace at the moment it is the determined attitude of the people that has caused it. Whatever the outcome the National Government will have to answer for its policy. I would not be a party to what has been going on here. There are as many Fascist opponents as there are in Germany, and I protest against the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia.

This incongruous cry evoked no echo. Commons adjourned at 4.27 p.m. on Monday, October 3. Nancy Astor dashed up to extend congratulations. Many other members followed her. Winston Churchill offered his good wishes. But Anthony Eden walked out with a heavy heart. Crowds wept with joy outside, as Chamberlain, on his way to Downing Street with his wife, cried out to them: "It's all right this time!"<sup>10</sup> Queen Mother Mary left the private gallery in tears. A whole nation heaved with relief and happiness.

"Good old Neville!" The prosaic businessman from the Midlands had become a deity. The undramatic dilettante from Birmingham had achieved the greatest triumph of his career in the greatest indignity he had ever witnessed. He had played his part with such accuracy that he half-believed in it. His audience believed totally, for he was completely convincing. Here, as elsewhere, the great test of faith is to believe what is absurd.

### 5. IN HITLER'S HOUSE

"When I come back I hope I may be able to say, as Hotspur says in *Henry IV*, 'Out of this gentle danger, we pluck a little flower, a glory'." Thus spoke Neville Chamberlain on a cheering throng at Heath airport Thursday morning, September 23, as he boarded a Reich second plane for the third time within a fortnight. Again he

was accompanied by Wilson and Strang, plus Adams-Gordon, Sir Willem Malton, and several Foreign Office specialists. Munich, birthplace of the NSDAP and sacred shrine of the eagles who died on November 9, 1918, became the Mecca of all the great. Mussolini, whom Hitler had met at the frontier at Kalisz for a preliminary discussion, arrived first with Der Führer. Deladier and staff reached the airport soon afterwards and were put up at the Hotel of the Four Seasons. Two British planes landed twenty minutes later with the guests from London.

Chattering Bavarian crowds surrounded the Bayern Palace Hotel, headquarters of the British delegation, and lined the streets to the magnificent Föhrerhaus, near the more modest Braun Haus. The imposing structure was part of a group of buildings housing the central headquarters of the NSDAP. They had been planned in part by Der Führer himself, who was always keenly interested in architecture. The buildings were reconstructed and enlarged in the spring of 1934 to house most of the central agencies of the multimillioned divisions, bureaus, and auxiliary organizations of the Party. The Föhrerhaus, Hitler's own executive headquarters, was a showpiece of pagan glory, dedicated to the great deeds of the dietitians, architects, and the saints of Nuremberg and fit to be the throne of the Almighty.

A last informal luncheon at the Föhrerhaus was followed by a gathering of the pressmen in Hitler's private office at 3.00 p.m. Chamberlain was meeting Mussolini for the first time. Deladier was meeting Hitler and Mussolini for the first time. An agenda was easily agreed upon. Hitler insisted on the commencement of military occupation of Sudetenland on Saturday, but otherwise was a generous conciliator. "I am not going to quibble about a village." At 4.30 the conference adjourned for dinner with Germans and Italians dining together at the Duce's headquarters in the Duca Palace and the French and British separately in their hotels. At 10.00 the conference was resumed. Sir Horace issued platitudes to the waiting correspondents. An American journalist, Frederick T. Beckell of the *New York Times*, noted a detail: "Some of the British onlookers have been greatly attracted by the appearance here of a companion not new in public office who slipped in unobtrusively in the afternoon and who has been eagerly interviewing leading Germans ever since. He is the Marquess of Londonderry."<sup>10</sup>

Shortly after midnight all was settled. At 12.35 a.m. (Friday)

signatures were attached to a Four-Power Accord, dated as of the preceding day. Its full text follows:

AGREEMENT CONCLUDED AT MUNICH ON SEPTEMBER 29, 1938

Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, taking into consideration the agreement which has already been reached in principle for reasons to Germany of the Eastern German provinces, have agreed on the following terms and conditions governing the said areas and the imminent consequent changes and by this agreement they each hold themselves responsible for the steps necessary to secure its fulfillment:

1. The evacuation will begin on the 1st October.

2. The United Kingdom, France, and Italy agree that the evacuation of the territory shall be completed by the 15th October without any existing installations having been destroyed and that the Czechoslovak Government will be held responsible for carrying out the evacuation without damage to the said installations.

3. The conditions governing the evacuation will be laid down in detail by an international commission composed of representatives of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Czechoslovakia.

4. The occupation by troops of the predominantly German territories by German troops will begin on the 1st October. The four territories marked on the attached map will be occupied by German troops in the following order.

Territory marked No. I on the 1st and 2d of October, territory marked No. II on the 3d, 4th, and 5th of October, territory marked No. IV on the 6th and 7th of October.

The remaining territory of predominantly German character will be assimilated by the above-mentioned successive footwork and be occupied by German troops by the 15th of October.

5. The international commission referred to in paragraph 3 will determine the method in which a plebiscite is to be held. These measures will be completed by international bodies until the plebiscite has been completed. The same commission will fix the conditions in which the plebiscite is to be held, taking as a basis the conditions of the four plebiscites. The conclusion will also fix a date, not later than the end of November, on which the plebiscite will be held.

6. The final determination of the frontier will be carried out by the four-nation commission. This commission will also be entitled to recommend to the four Powers, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, in events exceptional cases minor modifications in the strictly geographical determination of the areas which are to be transferred without plebiscite.

7. There will be a right of option over and out of the transferred territories, the option to be exercised within six months from the date of this agreement. A German-Czechoslovak commission shall determine the details of the option, consider ways of facilitating the transfer of populations, and settle questions of principle arising out of the said transfer.

8. The Czechoslovak Government will, within a period of four weeks from the date of this agreement, release from their military and police forces any

Southern Germans who may wish to be released, and the Czechoslovak Government will within the same period release Southern German prisoners who are serving terms of imprisonment for political offences.

ARTHUR HENRI  
HENRI CHAMBERLAIN  
EDOUARD DALADIER  
BENITO MUSSOLINI

Munich

September 19, 1938

*Terms of the Agreement*

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government have entered into the above agreement on the basis that they stand by the offer, contained in paragraph 4 of the Anglo-French proposals of the 19th September relating to an international guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression.

When the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia has been settled, Germany and Italy for their part will give a guarantee to Czechoslovakia.

*Declaration*

The Heads of the Governments of the four Powers declare that the problem of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia, if not settled within three months by agreement between the respective Governments, shall form the subject of another meeting of the Heads of the Governments of the four Powers here present.

*Supplementary Declaration*

All questions which may arise out of the conduct of the ceremony shall be considered as coming within the terms of reference to the international commission.

*Composition of the International Commission*

The four Heads of Government here present agree that the international commission provided for in the agreement signed by them today, shall consist of the Secretary of State in the German Foreign Office, the British, French, and Italian Ambassadors accredited to Berlin, and a representative to be nominated by the Government of Czechoslovakia.<sup>22</sup>

The sunshower and the showering died on Saturday morning. Despres, d'apres, and d'armatures alike took their leave from the Bavarian capital in a drizzling rain. "I have always had in mind," said Chamberlain, "that if we could find peace in Czechoslovakia it might open the way to appeasement in Europe. I hope there will be obvious measures of demobilization taken everywhere." Daladier responded: "I have had the pleasure personally to establish that no feeling of hate or enmity of any kind prevails in Germany against France. We assured that the French on their part feel no hostility towards Germany." Falace and Duce found converse unnecessary. In the afternoon, Mussolini



returned to Rome, Deladier to Paris, and Chamberlain to London. Each received an ovation. In the French capital great crowds cheered the Premier as if he were a conqueror returning in triumph. Guehen greeted him warmly. Chamberlain kissed him on both cheeks. Many wept—not with grief, but with joy. Deladier stopped to a microphone and spoke of "peace," "moral consensus," "spirit of co-operation," "general enthusiasm." "Never did the people of France possess in as great a degree as today esteem in the hearts of all the great nations." At Hilton airport Chamberlain cheerily waved a piece of paper in the enthusiastic throngs. On it was a typed agreement, as a bilateral addenda to the Four-Former Pact, signed by Chamberlain, who had proposed it, and by Hitler's scrawling hand. He read it with fervor:

We, the German Führer and Chancellor and the British Prime Minister, have had a further meeting today, and are agreed in recognizing that the question of Anglo-German relations is of the first importance for the two countries and for Europe.

We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German word agreement as symbols of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again.

We are resolved that the method of consultation shall be the method adopted to deal with any other questions that may concern our two countries, and we are determined to continue our efforts to remove possible sources of difference and thus to contribute to the attainment of peace in Europe.

Crowds gathered in droves outside Buckingham Palace. The setting sun beamed forth and projected a rainbow on the eastern sky (this was probably not planned!) as the Prime Minister and his wife drove up to report to the King and Queen. Still larger crowds milled about Downing Street far into the night while the Cabinet met. "Good old Noodle!" "Speech, speech!" "We want Chamberlain!" Imperceptible cheer-leaders led the throngs in song: *Rail, Britannia, Land of Hope and Glory, O God, Our Help in Aged Years, and For He's a Jolly Good Fellow*. From the balcony of 10 Downing Street Chamberlain told the joyous multitude that his achievement was comparable to Disraeli's at the Congress of Berlin in 1878: "My good friends, this is the second time in our history that there has come back from Germany to Downing Street peace with honor. I believe," he added, borrowing a phrase from Balzac, "it is peace for our time." (Chamberlain was sixty-nine.)

"We thank you," said the Prime Minister. "We thank you from the bottom of our hearts for your welcome." "And we thank you," responded the crowd. "Now," he replied paternally, "I recom-

told you to go home and sleep quietly in your bed." He vanished. Police cleared the street. One man wandered to stay all night before No. 10 thinking over and over: "Thank God, England and Germany together at last!" But even he finally went home to bed."

Hitler returned to Berlin on Sunday and received an overjoyed Chamberlain wave in Döberitz to soothe suspicions. He thanked him for his "co-operation" and opined that the documents in his accord with Hitler "see use of your own country no less than my own." He anticipated "increased and continuous co-operation with you in further efforts for consolidation of European peace through the extension of good will and confidence which so happily inspire the relations between our two countries." Only one member of the Prime Minister's Cabinet resigned in protest: Alfred Duff Cooper, First Lord of the Admiralty. As Hitler entered Sachsenhausen in triumph, Chamberlain met Goebbels on Monday, October 5. He announced a loan of £10,000,000 to Czechoslovakia and greeted Hitler, Mussolini, Daladier, and Roosevelt. Hirose and Halifax denied any desire to exclude the USSR. In Washington Sumner Welles hailed the new opportunity "for the establishment by the nations of the world of a new world order based upon justice and upon law . . . [and upon] the sanctity of the pledged word, non-intervention . . . and the settlement of disputes and the revision of treaties wherever necessary by peaceful negotiations and in a spirit of equity rather than by resort to the use of force or to the threat of force." In the Commons debate of Monday and Tuesday only Alfred Duff Cooper displayed any emotion of regret:

It was not for Serbia or Belgium we fought in 1914, though it stirred some people to say so, but we were fighting them, as we should have been fighting her, not only as a matter that our Great Powers should not be allowed, in disregard of treaty obligations and the laws of nations and against all morality, to dominate by brutal force the Continent of Europe. . . . Throughout these days the Prime Minister has believed in addressing Herr Hitler through the language of sweet reasonableness. I have believed he was more open to the language of the mailed fist. . . . I tried to reason them [the Munich terms], but they stuck in my throat. . . . I have perhaps ruined my political career, but that is of little matter. I have realised something which is to me of greater value—I can still walk about the world with my head erect.

The Prime Minister registered boredom. Inskip said that the British possession of Constantinople was already an affront. Baldwin praised Chamberlain. Morrison said that the Prime Minister was "trigged out of his life." James Moxon praised him for keeping peace. Chamberlain said "peace with honor" was a "wicked mockery." Eden and Sinclair uttered empty words. David Lloyd George said nothing. There was nothing to say. Chamberlain was God. He looked at his work, pronounced it good, and declared he had nothing to be ashamed of. Those who criticized him were "war-mongers." Those who might have been tempted to assail him for hypocrisy and to lay bare the secret calculus of his policy were also silent, knowing that the British public—now hopelessly demoralized by fear—would again give its blessing to "good old Neville" even if it was told that "general appeasement" was but a mask for giving Hitler the mastery of Europe for his war against Moscow. In either case the result was "peace" for Britain, whatever the cost in blood and cash to others, and the ruling classes and mass of the masses were quite content. Only Winston Churchill spoke on Wednesday with a certain bitterness:

I begin by saying what everybody would like to neglect or forget, but what must, nevertheless, be said—carefully, that we have sustained a total, unmitigated defeat. We are in the possession of a disaster of the first magnitude which has befallen Great Britain and France. Do not let us blind ourselves. We must expect that all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will make the best terms they can with the triumphant Nazi Power. The system of alliances in Central Europe upon which France relied for safety has been swept away. I see no reason to think it can be reconstructed.

The road down the Danube, with all its coal and iron, the road to the Black Sea and Turkey, has been broken. It seems to me that all the countries of Mideast Europe and the Danube Valley, one after the other, will be drawn into the vast system of Nazi politics, not only power military politics, but power economic politics radiating from Berlin. I believe that can be achieved quite smoothly and easily without firing a single shot. . . .

[Germany may make demands on Britain in a few years or months which] may effect surrender of territory or surrender of

liberty, and I foresee and forecast a policy that will carry with it rearings of freedom in Parliament, on the platform, and in the press. There, with the press under a careful half-direct but most generously indirect, every expression of public opinion doped and discoloured into acquiescence, we shall be conducted by steps along our journey.

No one cared. At the end Chamberlain asserted that the charge of betraying Czechoslovakia was "completely preposterous." He had "saved" Czechoslovakia. Commons upheld him on Thursday, October 6, by a vote of 366 to 244. No Conservative dared to vote against him, though a score abstained. The Prime Minister went to Scotland to fish, doubtless wrapped in devil thoughts of the strangeness of the world which apprehended him for dream-deeds which were fancies and knew or acknowledged nothing of his actual accomplishment. The whole Tory program was now achieved at a blow. The curtain fell. In far-off Ischia Gandhi said: "Europe has sold her soul for seven days of earthly existence."

The glory that was known by the third Chamberlain as he crowned his work for Anglo-German "peace" was unknown by world thoughts of peace. The price would be paid by others. Should Neville ever descend upon Britannia, the House of Chamberlain would feel little of the pain. Mrs. Neville prayed and rejoiced. Auntie's widow had just returned from a dainty holiday in Fascist Spain, where she had met Franco and been "favorably impressed." Neville fished—and perhaps reread the quartets written on the eve of Beethoven's death by Brian's poet laureate, John Masefield:

*As Priam to Achilles for his son,  
So you, into the night, dreamily led,  
To seek that young man's body, not yet dead,  
Be given from the house that began.<sup>47</sup>*

If a later generation of Britons should ever be obliged to pay the price of the deed of Munich, it might find another verse more appropriate. Thomas Gray's curse of the Welsh Bard on Edward I.<sup>48</sup> With a few slight shifts of words, it might well serve as Masefield's skinner's verdict on the peace-maker from Birmingham:

*Wring the woe, and wring the woe,  
The wanking throat of all our race.  
Give ample room, and range enough  
The chariot of hell to race.*

Mark the year, and mark the night,  
When Whitwell walked with aughts . . .

That kind of Prince, with wandering steps,  
That was the heart of the tangled maze,

To those forests, who star the country deep  
The scraps of Moor's. What seems round him was  
Assured in his way, with flight overhead,  
And never's faded form, and vibrant ink . . .

Now, Britain, looking a' the d'covered form  
Bury we our vengeance deep, and ready his form.

Well, let us make it  
(Where we the work. The shared a part.)

Half of the work we measure.  
(The work is done. The work is done.)

## TORY TRIUMPH

### 1. CZECHOSLOVAKIA + OCTOBER 1, 1938

During the long evening hours of September 29, 1938, two gentlemen from Prague waited in the Regina Palace Hotel in Munich while the Four deliberated behind closed doors. One was Dr. Hubert Masarik, who had come as representative of the Prague Foreign Office. The other was Dr. Vojtech Mastny, Minister to the Reich. At 7:30 p.m. they succeeded in seeing Adam-Gwastkin, but learned nothing. At 10:30 Sir Horace Wilson received them and outlined the terms in preparation for the dismemberment of their Republic. They objected. He returned to the Conference. Adam-Gwastkin assured them that their protests were useless, since the British Government had approved the German plan. "If you do not accept this plan you will have to settle your affair alone with Germany. Perhaps the French will put it in a more amiable way, but believe me, they think the way we do, they will keep out."

At 1:30 a.m. the two gentlemen from Prague were called into a room and met by Wilson, Chamberlain, Daladier, and Alexis Léger of the Quai d'Orsay. The agreement was read. Mastny asked questions. The British Prime Minister yawned repeatedly. He found this unedifying boring and wanted to go to bed. Bad enough for Hitler to keep him up so late. As for two Czechs . . . ! Masarik asked Daladier and Léger whether they were waiting for an answer. Daladier kept silent. Léger said that there was very little time. No answer was necessary because the plan was already accepted? There was mutual embarrassment—no might occur in a courtroom should the attorney for the defense assume the role of prosecutor and then step up

to the bench as judge and pronounce a death sentence on his client. Nothing remained to be said.

The Cabinet in Prague met at noon on Friday, September 12. There was nothing to say or do, were required. "The Czechoslovak Government protest the demand of the Four Great Powers, which was entirely one-sided and taken without Czechoslovakia's participation." Premier Jan Syrový told his troops that it was "the saddest moment of my life. . . . We were abandoned. We stood entirely alone. . . . We shall fulfill the conditions imposed upon us by force." Twilight fell over the Hradcany and then night. One hour after midnight, at 1.00 a.m. Saturday, October 1, 1938, the first German troops crossed the frontier from Aspern in Upper Austria to begin occupation of "Zone I." An ultimatum from Warsaw had demanded that Prague give up Teschen by Saturday noon. Prague yielded. Polish troops marched in on Sunday. Prague agreed to negotiate a settlement with Hungary. The international conference at Berlin was already instituted. Count Ernst von Weizsäcker of Wilhelmstrasse, Dr. Marmy, and Ambassador Neville Henderson, André François-Poncet, and Bernardo Amelino. As it began its work all the Czechoslovak Legionnaires, elderly heroes of 1918-19, of liberation and year of victory when they had been fed as crusaders of independence in the United States, Britain, and France—awarded and sent to London and Paris all their British and French medals and decorations.

The shamrock of Munich was in fact the powder of 1918's verdict. Twenty years before, the Second Reich as its bid for world hegemony had been defeated. By a strange paradox the crushing treaty which was imposed upon the vanquished was insufficient to prevent them from becoming victors in the aftermath, thanks to the sagacity with which the crumbly victors accepted their own defeat. And by a stranger paradox, final German victory in the First World War, which forever closed the Junkers and war lords of Potsdam, was belatedly won without firing a shot by an Austrian corporal masqueraded into Hitler and Gd for eighty million Teutons.

Austria was harvest-time. If the customary German Breadbasket Fest of October 1 had to be postponed, the harvest festival of gathering the fruits of Munich was relished all the more. For Munich meant German mastery of *Mittel Europa* to the Black Sea and the Aegean. The banner of Czechoslovakia was the key to the Little Entente and to French influence in the East. With the borders surrendered to the

Each by Chamberlain and Daladier, the whole kindred was lost. Hitler entered Egypt on Monday and Kirkland on Tuesday. Karel Krofta resigned as Czechoslovak Foreign Minister and was replaced by Dr. František Chvalovský, formerly Minister to Italy. On Wednesday, October 1, Eduard Benes relinquished the Presidency of the Republic which he had helped to bring into being. In a letter which President Syrový read over the radio, Benes declared that "the very sad events of these last days" have "weighed upon our spirits and our hearts, but they have not broken our faith nor our ideals toward our people, our nation, and our State. . . ." He felt that his remaining in office "might constitute an obstacle to the new conditions which now confront this State."<sup>1</sup>

As Benes took his leave, others elsewhere also drew the necessary conclusions from the Peace of Munich. In Rome Perth began daily consultations with Ciano for further "appointments." Paris announced its decision to send an Ambassador to Rome and recognize Italian rule in Ethiopia. Walter Funk, Nazi Minister of Economics, arrived in Istanbul from Belgrade and proceeded to Ankara, where he negotiated a loan of 150,000,000 marks to Turkey for German machinery and arms. Meanwhile, the international commission at Berlin, confined its activities to hearing, approving, and executing German demands. It agreed to accept the Goeborg Memorandum. It agreed to delimit the frontier on the basis of the language line as of October 28, 1918—as determined by the Habsburg census of 1910. On October 13, after Chvalovský had conferred with Ribbentrop at Berlin, the commission announced that it had "unanimously decided to refrain from any publicity." It "took cognizance with satisfaction of the noteworthy progress achieved thus far in the settlement of pending questions." Some hundreds of Czech war veterans who had been organized to supervise the plebiscites stayed at home.

The new German-Czech frontier was drawn in its final form not by the commission at Berlin but by a German-Czech commission on the basis of German division and Czech acceptance. A German-Czech accord, announced on November 13, provided that Berlin might expel Czechs who had come into Sudetenland after January 1, 1918, and Prague might expel Germans from its redeclared territories who had entered after that date. All Germans remaining under Prague were allowed until March 29, 1939 to opt for German citizenship, thus insuring that most of the 150,000 Germans still within the new Czech borders would become subjects of the Reich—and pro-



scarcely members of the NSDAP. The entire population of the annexed area prior to January 1, 1918 had German citizenship automatically conferred upon it with no option, save for non-Germans who might choose Czechoslovak citizenship. The new frontier deviated at a few points from the Godesberg line, but the districts within the line not annexed to the Reich were more than matched by other districts not demanded in Godesberg but now annexed regardless. Czechoslovakia lost to the Reich 11,000 square miles with a population of 2,500,000, including, by Czech estimates, 750,000 non-Germans.<sup>1</sup>

Messerschmidt Warne and Budapest scrambled for other spoils. On October 9, Polish troops seized Bohemia (Oberberg) three days ahead of schedule. Budapest moved to annex most of Slovakia and all of Ruthenia. Warsaw desired Hungary to annex Ruthenia in order to establish a common Polish-Magyar frontier as a new barrier to the Nazi Drang nach Osten—and as a means of preventing an autonomous Ruthenia from becoming a source of separatist agitation among Poland's five million Ruthenians (Ukrainians) to the East. Berlin desired her new usual to make part of Ruthenia as a corridor to Romania and the Ukraine.

Since all power rested with the Reich, the issue was never in doubt, despite Hungarian hopes, Italian enervity, and Polish anxiety. Budapest broke all negotiations with Prague on October 13 and determined to appeal to the four Munich Powers. Hitler and Ribbentrop received Chvalkovsky and Duzanyi in Munich on the 14th. Hitler vetoed the plan for a Four-Power conference. Rome found itself in "complete agreement" with Berlin on the 16th. In a feble counter-argument, made immediately after Germany had granted a commercial credit of 20,000,000 marks to Poland for German machinery, Josef Beck went to Bucharest on the 19th. He offered King Carol a slice of Ruthenia if he would assist to Hungarian annexation of the remainder. Slovak and Ruthenian Ministers went to Munich to make new appeals to Ribbentrop. But Hitler had already vetoed Hungarian annexation of Ruthenia. As a result Carol perceived that the Polish-Ruthenian bloc was now a wall of paper, and that his only hope of saving Transylvania was to co-operate with Hitler. He rejected Polish pleas. Beck returned empty-handed to Warsaw on October 20.

After further proposals and counter-proposals, unheeded with angry Hungarian threats to invade Czechoslovakia, the problem was newly settled. Ribbentrop flew to Rome on October 27. German

Italian arbitration of the Prague-Budapest dispute was proposed and accepted. On November 1, Ribbentrop and Ciano met in Vienna, conferred with Cieslarsky and Kanya, and handed down their award. Hungary received a generous portion of southern Slovakia (but with Bratislava on the Danube left to Prague) as well as all the fertile lowlands of Ruthenia, including Ungvár, the capital. Prague (i.e. Berlin) retained the barren mountain corridor of northern Ruthenia. Magyar occupation of the ceded territories began November 3 and was completed November 10. Budapest celebrated. Prague despaired. Warsaw was glad and Bucharest worried. Paris and London were silent.

By these bargains Poland received some 400 square miles with a population of 140,000, including 100,000 non-Poles, while Hungary increased almost 2,000 square miles with approximately 1,000,000 inhabitants, including 450,000 non-Magyars. Since all evidence pointed toward a Nazi program of employing the new ramp Republic of Carpatho-Ukraine (Ruthenia) within the truncated Czechoslovak State as a center of separatist agitation among the neighboring Ukrainians, Warsaw's rulers had difficulty in reconciling themselves to an annexation by Prague. They continued to hope that Italian influence might induce Berlin to permit an accession by Budapest. When this hope waned, they raised troops in the Carpathians and sought to stir up local disorders. But on November 19, 1938 Germany and Italy warned Warsaw and Budapest that the Vienna award must stand. Smereka's failure to obtain all of Ruthenia and the unpopularity among the nobles of his "land reform" program forced his own party to force his resignation on November 21, but he formed a new Cabinet four days later. Kanya was replaced by Count Stephen Csáky. Hungary was clearly a German satellite with only the form of its subordinate relationship to Berlin still to be determined. The uneasy uncertainties at Warsaw and Bucharest were now without effect and were confronted by an invincible Reich which they could neither defy nor resist.

The old Czechoslovakia was dead. The new and self-styled "Czechoslovakia" was a German dependency. The Reich covered German railway and canal rights across Moravia between Silesia and the Gneznitz. Czechoslovakia's new frontiers were guaranteed not by the Great Powers but by Germany for its own purposes. In domestic as in foreign affairs the new Czechoslovakia conformed to Berlin's desires. It became a satellite of Bohemia, Slovakia, and Carpa-

the Germans. In the latter two areas the anti-Semitic followers of the late Father Hlaha were in the ascendancy. They promptly outlawed the Communist Party. On October 20 it was dissolved throughout the Republic and on October 27 Chvaldovsky told Ambassador Alexandrovsky that Prague had no further interest in its mutual-assistance pact with the USSR. Many Jewish organizations were suppressed. Multitudes of homeless refugees, chiefly Jews and German war-Nazis, were denied admission to both Czechoslovakia and the Reich and wandered in the fields without food or shelter because the lines of stations. The Munich lodgers were dissolved. The youth unions were removed from the Socialist Party and faced "re-education" on the Nazi model. Leftist papers were suppressed. The entire press was censored. Pictures and statues of Benes were everywhere removed, and those of Masaryk. Both men were widely denounced as traitors.

In a word, the reversion of Czechoslovakia became a quasi-totalitarian model State of the Third Reich. The French alliance was allowed to lapse into a disheveled death. The Little Entente was as an end Czechoslovakia was "assimilated" into Nazi values in Prague were killed, while Goebbels abruptly turned off the anti-Czech propaganda campaign in the Reich. On November 30 the National Assembly, without enthusiasm, elected the politician Dr. Emil Hacha as President. Sperry stepped down to the post of Minister of Defense—of a defenseless land. Hacha named as new Premier the reactionary pro-German leader of the Agrarian Party, Rudolf Benes, who had long been a personal enemy of Benes. Hacha declared on December 1: "We should never forget that Germany in many fields has always been an example to us." Lord Renselmann's recommendations of September 22 were thus carried out to the letter. Czechoslovakia became that which Hitler and Chamberlain desired it to become.

## 1. FRANCE IN THE SHADOWS

French parrots by the score of thousands turned out to hail the returning heroes. They lined the twelve miles between La Bourget airbase and the Ministry of War on the Boulevard St. Germain. They followed the triumphal car, singing, throwing flowers, shouting themselves hoarse with joy. The great Poisson, whom they

cheered as perhaps no French leader had been cheered since Napoleon, stood up and bowed at the salute. His great Foreign Minister beside him smiled and waved at the throng. Both men were warmly greeted at their destination by the Chief of the French General Staff while the crowd cheered *La Marseillaise*. The next day was Sunday. All the week-end was given over to rejoicing. The *Arc de Triomphe*, massive monument to France's greatest conqueror, was draped with the tricolor. An immense multitude, at once sober and festive, greeted the Premier as he ascended the steps beneath the arch where stood the Republic's uniformed soldiers. The victors of the present then honored the hero dead of the mighty past and rededicated themselves, amid new triumphs, to the ideals for which an earlier generation had offered the supreme sacrifice. Everywhere was festivity, dancing, and unbridled celebrations on a scale unknown since the Armistice of 1918.

The Premier was Daladier. The Foreign Minister was Bonnet. The Chief of Staff was Gamelin. The dates were October 1-2, 1940. The occasion was the return from Munich. That which Paris and all France herewith hailed as a *débarcadere* of destiny was the most catastrophic French disaster since Sedan and the most calamitous peace-time débâcle in all the annals of French diplomacy. Daladier and Bonnet had come back from the sepulcher of all French power, all French hopes, all French dreams. In Munich they had found the cause for which a million and a half Frenchmen died. There they had uncrowned the victory of 1918, the whole French alliance system, every hope of security, and every remaining vestige of order and the rule of law in international society. There they had insured the past, destroyed the present, betrayed the future. The Power which had thrice invaded France within a century was now the invincible master of the Continent. Therefore Paris celebrated and paid such honors to the authors of defeat as it had seldom paid to its greatest kings and captains.

This weird and tragic spectacle was a product of forces not dissimilar to those at work in Britain. Here, too, a whole population had been driven by its leaders into such a paroxysm of war fever that it could celebrate "peace" in a frenzy of joy and could greet the supposed authors of the "peace" as despots. That the peace was a peace of international betrayal and national death mattered not, so long as the immediate price seemed to be paid by others. The leaders themselves were half-paralyzed by the strains of their own cruises and half-

convinced by class prejudice and political opposition to the Tory line, they therefore left all decisions to Downing Street and acquiesced in the result because that result meant a new victory for Fascism, a new defeat for Communism, a final blow at the People's Front, and, above all, escape from responsibility.

The rulers of France decided war not *for* or *but* because this war would have to be fought against Fascism in the name of the People's Front and in alliance with Moscow. It would therefore have to be fought at home against the "two enemies," the financial oligarchy, the corrupt magnates of the press, the great industrialists, and the reactionary remnants of aristocracy, since these elements would be joint allies of France's enemies and secret enemies of France's allies. With these elements much of the beleaguered *petite bourgeoisie* and the conservative peasantry was emotionally identified. The Radical Socialist Party spoke for the farmers and little businessmen. Deputies and Senators were its leaders. They knew well that their party was brought to power by alliance with the Socialists and Communists in 1936, that the Tory program meant the end of France as a Great Power and the collapse of the entire treaty system upon which the Republic had relied for security for twenty years, that Czechoslovakia was doomed and Poland, Rumania, and Jugoslavia were lost; that Hitler would now bestride the Continent like a colossus, and that France would be helpless and friendless save for Porfidosous Albion. What was for them more important was escape from a war in alliance with Bolsheviks and against the self-appointed French saviors of property, religion, and the family. What mattered was escape also from that which would have started war without surrender: a solid front of Liberal, Socialist, and Communist opposition to Berlin, willing so far as it necessary and therefore able to halt aggression without war by the organization of superior force. Such a front, whether as a barrier to war or as a basis for war, would have produced economic and social consequences advantageous to the Left and disastrous for the Right. Workers and peasants, though they paid and bled, would in the end gain a stronger strategic position in the Republic. The unopposed elite would suffer. Nothing else mattered. Hence surrender, disguised as a "victory" for "peace."

By a stronger irony only a Left Cabinet could play this role, as the leaders of the Right fully recognized. A Right Ministry would be repudiated by Left public opinion. But a Left Ministry could serve the purposes of the Right, even at the cost of manipulating

some of its supporters, for it would retain the support of others and still be viewed by the millions of the stupid and naive as a 'Left' regime. The question of Radical motivations goes to the roots of the dilemma of European Liberalism and Socialism in the twentieth century. Whence peasants and workers accept leadership by middle-class politicians who identify themselves psychologically with others of wealth and order, the result is foregone. Left leaders shift Rightward and finally serve the Right in the name of Left symbols. This was the whole history of parliamentary politics in France under the Third Republic. This was the history of German Social Democracy, of British Labor, of the French Socialists, and of almost all comparable groups elsewhere in every period of crisis calling for a final choice. The German Republic was delivered to chaos in 1919 by Ebert, Scheidemann, and Noske, and in 1932-3 by Brünn, Brünning, Brünn, and Brünn. Britain was delivered to the Tories in 1931 by MacDonald, Snowden, and Simon. The Spanish People's Front was betrayed in 1939 by León Blum, Daladier, Brunet, and Chautemps, all democratic Radical Socialists, were victims of an identical destiny. None of these men consciously willed the results of their decisions. They were merely incapable of any alternative course and were content to accept the consequences of what they did. From their acts came unspeakable tragedy for the causes they pretended to serve—and, paradoxically, for the causes also which they actually served.

In France as in Britain voices of protest on the Left were stifled by the fierce roar of the hell-hounds of war, followed by the skillfully staged concealment of the "protestations." In France as in Britain voices of protest against this deception were raised on the Right by those whose devotion to Nation and Empire was more potent than their fear of the masses, their hatred of radicalism, or their admiration of the Césaires. In both countries the weapons of disaster seemed the day because of the pusillity and paralysis of protestations of all persuasions—and because the masses, as Hitler had long ago discovered, were "a mass any prey to a big or a small one."

As the crisis developed, Daladier and Chamberlain's "reasons" and sought to take credit for the journey to Berchtesgaden. Georges Bonnet proceeded in public (and the end) to formal fulfillment of French obligations toward Prague and conceded in private that he desired an entente with the Reich-Lens at the cost of the sacrifice of Czechoslovakia. He helped to inspire anti-Czech and defamatory articles in the *renai Paris press*. When he and his Premier went to London on

September 21, they might have encouraged those in Downing Street, including Duff Cooper, Vansittart, and even Halifax, who opposed the Chamberlain-Hitler-Runciman program. But they preferred the promise of yielding to Tory pressure. There is no evidence to suggest that Chamberlain at any time threatened Paris with desertion if France became involved in war with Germany in defence of Czechoslovakia. In the Cabinet meeting of September 17 Bonnet denied that France could rely on British support, but Deladier corrected him.<sup>1</sup> Such a threat would in any case have been empty, for elementary geographic and strategic considerations bound Britain to join France in any war against the Reich, as every Tory spokesman had conceded for many years. Deladier and Bonnet thus held the whip hand at all times. By vigorous intervention at Prague and Berlin, they could have compelled Downing Street to support a Grand Alliance sufficiently potent to deter German aggression or to crush the Third Reich if it unleashed the storm. But they preferred to leave all leadership to Chamberlain-Deladier out of readiness and irresponsibility, Bonnet out of secret approval of the Cleeves program.

In order to leave the issue in no doubt, Bonnet indulged in repeated misrepresentation. To Downing Street he exaggerated the weakness in the French war machine and concealed its strength. He ignored Germany's strategic and economic limitations (which were reported to have been presented to Hitler at length in a Reichswehr memorandum of September 26).<sup>2</sup> He fed Vallenin's fears and opposed Gamelin's confidence. On September 24 he apparently told London that Lindbergh had assured him at Geneva that the USSR could not come to Czechoslovakia's defence. On his return to Paris he circulated reports that Moscow had been asked to initiate military conventions and had refused. In both cases the truth was the exact opposite of his utterances. Lindbergh had from the first pledged Soviet aid, as he made abundantly clear at Geneva on September 21, with no denial from Paris or Prague. Refusal to initiate military conventions came from the Quai d'Orsay, not from the Kremlin. At the end (September 27-8) Deladier and Bonnet lost their full support—already unnecessary—to the Chamberlain program. They ordered François-Poncet in Berlin to tell Das Reich that they would accept Saksien occupation on October 1. They ordered Curzon in London to tell Halifax that they favored an appeal to Manchukuo for a Four-Power Conference.<sup>3</sup>

Their Cabinet colleagues offered little criticism and no effective

opposition to this course. On September 13 Georges Mandel and Paul Reynaud advised a firm policy, but were outmaneuvered by the anti-Cabinet intrigues of Joseph Caillaux and Pierre-Étienne Flandin, both of whom demanded capitulation. The Anglo-French betrayal of Czechoslovakia thus on September 19 ruined Mandel, Reynaud, and Clément Combarieu to domestic opinion, but appeals for "order" dominated them.<sup>1</sup>

The French press exhibited its customary pattern of irresolution and vacillancy. The very surprising cleavage of opinion displayed in the French newspapers did not correspond to party lines. Two conservative and industrial papers, *Journal Industriel* and *Le Petit Paris* stood for vigorous defense of the nation and its allies. *Le Jour*, *Le Matin*, and *L'Intermédiaire* were delicate or confused. The Radical *L'Œuvre* ran Generative Taboulet's anti-Fascist column and consistently pleaded for peace at any price. The Communist *L'Humanité* followed the party line of collective security and opposition to Fascist aggression. After September 21 the Socialist and Communist parties adopted resolutions opposing the partition of Czechoslovakia and demanding the convocation of parliament. Blum's *Le Populaire* wobbled in pathetic indecision. The Socialist leader confessed "chaos" at Prague's betrayal and "horrendous relief" at Munich. He finally joined the chorus in praise of Daladier. He had not perfected his Marxist discourse to the point of perceiving that within two months Daladier would be contemplating crossing him.<sup>2</sup>

On the Right, André Gervad (Parisien), Henri de Kéroul in *L'Époque*, and Émile Bore in *L'Ordre* pleaded for firm support of Prague. But Flandin in *Le Journal* urged Czechoslovakia's departure from the scene of the crisis, denounced all war measures, and demanded that parliament be convoked. Before mid-September *Le République* (Left) joined *Le Jour* (Right) in campaigning for a plebiscite and the revocation of Czechoslovakia. Marcelin Fournier, dandified Socialist, polled considerable anti-war and pacifist support behind the slogan: "No War for Czechoslovakia." The semi-official *Le Temps* oscillated, but on the whole favored surrender to Berlin. On September 21 *Le Matin* went so far as to deny that the British fleet had been mobilized or that German mobilization had been scheduled for 1.00 p.m. Without denial the Right press quoted Daladier and Bonnet as saying of the British pledge of September 20 to defend France: "We have not received any confirmation" and "From an official of no importance." Daladier concluded an author-



today—on October 4. On September 29 the Cabinet belatedly expressed an issue of *L'Action Française* for charging that "traitors" at the Quai d'Orsay would attempt to subvert "peace." It also expressed Francis Delais's *Le Liberté* for printing a manifesto by Thadée charging that France was being duped by war-mongers. Thadée's anti-war proclamations were torn off leads by the police. But the campaign of defamation had already reached its goal.

After Munich everyone joined in the chorus of praise even the Communists and a few reactionary Nationalists. First came on 29 October: suggested the mood. Blum: "We can go back to work and sleep soundly again." Maurice Poir in *Le Petit Parisien*: "Peace! That great word, that sacred word, can at last be spoken, can at last be written and printed. Peace!" Jean Frenoy in *Paris-Saint*: "Peace! Peace! Peace! The world can breathe again; we will can live!" *L'Informateur*: "A great victory for peace!" *Le Temps*: "... a new spirit in international affairs ... a spirit of consultation." Scribner confirmed in *Avenue de la Paix* "Avenue Chamberlain" and in *Avenue de la Liberté* "Avenue Edouard Delais." *L'Œuvre* asked contributors for a gift for Mrs. Chamberlain. Funds were collected for a French villa for her husband. President Lohren congratulated the Premier for his "brilliant courage" and "far-seeing and regular patriotism." Flodin exchanged congratulatory telegrams with Hake. This, however, was too much for some of his colleagues in his "Democratic Alliance." They quit the party in disgust.

On October 4 Delais went before the Chamber to declare that he had saved peace. He demanded a vote of confidence and power to rule by decree. Amid loud cheers he was upheld by a vote of 313 to 75 with only three abstentions. The opposition consisted of the 75 Communist deputies, 2 Socialists, Pierre Blach, and 2 Nationalists, Henri de Kerillis. Léon Blum's 125 Socialists joined the majority. On the request for authority to rule by decree, they abstained. The request was approved, 331 to 78. The Senate approved 184 to 2. Delais was showered with eulogies. "I accept my popularity," he said, "with the modesty that is only one of the forms my duty takes!"

After Paris (1925), when Francis I was taken prisoner by Charles V, the French King wrote to his mother that he had lost everything in the world save his honor and his life. At Munich the rulers of the French Republic surrendered honor for a short lease of life—and discovered promptly that they had lost both. Chamberlain and Delais brought back not "peace with honor," but disaster without peace.

In the words of Winston Churchill, "France and Britain had to choose between war and dishonor. They chose dishonor. They will have war." In the face of a shame and disgrace without precedent in French diplomacy, there were no resignations from the French Cabinet, none from the diplomatic service, none even from the General Staff. Gamelin was alone when a voice remarked: "General, you have just lost thirty-five divisions"—the Czech army. Voices in Prague prophesied that Slovak artillery would again bombard Annemasse and Paris. The Reichswehr learned the secrets of the Maginot Line from the Czech fortifications and skillfully perfected the science of demolishing them with Nazi howitzers. Only one French military leader retained his honor: General Louis Franchet, former head of the French army reserve in Prague. He resigned his rank, joined the Czech army, and declared that he would never again set foot on French soil. Only one party in the Republic remained patriotically loyal to *La Patrie*: the Communists.

The price of Munich in foreign affairs would necessarily be paid in successive humiliations. The publicly transparent cancellations of defeat in which all French leaders indulged during October could not conceal the present and future cost of the *débâcle*. Moscow refused from all official comment, but on October 4 the *Journal de Moscou* declared that France "no longer has an ally in Europe except Britain. What now is the value of France's word? . . . What now is the value of the French-Soviet pact since France has just torn up her treaty with Czechoslovakia—a treaty that bound her much more strongly?" Warsaw, Belgrade, Bucharest recognized that French power on the Continent was now at an end. On October 22, in quest of "appeasement" with Italy, Bonnet named Robert Coulondre as new Ambassador to Berlin and appointed the veteran André François-Poncet as Ambassador to the "King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia." Raffaele Guariglia came to Paris as Italian Ambassador. Benito Mussolini pressed this belated recognition of his role as conqueror with loud outcries from his Deputies for French territories, while Ambassador André watched the demonstration from the gallery. Japanese forces came ever closer to Indo-China. Nazi agitators in Alsace resumed alarming prophecies. Tory voices in Britain were raised in favor of meeting German colonial demands through French concessions. Chamberlain and Halifax visited Paris on November 15, but nothing of their discussions with Daladier and Bonnet was revealed. All was left in obscurity. Popular horror over the atrocious

November program in the Reich rendered colonial concessions and other forms of appeasement difficult. These must come later. . . .

The price of Munich in domestic affairs was soon obvious. Compromise with Fascism abroad is utterly incompatible with preservation of democracy at home. Blum's betrayal of Republican Spain in 1936 now came back to him with interest. The People's Front was already shattered by the sabotage of the moneyed class and by the irresponsibility of its leaders. Munich was its death-knell. Rather than permit the rising tide of Fascism to express itself through the Right, Daladier made himself the instrument of reaction and of a labor class war waged by industrialists, financiers, and reaction against the proletariats. The pretense was as plausible as those employed to justify the "peace" with Hitler. France must work, save, and produce to meet new dangers. The mobilization and related extraordinary expenses had cost over eight billion francs during September. Security, solvency, and prosperity demanded "austerity" and "sacrifice." Above all, France must be cleared of Communism. The paid press took up the cry with vigour. At the Marseille Congress of the Radical Socialism on October 18, the Premier denounced the "Reds." He made Raymond his Minister of Finance and used his new decree power to launch a general assault upon Blum's "reforms," beginning with the forty-hour week.

The offensive of reaction provoked promises and strikes. Daladier, now the "strong man," resorted to mobilization and courts martial. Blum joined Thorez and Léon Jouhaux of the C.G.T. in imprisoned demagogues. Daladier threatened their arrest and persecuted rumors to circulate regarding the possible dissolution of the Socialist and Communist parties. By the end of November tens of thousands of workers all over France had occupied factories or walked out of them on strike. A one-day General Strike was ordered for November 30. But it was broken in many industries by mobilizing workers into the army. Hundreds of labor leaders were arrested. Thousands of workers lost their jobs. The strike was a failure. Daladier spoke of having saved France from Bolshevism. Brown, embittered, and betrayed, the working masses raised vengeance. By sabotage, obstructionism, and local strikes they threw French capitalism into such confusion that no program of deflation and extractions could restore solvency and no appeals for support could restore the unity or power of the Republic.

What price peace with the Germans? For the Third French Republic

the price was to be far more than the surrender of its allies and the loss of its prestige and security as a European Great Power. Should the German menace the West instead of marching on Moscow, France would pay the price of the Tory-Naz alliance by ceding pieces of her colonial empire and perhaps even portions of her metropolitan territories to those who asked for them. Folly to talk of resistance, for all possibility of resistance had been paralyzingly Oppositized. Opposites would mean crushing defeat at the hands of foes now rendered invincible. Therefore demands must be met. This "peace" might be eternal (unless future Cabinets should embark upon a suicidal course of trying to thwart the Triple), but the price of peace would be French reduction—*Albert Kempf* spoke of "incubitation"—to the status of a *petit State*.

Such States, as *Pouget* had already learned, cannot afford the luxury of democracy, liberty, or republican institutions. These too must be whittled away and eventually abandoned. If French labor resisted reaction successfully, it could exist only through revolutionary action. Revolution within would give enemies without their opportunity to strike France down. If labor's resistance was unsuccessful, reaction would triumph and French democracy would become a memory. The France which Daladier and Bonnet condemned to death in Hitler's house was not merely the powerful and respected France of Berthoin, Brindeau, Polignac, Clemenceau, Delors, the Bonapartes, and the Bourbon kings. It was also the liberal and egalitarian France of Blum and Zola, of Jaurès and Gambetta, of Lucie Blanc and Mirabeau, of Danton and Robespierre and Voltaire. *La Grande Nation*, as a Great Power and as a colonial empire, died at Munich. The Republic of the Enlightenment and of the Rights of Man also died. The bourgeoisie which had fought for freedom and made France great would be left at length with nothing but its wealth. In the end that too would vanish, for those who worship all other values on the altar of Property discover ultimately that the altar itself is gone. In the new cult of Power, Poverty, and Persecution, the France of old would find no place of honor among the worshippers.

## 5. DUSK OVER WESTMINSTER

*It is right or even prudent for England to incur any sacrifice or see others, already variously sacrificed nearly in order to save Germany in building up step by step the threat of a universal preponderance? . . .* *Sumner's British Ger-*

cruminals [sic] agreed to make concessions and accept compromises which not only appeared to satisfy all German demands but were by the amount of both parties indulged and dropped inasmuch as it possible on a firmer basis the desire of Anglo-German friendship. . . . [But] the action of Germany towards this country . . . might be looked not inappropriately to that of a professional blackmailer when extortion are wrong from his victim by the threat of some huge and detailed consequence in case of refusal. To give way to the blackmailer's whimsical whims has, but a too long been proved by modern experience that, although this may secure for the victim temporary peace, it is certain to lead to increased violence and higher demands after ever shortening periods of vacillate forbearance. The blackmailer is usually ruled by the first impulse and made again by machine and the determination to force all rules of a possible despicable reaction rather than an evidence in the path of modern civilization. But, failing such determination, it is probable that the relations between the two parties will grow steadily worse.

There is one road which, if past experience is any guide to the future, will most certainly not lead to any permanent improvement of relations with any power, least of all Germany, and which must therefore be abandoned: that is the road paved with pseudo British concessions—concessions made without any conviction either of their justice or of their being an all by agitators counter-actives. The rule hopes that in this manner Germany can be "convinced" and made more friendly must be definitely given up. . . . Men in responsible positions, whose business it is to inform themselves, and to see things as they really are, cannot conceivably make any blunders on this subject. Germany will be encouraged to slack once before the first sign to any fresh disagreement if she moves on England's part with an unwavering courtesy and consideration in all matters of common concern, but she with a prompt and firm refusal to enter into any concealed bargain or compromise and the most unflinching determination to uphold British rights and interests in every part of the globe. There will be no more or quicker way to win the respect of the German Government and of the German nation.<sup>8</sup>

These observations were made by Eyre Crowe of the Foreign Office in 1907. Thirty-one years later Winston Churchill offered a prognosis of the probable consequences of an alternative course.

Undoubtedly the Government could make an agreement with Germany. All they have to do is to give her back her former colonies or such others as she may desire, to restore the British Press and platform by her of censorship; to give Herr Hitler a free hand to spread the Nazi system and dominions big and wide through Central Europe. After an interval, long or short, we should be drawn into a war, but by that time we should be confronted with an antagonist overwhelmingly powerful and his ourselves deprived of every friend.<sup>9</sup>

The course of events after January 1933, and particularly after March, lost weight to these melancholy forecasts. But for the Tory High Command there could be no turning back. All hinges were bowed. Downing Street must go forward with "appetement" and hope against hope that the Triple would in the end attack the USSR, rather than the Western Powers. Meanwhile plausible explanations had to be offered of the decisions already taken, and of those about to be taken, in order that public disillusionment at the price of "peace with honour" would not become politically dangerous.

Only a few of the shams perpetrated in the service of this objective can here be noted. On October 10, 1931 Earl Winterton, who held the Cabinet slot of Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, asserted in a speech at Shrewsbury that defence of Czechoslovakia would have been impossible because the USSR had offered no help in Prague and "only made very vague promises, owing to her military weakness." Ambassador Marby presented in Halifax. The Gliveden club found it useful to make Moscow the scapegoat of the March débâcle. It found no city in a strange quarter. Colonel Lindbergh had for some months made it a habit in British social circles of lavishing praise on the German and Italian air forces and speaking disparagingly of French and Soviet aviation. On August 10 he and his wife left England and went to Moscow, where for ten days they were hospitably entertained by Soviet air officials. He returned to London on September 14. He was reported to have declared at Gliveden that the Nazi air force, single-handed, could easily defeat the combined squadrons of France, Britain, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR. Soviet aviation in particular, argued the Colonel, had been demoralized utterly.<sup>14</sup> Lindbergh was taken to see Lloyd George—presumably to convince him that Russia was villainously weak and that the pending "peace" was therefore inevitable. A Jewish weekly, *New Review*, could say after the event:

The man who turned the scales against war last week was Colonel Charles Augustus Lindbergh. . . . In Berlin he was cordially received. In Russia he was an honored guest. When he returned home he had already drafted an amazing report for the American Government. A copy was passed to the French General Staff. Details filtered through to London. The document showed that the much-reputed Soviet Air Force was riddled with inefficiency, whereas Germany's was strong and well

organized. With the Lindbergh report in their possession, British and French military chiefs set down to form their own estimate of the relative air strengths of Germany and Russia. . . . Borneo was particularly alarmed. . . . Cécile of Noailles Chamberlain's advisers urged him to make peace with Hitler whatever the cost in view of the facts unearthed by "Lindy" . . . German secret agents obtained copies of the Lindbergh findings. . . . Adolf Hitler knew from that moment how far he could go.<sup>11</sup>

On October 15, as Lindbergh was preparing to go to Berlin to be fired by Nazi air officials, eleven Soviet evasion leaders in a letter to *Pravda* accused him of making "slandorous and insolent anti-Soviet statements" at Cleveland and acting as a biased witness and "lackey and flunkey of German Fascism." Lindbergh had the task in English's missionary circles of certifying to the weakness of Soviet evasion and thereby giving Chamberlain an argument for capitulation in Munich on Czechoslovakia. Lindbergh has fulfilled this task of his masters.<sup>12</sup>

Lindbergh kept silent. Nancy Astor hailed accusations at Claude Cockburn, editor of *The Week*, who first revealed Lindbergh's role at Cleveland. She declared that the whole story was "Communist propaganda." She first denied that Lindbergh had been at any Cleveland dinner recently or made any remarks on Russia. Later she conceded that he had attended a luncheon. "He did talk about Russia in general,"<sup>13</sup> but Lady Nancy couldn't remember what he said or who was there! The Colonel subsequently accepted from Hitler the Service Cross of the Order of the German Eagle With Star, the second highest decoration in the Reich. He did not deny reports that he was contemplating moving to Berlin, where authorities searched for living-quarters for him among houses and apartments taken from Jewish families.<sup>14</sup>

The cheap stage-play, following hard upon the Munich melodrama, deceived almost millions of Germans to believe that the partition of Czechoslovakia was necessitated by German racial intractability and Soviet perfidy or incompetence. Had not the world's most famous flyer said so in a "secret," "inside" report? That the tale was fantastic and unbelieveable did not prevent it from serving its purpose. Lindbergh made no "report" to the American Government, but secretly circulated a mysterious memorandum. Germanians de-

not rely for information regarding the military forces of other States on such sources. All governments maintain permanent diplomats, consuls, military, naval, and air attachés, and widespread intelligence services for such purposes. The content of the story, moreover, was a falsehood. On October 8 Pierre Cot, former French Air Minister, revealed in *L'Œuvre* that France, Britain, and Czechoslovakia alone had more planes than the Reich and that with only half of the Soviet fleet added to their forces they would command squadrons outnumbering those of Italy and Germany combined.<sup>12</sup> That any air ministry in any capital attached any great significance to any of the opinions of Colonel Lindbergh regarding the quantity or quality of any national air force or national production potentials in aircraft is so improbable as to approach the absurd. But the engineers of the Tokyo-Nazi contest perceived the value of utilizing Lindbergh's name to lend credence to the panic which they had manufactured to reach their objectives.

Lloyd George broke his long silence on October 22 to declare that "in fact peace is no peace at all. I will tell you what we shall find, and I am speaking now as one who has taken a great part in the affairs of this country at the most critical moments in the whole of its history: we shall have fortified homes; we shall have lost the respect of the world, and, what is still worse, we shall have lost our own self-respect. And in the end there will be no peace. There will be war, and war without friends. . . . We handed over a little democratic State in Central Europe, swamped by the Union Jack and the Tricolor, to a ruthless dictator who will deny freedom to both Czechs and Germans alike. . . . I know something about armaments. The French army is today the best army in Europe, and the Russian army is the greatest army in the world so far as numbers are concerned and so far as its air force is concerned."<sup>13</sup>

Berlin lost little time in warning Downing Street that it would not tolerate such overstatements. As early as October 9 at Saatchi-Berlin Hitler denounced Duff Cooper, Eden, and Churchill: "We know that the aim of these men would be to start war. . . . We know further that now, as before, there is lacking threateningly the Jewish international world economy which has found living expression in Bolshevism. . . . We want peace. . . . It is also part of the task of ensuring world peace that responsible statesmen and politicians refrain from continuously meddling with it." Amid a chorus of similar warnings in the Nazi Press the *Frankfurter Zeitung* declared:



The English and French must make it clear, beyond doubt, whether their Governments are capable of carrying out a policy of peaceful understanding and of settling the differences which exist between the two sides or whether "public opinion" will not allow this. We cannot enter into agreement with Chamberlain only to be suddenly confronted with a Churchill. We cannot afford to offer our hands to Daladier only to discover suddenly that a Mideel has taken his place. . . . As long as Churchill and Lloyd George are able to deliver provocative radio speeches across the ocean, even if their own Governments disavow them, we cannot suppose that England's public opinion is really ready for understanding. . . . All further progress must therefore be preceded by a final clarification within England and France."

Downing Street lost little time in heeding these warnings. In the night of the 15th Sir John Simon banned the showing in Britain of a Paramount Newsreel containing an interview with Winston S. Churchill. The ban was achieved by a "request" to the company (accompanied by such threats of reprisals), transmitted by Ambassador Kennedy, whom Simon and Chamberlain represented as "co-operating" with them "in the public interest." The October issue of *The March of Time*, dealing in part with "The British Delusion," was likewise banned. An unofficial censorship of the press, the radio, and the cinema, already highly effective through official "requests," silent screens, and pressure upon advertisers, became increasingly crunched. Many potential critics of the Chamberlain line were censored. Even an editorial writer in the *Commonwealth Daily Worker* (October 2) was so far deceived as to write that Communists shared the "general relief" that Chamberlain had spared Europe from "the horrors of the ghastly calamity" of war.<sup>10</sup> Critics who could be neither censored nor frightened into approval by the war hogs were intimidated by threats of prosecution for libel or for violation of the sedition act and the official-censorship act. Orders to the press during September and October were generally obeyed. Informal but effective restrictions upon book-publishing had long been in force. All criticism of Chamberlain was banned from the ether waves by the British Broadcasting Company. A "neutrality register" was prepared as a trap toward subscriptions—and, if need be, toward the introduction of the Continental system of tracing the movements of all subjects through police cards.<sup>11</sup> American co-operation was refused in keeping unpleasant

fact from the British public—and from the American public. On October 10 John Bruckley landed in New York to begin a lecture tour during the course of which he would be expected to speak unfavourably of the Chamberlain cabal. His visit was rendered in fruitless by the American Consulate in London on the ground that he was a "Communist," an allegation which he denied. He was refused admission and, when released on bail, forbidden to lecture. Other avowed foreign Communists were admitted freely. The hand of Downing Street reached far.

The Tory leaders meanwhile moved to perfect the diplomatic structure of "appeasement." A reshuffle of posts at the end of October rewarded Curzon with the Lord Presidency of the Council, vacated by Viscount Halifax. Earl Stanhope succeeded Duff Cooper at the Admiralty and was succeeded at Ministry of Education by Earl De La Warr. "Knicker" Sir John Anderson, former Governor of Bengal, became Lord Privy Seal. Thus reinforced, the Cabinet pursued its destiny. The long promised "general statement" with Germany was sent in order. Berlin hinted that it was willing to conclude a pact for mutual assistance with Britain if London would accept the total and of a ratio of 3:2. While this proposal was not deemed acceptable, Chamberlain apparently heeded Hitler's objection to any further expansion of British armaments. The proportion of bombers to fighters in the British Air Force, already fixed at 1:1, was changed in November to 2:1. Demands for a Ministry of Supply to organize industry for the defence services were rejected. The Prime Minister was evidently in agreement with Der Führer that new British armaments must be purely defensive, not offensive.<sup>20</sup> Chamberlain told Commons on November 1 that Polish, Hungarian, and new German armaments at Prague's expense did not involve Britain's "guarantee" because the terms thereof were not yet fixed and it was merely a pledge of aid against "unprovoked" aggression. He repeated that some were a "wilful political mistake" behind Herr Pank's radio drive in the *Sochauer*. Germany must be conceded mastery of *West Europe*.

Geographically Germany must occupy the preëminence position in relation to the States of Central and Southeastern Europe. I do not see any reason why we should expect a fundamental change to take place in these regions. Far from the country being concerned, we have no wish to black Germany out of

these countries or exclude her economically. . . . There may be some competition, but competition is a thing on which we have thrived in the past. In my view, there is room both for Germany and ourselves in the trade with these countries and neither of us ought to try to obtain an exclusive position there.

Unfortunately for Tory purposes, Hitler displayed no disposition to charge against the Soviet windmill and leave the West in peace. On the contrary he was reported in reliable quarters to be making overtures to Moscow for a rapprochement.<sup>10</sup> He was likewise reported to have struck a bargain with D. Duce in return for abandonment of Italian championship of Hungarian claims in Bessarabia. Berlin agreed at the end of October to lend support to Roman demands for "self-determination" in French Tunisia.<sup>11</sup> What was even more disturbing, Nazi spokesmen now revived their demands for the restoration of the German colonies. On October 29 Franz Ritter von Epp intimated that all must be handed back or compensation must be made elsewhere for those not returned. Whitehall countered that rich Tanganyika could never be given up. The Union of South Africa would not yield German Southwest Africa. Der Führer declared in a dinner vein on November 2: "It only remains for us (Britain, France, and Germany) to agree over colonies which were taken away from us on pretence contrary to justice. . . . Nazi Germany will never go begging. We do not go to Canada. We wish to negotiate, but if others decline to grant our rights we shall secure them in a different way."<sup>12</sup>

Such explicit suggestions at these altered circumstances to new activity. Neville Chamberlain proposed that France cede Togoland and Kamerun to the Reich. Oswald Pirow, South African Defence Minister, had already embarked upon a new "Runciman mission." He reached Lisbon October 27 and then visited London, Paris, Brussels, The Hague, Berlin, and Rome to negotiate ("unofficially" and in strict secrecy) about Germany's colonial "grievances." Mention was made in informal circles of the possibility of satisfying the Reich with Portuguese Angola, the Belgian Congo, a slice of French Equatorial Africa. . . .<sup>13</sup> But Pirow was discouraged. On December 6 he predicted war by spring, forgetting that war, his boss, reports two. Those who have surrendered all possibilities of resistance cannot resist unless they choose to commit suicide.

Progress toward appeasement had meanwhile been delayed by a sudden discarding of cheap clothing in Berlin. The poster was the face of a young man, a student of the German Embassy in Paris, by a young Polish Jew, Herschel Grynszpan, crazed with grief and desperation at the persecution of his family and his people. The Nazi Press shrieked for vengeance upon the Jewish "foreigner" in Germany and announced that Eden, Churchill, and Duff Cooper were responsible for the murder. During the following week Jewish shops all over the Reich were smashed and looted, over five hundred synagogues were burned, bombed, or demolished, insurance payments were confiscated by the Government, some sixty thousand Jews were herded into concentration camps, scores were tortured to death and hundreds driven to suicide, all were subjected to a "fine" of a billion marks was imposed upon the survivors, German Jewry was ruthlessly ousted from her last hope of livelihood (small merchandising) and driven into ghettos or into penniless exile. The cages of the Black Guards, *Das Schwarze Korps*, hinted that the German Jews would be starved and driven to crime and then exterminated with fire and sword. Britain, America, and the democratic world were outraged. President Roosevelt summoned Ambassador Hugh Wilson home from Berlin and voiced the indignation of the American people in vigorous language. Chamberlain was forced to express regret over the pogrom and to make gestures toward aiding the refugees. Some might be settled, he hoped, in British Guiana—or in Tanganyika. He even felt obliged to protest at Nazi insults to British leaders. He told Commons on November 14 that no British mandates would be returned to the Reich. He would obviously be compelled to smother the wringing of indignation before mounting discussions of the possible transfer of Portuguese, Dutch, or French colonies. His collaborator in Berlin was not being helpful. Earl De La Warr declared on December 4:

Within a fortnight of Munich, [we have seen] the wildest abuse of ourselves, attacks on our politicians that amounted to an attempt at interference in our internal affairs, and defiance of every canon of civilization in treatment of the Jews that has caused anger and dismay in every quarter of the globe. It may seem decadent to insist on continuing to lead civilized lives. . . . There is also a deep and growing feeling that there is nothing

we can do that can satisfy them, that friendly words and friendly actions are wisdom for cowardice and that only armaments can speak effectively.

There were also difficulties regarding "appeasement" with the Roman Court. Mussolini's Reformerish Diplomatics of October 12 asserted: "Against the Indo-German bloc of 125,000,000 . . . there is no longer anything to be done. The only thing that can be done is to make a final peace, a true peace, a peace on the Munich model." Such indeed was Chamberlain's intention, and for his purposes no sacrifice by whom seemed too great to be borne. The first step was to put into operation the Ciano-Porch accord. By its terms its execution was contingent upon a "settlement in Spain." But Franco's victory (announced April 19) was still remote. The Castille warred that continued loyalist resistance could only be explained "by a total absence of patriotism and the criminal spirit of the Red leaders." Acceptance of the "Non-Intervention" Committee's plan of July 1, which was to be followed by the grant of belligerent rights to the rebels, was equally remote. Chamberlain turned to new devices. If Duce agreed at Munich to withdraw 10,000 Italian "volunteers," Barcelona simultaneously discharged all foreign volunteers on the loyalist side. The Fascist volunteers were received as heroes in Naples on October 20. By official admission Italy had suffered over 12,000 casualties in the Roman campaign, including 3,000 dead. The left, according to *The Times* of October 6, a mere 10,000 to 15,000 Italian troops still in Spain. But the posture sufficed.

On November 1, Commons approved, 345 to 228, the Cabinet's decision to put the accord into effect. Chamberlain declared that the war in Spain was no longer a threat to European peace. Halifax explained in Lords that "it has never been true, and it is not true today, that the Anglo-Italian agreement has value as a lever, in some think, which might be used to make Italy decide upon supporting Franco's forces. . . . Premier Mussolini has always made clear from the first that he is not prepared to see Franco defeated." Here at long last the British Foreign Minister openly admitted that the Cabinet was pledged, at Duce's command, to Fascist victory in Spain. Eden observed mournfully: "We are constantly giving and they are constantly taking." On November 16, exactly seven months after its signature, the accord was put into operation by a supplementary agreement at Rome. Downing Street cheerfully sanctioned

continued Italian intervention in Spain, recognized Italian rule in Ethiopia, and acknowledged Oran as co-partner in a joint protectorate over North Arabia and Yaman.

Faucher's victory in Spain was no longer essential to London to complete the immobilization of France, since Munich had resolved this issue. But it was still essential to appease *Il Duce*. The Tory oligarchy was so fully prepared to pay this price as it had been from the outset. To grant belligerent rights to France would make possible a German and Italian blockade of the loyalist ports and starve the Republic into submission. For this, French approbation was needed. Deladier and Bonnet were willing enough, since all decisions at the Quai d'Orsay were now made in London. But *Il Duce*, too, refused to play cricket. On November 30 he presented his deputies to greet Ambassador François-Poncet, who had brought the gift of French recognition of Italy's title to Ethiopia, with loud cries of "Traïson!" The crowds and the press added: "Nouvel Suvoy! C'est-à-dire! D'hyéna!" The Mediterranean statesmen, "imobilized" by the Anglo-Italian agreements of January 2, 1917 and April 16, 1918, was accordingly not yet satisfactory to Ciano. Fascism raged against Poincaré declared that sanctions had invalidated the Lloyd-Morleyan accord of 1916, the ratification of which had never been exchanged. Paris protested London refused regret. Rome demanded a Munich peace in the middle sea. Chamberlain, facing facts as boldly as always, concluded that this issue was too large to leave to a Simon, a Haug, or a Runciman. He declared that he and Halifax would visit Rome on January 11. . . .

In the Far East, Tokio had also drawn its own conclusions from Munich. On October 21, Japanese forces took Canton and on the 25th Hankow. Hong Kong was cut off from its hinterland. The Yangtze was closed to all foreign shipping. Poland recognized Manchukuo on October 10. The British postbox Sandpiper was struck by Japanese bombs five days later. Tokio presented to France on October 19 an armistice proposal to China and made veiled threats against Indo-China. On October 27 Washington released an elaborate protest to Japan of October 8 against violations of the Open Door and the Nine-Power Pact. Tokio indicated that the pact was obsolete and asserted, politely but unmistakably, that it proposed henceforth to exclude the Western Powers from Eastern Asia. But Chamberlain was reassuring. He told Ciano on November 21:

China cannot be developed into a real market without the influx of a great deal of capital, and the fact that so much capital is being destroyed during the war means that even more will have to be introduced after the war is over. It is quite certain that it cannot be supplied by Japan. Therefore, when anyone appears to contemplate a future in which Japan has a monopoly of the Chinese trade and we shall be excluded from it, I think it is flying in the face of facts. It is quite certain that when the war is over and the reconstruction of China begins she cannot be reconstructed without some help from this country.

If these words were anything more than verbiage, they meant that Tory Britain would assist Japan to exploit a conquered China, to the exclusion of other foreign interests and even to the detriment of established British interests, in the hope of thereby saving Hong Kong and the Far Indies. Washington's anti-Japanese, anti-Far East, and pro-British orientation was bankrupt, since Westminster was now openly siding the Far East. Though new doubts regarding the Far East began to be voiced in London by the end of November, Downing Street was irrevocably committed to sacrifice any and all other Schemes to the exigencies of the program it had embarked upon in 1931. Should this program fail to save the Empire, Americans would be needed. It was announced on November 8 that George Rex and Elizabeth Rogers would visit President Roosevelt in the spring. Eden, who seemingly had made his peace with his colleagues, visited the United States in December. He declared in New York on December 3:

To be conscious of shortcomings is not to proclaim that we are false-hearted, still less to suggest that we are decadent . . . We do still care, deeply, strongly, and for the same things . . . We still want peace . . . Nor are we calling out for help to others, nor seeking to lure others to pull our chairmen from the fire. We have no such intention. We know that we are destined, in our land and in our generation, to live in a period of emergency of which none can see the end. If throughout that taxing time, however long or short it be, we hold fast to our faith, tackle it in stone, and set steel to defend it, we can yet hand on our inheritance of freedom intact to the generations that are to come.

Despite doubt, his presence and his message were a call for aid. Thus the mightiest and most self-complacent of Empires looked be-

locally no others for help against the doom his leaders had prepared through their emperor's sacrifice of others for the enhancement of French power. Britain had once known a Germany far weaker than the Germany of Bismarck only with the combined military aid of France, Italy, Russia, Japan, the United States, and almost a score of lesser allies. The new Reich had Italy and Japan as allies and all of Southernmost Europe at its feet. France had fallen to the rank of a vassal State. America would not save a Britain bereft of allies and could not if it would. Russia waited for the capitalist wolves to devour the capitalist sheep. A brief respite for the sheep might be had if the wolves attacked the Red Bear. For wolves is more palatable than bear meat. *Sic transit gloria Britanniae.*

#### 4. NIGHTFALL

The course of post-Munich diplomacy in January of 1939 suggested the troubled waters of some mighty stream, poised steadily between two catheads and resulting over tumultuous rapids in violent eddies and countercurrents. The crisis poised had resulted in a dangerous decline of influence and prestige for the Western Powers. The crisis to come would shred it in men, but it was already clear that, whatever its form, it could have no outcome other than a further weakening of Anglo-French power and a new victory for the Eastern Triumvir.

Nazi imperialism, like Nazi socialism, was a product both of the Heilman *Wirtschaftswunder* and of the desperate exigencies of Fascist economics. French prosperity resulting from heavy public spending was accompanied by an ever mounting debt, with no recovery of postwar investments. Only 20% of new capital loans during 1938 represented postwar business. An increase of 8% in national productivity during the year was accompanied by an increase of 11% in currency circulation, backed by a Reichsbank reserve of gold and foreign exchange of only 0.90% (January 3, 1939)—an all-time low. An increasingly unfavorable trade balance added to Hitler's difficulties. Stock values declined. For the masses living standards fell as hours of labor increased. The Nazi economic machine could be kept running and war could be slowed only by new "confidence" which could be created only by new diplomatic or military triumphs.

The issue was not whether the Reich would strike again, but when.



It would strike and in what direction. Having been granted strategic freedom of action by Chamberlain and Daladier at Munich, Hitler could move Eastward or Westward as will. Der Führer concealed his plans well, like all skilled commanders, held himself ready to move in either direction as circumstances might dictate. Despite persistent Polish and Magyar resentment at the Warsaw settlement of November 1 and occasional border clashes between Czechs and Hungarians, Nazi agents continued to groom Carpatho-Ukraine as the nucleus of a new vassal state to be carved out of Poland and the USSR. While the economic "Ghettoisierung" of Carpatho-Slovakia was accelerated during December, plans were laid for a German military highway from Silesia to the Odermark across Munster. Schneider-Gottschalk sold to the Czechoslovak Government as half-chase in the Rieda area planes, which would immediately equip not France's allies but Hitler's legions. Ukrainian Hetman Skoropadsky in Berlin and Cosak Hetman Popov, who came from Berlin to Carpatho-Ukraine early in January, were hopeful of Nazi support for the "liberation" of all Ukraine. Grand Duke Vladimir, pretender to the Russian throne, visited Berlin in mid-December, but denied that he would accept German aid to recover the Romanov crown. When Russia General Anton Denikin charged in Paris on December 20 that Hitler was plotting to seize the Ukraine and the Caucasus. He denounced fellow-traitors for accepting money and support from Berlin and Tokyo. Premier Augustus Volosh of Carpatho-Ukraine declared on January 6, 1938: "The creation of a great Ukraine will be realized in the near future. I believe Ukrainians of the whole world will be able to return to a liberated fatherland, to their brethren who are now so brutally oppressed by Poland and Soviet Russia."

Moscow scoffed at such assertions, protested to Prague at Popov's activities, and disclosed that Nazi manoeuvres to drag in disgre against the West. Bonnet was reported on December 20 to have told Moscow that it could rely on French military aid against the Reich only in case of a German invasion and not in the event of a German-inspired Ukrainian insurrection. But everyone knew that Munich had killed the French-Soviet pact and that France could no longer aid the USSR, even if it would. Warsaw registered anxiety. On December 11, 1938, the Polish Government rejected plans for autonomy from its own five million Ukrainians. On the same day, in the Mancel provincial elections, Nazi candidates secured 87% of the votes. London and Paris expressed hope that Berlin would not waste Mancel

from Lithuania and were apparently sold to assist their own business. Warsaw wanted Prague on December 26 and 27 to halt the anti-Polish agitation of Ukrainian émigrés. Beck hastened to conclude new trade agreements with Lithuania and the USSR and to secure the non-aggression pact with Moscow. As a Polish-Soviet rapprochement was thus initiated, Warsaw spokesmen asserted that Poland would fight any attempt at dismemberment. Beck conferred with Hitler in an ultra-secret conference at Berchtesgaden on January 2, but the results were obscure. Rydz-Smigly, like Stalin, optimistically hoped that the Nazi offensive would move toward the West. With France reduced to impotence, any effort to breathe new life into the French-Polish alliance was futile. Any German-Polish bargain at Russia's expense would probably prove fatal to the weaker partner. The alternative of a Polish-Soviet mutual assistance pact was unlikely to be realized. Whether Warsaw under the circumstances could maintain its neutrality between mighty neighbors depended upon decisions not yet reached in Moscow and Berlin.

Bucharest was no less anxious over the Drang nach Osten. King Carol, after vain efforts to secure aid in London and inconclusive visits with Göring and Hitler in the Reich, took a leaf from the Nazi book and established an indigenous Fascist to drive Rumania from Hitler. On November 30 Constantine Codreanu and dozens of his fellow prisoners, all convicted political murderers, were shot to death "while trying to escape." The Iron Guard was mercilessly crushed. The Reich press raged against "Jewish" and "Masonic" conspiracies and professed revolution in Rumania. But on December 12 Berlin and Bucharest concluded a new trade pact. While some observers, including Aygun, opined that Rumania would be the Reich's next target, Carol strengthened his disposition and shared with others the hope that Berlin would move Westward.

Elsewhere in Balkans similar hopes shimmered with sinister lustre. In Belgrade Stjepanowitch courted both the Germans, sought to play them off against one another, and prayed that German-supported Magyar mercenaries would look toward Transylvania rather than Croatia. Sofia and Athens waited upon the decisions of the mighty. In Turkey death came for Kemal Ataturk on November 10, 1938, but the strong new State which he had forged centred on another President: Ismet Inönü. Ankara also viewed the Drang nach Osten with alarm, but Turkey's peril was not yet imminent.

On the Western front the Reich combined new moves to secure

a free hand in the East with alarming gestures suggesting that the Western Powers, rather than the USSR, might after all become the chosen target. On December 4, 1938, Ribbentrop and Bönner signed in Paris a declaration of "peaceful and good neighborly relations." "The two Governments take note that between their countries no question of a territorial order remains in suspense and they solemnly recognize as definitive the frontier between their two countries as it is at present established." They agreed to "consult" regarding future controversies. If this document had any value higher than that of the paper on which it was written, it could have but one meaning: Paris had recognized the arbitrary consequences of Munich and gave Berlin carte blanche in the East. The *quid pro quo*, if any, was renunciation—for the moment—of German claims to Alsace-Lorraine (but not to French mandates or colonies) and German discouragement—perhaps—of Italian ambitions at the expense of France.

In dealing with Britain the Nazi regime pursued its conciliatory strategy of assault, blackmail, promises, and threats. Hjalmar Schacht, President of the Reichsbank, arrived in London on December 14 on a mysterious mission, apparently having to do with the Nazi plan to expand exports at the price of permitting Jewish refugees from the Reich to take part of their money with them. Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank of England, went to Berlin on January 4, 1939, on an equally mysterious mission. George Robles followed him on January 20 to discuss the ransom plan. That the Reich was seeking a trade accord with Britain and possibly a loan was probable. That Chamberlain and Norman were prepared to do all in their power to rescue Hitler from his financial difficulties was more than probable. But no open move could be made, since British and American opinion would be shocked by any such gesture, particularly if coupled with acceptance of Nazi plans to expand German markets through anti-Semitic persecutions. Funding developments elsewhere, the Tory-Nazi account hung flat.

On December 30, 1938, it became known that British Admiralty officials were in Berlin to discuss Germany's demand for submarine tonnage equal to Britain's. The Anglo-German naval accord of June 18, 1935, often praised by Chamberlain, had granted the Reich a submarine fleet 45% as large as Britain's with the option of building up to 100% of British tonnage. This option Wilhelmstrasse now proposed to exercise, though Germany already had 47 submarines (of smaller tonnage) to Britain's 32. Amid deep anxiety it was rumored

that the British also desired to construct additional cruisers and to avail itself of the cruiser clause of the 1935 naval agreement in order to build battleships of Japanese size with British guns. Here at least the "Euxine incident" was cited as justification. No concrete result of the Berlin discussions was announced. These overtures were not conclusively indicative of a Nazi decision to challenge British sea-power. But since Chamberlain's quest for appeasement required ever new concessions, Hitler saw no reason for not changing all the trumps would be.

For the Nazi war lords the question of East versus West could not be decided without giving some consideration to the desires of the British allies in Tokyo and Rome. For Japan, where the "moderate" Prince Konoye was displaced in the premiership on January 4, 1939, by "Fascist" Baron Hirota, any German assault on the USSR before the completion of the conquest of China would afford little opportunity for sharing in the spoils. Neither could the Tokyo militarists hope to unite British and French possessions in the Orient in the event of a German drive against the West unless the "China incident" were first liquidated. Wang Chang Wei's peace overtures of December had no immediate results save his expulsion from the Kuomintang on the first day of the new year and a purge of the party ranks of all defunct elements. Chiang Kai Shek obtained small favors from the Western Powers by threatening to make a bargain with Moscow. So long as his forces could still offer resistance, Tokyo was obliged to hope for a postponement of the new European crisis. If Germany moved against Moscow, Japan's prizes would be Eastern Siberia, if against Paris and London, then Hong Kong, Indo-China, and the East Indies. The latter booty was much more tempting and far less hotly defended. It could therefore be assumed that whatever advice Tokyo tendered Berlin was inspired by hopes for a Nazi-Drang nach Warren.

For Il Duce there could be no choice. Italy could gain nothing from a crusade against the USSR. Mussolini had been defeated in his efforts to forge a new Polish-Hungarian bloc against the Drang nach Osten. Ciano's visit to Budapest could not alter Magyar dependence on the Reich. Compensation for Rome could be offered only at the expense of France, and only with German support against the French. The campaign for French colonies initiated on November 30 was intensified through press agitation and public demonstrations. Rising trouble was in Tunis on December 8. Two days later Gayda demanded Italian participation in the management of the Suez

Canal. He warned Paris of the fate of Prague and intimated that French Somaliland and the Addis-Djibouti railway must pass into Fascist hands. Ciano hinted at war. On December 22 it was revealed that Rome had informed Paris (December 17, 1938) that it no longer regarded the Laval-Mussolini accord of 1935 as binding. Ratifications had never been exchanged. Far from giving up the railway shares and the red route ceded to Italy by Laval's catastrophic pact, Rome pressed for new concessions in fresh fulfillment of the promises of the Treaty of London of 1919. Ciano warned that if France proved weak-kneed, "Italy is ready to accept the offensive on any front and with any means." Verbal threats were accompanied by troop movements down Ethiopia toward French Somaliland, though any intention of invasion was disclaimed. It was hinted that Rome might be satisfied with "independence" for Tadjik, participation in the Suez Canal, and a free port at Djibouti.

The Fascist clamor for partition of the French colonial empire was based upon the realistic supposition that France, even with British support, could never dare to risk the military might of the Roma-Berlin axis. Only with American and Soviet support could London and Paris meet the Fascist Triple on equal terms. At a Socialist Congress on December 28 Blum advocated such a four-Power bloc against Fascism. His suggestion approved, but his words were idle. Munich had ended any such prospect, at least for the near future. Should Germany move Eastward, the USSR could hope to offer effective resistance, even without allies. But should she also move Westward, France and Britain would be beaten: eastern powerful allies none to their aid. Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay were thus under an increasingly desperate necessity either to join forces with Moscow or to push the Fascist Powers into an armistice on the USSR at all costs. The first objective they were unwilling to contemplate. How to achieve the second?

The invasion of the West through a German war against Russia was attainable only by convincing Hitler that his path of least resistance lay to the East and by convincing his allies that they stood to gain something from such an enterprise. The first condition could scarcely be realized as long as the USSR remained allied to the north and Britain and France were without allies, hopelessly outnumbered by the greater Reich which they had helped to create, and governed by Chamberlain and Daladier. The second condition also offered difficulties. To achieve it, Japan must be stopped from expansion

Southward and deflected toward Outer Mongolia and Siberia. And since Italy could gain nothing by the anti-Bornet crusade, Mussolini might be paid in other coin to give it his blessing.

This double-profile distorted Tary diplomacy at the turn of the year. On December 6, 1938, Earl Plymouth announced that the Cabinet was contemplating the extension of export credits to China. He warned Japan of the "incalculable consequences" of closing the Open Door. Downing Street, having already hailed the Anglo-American trade agreement of November 17 as a symbol of solidarity, expressed approval of renewed American championship of the Open Door, blessed the \$25,000,000 credit to China through the Export-Import Bank, announced December 12 in Washington, and looked to the United States to keep Japan whole hands. These gestures of belated and feeble aid to China were of doubtful efficacy. Tokyo indicated that it regarded the Nine-Power Pact as dead and that the "new order" in East Asia would comprise a bloc of Japan, Manchukuo, and China in which the privileges of the Western Powers would be excluded or curtailed. Hiroshima's assumption of the premiership signified renewed determination to crush Chinese resistance, but it did not necessarily foreshadow any program of war against the USSR. Whatever the West might do, Japan's path of least resistance lay Southward. In the event that France and Britain should be driven to the wall in Europe by the Germans, Tokyo would strike at their Oriental possessions.

To London's distress, Paris failed to comprehend the problem of "appeasing" Mussolini. Daladier referred on December 3 to "the firm resolve of all Frenchmen to assure, by all the means in their power, the absolute integrity of the territory over which the French flag floats." On December 14 Bornet told the deputies: "There cannot be the slightest equivocation. France will never consent to giving up an inch of territory to Italy, and any attempt to settle such a claim can only lead to an armed conflict." On December 19 he reiterated this defiance and coupled it with references to Niem, Saroy, Carica, Turki, and Scanzilhard and to French support of France against aggression. Three months previously he had declared that France could count on Britain. Four months previously he had made similar hollow pledges in defense of Prague. Small military and naval reinforcements were sent to Djibouti, where a few hundred troops faced 150,000 Italian and colonial soldiers in neighboring East Africa. China's note of December 17 was answered on the 18th with an acknowledgment

and an expression of willingness to exchange ratifications of the accord which Rome had just repudiated and to redress "grievances." But no French territory would be ceded and Rome's suggestion of "arbitration" it is thought, with Fisher and Chamberlain as participants, was rejected. On the same day Deladier and Bonnet pressed Chamberlain and Halifax to stop in Paris on their way to Rome for their projected January visit. On January 9 the Premier returned to Paris from a ten-day tour of Corsica, Tunisia, and Algeria which the French press denounced as a "provocation." Deladier made new promises: "I shall maintain France. I shall maintain the French colonial empire."

Under these circumstances British policy oscillated between pledges of "firmness" and new propensities for "appeasement." As for Germany, Malcolm MacDonald declared on December 7 that colonies are "not now an issue in practical politics." Lloyd George echoed this sentiment. A bill to guarantee export credits provided £75,000,000 for the promotion of foreign trade, of which £10,000,000 would be used to facilitate exports to markets which the Government might desire to have or to hold for reasons of national interest. The direct played its part in bringing Schacht to London. On December 15 Ambassador von Dönitz, his staff, and all German journalists in London boycotted the fiftieth anniversary dinner of the Foreign Press Association when they learned that Chamberlain's speech would deplore the attitude of the German press in calling Baldwin a "parricide." Chamberlain crossed German wrath over more on December 15 by distinguishing between German politicians and the German people and by opining that British finances and arms would triumph in any war of long duration. On December 20, in the face of a confidence vote of 342 to 143, Chamberlain in Commons sought to conciliate the Nazis, but declared: "I am still waiting for a sign . . . that they are prepared to make their contribution to peace." He defended Munich by alleging that the alternative would have been simultaneous wars with Germany, Italy, Japan, and insurgent Spain—the despite the fact that Franco had proclaimed his "neutrality" during the September crisis and that the Occurs had not contemplated general war, but had capitulated, with Chamberlain's aid, on the threat of it. The Prime Minister denied for the hundredth time charges of bad faith on the part of Italy and declared that his slogan was still "peace with the dictators."

Who would pay the next installment of the price of this peace? In

his references to the French colonies, Chamberlain first declared that Britain had "no specific pledge" to defend them. But at the Press dinner, he asserted that "our relations with France are so close as to give far beyond mere legal obligations, since they are founded on identity of interests." In Commons on December 14 he asserted that the Anglo-Italian agreement to respect the Mediterranean *status quo* "naturally applies to Tunis." Any attack upon Tunis "would be a matter of grave concern." Here, as in dealing with Prussia in the spring, Chamberlain warned against war, but declined to assume any pledge of defense. It was not strange that some Frenchmen feared that Tunis might suffer the fate of Madagascar. On December 19 he spoke of Anglo-French relations as "rocked" and expressed gratitude at Bonnet's pledge of December 14 to place all the forces of France at Britain's disposal to assist unprovoked attacks. But he made no reciprocal pledge covering the French colonies, merely stating that "intentions" were "more significant than actual treaties." Paris wondered exactly what his intentions were.

As preparations for the Rome visit proceeded, it became known on December 19 that Chamberlain and Hallam would visit the Pope as well as Menotti. On the same day Charles Roger Cantan called at the Foreign Office to express the French desire that Chamberlain should not attempt "mediation" between Paris and Rome. He disclaimed any such intention, but the Italian press was confident that he could not escape his favorite role. The *Quotidien* begged the British Ministers to stop in Paris. They hesitated, but it soon be understood, but finally agreed to stop for "tea." Meanwhile on December 21 Franco's armies launched a "Chamberlain offensive" in Catalonia designed to break through if possible to Barcelona in order to convince the conference in Rome that rebel victory was assured and that belligerent rights should be granted. Chamberlain had stated on December 19 that Italy was sending new troops to Spain, but asserted that belligerent rights would not be granted save in accordance with the non-intervention plan or withdrawal of foreign troops. The rebel drive reached Arona and Borja Blanca on January 4, but was held up on the second hybrid defense line. Maña launched a "Chamberlain offensive" of his own in Extremadura and drove some miles into Badajoz province toward the Portuguese frontier.

If these events were disturbing to the Tory leaders, developments at the Eighth Pan-American Conference at Lima were most disturbing. Here the efforts of Hall to achieve an effective agreement for



continued defense—which might conceivably promote indifference among both North and South Americans to the fate of the British Empire and even attract Canada into its orbit—were largely frustrated by Argentina, here as always a British dependency. The Declaration of Lima of December 24, 1918 merely pledged the American Republics to "consult" in the event of any threat to their peace, integrity, or independence. If Washington was gratified by the purpose of this pledge, Downing Street was more gratified (as were Rome, Berlin, and Tokyo) by the failure of its implementation.

There remained the problem of placating Mussolini. The necessity of compensating Il Duce for his acquiescence in any Drang nach Osten was appreciated by Hitler and Chamberlain. Il Duce sought German and British support of his Mediterranean and African ambitions. What would he regard as sufficient compensation? On the principle that he who asks little gets nothing and he who asks much gets something, his spokesman clamored for everything in sight. The greater the demands the greater the opportunity for advantageous bargaining. Mussolini might agree to withdraw most troops from Spain in return for a French colony or two. He might agree to postpone demands for French colonies in return for half-grown rights for France and assurance of French victory in Spain—which would make Tunis and Algeria indefensible. He might for the moment be content with a British loan and with non-sterilized concessions at Tunis, Djibouti, and Suez. His problem was to win German support and induce Chamberlain to browbeat Paris into concessions and to acquiesce in further intervention in Spain.

In this situation the British remained reserved. While appreciating the necessity of supporting his ally, Hitler had no desire to be drawn into conflict with France and Britain over Rome's ambitions. This contingency, however, was serious despite Daladier's blarney. France could not resist Italian demands without British support. Such support might well wreck the Chamberlain program of appeasement. With Downing Street willing and anxious to compensate Caesar, the only issue was whether compensation should be extracted first at the expense of Spain or of France. If France were compelled to yield to Fascist blackmail in Africa, French victory in Spain would ultimately be secured in any case. If the Spanish Republic were crushed first by Fascism, French colonial communications in the Mediterranean would become unreliable. Who should first be persuaded to make Chamberlain's Roman holiday a success? Which course would in-

value the least sacrifice of Polish territory.

Chamberlain and Halifax, accompanied by Cadogan, took tea in Paris with the French Ministers on January 16. Bismarck expressed confidence that the British leaders understood the French position and, in imitation of the example of the United States, announced that 45,000 tons of French wheat would be made available to Barcelona. The Spanish Republic might yet be saved, not by whom but by planes, tanks, and artillery. All arms for its defense, however, were still denied it by the "non-intervention" Powers and by Washington as well. As his British guests reached his capital, Il Duce's legationnaires aided Franco's forces to capture Madrid-Arch and Vitor. On January 17 Tarragona was taken. Heroic loyalty resistance lasted many months of fighting before Franco's victory should be complete, but the fire of Spanish democracy appeared already smoldering, having won belated change of policy in foreign capitals. Although relief victory would in all likelihood render French North Africa indefensible and insure Franco penetration of Latin America, no effective steps were taken in Paris or Washington to terminate such collaboration with the Rome-Berlin axis and the Tory-Nazi masses in their fixed program of delivering Spain to Fascism. Whom the gods would destroy they first make irresponsible.

His Majesty's Ministers, amid much pomp, conferred in Rome with Mussolini, Ciano, and Pius XI, January 13-14, 1939. Mussolini championed "peace with justice." Chamberlain championed peace "by the method of negotiation." But without a war police the Tory leaders could not silence French and domestic objections to any open surrender of the interests of others to Caesar. Secrecy and deception were therefore the order of the day. "No new commitments, arrangement or agreement," declared the laconic communiqué of January 12, "has been asked for or secured nor by either Government." But the valiant had "framed" the Italian viewpoint—which the Fascist press had screamed to the world for two months and Paris (scheduled to return in April) had presumably conveyed to London long since. Gayda expressed doubt as to whether Chamberlain had sufficient "understanding" and "courage for sacrifice" to oppose Italy. Observers spoke of the conference as a "balance" with the British and Italian positions "far apart." But it may be surmised that plans were laid by the Tory leaders for preventing Il Duce from recurring anti-British agitation or embarrassing Hitler's plans by holding Rome with new concessions at the expense of France and Spain or, in a possible

alternative, at the expense of the lesser Powers of the Near East.

While the discussion in Rome proceeded, Hitler opened his new Chancellery building and received the diplomatic corps on January 12. Monseigneur Cesare Orsini, Papal Nuncio and Dean of the corps, expressed hope that "the peaceful procedure which was so effective in Munich and that so completely conforms to the wishes of all peoples may become the accepted method in the future of resolving international controversies." One Fulcrum echoed this sentiment and praised the "wise discernment of the Powers." "The moral and vital necessities of nations must sooner or later be admitted and not be obstructed by force." Downing Street and 11 Place cried "Amaz!"

As Chamberlain returned to London, the French press vented its spleen on France and indicated that all eyes must now turn upon France's final victory. Cizley visited Berlin and announced Hungary's adherence to the Axis-Comintern. Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay belatedly followed the United States in protesting Japan's closing of the Open Door. France furor moved against Barcelona. The latter development led to public outcries in Britain and France for an end of the force of "non-intervention." Chamberlain and Bonnet reassured on January 14 that any change of policy would have "grave consequences" and could not be considered. To the end and beyond, the damned are doomed to aid their destroyers in bringing faggots to the stake at which they must die. Dark rumors hinted at a Fascist spring offensive against the West.

By mid-winter of 1939 the prospects were that the Western Powers would suffer at least one more major diplomatic defeat, of which Italy would be the major beneficiary, before Hitler should make an irrevocable choice between East and West. While Spain (and therewith France) could still be saved by French intervention, the temper of political leadership at Paris was such that *Le Grand Marais* had become clay in the hands of the potter. But a "Mediterranean Munich" might well require another war panic to frighten the British and French masses into acquiescence. Apart from a slowly rising tide of unrest among his own followers, Chamberlain anticipated no difficulties in negotiating such a panic, for Wendell and Hitler were certain to give him full co-operation. That it would evaporate diffidently from the panic of September was improbable, for France was steadily a passive object of Tory-Fascist diplomacy and no longer able to act on its own behalf. In the United States Secretary Helen dominated the Reich, and Sumner Welles, on Decem-

bar 12, brusquely rejected German protests. President Roosevelt in a moving address to the Seventy-Sixth Congress on January 2, 1939, based at the end of the "new neutrality" and possible economic pressure upon aggressor States. Chamberlain expressed approval. But American pacifists and isolationists would have none of Roosevelt's medicine. The United States continued to bar arms to the Spanish Republic and to call them freely to Germany, Italy, and Portugal. The United States continued to express alarm over Fascist domination of Latin America and to acquiesce in the Fascist conquest of Spain— which would insure Fascist domination of Latin America. The United States continued to protest at Tokyo's campaign in China and to supply Japan with all the necessary materials to complete the conquest. Under these conditions London and Paris could count on no American aid against the Triplex. Chamberlain's Britain continued its passive acquiescence. Daladier's France continued to be the victim.

Moscow, like Washington, could and would give no support to the European democracies so long as their leaders pursued a program of suicide. No other program was in prospect for 1939, nor could any other be implemented effectively with European legitimacy already delivered to the Caesar. As for the Dong north Oases, Poland and Rumania appeared to be doomed to massacre or partition at German hands. This victory could be won without war, or, at worst, at the cost of local conflict in which Warsaw and Bucharest would soon fall to the invaders. Beyond lay the Ukraine. But the price of the Ukraine would be a desperate and prolonged armed combat with the USSR. Such a combat, however much desired by Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay, might weaken the Third Reich and leave a weakened Italy at the mercy of London and Paris. The road toward Baghdad and India was open. The game of blackmail against France and Britain enabled Hitler to win.

West of East Time would tell. "Through wood and dale the sacred river ran, then reached the centre meadowland to man, and sank its realm to a lifeless ocean, and 'mid the tumult Kabla heard from far imperial voices prophesying war."

## DEFEAT

### 1. THE HOLLOW MEN

In *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* Edward Gibbon relates the tragic tale of the Emperor Valens, whose folly was fatal to himself and his realm. In classic prose the great historian of the decadence of ancient culture tells how the Visigoths, in fear of the even more barbarous Scythians, persuaded Valens to permit them to cross the Danube. Valens, who in fear of the Scythians, granted the Visigoths leave to settle on Roman soil on condition that they defend the border against the wild hordes without. They agreed and "voluntarily" promised that, if the gracious liberality of the Emperor would permit them to cultivate the wastelands of Thracia, they should ever hold themselves bound, by the strongest obligations of duty and gratitude, to obey the laws and to guard the limits of the republic against the Scythians. Presently, however, the new "defenders" made demands which Valens was unwilling to grant.

The impudence of Valens and his ministers had introduced into the heart of the Empire a nucleus of treason, but the Visigoths might even yet have been reconciled by the timely confession of past errors and the sincere performance of former engagements. Their leading and companion warriors seemed to concur with the dimensive disposition of the sovereign of the East; but on this occasion alone Valens was heaven, and his unreasonable heavity was fatal to himself and to his subjects. He declared his intention of marching from Antioch to Constantinople, to subdue this dangerous rebellion.<sup>1</sup>

Valens marched. On the 9th of August a.m. 378, "a day which has deserved to be marked among the most insipidities of the Roman

calendar," he attacked those who had been granted wealth and power to save the Empire from its foes, but who had now become "robust" and "invincible." Near Hadrianople the battle was joined. The Roman army fled. The infantry was surrounded and cut to pieces. Valens was slain. From this blow the Empire never recovered, though none then perceived its ultimate impact and the tempo of dying was slow. The Visigoths heartlessly roamed through the provinces with looting madness. Thirty-two years later they sacked Rome. Four decades after this disaster the Eternal City was taken and looted by the Vandals. Another two decades sufficed to bring the Western Empire, already a shadow, to an end. The Byzantines played little part in its destruction.

The rulers of Western Europe in the twentieth century of the Christian era displayed as little wisdom as Valens and less courage. If their problems were more complex, their alternatives were not more numerous. Two tribes of "barbarians" threatened their herding Continent and France. They drove the vanguard of the former back toward the East end, having failed in their efforts to destroy Red Moscow; they concluded a truce with its masters. But when the hard-headers of France were closer to home and prodded protection against the Bolshevik menace, the men of wealth and title in the West took them at their word and spurned Moscow's offers of aid against the new danger. The barbaric Germans who pledged themselves to use "civilization" shamelessly offered protection (at a price) against Communism and held up the bag of their own displacement by bloody revolutionaries if their own power should be menaced or their wants denied. The leaders of the West therefore upheld their power and granted their demands. Too late they discovered that they had thereby sealed their own doom. That their ultimate fate would be different from that of Valens appeared respectable, however long the years might be before their final end.

The cultural march of the doom was as complex as modern society. But the anatomy and physiology of Nervous were as simple as the elemental processes of life itself. The experience of frustration among living things, man included, stems most commonly from inability to achieve adjustment to environmental change. Survival in a world in flux requires dexterity in the adaptation or discarding of old habits, and in the improvisation of new ones which will be objectively adaptive to the nature of the task at hand. Reluctance to abandon established formulas which no longer make for adaptive behavior spells

failure. Inspiration in evolving new devices to cope with unforeseen situations quells failure. When failure becomes chronic, the consequence is extinction.

If Western European culture is today facing death, the source of its danger lies in the inability of those in the seats of power to abandon or modify old symbols, values, and practices which are irrelevant to the exigencies of a new day. It lies also in inability to devise new symbols, values, and practices calculated to serve the good life in a changed world in which old ways no longer work. The culture crisis of the twentieth century is ineluctable only in terms of the specific nature and content of this frustration. Throughout the Western nation-states the old ethos of land and the new ethos of money traditionally wedded influence and enjoyed power and privilege in a social setting dominated by the twin deities of Property and Sovereignty. Out of feudalism and absolutism were born those concepts of private ownership and of national independence upon which the whole superstructure of modern communities and of the Western State System came to rest. The incarnation of Property as it has developed in the modern age was the legacy of feudal aristocrats to bourgeois-merchants and artisans. The incarnation of Sovereignty was the legacy of royal rulers to bourgeois-citizens and parties. The rise of the bourgeoisie to social and political ascendancy in the West reached its full flood with the progress of science, the acceleration of technological change through invention, the rise of industrial entrepreneurs, and the emergence of a machine economy competently producing goods for a mass market. The rule of the bourgeoisie brought national Sovereignty to full flower with the cult of nationalism becoming a new mass religion.

By the last decades of the nineteenth century the new world of Property and Sovereignty had come fully into its own. It was a world of competitive enterprise among independent producers in which production for profit made for constantly greater efficiency in the output of an ever greater volume of goods and services. It was a world of competitive politics among independent nation-states in which the quest for power made for national unity, for vigorous trade, and for the rapid development of the backward areas of the earth. Economic competition promoted individual risk and bravery, with occasional exploitation of the less forward and periodical losses to all in depressions. But the lure of riches for the few, beyond the hopes of slaves, and the reality of unprecedented wealth for the

may, lay, and the longings of all earlier peoples of Utopia, led all to pronounce a blessing on the system of "capitalism" which made prosperity and progress possible. By the same token political competition in Whirlwind postulated national risk and treachery, with a constant burden of armaments and occasionally disastrous wars. But nations of empire, beyond the dreams of all the great conquerors, and the cohesion of all peoples in worship of the fatherland, led all to look with favor upon the division of the civilized world into independent national sovereignties. In both cases the complex patterns of collective feeling and action which were thus pronounced good were not the product of deliberate fabrication, but were the comforting accident, inherited and familiar, of an unplanned path in which Providence or Progress or some unseen but benevolent hand caused all things to work out for the best in the best of possible worlds.

Along with this faith, the blindness of which became belatedly apparent, the new people of the machine age increasingly developed a more concrete and tangible confidence in Reason and in Freedom. From these values grew, in appearance if not always in fulfillment, the faint dreams of modern man. Science and the machine were products of untrammeled creative intelligence, applied to the problem of bending nature to serve man's needs. Competitive enterprise was possible only through the freedom won by throwing off the shackles of feudalism and the more restraint of a parochial folk-cowery. Freedom to produce and sell and buy seemed inseparable from freedom to think, to talk, to worship, and to vote. Liberty and Property were but two sides of the same coin. Both affirmed the worth of man and the dignity of individual personality. The humanitarian ideal of fraternity and equality, far from appearing to be obstructed by the enjoyment of property, seemed indispensable conditions of such enjoyment. The new vision of brotherhood and peace among nations was an antithesis to Sovereignty, but the common goal of international life. The dream was of a world in which Man would at long last be master of his fate and captain of his soul and become he would at last be free of the bonds of slavery and servitude, free from exploitation and oppression, free from ignorance, bigotry, and superstition. He would be able and anxious to find truth in the freedom of the marketplace and to apply truth to the solution of all his problems and to the co-herent amelioration of his common life. The dream found expression in political democracy and in social democracy, in "reform" and in the New Freedom, in the visions of Jefferson and Lincoln, Gladstone



and Muziol, Garibaldi and Marx, in "internationals" and in the covenant of Woodrow Wilson.

In contemporary Europe this dawn has its *obit*. The culture which bred the dream is dying. The cause of the tragedy lies in the inadequacy of cherished ideas and habits resting upon accepted definitions of Property and Sovereignty in the face of the emergence of a new economy of abundance and a new world society of interdependent communities. Corporate industry and the rise of trusts, trusts, and trade unions, all within the legal and institutional framework of the eighteenth century, progressively destroyed the old competitive order without substituting for it any new pattern of productive and distributive relationships commensurate with the demands of new markets. In the markets of late capitalism the ability of consumers to purchase the output of industry at prices profitable to producers seemed somehow to be less than the ability of producers to turn out goods and services in abundance. Lacking wit or will to preserve and develop an economy of plenty by modifying the established patterns of incentives and rewards, the men of the nineteenth century resorted perforce to an economy of scarcity in which life and profits faceted and life and hungry workers conformed in incongruous juxtaposition. By the same token, the pattern of incentives which became fixed in the pre-industrial era was incompatible with the world economy and the world society created by the machine. Lacking will or wit to preserve and develop that society by so modifying the creed of Sovereignty and the cult of nationalism as to permit of effective world organization, modern man returned perforce to international anarchy in which all nations were threatened with disaster by the efforts of each to seek self-salvation.

The most question as to whether paralysis of wit and will is a cause or result of cultural decadence may be left to the morphologists of history and the specialists of *Kulturgeschichte*. It is enough to notice that just as the rulers of Rome were unable to cope with the new problems of the fourth and fifth centuries, so the rulers of the West are unable to cope with the new problems of the twentieth century. In both cases the "problems" are symptoms not of cultural disaster but of inter-human maladjustments. *A priori* such problems are susceptible of analysis and solution by the application of human intelligence. But intelligence fails when thought and action are dominated by the symbols of a dead age. When contemplation from the past, absorption to the present, preparation for the future become schizoid activities be-

and the capacity of those called upon to act, the flash of resistance rise ever higher and presently engulf such an intelligence itself. Therewith comes a great loss. With lost marches and-rationalism, mysticism, portrait of images, persecution of scapegoats, and a resurrection to superstition and magic. When these eras of despair have established their dominion, they bring with them necessarily an appointed doom of the whole society toward the primal chaos out of which it once emerged.

This process, already well advanced in the Europe of today, appears on the surface to be a consequence of the corruption and blindness of elites, of the betrayal or impidity of the masses, of the senseless slaughter of youth, of the senility and ineptitude of the elders, of the restlessness of the outer barbarians, or of the cowardice of those who defend the frontier. It is *not* any of these things. It is always more than these things. But whether, once begun, the process is attributable to some variety of cultural misadventure, to some word reducing away of the roots of mind and heart and will, must remain a mystery. In the end the people of dusk who face the night are incapable of comprehending even these questions.

Fear is indeed the Nemesis which drives victims of this fate to self-destruction. The disequilibrium of a decaying culture reflects, and is reflected in, the maladjustment of millions of autistic personalities. The human psyche is at best an unstable system of socially acquired restraints upon fear, rage, and love—or, in psychoanalytical terminology, upon id-impulses potentially driving the ego toward incest, murder, and suicide. When war, famine, pestilence, and death breed universal despair, those who are tormented underfoot by the Horrors of the Apocalypse seek to flee from danger or to destroy the sources of their misery. Since fear is ever an evil companion, its addictions are more frequently from dream-dangers than from actual perils and often discharge their aggressions not upon objects relevant to their woes but upon substitute targets which happen to be handy or helpless. Ghost-chasing and witch-burning are devices useful to insecure states to protect them from the wrath of the masses. But these devices, which can only be employed among masses already panic-stricken, themselves reflect the demoralization and flight of the ruling groups which resort to them.

Fear is everywhere the basic motivation to public action in what Karlud Höller has aptly named *Die Zeit der Verunsicherung*—*disquiet*. Those with wealth and power in the Western societies

lived in a world which could only be saved from ruin by a new departure in economic relationships either through a renunciation of monopolistic privileges and a consciously directed return to a truly competitive capitalism or through the socialization of the means of production in a planned economy. That world likewise required for its salvation a new departure in international relations either through a genuine renunciation of the pursuit of power and the practice of war by sovereign states or through the merging of sovereign states into a federation of mankind organized to keep the peace and to serve the common purposes of its members. The more remote benefits of these innovations were to be had only at the cost of immediate deprivations, material and psychic, which were beyond the endurance of those called upon to accept them. In their efforts to cling to their vested interests in the old order, they destroyed competitive capitalism, blocked the path for democratic socialization, and reduced all efforts at the organization of peace to a tragic farce. When they led the nations to Armageddon in 1914, they recoiled in horror from the bloody "accident" in which they found themselves entangled. With horror came fright. And fright became terror when those years of agony led in one great conamity to a stroke of the masses, which annihilated the classes hitherto enjoying wealth and power.

In its ultimate ramifications the panic which the Russian Revolution inspired among the wealthy and well-born of Western Europe is the close to the politics of the epoch of dread. Elites fear masses only when their members are troubled in conscience or are acutely aware that mass mobilities are of such magnitude that traditional symbols for eliciting obedience have become of dubious efficacy. Despite the "stabilization of capitalism," the failure of "World Revolution," and, in Calvin Coolidge's phrase of 1923, the "encouraging evidences (in Russia itself) of returning to the ancient ways of society," the fear of peasant or proletarian revolt became a determining factor in the political behavior of European aristocrats and industrialists.

Such fear was well founded. Had it served as incentive to efforts toward removing the sources of mass misery and thereby diminishing the potential market for Communism, it might have produced salvation. Such efforts would have required some sacrifice of interests and redefinition of privileges on the part of the misery. They would also have involved the reshaping of traditional values and ideals. The plutocrats and aristocrats of the West were incapable of such modifications. Their members, with few exceptions, believed

like frightened children or hysterical psychoses. Their first move was to arrange to murder and bludgeon the Russian masses into a return to what they chose to call "anarchy." By blockade, intervention, and subordinated civil war, they starved and slaughtered millions—all the while expending obscene fortunes at the butcherery by the Bolshevism of their paid agents and of the anarchists and plotters of the Canton. But they failed to smother the Communist chafers. Defeated, they made "peace" and waited for a new opportunity to mass the killing of the Red Dragon. Meanwhile they sought salvation at home in new expedients which were as much a tribute to their short-sighted egotism as to their already chronic blindness and folly.

The rise and spread of Fascism were the product of this searching. All Fascist movements sprang from the panic-stricken desperation of the little men of the lower middle class who had escape from their fears through conversion to the mystic cult of institutionalism, atmosphere, and "barbaric" intolerance. The practitioners of the cult were always in employing the device of democracy to encourage democracy's destruction. But no Fascist movement anywhere was ever brought to power by the democratic election process, for none ever won a majority of any electorate to its cause. In each instance of victory the gang-captains were brought to power by the clime of land and industry, of commerce and finance, of army and church. The Little Caesar of the colored shirts promised protection to Property, Morality, and Religion against "Bolshevism" in return for money, power, and an opportunity to establish their tyranny. Those who lived by Property, Morality, and Religion and who served power and protection ridiculous with stunts turned willingly to their would-be rescuers who had risen from the ranks of the lesser bourgeoisie. The mobsters and gunmen of the new creed of violence were given control of the machinery of government by the men of money in order that they might rescue their patrons from the subversive preachers of class hatred from the lower social orders. Once and again the patrons were obliged to rescue the mobsters from their own folly or from the wrath of those unwilling to be rescued. Since this process, once begun, was all but irreversible, the patrons were obliged to pay over higher tribute to the gang-leaders who peddled "protection." This tribute was at first the sacrifice of the freedom of others. Ultimately the patrons were obliged to abandon their own freedom and even a portion of their privileges in favor of a new class of political parasites whose hunger for power, and for the lives

and sense of authority, was insupportable.

Down this path have fearfully straggled in mass and melancholy procession some of the ecclesiastics, philosophers, and priesthoods of the Continent—first in Italy, then in Germany, later in varying tempo in Austria, Poland, Portugal, Hungary, Spain, and other States. In the barbaric cult of middle-class Cæsarism all sought refuge: the feudal gentry of ancient times who feared the pressure of land-hungry peasants, the great entrepreneurs who feared the reactions of their wage-workers, the industrialists and financiers who welcomed "protection" for Property against proletarian revolutions, the clergy of the Church of Rome, and of some other churches as well, who bought "protection" for Religion against Marxist atheism, the professors who either believed promises of land distribution or merely rejoiced in a cause which vocalized their primitive folk-resentment against rationalism, utilitarianism, and the alien world of metropolitan culture, some even of the proletarians who believed promises of "socialism" and "revolution" or who became passive or hostile toward their own leaders who had betrayed them, and, above all, the nasal bourgeois, still decent and sane, not yet converted to Cæsarism, still clinging to liberty, but finally persuaded by force or fraud to support Cæsar's shinned legions for defeat against the bogies and boghobos conjured up out of darkness by the new magicians. Finally, in the arena of *Wschodniak*, the diplomats and menagers of the Western Powers, caught in the fears and recitations of the élites for whom they spoke, joined the parade of those who sought to buy peace and protection from the Little Cæsar, now grown formidable with the booty which patrons, enemies, and victims alike brought rapidly to their door.

What measure of security did the tribute-payers buy with their Dargulid? In the paying they surrendered, for others and at length for themselves, most of the human values which have been the distinctive contributions of Western culture to the enrichment of the life of the race. Liberty, Equality, Fraternity were yielded up with small regret, for all of these seemed to the fearful to have become dangerous to Property and to Sovereignty. The dignity of the individual, the privacy of the home, the sanctity of the church, the rule of Reason, the creed of toleration and noninterference, the vision of "peace on earth, good will to men" were likewise abandoned since the new tyrants would have it so in order to further their ends. In the name of Kultur, culture itself was sacrificed. Wrote Thomas Mann:

Colours! The special language of a whole generation mocks at the word. It refers, of course, to the cherished god of our whole liberal bourgeois outlook. As though genuine culture were anything else but precisely their liberalism, good citizenship! As though it were not the exact opposite of credulity and human imperialism, and no less the opposite of a wretched inertia and falseness which remains false no matter how stiffly it stands at salute! As though, in a word, culture, whether in a matter of form, or desire for freedom and truth, or the conscientious guiding spirit of life, or endless pampering, were anything at all but moral discipline itself! . . .

The small man craved by the *flair* of thinking . . . believes in violence, and in only one thing more, he believes, even more passionately, in the lie. Among all the European ideas—truth, freedom, justice—which he thinks to have liquidated, truth is the one he most hates and rejects. In its place he puts the "myth." It is a word which bulks as large as the heroic in his vocabulary, and what he means by it, one discovers, is the abolition of the distinction between truth and fantasy. . . .

It is heartrending to see the weakness of the older cultural group in face of this barbarism in bewildered, confused retreat. Dazed and drenched, with an embarrassed smile a shadowy one polished after another, seeming to concede that in very truth it "no longer understands the world." It swaps in the face's moral and mental level, adopts his lifeless terminology, adjusts itself to his pathetic categories, his stupid, spiritual, and capricious propaganda—and does not even see what it is doing. Perhaps it is already lost.

Along with these losses went the loss of the humane ideal and the surrender of the hard-won conviction that arbitrary power and lawless violence are evil. What André Malraux

The movement which has been called Fascism is a reaction of despair on the part of societies seeking order in any way. During the glorious years of the 1920's men had forgotten the price of security; they had believed that other values could be superior to it. But from the moment when they felt their lives and their possessions threatened and helplessly protected by governments which were no longer able to govern, they yearned, as Paul Valéry has put it, for discipline or death. In a disorder

which almost looked like the chaos following on the fall of the Roman Empire, soon rediscovered and paid tribute to the value of peace. Under the feudal system people had willingly submitted themselves to the superior strength of a warrior because he guaranteed them protection against barbarians and brigands. Similarly the middle classes of modern Europe, anxious as they once were for liberty, have accepted the authority of parties composed of a minority of the population, but of a minority which is ready to fight. The ideal of gentleness and of love is a practical ideal; it cannot survive in times of war.<sup>1</sup>

As the will to war waned into the fanaticism of ever-deteriorating violence, the will to resist among the defenders of the Western tradition waned into impotence. Words of warning were idle. Irrefutable evidence of the consequences of their course produced no change of course among the doomed.<sup>2</sup> The diplomats of Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay pretended that in this wise they had purchased "peace." Ignorant noblesse, and even some of the mighty, believed the promise. Even when purchased peace crumbled to bloodstained dust, they still believed, far the will to believe enough to the mark of the doomed and the damned. The worshippers of the nation state believed that they had purchased the safety of the debbaith of Sovereignty—and continued to believe long after the durlang atrocities of the Fascist International had reached out into every land to perform its task of corruption and disintegration. The priests and bishops who sold Christianity into bondage to the new pagans believed that at least the Church of God had been rescued from church-burning heretics. For many of them the spectacle of Franco's Nazis and Moslem "herring" and "parrying" Catholicism through seas of Spanish blood availed no change of conviction. Doubts came only when the pagans of the Third Reich themselves demolished churches, seized the wealth of the hierarchy, herded priests into jails, and seized the homes of cardinals and archbishops. By then their doubts were futile.

Was Property saved? Some of the men of land and money were content enough with their bargain. The nobles of Italy, the Junkers of Prussia, the grandes of Spain regained something of the privileges, if not the power, of the feudal gentry of old. The industrialists of Lombardy, the Rhineland, and Saxony, with labor known or hypnotized into submission, waded the sea the profits of weapons for the gods of war. But competitive capitalism was as dead in the Fascist

reins as in Red Russia. The difference lay only in the fact that in Russia the capitalists were also dead, while in the Fascist empire they lingered on and even prospered, no longer as independent entrepreneurs but as parasitical beneficiaries of the bureaucracy of centralism. If their new masters should fare well and suffer them to exploit the poor in peace—will heaven, if their new masters reached Moscow and gave them new profits from contracts needed for the imperial crusade, they might indeed retain the privileges, if not the influence, of a privileged plutocracy.

But if their new masters should come to rule, swiftly through defeat in war or slowly through an inner decay of the corporative economy, they would be undone. In the wake of such disaster would almost certainly come social revolution and the abolition of Property. Precisely because of this point, the men of land and money in the Western democracies were ever obliged to rescue the Fascist regimes, for they, too, feared ruin if their counterparts elsewhere were destroyed. Precisely because of that fear the rulers of France and Britain at every crisis gave all to the near conquerors rather than permit them to risk defeat. In the gliding Property and Sovereignty alike were reduced to gloom. Property was "saved" by the destruction of all that had hitherto made property meaningful as an institution and as a way toward progress. Under hellish Fascism the holders of property, whether small men or great monopolists, held their holdings as the pleasure of the gang-captains whose rapacity knew no limits and whose pseudo-business might well drag the propertied classes to irretrievable ruin. In the decadent democracies the holders of property kept their posts by reliance on foreign blackmailing. They lived under an ever-growing fear that those who had "saved the world from Bolshevism" would proceed to despoil them utterly of their imperial riches and even of their domestic wealth, once granted the omnipotence increasingly demanded under threat of violence. But, like the Egyptians, they learned nothing and forgot nothing. Driven remorselessly by fear, they walked the road to the gallows which they had themselves reserved for others. Then as the end was Property ended, as Religion and Morality and Culture were saved, by the same devices that Hitler had employed to protect his realm from the Soviets. There was little prospect that the ultimate results would be different.

The processes here at work were not unique to Western civilization or to the modern age. A political scientist of ancient Athens



*depicted the physiognomy of decay in terms as fresh as tomorrow's newspaper:*

Tyranny inevitably arises out of democracy, and the most aggravated form of tyranny and slavery out of the most extensive form of liberty. . . . The leaders of the poor deprive the rich of their estates and distribute them among the people, at the same time taking care to reserve the larger part for themselves. And the persons whose property is taken from them are compelled to defend themselves before the people as long as they can. And then, although they may have no desire of change, the others change them with pleasure upon the people and bring forward all oligarchy. And the end is that when they see the people, not of their own accord, but through ignorance, and because they are deceived by informers, seeking to do them wrong, then at last they are forced to become oligarchs in reality. . . .

Thus, and no other, is the road from which a tyrant springs; when he first appears there ground is in a process. How then does a tyrant begin, to change into a tyrant? . . . Having a good mastery in his disposal, he is not restrained from shedding the blood of his own. . . . Some he kills and others he banishes, so the more there living at the abolition of debt and the partition of lands; and when this, what will be his decay? Must he not either perish at the hands of his enemies, or from being a man become a wolf—that is, a tyrant? . . . Then comes the tyrant's request for a bodyguard, which is a device of all those who have got thus far in their tyrannical career. . . . At first, in the early days of his power, he is full of smiles, and he allows everyone whom he meets he is to be called a friend, who is making promises in public and also in private; showing kindness, and distributing land to the people and his followers, and waiting to be so kind and good to everyone!

But when he has disposed of foreign enemies by conquest or treaty, and there is nothing to fear from them, then he is always raising up some war or strife, in order that the people may require a leader. . . . And if any of them are inspired by him of having means of direction, and of reverence to his authority, he will have a good pretext for destroying them by placing them at the mercy of the many, and for all these reasons the tyrant must be always getting up a war. Now he begins to grow suspicious. Then some of those who found him wrong turn up, and who are so power, speak their minds. . . . And the tyrant, if he means to rule, must get rid of them, he cannot stop while he has a friend or an enemy who is good for anything. And therefore he must look about him and see who is wise, who is high-minded, who is rich, who is wealthy, happy man, he is the enemy of them all, and must seek reasons against them whether he will or no, until he has made a party of the many. . . . And the most desirable his reasons are so the wisest the most skillful and the greatest doctors in them will be acquiescent. . . .

If there are mixed resources in the city, he will confound and spend them. . . . Then he is a persecutor, and a cruel punisher of an aged parent, and this is real tyranny, about which there can no longer be a mistake: in the saying is, the people who would escape the master which is the slavery of democracy, have fallen into the fire which is the tyranny of slaves.

—*Plato's Republic*, translated by Benjamin Jowett, in *Disputes* (New York: Random House, 1911), Vol. I, pp. 310-11, passage.

A modern man described the same process in terms applicable to the decadence of all cultures:

The more radical the political domination of the minority old order of Egypt and Assyria, the more frenzied and terrible the electoral wars, the more completely it is delivered over the hands of the new parties, the party leaders, who devote their will to the people through all the machinery of unbridled compulsion . . . and treat public opinion merely as the weapon to be forged and used for blows at each other. But this very process, derived from another origin, is now as an irresistible tendency driving every democracy further and further on the road to suicide. . . . In the Latin Democracy, race breeds death and order makes itself as deadly as disorder, it drives them inevitably into the pit. It was so, too, in Egyptian Thebes, in Rome, in China—but in no other Civilization has the will-to-power manifested itself as so irresistible a force as in that of ours. The thought, and consequently the action, of the man are kept under iron pressure—other which passes, and for which reason only, men are permitted to be restless and violent—thus it, in a dual destiny—while the parties become the obedient servants of a few, and the shadow of coming Civilization already troubles them. . . .

Through money, democracy becomes its own destroyer, after money has destroyed freedom. . . . Men are used to disgust of money-economy. They hope for salvation from something or other, but wait and cling of honor and decency, of moral nobility, of nobility and duty. And now comes the time when the fossilized power of the blood, which the civilization of the Megalopoli has suppressed, awakes in the depths. Everything is the result of dynamic violence and old nobility that has stood itself up for the future, everything that does it of high modern-decaying value, everything that is humanly worth enough to be, in Friedrich the Great's words, the uttermost hard-working, self-sacrificing, saving system—of the time, all that I have described elsewhere as one word as socialism in contrast to Capitalism—all this becomes suddenly the focus of human blindness. Capitalism grows on the end of Democracy, but its roots spread deeply from the underground of blood tradition. . . . There now lies in the final battle between Democracy and Capitalism, between the fading force of democratic money-economy and the purely political will-conviction of the Capital. . . . (This is the) final battle between Economy and Politics, in which the least advantage is vital.

—Gustav Spengler, *The Decline of the West* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1921), Vol. II, pp. 425, 426

With the triumph of the new Politics of Caesarism, Property and Sovereignty alike are in the old ones gone, along with Freedom and Reason. The clods of land and money, in destroying democracy and clinging blindly to privileges which democracy opposes to them, hand with encourage their own doom.

## 1. THE LOST SOULS

Since all believers are ever tempted to confuse their own convictions with the immutable foundations of the Universe, they are readily led to suppose that the subversion of their faith signifies the end of the world. This common human trait has caused many Liberals to view Communism and Fascism as the destroyers of civilization and to assume that the world-wide triumph of either would be equivalent to the cultural demise of modern man. The agnostic may well contend that all values are relative, that each creed reshapes the Cosmos in its own image, that old ways pass and new ways arise, that totalitarianism, whether Black or Red, has contributions of its own to offer which are different from those of Liberalism but are not necessarily inferior or debased.

The time is not ripe for any final assessment of the new antiliberal ideologies which have swept over the Western world during the years of its tribulation. It is evident that European Liberalism has decayed with the decay of the class which gave it birth. Its bourgeois defenders are all but purged. They have suffered defeat by default. The only other social stratum which might be expected to save the torch of freedom from fading hands is the urban proletarian. But workers who have embraced revolutionary Marxism have either met unmitigated defeat at the hands of the class they proposed to destroy, or won victory (in Russia) in the name of dictatorship which claims on the surface, despite its professed Liberal objectives, to be as fond of the values of historic Liberalism as is the cult of the Czar.

Elsewhere those who are lost to the Liberal faith—namely, industrialism, the mass peasantry, and the middle millions of little men—have embraced a creed and a way of life which repudiate utterly not only the *Wohlfahrten* of the Russian Revolution, but likewise that of the French Revolution, the American Revolution, the Great Rebellions, and the whole tradition of Liberty from Hugo Grotius to modern democracy. It is evident, regardless of the issue of whether the world is thereby doomed, that a particular world is in process of being done to death by the weakness of its champions and the onslaught of its foes.

The dynamics of Liberalism's self-destruction as manifested in the realm of diplomacy have been explored at some length in the preced-

ing pages. The present and prospective shape of the new cultural forms evoked by the barbarians of the twentieth century is not primarily an object of the present inquiry. Whatever shape the new world may take, its path will be new and violent paths and the old faith of the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the Age of Reason will be in dust beneath the feet of the conquerors. Man is the slave of his symbols. New symbols challenging the old are often forthcoming to victory. There is no inevitability in the "old-man" radiation of "Justice," "Reason," and "Freedom," any more than the occupation of the last libraries of the dead cultures of Rome was implicate in the overwhelming of the Empire by the Teutonic barbarians. The destroyers of ancient culture, however, were simple people of a new dawn, who looked with awe and even reverence upon what they demolished. They therefore sought to rebuild. After long centuries of darkness they succeeded in re-creating in a new world some of the values and institutions of the great Imperium which had forever passed away. Today the new barbarians stare at dust which they deem to death. Out of their ruthlessness and contempt no Renaissance of Western culture in its harniss configuration is likely to emerge. Dr. Hans Kohn has aptly named the probabilities which flow from this circumstance:

- The new barbarian is different from former barbarians. He comes equipped with the latest devices and instruments of technique. He dupes, steams, but he accepts and cultivates science and technology and puts them to a new, demagogical use. Without the guidance of reason, without a faith in man and humanity, all our achievements and discoveries become meaningless tools of destruction. It is questionable how far force can be creative and productive in exceptional circumstances, but there seems no doubt that force, rearing round in an intellectual vacuum, can only result in the most unbridled reign of terror, which threatens to undermine the foundations of civilization.<sup>1</sup>

But the end is not yet. The conceptions and misconceptions persistently transmitted in what is left of the West continue to play their fatal role in completing the process of disintegration. It is therefore not irrelevant to recapitulate *ex post* the criteria of evaluation currently applied to the surviving European democracies to the mystic valleys beyond the Rhine and the Alps.

As regards the Fascist Empire, the most persistent belief which has

heretofore been employed as the motivation or rationalization of policy is that they will ultimately attain a state of inner and outer equilibrium or *equilibrium*, making possible "general appeasement" and neighborly relations with the democracies. By way of accelerating the arrival of this happy condition, it is contended, the new Caesars must be permitted and perhaps even encouraged to seek the redress of "grievances." They must be allowed to persecute and expel their enemies and victims since the liquidation of these unfortunate will, after all, bring persecution to an end. They must be allowed to recon or raid lands and conquer new lands, for only thus will the "agitation" of 1919 be quieted and the "causes of war" removed. They must be allowed freer access to the markets of the world and they must be permitted to conquer new markets from their competitors, by fair means or foul, for only thus will they attain prosperity—and prosperity makes for "reasonableness" and contentment. On no account must they be resisted, for "war solves no problems." On no account must they be opposed by their own weapons, for if democracy fights Fascism with the tools of its enemies it will automatically destroy itself. A policy of concessions and of "live-and-let-live," it is argued, will eventually in a new media abroad in a world in which peace and plenty are again secured, by action of ideological divergence.

These illusions promise to persist to the end, for the will to believe is here more potent than the evidence of the senses. Scores of observers have long since noted with crystal clarity the inner nature of the dynamics of Fascism.<sup>1</sup> Economic and social stability and political cohesion, even in a limited and relative sense, are impossible in these institutionalizations of cultural decay. The new Caesars are men sliding into a quagmire—now slowly, now swiftly, at this moment pulling themselves out by desperate movements suggesting escape, at the next grabbing desperately at every stick and stone, at all times riding high of others within their grasp and dragging them down into the vortex. Fascism "solves" the problem which arises from the disappearance of competitive enterprise in the free market of classic capitalism by building the national economy on the swayed basis of private monopoly. This system of mass exploitation is paradox and destructive to each segment of the business order as we will left free from its blighting hand. Cumulative impoverishment is dealt with through repression, witch-hunting, and heroic military adventures. Unemployment, the paralysis of the capital goods industries, and the drying up of the sources of private investment are attacked by color-

al governmental expenditures for public works and armaments. All the "tricks" of a free-market economy are suspended in a system in which money and credit and the soaring superstructure of public debt are based on nothing more tangible than hypnotic "confidence" in the regime.<sup>1</sup> Confidence is maintained by terror, propaganda, forced loans, and all the political and economic tricks of cunning. The system survives only by constant expansion of arms expenditures, by incessant ultra-nationalism and adventurism, and in the end by the robbery of persecuted scapegoats at home and helpless victims of imperialism abroad. The baleful consequences predicted and predicted for such a social order have been shamelessly realized in practice.

In 1934 the present writer declared:

In the Third Reich the democracy is driven toward conquest by hunger for land and glory. The plutocracy is driven toward conquest by the starving of its markets, by the dissipation of its profits through the impoverishment of domestic consumers, by the bright prospects of gain to be got by looting the weapons of war and by using them to conquer new markets in the East. The nervous middle-class masses are driven toward conquest by nationalistic imperialism, by hero-fantasies, by morbid longings for murder and suicide bred of the moroseness and restlessness of a diseased society. The Nazi leaders are driven toward conquest by all these pressures and by the exigencies of internal politics in a dictatorship which must become increasingly unstable and insecure with the further disintegration of the economic and social order of monopolistic capitalism.<sup>2</sup>

In 1941 E. E. Schattschneider wrote:

The growth of a Fascist nation knows no saturation point. Its every expansion, whether justified or not, serves to increase its strength—and every increase in its strength, in turn, calls for new fields to conquer.<sup>3</sup>

In 1948 Aaron Kolson wrote:

Even today I see the chief pull in the fascist "have-nots" theory—its saving simplicity and cheap generosity—with blind fanatic and Sunday-school progressivism hurrying behind it. As if domestic evil were really a "product" of unjust "inequalities"

and, better still, could be spirited away by a single tip, or even by a kindly doorman! As if a drug addict could be cured just by offering him some good Burgundy (without even, in the same case, locking up all stores of morphine within his reach): "

There is nothing in the record of the years of decadence to suggest that these judgments are at any point in error. The barbarous Scans of Dons, Fehers, and Mikuls must conquer and exploit other communities or perish. The hollow men of the West have given them leave of life by shorting their courses of robbery and violence and have refused to scourge them (or even punish them) to perdition. Out of the maelstrom of domestic anarchy and the howl of democratic delusions, the Czarist have snatched fresh flowers of evil and have at last won military omnipotence. The formidable machines of war at their disposal cannot be dismantled, for the military economy of the Czarist State has no foundation other than preparation for armed aggression. The task of Mars must be multiplied manyfold and must ever be used to crush such resistance as may be offered and to broadcast those incapable of resistance into grinding gears under chariot of invincible violence.

Que vadit! The frightened Slavs of the West have hoped that the great war machines which, by their coarseness, they have brought into being will move against Moscow. They have prayed that the Fascist coalition will thereby destroy the Bolshevik bogey and give to the legions of the Czarist ample room for theft and glory while the West is left in complacent peace. Such an assumption is possible. If it should achieve victory or even a stalemate, the crusade might leave to the West some decades of relative quiet, since the resulting slaughter and desecration in Eastern Europe and the Orient would long pre-occupy the Powers of the Fascist Tangle. But if the crusaders should meet with defeat, the "Red horde" of Moscow might well sweep over the ruins of Fascism in Europe and Asia alike. And if, as is quite possible, the Czarist prefer to decimate with attack those who no longer possess a will to resist rather than invading a vast realm whose millions of defenders will fight to the death, they will move forthwith against the remnants of the West and demolish the vestiges of democratic culture as thoroughly as Goths, Vandals, Huns, Saxons, Angles, and Normans once ravaged Britain, Gaul, and Spain.

Regardless of whether Russia or the States of Western Europe are the first victims of the coming barbarous invasion, the would-be con-

quarters must either annihilate their foes or themselves be annihilated. It is difficult to picture any basis of stability emerging from this process, for the Far East, like a vicious agent against common enemies, may reasonably be expected to fall itself of one another. In this view of incessant conflict the declining populations of Central and Western Europe will be first maltreated, then brutalized, and at length reduced to a miserable peasantry scrambling about in the ruins of their feudal system. Under the whips and bloodstains of petty despots and war lords who make the importance of death and the price of submission with the trappings of empire, let miserable who survive will sink into a dark age comparable to the chaos of a thousand years ago.

Meanwhile what of the Communist death from whom the new barbarians will thus have "saved" civilization? Under Communist leadership Russia alone among the Great Powers exhibits the phenomenon, strange in an age of decay, of a population expanding with extraordinary rapidity not from conquest but from the love of its people. Russia alone displays a vigorous expansion of capital-goods industries and a constant increase in productivity, not based upon theft or magic or millenarian gossamer but upon a steady advance in technology and upon a diffusion of increased purchasing power among wide masses. The Socialist-Federalism is still crude and primitive, its peoples are not the effete cosmopolites of the Western blocs, but are sons and daughters of sturdy stocks coming for the first time in their young history into a full consciousness of their own capacities. Its rulers are not gentlemen-scholars nor corrupt politicians nor yet the marionettes of a Klementism which has found its end by losing its mind. Neither are they peasants or proletarians, despite their class vocabulary. They are representatives of a new class, recruited from the ranks of the masses and gifted with political power (and with incomes twice generous than those of the unskilled) by virtue of partially acquired notions of organization, management, planning, symbol manipulation, and military prowess. The aim of the "new civilization" of Soviet Communism<sup>14</sup> is not wholly unilluminated, homogeneous, or united. Factual quarrels and the intrigues of Far East blocs may continue to make its repulsions and purges. Despite the exigencies of Socialist planning and defense, the stifling Prussian regimentation which makes for a maximum of efficiency in industry and war will never be applied in the USSR, for its leaders and its peoples are still individuals, not automatons.

The Western nihilists who protest for Red Manurey's



future either of middle-class democracy on the Western model or a future of totalitarianism on the Chinese or Bonapartist model are embracing without the creative examples of an unbridled Stalins and are ignoring past achievements and present trends in a society irrevocably based upon collectivized agriculture and socialized industry. Truebelievers, to be sure, delight in "proving" that Stalins and Fuchens are identical,<sup>10</sup> thus improving upon the verbal gymnastics of the Stalins themselves, who are content merely to prove that Trotskyism serves Fuchens's purposes without being quite one with it. In other camps there are those who prove that Fuchens or Communism is, after all, the most perfect form of democracy or that Liberalism is identical with Bolshevism. Such verbalizations are only the debonair devices of incorporeal propagandists or the intellectual stunts of psychopathic fantasists. The labels used describe nothing which has reality in the objective world.

If Soviet Communism is not Fuchens, neither is it the democracy which the West has hitherto cherished without being able to preserve or defend it. The Soviet state commands obedience within a narrow, quasi-theological framework of words. It permits no free market for talk, any more than it permits a free market for the buying and selling of goods and services. Like other totalitarian systems, it is dedicated to order, hierarchy, discipline. Its leaders rule with intolerance and ruthlessness. The means they have devised to serve their ends appear to defeat the ends in the eyes of many Western liberals—who, in Europe at least, are now usually incapable of devising any means to serve their own ends. Power corrupts. Dissenters break down. Socialist planning involves the regimentation and debasement of the individual. Q.E.D.

It is imperative to recall, however, that the goals which men strive for and the ends which they attain bear some relationship to the symbolic values and verbalized programs to which they have pledged their faith. The Communist values of the USSR are committed to ideals which stem from the Western tradition in the days of its glory. Despite their parochialism of class and creed and all the ugly apparatus of dictatorial governance, they are sworn by the shades of Marx and Lenin to the ultimate objectives of a chosen and warlike society, to equality and fraternity, to emancipation from tyranny and oppression, to the reign of Reason and Science, to internationalism and the brotherhood of men. Their crimes are many. They have strangled God and held all priesthoods in contempt. They have

repudiated Sovereignty in favor of their own formula of world organization. They have trampled underfoot the principles of Justice of all, they have repudiated Property in favor of Socialism "In every ordered State," once wrote Aristotle France, "wealth is a sacred thing; in democracy it is the only sacred thing." Hence democratic abhorrence of Bolshevistic thieves, slaves, and scoundrels. But history need fear do not blot the fact that the enemies of the Kremlin are well rationalized in a world of nations, still agonizing in a world of unattached feudalism, still Catholics in a world of tribal divisions, still experimental pragmatism in a world of affable hypocrisy and blind dogma. The ultimate shape of the civilization they are helping to build will be conditioned by these beliefs—the more so as the economic and social foundations upon which they are building are not destructive but productive of the values to which they are sworn.<sup>12</sup>

To what destination does Moscow's road lead? If left alone and in peace the USSR will continue along its chosen path toward socialist industrialization. Since its economy is not contracting but expanding, since its expansion is not a product of robbery, conquest, or preparation for war, the Soviet Union, for all its dreams of a proletarian world, will never in any presently visible future take the sword against non-socialist States. In the face of danger it offers its arms to help the West defend a common heritage against Fascist aggression. The offer was at first accepted and then, as fear refused. After Munich the USSR faced two alternatives in its relations with other Great Powers, neither of its own devising. It could anticipate either an armed assault against it by the Fascist Triplets, shocked by the democratic Powers, or it could look forward to being left alone while Rome, Berlin, and Tokyo bled themselves with the passion of the established colonial empire. In the latter event it will stand aside, since any intervention will but delay the inevitable disintegration of British and French power. The ultimate beneficiary of that disintegration is likely to be the USSR. In the former event, it will be obliged to fight for as his against formidable odds.

If that fight should be lost, it is improbable that the poverty of defeat would be anything worse than withdrawal from peripheral provinces into the remote and impregnable fastnesses of Eastern Russia, Western Siberia, and Central Asia, where a better day might be awaited. If that fight should be won, the Communists would might conceivably make peace with the vanquished on the basis of the *status quo ante bellum* if the cost of destroying the vanquished ap-

peared massive and if, as is probable, Britain, France, and the United States should threaten armed intervention to arrest Fascism from under Hitler at Moscow's hands. If, however, the defeated aggressors should be helplessly crushed in the field and destroyed by domestic revolution, Moscow might well send its legions far over Europe and Asia to crucify Slav, Magyar, German, Italian, and Chinese upon the threshold of the bankrupt and broken Caesars.

In this eventuality World Revolution would become practical politics and the danger would arise of an armed clash with the bourgeois democracies. These Powers, while never willing to fight Fascism even to protect their own riches, might display an unprecedented eagerness to resort to arms to save the world from the Bolshevism which Fascist folly had unleashed. Such a conflict would lead ultimately to a stalemate. Geographical obstacles would render it impossible for Britain, France, and America (by this time given over to their own brands of Fascism) to reconquer Central Europe from the enemy. By the same token the refinements of Japan could scarcely hope to recover control of a Bolshevized China. But neither could Moscow inflict serious damage on Britain, Japan, or America.

In all these imaginable contingencies of the days to come, Western Liberalism in its European homelands would appear to be crushed for death. And in all imaginable contingencies the creed of the new Caesars, already periled with the seeds of decay, would seem likewise to be doomed—either through violent and bloody extinction or through temporary triumph followed by slow retrogression to the perennial darkness in which its disciples look for success of their strivings. It is possible that on the European Continent Communism alone may survive as a living force. If its enemies desert this prospect, they have only their own marred folly or their irresponsible, heart-stricken stupidity to thank for the fact. Whether Communism will live only on the scraps of Russia while the outer world to East and West descends into night, or will serve as the force which may recreate a world society on new foundations remains a secret locked in the womb of time.

### 3. THE KINGDOM OF DEATH

Europe's crisis in the years of twilight has long since unpressed reflection obscurely and deeply as a new context for yesterday

among Great Powers, comparable to past centuries, nor yet to a class war or justifiest social revolution, comparable to the earlier displacement of aristocracies by plutocracies. From the perspective of the future, the crisis may indeed appear to have been little more than this. But it is more probable that it will loom through the time to come as a world-shocking transvaluation of values, involving the submergence of Western culture after a millennium of uninterupted exaltation in successive waves of anti-Western fanaticism beginning the bigotry, brutality, and ignorance of those epochs in which old worlds die and new worlds are as yet unborn.<sup>14</sup>

Property and Sovereignty are already pulsing under the impact of the technicisms, along with Reason and Freedom and the greater goods of civilized living. Among the artifacts of Western man which were destined to disappear in the night which lay ahead is the whole system of international relationships which has hitherto prevailed in the Western world. This conclusion flows not from any conviction of ultimate inevitability with regard to the transformation of systems of independent nation-states into world imperiums or into chaotic congeries of warring principalities. It flows rather from the circumstance that the diplomacy of the 1920's has conserved the world balance of power upon which the survival of the Western State System has always depended, and the present prospects are not bright for any restoration of equilibrium.

It is true that the balance has been temporarily destroyed before and has always been restored. The France of Louis XIV and Napoleon I and the Germany of Wilhelm II established their hegemony over other members of the System and were all at length cut down by coalitions of their victims and associates. In each such instance, however, the balance was upset and redressed in the course of prolonged and general military conflicts in which those threatened by the upstart or world dominion played the game of *Rispolitik* in its classic form. By so doing they sought protection for their existence as independent States and ultimately achieved salvation by marshaling to their cause most of the other Powers whose rulers also took themselves concerned. In the present situation *Rispolitik* has degenerated into formalism. The balance has been destroyed without war. No Power or combination was to restore it. Deriving Soviet and the Quai d'Orsay have yielded the mastery of Europe to the Kaiser-Berlin side and have surrendered control of Eastern Asia to Tokio, all without doing a thing to dislodge of the positions they once held.

Such a development is without precedent in the Western State System. Its consequences are likely also to be without precedent.

The motives and corruptions which have caused the rulers of the British Empire and the French Republic to abandon the principles of *Républicanisme* after centuries of devotion to its practice have been abundantly suggested in the preceding pages. The alarm of decadent ruling classes over threats to their prerogatives caused them to condemn the rise of the Czarism betwixts against the menace of Moscow. They shrunk from crushing the Czarism when they could still have been crushed without war. They shrunk even more hesitantly from war when they perceived belatedly that force alone could stop the onward march of those dedicated to the destruction of the State System. Victory in war would destroy the "permanence" of Property and open the gates to proletarian radicalism. Defeat in war would mean their own destruction. War was therefore forbidden not by the Pact of Paris but by the calculus of class interest. The Czarism handed the keys to the fortress for the taking.

By no isolated parties these decisions for "peace"—at the price of the betrayal of national and imperial interests—were made by the very gentlemen of wealth and title (or by the pseudo-left dupes among the politicians) who were constantly being accused by radicals and pacifists of war-mongering for private profit. Profit there was in abundance, for the fear of the war which could never be undertaken was used to justify stupendous armaments programs. But the profits of the arms race and all the flows of land and money in the democracies were most firmly resolved to abstain from any armed resistance to the Fascist Triplets. To acknowledge this as an objective would be fatal. But it was easy and plausible to expatiate upon popular dread of war and to argue, year after year, that compliance with Fascist demands was the only road to peace.

Therewith began the process of demoralizing and corrupting utterly the masses in the European democracies in order to evoke approval for the course of suicide which their political leaders and social superiors had embarked upon. The deception was carried to its highest perfection in Britain, since the British ruling classes were of old most skillful in the art. Masses wanted "peace." Masses wanted collective security as a means thereto. But collective security would halt the Fascist transfers. They must not be halted but united. Therefore: praise the League but betray the League and then denounce it for its ineffectiveness. Therefore: pay lip

sanction to collective security but power it not as a safeguard against war but as a source of war. War-makers can obviously be stopped only by war. Masses want peace. Therefore, war-makers must not be stopped. Masses acquiescent and even celebrated the decision. In France the shabby, fishy figures of Blum and Flandin, Paul-Boncour and Laval, Bonnet and Daladier sped the sentence of Tory hypocrisy across the Channel.

By 1939 this process had been continued long enough to produce two clearly predictable consequences which were not clearly anticipated by the architects of the new position. On the one hand the Pacific Triphite had taken shape itself, with the aid of Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay, such formidable components of power that it was now hardly tractable and amenable. By the end of the decade France and Britain had lost all possibility of offering armed resistance even if they would, for resistance would mean overwhelming defeat. China was lost. Ethiopia, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Spain, all the Eastern allies of France were lost or at the mercy of the Triphite. In 1914-18 Britain and France were pushed to the wall and succeeded in beating a far less formidable coalition only with the armed aid of Italy, Russia, Japan, the United States, and a score of lesser allies. Italy and Japan were now allies of the Reich. The Reich was a vast arms factory, larger in territory and population than the Germany of 1914 and infinitely more powerful in the field. Despite wheedling and pleading and royal visits, there could be no assurance that America would come again to the aid of Britain and France in an armed contest with the Pacific Powers. The Soviet Union, having been spurned and excluded from the councils of the West, would naturally not aid unless it were itself attacked. Adolf Munich, London and Paris had no option but to create new demands and thereby face certain defeat or to yield to new demands whatever their nature. In a community in which there is no police force, those who buy "protection" from gangsters are soon the victims of the gangsters. They must pay—or else! They pay, even unto the last penny and cent.

Another consequence of the mass demoralization engineered by the political leaders of the democracies was that Adolf Munich there could scarcely hope to mobilize public support even for a war which might conceivably be won. For a decade and more they had found it useful to circumvent popular opposition to their policies by dramatizing scenes of armed hostilities. The Triphite aided them in their task by hideous atrocities in China, Ethiopia, and Spain. The neo-

sears at Shanghai, the rape of Nanking, the butcheries in Peking, Guernica, and Barcelona, the agony of the *Ambient* under the thunder birds of war, dropping eggs of fire and excitement of flaming death—all had their effects on the panic-stricken West. In September 1918 public approval of surrender could be had only by fabricating a startling rumor of imminent doom. The man in the street in Britain and France, thanks to pacifist propaganda, thanks to the horrors perpetrated by the soldiery of Hitler, Mussolini, and Hirohito, thanks above all to systematic stimulation by his own government, now envisages war as a certainty of sudden and horrible death, not only for himself but for all his family as well.

Whether in the present generation any government in Britain or France, save perhaps a revolutionary government, can ever rally a courageous and united people to its support in a foreign war has become a moot question. An army stricken with panic is a military liability. Defense forces lacking courageous civilian support are worthless. Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay have turned civilian blood to water by repeatedly taking refuge from responsibility in panic fear. Their constant cries of "Wait! Wait!" have had not indifference but paralyzing anxiety mingled with contempt. Should a decision for war ever be made, the disillusionment which would attend such an admitted bankruptcy of the policy of "appeasement" would add its burden to the already difficult task of the propagandists charged with manufacturing enthusiasm. French labor, smearing under the vicious results of reaction, would ask why it must fight and for whom. A call to war against the Fascist Powers in 1935 or 1936 would doubtless have evoked loyal popular support in both the democracies. In 1939 or 1940 it may evoke sabotage or revolution. Under such circumstances war cannot be risked. War will not be risked. There will be no call.

The meaning of this is clear: France and Britain have already abandoned their position as Great Powers. In a State System resting upon the assumption of violence, power is fighting capacity. A diplomacy unsupported by ability and willingness to fight is a diplomacy of shadow-men and ghost-States. The Britain and France of The City and the Bourse will not fight and could not if they would. The Britain and France of Labor and the People's Front, should these names ever be revitalized and come to power, might too late be willing to fight, but the men of money and title would sabotage the enterprise. The enemy moreover will be invincible. War will

man defeat. The ruling classes of the States furnished to defeat are themselves furnished to decline and destruction. In the Tangle of nations against Mexico, the proposed classes of France and Britain may enjoy a few more years of eastern "peace." If not . . . ?

The nature of this "peace" is not in doubt. It will not be the peace of third-rate Powers who have nothing covered by conquerors and can therefore abstain from playing the power game. It will not be the peace of those humbly defeated by honorable foes. It will not be the peace available the peace of Utrecht or Vienna or Frankfurt or Portsmouth or Versailles. There will be no terms. There will be only endless humiliations and bloodshed. It will be, indeed, it is already—worse than the peace which the burghers of the Netherlands paid to His Most Catholic Majesty and to the Duke of Alva instead of resisting. It will be worse than the peace which the American colonists would have known had they remained loyal to George III instead of rebelling. It will be a peace worse than that which India has known under British rule or Syria and Madagascar under the French. It may be the end resemble the peace which Japan has brought to China or the Caesar has brought to Spain. It will at best be not different in kind and very little different in degree from the peace which Rancunas and Christofides brought to Portugal. It may well resemble, in the words of Oswald Spengler, the peace which comes with the end of History.

World peace—which has often failed to internationalize the private ramifications of war on the part of the immense majority, has along with this a function as universal resistance to violence as being the honey of violence who do not produce it. It begins with the State-forgiving with the universal non-violence, and it ends in violence's moving a finger as long as violence only creates his neighbor . . . On this general position a second Versailles develops. The state of being "in force" passes from nature to hands and violence of adventures, unfulfilled causes, unending passions, broken limbs, and what comes to when eyes the population becomes in the end merely a part of the landscape. There is a deep relation between the horror of the Mycenaean primitive age and the nihilism-appears of Rome, and, however, age, Roman and Roman II. In our Germany would the spirit of Alois and Theodor will come again :

With the forested men, high honey the legs would down weary to sleep. Man becomes a plant again, adhering to the soil, death and enduring. The smallest village and the "village" passes through, beginning children and burying and in Modern Earth—a long, not landscape form, over which the respect of soldier appears pastingly black. In the midst of this land is the old world-city, empty reminders of an unfulfilled task, in which a honeycomb man-



land slowly near itself. Man lives from hand to mouth, with petty tricks and petty ingenuities, and suffers. Nations are trampled on in the confusion of the conquerors who contend for the power and the spoil of the world; but the survivors fill up the gaps with a positive disorder and suffer on. And while in high places there is moral abomination of victory and defeat, there in the depths pray, pray with that mighty pray of the Second Reformation that has overcome all doubts before: . . . Only with the aid of grand Theology does hope, will, living courage. It is a divine noble in its uncertainty, noble and agonies as the course of the seas, the course of the earth, and abomination of land and sea, of ice and virgin forest upon its face. We may marvel at it or we may leave it—let it be days.<sup>22</sup>

Is it possible that some future leadership at Westminster or in the Palais d'Élysée will find this peace inadvisable? Is it conceivable—after all allies have been lost, all friends betrayed, all principles compromised, all ideals besmirched and prostituted, after the cup of shame and humiliation is full, after all the goods of others have been given up, after crushing pains and colonies have been surrendered—that men will arise in Britain and France to call their countrymen to arms in order to halt an endless terror even at the risk of a terrible end? It is possible though scarcely probable, since fear is cumulative and contagious. If such a belated reckoning is attempted, there may occur a uniquely one-sided war. In an article entitled "Glimpses—merging" in the *Reichswehr Journal*, *Deutscher Wehr* (June 13, 1925), the enemy spoke quite plainly:

In such a war there will be no longer victors and vanquished, but survivors and those whose name is unknown from the list of nations. Many an apparently invincible Colossus is today made of foot of clay, and what once or two generations ago was impossible has today already become possible: with a single powerful blow to break a nation's spiritual backbone, to destroy it forever and trample it in the dust.

Just this is the essence, the burning aspect of the war of annihilation. The die has been thrown and poisoned on the battlefield. The survivors, a leaderless, demoralized mob of human beings crushed and broken by madden horror and sufferings, by unspeakable terror, mass delinquency and without any will before their victors—clay in the potter's hands. . . . Their number does not matter. . . . Fifty million trembling skeletons are not more difficult to bring into subjection than fifty; for many million times sought is still sought. A nation will no

longer want something from its opponent, but will put an end to its opponent—make an end of it, once and for all.”

After the collapse of collective security and sanctions in 1934, Arnold J. Toynbee in his *Greek Ode on Extremism and European Forebodings* of the possible fate of the West:

Without our arms or art, than men could dare  
We're stronger, frightfullest, worse even they were,  
And, in close fight, to death unsmiling passed,  
Still freemen, bawling nobly to the last.  
But we, whose arms matter as strong and great,  
Are doomed to share the victims of their fate,  
Yet not their soldier's grave, the gods as soon  
Withhold that privilege from men however.”

The European drama runs either with Moscow or with the Berlin-Baghdad struggle. If Red and Black totalitarianism declares a truce, the Fascist Empire will sweep the Anglo-French colonial empire from the map of the Eastern hemisphere. If they embark upon a death struggle for world mastery, Britain and France will be impotent spectators and, unless the bear and the wolfen mutually devour one another, they will become victims of the victor. Europe, Asia, and Africa will live during the coming decades under the sign of Fascist world hegemony or of Communist World Revolution—or perhaps of one followed in the fullness of time by the other. There will be little place in such a world for British ministers and investors, nor for French settlers and imperialists, nor yet for the goldenists who have hitherto spoken for these groups. The splendors of illusion will lose their last illusion. The betrayers will know their last betrayal, not because there is justice in the Universe, but because, in Machiavelli's words, “The prince who conquers cannot be vanquished of another power than his own.”

With the fall of these last debauched representatives of a great collapsed civilization, Western Liberalism—ever looking backward to the reason and freedom it will have lost forever—will pass into the tomb. Its legacy will either be gobbled into the mire under the boot of the conqueror or will, by a stranger race, be recovered and brought to life again in a new form by the disciples of Marx and Lenin. In either case a world will have died because its guardians yielded to fear and fell to earth beneath a burden which they were no longer able or willing to carry.

And what of the "New World" of the transatlantic West? Americans are Europeans and see a part of the European culture which is facing death. That they can in the end escape the destiny of that culture is improbable. Their geographical remoteness from the new clutches of barbarism, their older and more deeply rooted democratic traditions, and the greater reserves of wealth and power at their disposal may enable them to escape the more appalling consequences of economic maladjustment and social conflict. But the specter of fear again occurs with ease. And with fear come frustration and folly and bigotry. There are already some among the landowners of Brazil, the entrepreneurs of the Argentine, the financiers of Manhattan, and the industrialists of the North American Middle West who fear that social infections with a degenerate hue and the promise of profit and security in the lure of authoritarian cults. It is possible that in the Americas as in Europe the democratic way of life may be corrupted by money and betrayed through the inability of its economists to adjust their habits to new problems. It is possible that it may perish through war if the United States should be engaged by innocent or venal motives to carry the peace of Britain and France by an armed struggle against the Triplex. With the USSR as ally such a struggle might be crowned with victory. Without such an ally it would almost certainly be defeat, followed by domestic fanaticism and despotism. It is possible that American democracy may perish through war if the United States and its neighbors seek by arms to "save the world from Bolshevism" in the event that the military defeat of Fuchien in Europe and Asia should open the gates to widespread social revolution abroad. It is possible that it may perish through peace if the defenders of freedom in North and South refuse to fight domestic treason and foreign aggression.

The index of time on the foreign policy of the United States during the years of Europe's decline does not encourage optimism. Lip-service to law, order, and peace was accompanied by a partial withdrawal to lawlessness, anarchy, and war threat, by collaboration with the Turpines which allied itself with the barbarians, by attempted flight from responsibility through a "neutrality" which professed victims of aggression and rewarded the aggressors. Fear of German and Italian military might did not prevent the free ride of American arms to Rome and Berlin. Desencouragement of Japanese imperialism was accompanied by policies which enabled the war lords of Tokio to secure over half of their needs of conquest from Ameri-

ican exporters. Anxiety over Fascist designs in Latin America did not prevent such co-operation with Rome, Berlin, and London to insure the Fascist conquest of Spain—though all knew that the victory of Franco in Spain would spread the totalitarian cult throughout the American Republics of the South and create unexampled opportunities for political intrigue, commercial speculation, and military penetration by the Triplets. Here, too, the paralyzing hand of fear threatened immense danger to the power of the United States and to the Liberal tradition in its firm stronghold.

These observations of disaster, however, suggested only possibilities, not probabilities, and assuredly not certainties. The roads to safety were many. The safety in the disintegrating world society of the twentieth century is not to be found by the roadside, not headed down from heaven, nor achieved by waiting or by compromise or by yielding to indifference or inaction. It can only be earned. The price of the prize is high and difficult of payment. If the Americans are to escape Europe's Nemesis, they must profit by European experience. Their classes and masses must combine to keep firm of the blighting hand of fear. They must develop new talent in adapting old values to unprecedented problems and in solving solutions which are not merely satisfying to the demands of monster-worship but are pertinent to the alleviation of contemporary social ills. They must redefine property so that economic mobility again becomes compatible with human freedom even in the late capitalism of the machine age. They must redefine Sovereignty so that effective international collaboration becomes possible—no longer on a world scale, for the world community is already broken into fragments, but on a scale commensurate with the Western hemisphere. There will be little security for any of the American Republics unless there is collective security for all, organized among equals and buttressed by collective forces of defense. There will be little democracy anywhere in the Americas unless the democratic ideal is vigorously reaffirmed and adequately implemented throughout the Americas. And democracy and security alike will elude the searchers unless a more hopeful measure of economic well-being can be achieved with its benefits widely distributed among all races, classes, and countries.

These imperatives are far more easily stated than realized. Whether they are realizable depends upon the patience and good will and inventiveness of American leaders in all walks of life. The prospects of

their realization will be furthered if North and South can achieve not merely *synthesis* but *synthesis*. The North brings to the task mechanical ingenuity, administrative skill, pragmatic experimentation, and the mightiest machinery of industrial production on all the planet. The South brings Latin logic, social sensitivity, a great literary and religious heritage, and untold riches of mineral and agrarian wealth. Both together combine the most cherished attributes of the European tradition, reinforced by thousands of European émigrés and by more thousands to come, driven to flight by their loyalty to freedom and reason and humanism. If the light of Western learning is to be kept burning anywhere outside the twilight kingdoms of the doomed, it will be kept burning where courageous and open-eyed men and women are determined that the flame shall remain alive and bright. In the generations which lie ahead in the remote future such defenders of the faith may well be found among the awakened and emancipated peoples of Russia, India, and China. In today's generation they will be found—if they are capable of finding themselves in America.

# NOTES

## ABBREVIATIONS

*AJIL*—*The American Journal of International Law*.

*APSR*—*The American Political Science Review*.

*Cad.*—British "Command" Papers, passed by the Prime Minister or some other Minister to Parliament "in command of His Majesty," published and printed by His Majesty's Stationery Office, London.

*Commons*—House of Commons, *House's Parliamentary Debates*, as of dates indicated.

*DLA*—*Documents on International Affairs*, edited by John W. Wheeler-Bennett and Stephen Wacht (London: Humphrey Milford-Oxford University Press), issued annually under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.

*JOCH*—*Parliamentary Debates of the Chamber of Deputies, Journal Officiel de la Chambre Française*, *Travaux Parlementaires*, Paris, as of dates indicated.

*LOS*—*Ibid.*, German.

*LNDJ*—*Official Journal of the League of Nations*, Geneva, as of dates indicated.

*LNTP*—*League of Nations Treaty Series*.

*Lords*—House of Lords, *Parliamentary Debates*, as of dates indicated.

*SLA*—*Survey of International Affairs*, by Arnold J. Toynbee and others (London: Humphrey Milford-Oxford University Press), issued annually under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.

## I. ARMS AND THE MAN

### 1. AFTER JANUARY

1. Cf. Paul Joseph Giblin, *From Kautskoff zur Sozialdemokratie* (Munich: Eber, 1922), pp. 124-25, and Kurt Lubcke, *18 Jahre Arbeiter* (New York: Scribner's, 1923), pp. 127-28.
2. Lubcke, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

3. For an account of the Beethell episode of 1907 and of Hader's subsequent political career, see Friedrich L. Schramm: *The Nazi Dictatorship* (New York: Knopf, 1956), pp. 2-30.
4. Arnold J. Toynbee, *MA*, 1922, p. 141.
5. Adolph Hader: *Mein Kampf* (Munich: Econ, 17th edition, 1931), pp. 124-5.
6. In 1914-15 Ernst von Papen served as military attaché in the German Embassy in Washington. On December 28, 1919, following his exposure by a woman agent of the British Secret Service, he was expelled from the United States along with the naval attaché, Captain Rop-Ed, for conspiracy to destroy ships and harbors. In April 1920 he was ordered, for a plot to blow up the Welland Canal and make subject to attack Canada, to travel across to America.
7. Cf. John W. Warden Evans: *Warden from Washington in Turkey: First of German Military 1914-1919* (New York: Morrow, 1928), pp. 11-12, 166-9.
8. Interview with Schlichter, March 1932, in *the New Statesman and Nation*, London, July 7, 1932, pp. 2-3.
9. Göttsch, *op. cit.*, pp. 121-2.
10. W. Gell: *Die nationalsozialistische Revolution* (Gießen: Hain, 1931), pp. 24-6.
11. Cf. *The Nazi Dictatorship*, pp. 20-21, 130-5, and for a more detailed account, Douglas Reed: *The Burning of the Reichstag* (New York: Cowi Books, 1932).
12. *Reichsgeschichte*, 1932, No. 17, p. 82.
13. *Ibid.*, 1932, No. 22, p. 242.
14. Gell, *op. cit.*, pp. 110-11.
15. *Reichsgeschichte*, 1932, No. 22, p. 270.
16. *Ibid.*, 1932, I, p. 79.
17. Text in *The Nazi Dictatorship*, and *ibidem*, 1934, pp. 211-12.

#### 1. THE CULT OF ANNIHILATION

18. See Alfred Vago: *The History of Millenium* (New York: Norton, 1936).
19. Cf. *The Nazi Dictatorship*, pp. 22-23, and Hans Kohn: *The War against the West* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1936), pp. 115-124.
20. *The Most Wound Laid*, author's introduction from *The Nazi Dictatorship*, p. 30.
21. Cf. Hans Kohn: "Totalitarian Roots of National Socialism," *Harvard Guardian*, April 1934, pp. 2-4.
22. Cf. Harold D. Lasswell: "The Psychology of Utopians," *The Political Quarterly*, Vol. IV, pp. 173-84. See also his "Semi-Asiatic China: The Question: State vs. the Chinese State," *The China Quarterly*, Special Fall Number, 1957, pp. 52-9, his *Psychobiology and Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950), his *World Politics and Personal Autocracy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1955), and his *Politics—What Gets What, What, How* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956).
23. Cf. Ernest Hooton: *A History of National Socialism* (New York: Knopf, 1950).

## 3. VOKE AND VOLKREUND

24. Cf. William Zeeb's Introduction to *Amiel Kolha: The War against the West*.
25. *The New York Times*, December 21, 22, 1922.
26. Robert Ley, leader of the *Sturmabteilung*, to 12,000 Hitler Youth in Berlin, February 22, 1923, as quoted in the *New York Times*, February 22, 1923.
27. The passages here quoted are from the 1922 edition. The translations are in part those of the author and in part taken from "Friends of Europe" publications No. 20: "Germany's Foreign Policy as Set out in *Mein Kampf*," with a foreword by the Director of AUSA, M.P. (London, 1925). The only English translation of Hitler's work, *My Battle Chronicle* (1925), is a highly abridged and untrustworthy which is wholly unreliable.
28. Cf. Roger Owen, "The Unknown Frontiers," *Review of Reviews*, November 1922 and Charles Butler, "German Anti-Chem," *Current History*, June 1922.
29. Cf. *Mein Kampf*, pp. 494-95.
30. *Völkischer Beobachter*, June 22, 1922.
31. Alfred Rosenberg, *Wissen, Gewissen und Schuld der NSD-AP*, p. 25.
32. *Völkischer Beobachter*, July 28, 1922; cf. Rosenberg's *Blut und Ehre* (Munich, 1922), pp. 22-2, 23-4.
33. See also Hann Ludenstamper, *The Third Reich* (New York: Greystone, 1925), pp. 120-21, and Amiel Kolha, op. cit., "The Ethnic Motif," pp. 207, "The German Chem," pp. 214-15, and German pp. 12-4, 23-25.
34. See Kolha, op. cit., p. 21: "The real European adversary is and remains the West, with everything that clings to the name." The *Frankfurter Zeitung*, March 29, 1922, published an illegal secret memorandum on Nazi foreign policy, contemplating by gradual steps the annexation of Austria, the conquest of Czechoslovakia, and an alliance with an enlarged Hungary and Belgium to be followed by the mobilization of France. The initial Nazi assumption that Russia would offer her assistance to German conquests that France was necessarily reversed by the diplomatic and strategic developments of 1923-4.

## 4. WORDS OVER WEAPONS

35. John T. Whelan, *And Fire Came* (New York: Macmillan, 1921), p. 26.
36. Edwin A. Jenkins, *From Friendly to Foreign Enemy* (London: Greysen & Givens, 1921), pp. 102.
37. Cf. John T. Whelan, op. cit., pp. 117; Mary Agnes Hamilton, *Another Wanderer: A Biography* (London: Hutchinson, 1920), pp. 42-4, 424; George Slocum, *A Winter in Geneva* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1921), pp. 121-22; John W. Wheeler-Bennet, *The Popedom of Peace* (New York: Morrow, 1921), pp. 121.
38. Henry L. Stimson, *The War Between China* (New York: Harper, 1921), pp. 24-5. On August 1, 1921 Sir John Simon indignantly denied an allegation in the *Greenway Review* that he had declined to join Stimson in refusing to recognize economic conquest as victims of the Railway Pox.



He further denied "the original paper shows some differences with Stimson" (the *New York Times*, August 2, 1933). He did approve, reluctantly, the Assembly Resolution of March 12, 1932, containing the "Nine-Power Doctrine" which was repudiated by the Chankai-shan Cabinet in the Cassin-Park accord of April 15, 1933. But Sir John never approved plans either with the United States under the Nine-Power Pact which Stimson had urged upon him.

39. Henry L. Stimson, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

40. George Shennan, *op. cit.*, pp. 192-3.

41. The *Manchester Guardian*, December 8, 1932, and Stimson, p. 172. Cf. John T. Whelan, *op. cit.*, pp. 113-14.

42. *Ibid.*, 1932, pp. 32-4. The Tory press in Britain fully approved Stimson's stand. Thus the *Morning Post*, November 22, 1932: "Nothing could be more foolish than any attempt on the part of the League Council to lay its finger upon Japan the 'vicious nation' stipulated in Article 18 of the Covenant. . . . A policy which aimed embroiling the world for the sake of peace would be a disaster. What is at issue is something more important than the dignity of the League of Nations." And again, January 25, 1933: "For our part, although we do not believe in peace at any price, we value it enough to beware of entering into superfluous danger in a doubtful cause. Japan, broadly speaking, is the only element making for order and good government in the Far East." Also the *Daily Mail*, November 2, 1932: "Japan's presence in Manchuria has been a benefit to the world. . . . Not for a moment would the people of this country permit an assault of hostility toward Japan." November 21, 1932: "The Japanese reply to the Lytton Report on Manchuria was most far-seeing. It is an exceedingly fine document which will convince all reasonable people that Japan has righteous her side. . . . It would be an outrage or lacunary to hang about such a nuisance [as the Lytton Report] in order to save the face of the League of Nations. But the misguided statesmen who have so openly taken sides with the Chinese war lords and Communists mean to make strenuous efforts to force Great Britain into some wild scheme of economic and financial boycott of Japan which they hope would drive Japan from Manchuria." December 12, 1932: "Japan is rendering good service to civilization by restoring law and order in Manchuria. . . . Fortunately for John Stimson's own and moderate policy pursued with the Assembly of the League of Nations." February 17, 1933: "Any embargo of arms or the combination must be applied equally to both sides. But any embargo would mean constant interference with British industry." These and other extracts are to be found in Norman Angell, *Peace with the Eastward* (London: Methuen Henderson, 1933), pp. 121-2.

43. "Even as Gibbon drew the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire from the reign of the first Emperor, so did the Decline of the Democratic Confederacy begin at its opening union." John W. Wheeler-Bennett, *The Pipe-dream of Peace*, p. 19.

44. George Shennan, *A Mirror to Germany*, p. 173.

45. *The Marquess of Lansdowne: Character and Germany* (London: Robert Hale, 1933), p. 37.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

21. *Id.*, 1922, pp. 140-41.
22. *The New Democratic*, p. 346.
23. *Id.*, 1922, pp. 146-48.
24. *Id.*, 1922, p. 148.
25. Cf. C. F. Mahoney, "Europe in Two Camps," *Fortnightly Review*, April 1, 1922.
26. *Id.*, 1922, pp. 149, Cf. Robert Blackley, "The Significance of Dr. Bauer," *Fortnightly Review*, June 1, 1922.
27. The text of all the drafts as reproduced in *Id.*, 1922, pp. 149-51, of *Francisco Salas: A Poet Abandoned* (Milan: Mondadori, 1922).
28. *The New York Times*, June 3, 1922; *Id.*, 1922, pp. 149.
29. *Id.*, 1922, p. 150.
30. *The New York Times*, November 11, 1922.
31. *Id.*, 1922, p. 149.
32. *Id.*, 1922, pp. 149-51.

### B. DISARMAMENT † OCTOBER 26, 1922

33. *Europe nouvelle*, October 25, 1922, *Id.*, 1922, pp. 151-52.
34. *Id.*, 1922, pp. 150-51.
35. Fritz Baerle, *Lecciones Eine Disarmamentumammlung* (Berlin: Jocher und Dusselange, 1920), translated as *Lessons of Collection of Documents* (London: Hodges, 1921), pp. 26-27, cf. *The New Democratic*, pp. 150-51.
36. *Frankfurter Zeitung*, October 15, 1922.
37. *Id.*, 1922, pp. 150-51.
38. "We do not demand 'equal rights' for Germany, as we are not ourselves disposed to grant equal rights to others. There can, and shall, be no equal rights, what we demand is truth and honor. . . . We Germans are not on a level with other nations, nay, we have a right which cannot be compared with that of anybody else." Wilhelm Bauer, *Der Christliche Sozialismus* (Graz), quoted in Karl Kautsky, *The War against the West*.
39. *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1922, I, No. 113 (October 25), p. 799.
40. *Id.*, No. 118 (October 25), p. 346.
41. *Id.*, No. 113 (October 25), p. 799 and No. 117 (October 25), p. 797.
42. *Deutsche Reichsanzeiger und Preussische Anzeiger*, No. 191, November 29, 1922.
43. Cf. Arnold J. Toecher, "The Hitler Behemoth," *AFR*, February 1923, pp. 41-4.
44. George Schooner, *A Mirror to Geneva*, pp. 341-5.
45. *Id.*, 1922, p. 328.
46. *Continuum*, November 27, 1922.
47. *Id.*, 1922, pp. 324-5. For text of the and subsequent German and French communications see French Blue Book: *Négociations relatives à la réduction et à la limitation des armements*, 14 October 1922-27 April 1924 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1924). Cf. French White Paper, Cmd. 4216, 4465, and 4227 (1924).
48. *Le Sun*, March 2, 1924.
49. *Id.*, 1922, I, p. 11.

16. *DDA*, 1932, pp. 171-2.

17. *The New York Times*, October 22, 1932.

18. *AP Dispatch from Magdeburg, Italian Switzerland*, October 22, 1932.

## H · SWORDS OVER AUSTRIA

### 1. SCHIELGRUBER VS. SCHMUTZ

1. Cf. John Gunther *Inside Europe* (New York: Harper, 1931 edition) pp. 10-1.

2. J. D. Gregory, *Dollfus and His Times* (London: Hutchinson, 1931), pp. 17-18.

3. George Sorel, *The Ties that Bind and the Shewing* (London: Heinemann, 1926), p. 202. Gregory, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-8, 37-9.

4. Gregory, p. 179.

5. *West Coast*, pp. 47, 48. Cf. Stephen H. Roberts, *The House that Hitler Built* (London: Methuen, 1931), pp. 31.

6. Cf. statement by Dr. Siegel in R. H. Brown Lockhart, *Reveries from Ghent* (New York: Putnam's 1932), pp. 200-2.

7. "The independence of Austria is an inalienable attribute that with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. Consequently Austria undertakes in the absence of the consent of the said Council to abstain from any act which might directly or indirectly or by any means whatsoever compromise her independence, particularly, and avoid her admission to membership of the League of Nations, by participation in the affairs of another Power." Cf. Nina Akmed and Ralph H. Lee, *The Treaty of St. Germain* (Harvard War Library Publications, No. 3. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1920).

8. "Germany acknowledges and will respect strictly the independence of Austria, within the limits which may be fixed between that State and the Principal Allied and Associated Powers; she agrees that such independence shall be inalienable, except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations."

9. Cf. Margaret M. Ball, *Post-War German-Austrian Relations* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1932); Jean Bastien-Las, *La Crise des international de l'Europe* (Paris: Sirey, 1932); G. E. R. Geddes, *Major to the Reichstag* (London: Hutchinson, 1931).

10. *The Death of Dollfus*, translated by Johann Masingier (London: Archer, 1932), pp. 17-18.

11. J. D. Gregory, *op. cit.*, pp. 124-25.

12. Cf. M. W. Foster, *Fire and Counter-Fire in Central Europe* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1932), pp. 157-8.

13. Kurt Schuschnigg, *My Austria* (New York: Knopf, 1931), pp. 224-4.

14. Cf. *the New Statesman and Nation*, June 18, 1932; *the Literary Digest*, April 2, 1934.

15. *The Death of Dollfus*, pp. 17-18.

16. *Fölkets Röst*, July 2, 1933.

17. *The Death of Dollfus*, pp. 24-26.
18. *The Literary Digest*, June 24, 1933.
19. *CF Eden to Congress*, June 21, 1933.
20. *The New Statesman and Nation*, April 22, 1933.
21. *J. D. Gregory*, op. cit., p. 109.
22. *Kurt Schuschnigg*, op. cit., pp. 202-3.
23. *The Death of Dollfus*, p. 23.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 22-4.
25. *Mr. John Brown to Congress*, February 13, 1934.
26. *The New York Times*, February 15, 1934. *Id.*, 1934, p. 100.

## 1. MASSACRE IN FEBRUARY

27. *J. D. Gregory*, op. cit., pp. 117-8.
28. *Kurt Schuschnigg*, op. cit., pp. 202-14.
29. *Id.*, 1934, pp. 198.
30. For a detailed account of the fighting and the miserable disposition of Frederick T. Barthall and G. E. R. Geyser in the *New York Times*, February 12, 1934, and John Gardner's *Inside Europe* (1934 edition), pp. 200-2, where the conclusion of the Schuschnigg defense is well presented. Cf. Julius Danneberg, *Der Bergsteiger in Österreich* (Halleberg, Germany, 1934).
31. Naomi Mitchison, *Private Diary* (London: Collins, 1934), pp. 121-22, E. Evelyn Jones, *The Road for Peace* (London: Collins, 1935), pp. 261.
32. *LNTS*, Vol. 134 (1934-35), pp. 249, 250-251. Also 1934, 1935, 1174.
33. Cf. Arnold J. Barden, "Austria's Corporate Constitution," *AFSA*, August 1934, pp. 289-90.

## 2. DOLLFUS : JULY 23, 1934

34. *Kurt Ludovic*, *J. Ewen-Robert*, pp. 26-28.
35. *Victor Barjart*, *Reconstruction of Europe* (New York: Oxford, 1935), pp. 220-4.
36. *Id.*, 1934, p. 202.
37. *Courrier de la Sera*, June 24, 1934.
38. *AP Dispatch in the New York Times*, June 26, 1934.
39. *M. W. Todor*, op. cit., p. 128.
40. *J. D. Gregory*, op. cit., pp. 128-29.
41. *John Gardner*, op. cit., p. 202.
42. *CF The New Statesman*, pp. 273-4.
43. *The Brown Network* (Constitution by the End of London) (New York: Knopf, 1935), p. 179.
44. *J. D. Gregory*, op. cit., pp. 127-8.
45. Cf. p. 100 of *The Death of Dollfus*. In this reproduction, headed "Folkish Feeling in Germany," the caption report that Dollfus is dead and Klotzner is negotiating for the formation of a new government. The Austrian Government subsequently took the view that the date "July 23" was correct and that this conspiracy by three days of the arrest of July 22 proved that the German authorities were patriots, if not antagonists, of the peace. While other evidence of German official assistance is overwhelming,

- ing, the particular exhibit may prove as more than that those who issued it on July 12, indicated it.
46. *Der Neue Tagblatt* (Paris), May 22, 1918, among *Der Schweizer Korps*, organ of the S.S. for May 22, 1918.
  47. *The Death of Delfius*, pp. 127-28.
  48. *Ibid.*, pp. 127-8.
  49. *Ibid.*, pp. 128-32.
  50. *Ibid.*, pp. 128-32. For specimens see also John Gumbel's *Inside Europe* (1918 edition), pp. 128-32, and M. W. Fodor's *Flies and Counter-Flies in Central Europe*, pp. 127-32. Schuchenberg's evaluation of these events, along with the subsequent testimony of Gumbel and Montagu, are to be found in *My Austria*, pp. 207-10.
  51. John T. Wheeler, *And Fair Game*, pp. 170-4, the *New York Times*, July 22, 1918.
  52. *The Death of Delfius*, pp. 127-128.
  53. *Ibid.*, pp. 127-8.
  54. J. D. Gregory, *op. cit.*, pp. 193.
  55. Kurt Schuchenberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 142-3.
  56. G. E. R. Oakes in the *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 124, pp. 191-4.

### III · VICTORY TO THE VANQUISHED

#### I. BARTHOU

1. Cf. Alexander Wagh, *France in Fervent* (New York: Harper, 1915), passing; and *Which Way France?* (New York: Harper, 1917), pp. 31-42. Cf. Ralph Fox, *France Faces the Future* (New York: International Publishers, 1917), pp. 27-29, and Laurent Ranneguy, *Les Journaux Français de 4 (Hiver) (Paris: Flammarion, 1914)*.
2. Geoffrey Trevel and Thomas Nazarenko, *Life About Man and Movement* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1920), p. 222.
3. Cf. Pierre Lader, *Quatre Démocrates, à la vie et à la mort* (Paris: Plon, 1913).
4. Cf. S.S., 1914, pp. 285.
5. Cf. Gustav Adolfer, *Lesle Enrich* (Paris: Gallie, 1915); Wilhelm Harig, *Enrich* (Zürich: Verlag des Laps, 1915). See also Georges Sorel, *Enrich* (Paris: Plon). In this delicious four-volume biography of Enrich, of which the first volume was published in the spring of 1912 and of which I have been privileged to see the second and third volumes in manuscript, there are numerous anecdotes about Enrich and many illuminating characterizations of his personality and movement.
6. Edmund Herron, *Enriched from Paris* (London: Gollancz, 1914).
7. On the early history of the Lesle Enrich see John O. Grise, *The Lesle Enrich* (New York: Macmillan, 1917); Robert Mackay, *The Lesle Enrich* (New York: R. R. Smith, 1920); Gerhard Schuchberg, *Central Europe and the Western World* (New York: Holt, 1920), pp. 27-32; F. Colson, *Le Pays Enrich* (Paris: Bouillon, 1911).

1. Cf. *ibid.*, 1922, pp. 200-21.
2. Cf. E. J. Fournier: *Polskai, Marshal of Poland* (London: Anversbach, 1917).
3. *Time* in *ibid.*, 1922, pp. 224-5.
4. *LNTE*, Vol. 18, p. 13.
5. See the interesting report of a proposed French-Soviet alliance, projected in December 1922 for completion in April 1923, in Louis Wolff: *Based on the Moon* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1923), pp. 37-3.
6. Cf. *ibid.*, 1923, pp. 246.
7. See Bartholomew's speech at Bayona, June 17, in *Le Temps*, June 18, 1924.
8. *Time* of documents in *Le Temps*, June 22, 1924.
9. *LNTE*, 1924 Assembly, September 22, 1924.
10. Article 1 of the Covenant reads as follows: "... Any fully self-governing State, Territory, or Colony not named in the Annex may become a Member of the League if an admission is agreed to by two-thirds of the Assembly, provided that it shall give effective guarantee of its utmost intention to observe its international obligations, and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the League as regard to its military, naval, and air forces and armaments."
11. *LNTE*, 1924 Assembly, September 22, 1924.
12. *LNTE*, Vol. 24, pp. 22-3. Cf. Robert J. Ransel and Harry W. Howard: *The Balkan Conference and the Balkan States, 1912-1913* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1926). Also Norman J. Pankhurst: *Peace in the Balkans* (New York: Oxford, 1927).

### 1. MURDER IN MANSETLE

13. For a brief but illuminating treatment of the origin and subsequent history of the dynamic study in Fordham School: *The History of the Balkan Peninsula* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1926), pp. 39-45, 216-21.
14. On Alexander and his regime see *Le Vansuabul: L'histoire de la Grèce*, 1922; Wilfred Hindle: "A Dimension Near to Crisis," *Foreign Policy Review*, February 1, 1922; John Gardner: *Inside Europe* (1922 edition), pp. 32-46; M. W. Fisher: *Man and Cosmos-Peace in Central Europe*, pp. 20-21 and Douglas Reed's brilliant chapter, "Such Killings?" in *Islands for* (New York: Cornell Books, 1926), pp. 26-28.
15. Cf. *ibid.*, 1922, pp. 124, and account of author Haggard-Jagade's conversation in *LNTE*, December 1922, pp. 110-112.
16. Cf. Wilhelm Herzog, *Berlin*, pp. 127-128.
17. *LNTE*, December 19, 1922, in *New York Times*, December 11, 1922. *ibid.*, 1922, pp. 128-9.
18. *Quincy Adams*: *Love Berlin*, p. 115.

### 2. VERSAILLES (MARCH 16, 1921)

19. *FD-S*, December 28, 1922, p. 136; *ibid.*, 1922, pp. 216-7.
20. Cf. *LNTE*, June 1922, pp. 42-46.
21. *ibid.*, December 1922, pp. 120-2, 122-23.
22. *ibid.*, February 1923, pp. 122-3.

24. *Ibid.*, February 1933, p. 147.
25. *Ibid.*, February 1933, p. 137.
26. On the earlier aspects of the problem see Michael T. Flanagan: *The Star Scandal* (New York: Macmillan, 1934). For a reproduction of the letter and an account of the payments itself, see James E. Folsom: "The Star Scandal," *AFSR*, April 1933, pp. 102-10.
27. *British White Papers*, Cmd. 2501 (1933) and Cmd. 2541, *Mem.* No. 1 of 1933. "Joint communiqué issued on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the French Republic in the name of the Commissions between the British and French Ministers in London February 1st to 3rd, 1933." Cf. *Le Temps*, February 3, 1933. *L'Europe nouvelle*, February 5, 1933.
28. *The Times* (London), February 4, 1933.
29. *Le Temps*, February 4, 1933.
30. *AP dispatch in the New York Times*, February 26, 1933. *DDA*, 1933, I, pp. 35-6.
31. *Star Book*, *Mem.* No. 3, Cmd. 2542, of 1933.
32. Full text in *DDA*, 1933, I, pp. 38-42.
33. Letter in *The Times*, March 22, 1933.
34. All news from the *New York Times*, March 17, 1933.
35. Cf. E. P. Chase: "British Political Parties in 1933," *AFSR*, February 1934, pp. 171-2.
36. *The Observer*, March 23, 1933.
37. *The Sunday Express*, March 25, 1933.
38. *British White Papers*, Cmd. 2541 of 1933; *DDA*, 1933, I, pp. 41-6.
39. *Le Temps*, March 19, 1933; the *New York Times*, March 22, 1933; *DDA*, 1933, I, pp. 66-7.
40. *The New York Times*, March 22, 1933.
41. *DDA*, 1933, I, pp. 68-9.
42. *Commons*, March 23, 1933.
43. *The New York Times*, March 29, 1933; on the French camp, see Shelby Cullum Davis: *The French War Machine* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1931), and *Experiences of Max Glaser* (London, 1934).

## IV : FACT COUNTER-FACT

### 1. ISOLA BELLA

1. *The Times* (London), March 17, 1933.
2. MacDonald to Commons, May 1, 1933, citing Brown's "attestation" to Hitler of March 26.
3. Brown to Commons, March 26, 1933.
4. Simon to Commons, April 5, 1933.
5. *DDA*, 1933, I, p. 120.
6. *The New York Times*, April 1, 1933. *DDA*, 1933, I, pp. 121-2.
7. *The Times*, April 2, 1933.
8. *Commons*, April 2, *The Times*, April 3, 1933. *DDA*, 1933, I, p. 123.

9. Professor Arnold J. Toynbee aptly characterizes French policy as follows: "Throughout the fourteen years preceding World Wars which in power in 1919 it had lost the economic foreign policy of France to another country—also for the sake of securing the peace—without the will—or make a paragon was upon Germany it and when the economic should arise, and now, when the economic had again—and this very largely in the hands of French inexperience—France used on her feelings, in the past of reinforcing her policy, by influencing from playing the trump card which she had secured, at such cost, upon keeping in her hand?" *IDA*, 1931, I, p. 124.
10. *British Blue Book*, Cmd. 2141, No. 12.
11. *British White Paper*, Cmd. 246 of 1920 *IDA*, 1920, I, pp. 10-11.
12. *LMO*, May 1919, pp. 26-27; *IDA*, 1919, I, pp. 22-23.
13. *LMO*, May 1919, pp. 31-32 *IDA*, 1919, I, pp. 26-27.
14. *LMO*, May 1919, pp. 27-29.

## 1. DEFENSE AGAINST BERLIN

15. Article 10 of the Covenant reads as follows: "The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled."
16. Article 12, paragraph 1 of the Covenant reads: "If the Council fails to make a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof, upon the representation of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice."
17. Article 16 of the Covenant reads as follows: "1. Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 11, 12, or 13, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severest of all economic and financial relations, the prohibition of all interstate commerce that entails and the abolition of the currency-handling forms, and the prohibition of all financial, commercial, or personal transactions between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not. 2. It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval, or air force the Members of the League shall actually contribute to the armed forces to be used to enforce the covenants of the League. 3. The Members of the League agree, however, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this Article, in order to magnify the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in taking any special measures used at one of their number by the covenant-breaking



States, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League which are co-operating to protect the co-contractors of the League. 4. Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League may be declared as no longer a member of the League by a vote of the Council concurred in by the Representatives of all the other Members of the League represented therein."

14. Article 22 of the Covenant reads as follows: "1. In the event of a dispute between a Member of the League and a State which is not a Member of the League, or between States not Members of the League, the State or States not Members of the League shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purpose of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem just. If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of Article 12 as to arbitrage shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed necessary by the Council. 2. Upon such invitation being given the Council shall immediately assume its supervisory role in the management of the dispute and recommend such action as may seem just and most effective in the circumstances. 3. If a State is invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purpose of such dispute, and shall resort to war against a Member of the League, the provisions of Article 21 shall be applicable as against the State using such action. 4. If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, the Council may take such measures and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute."
15. Cf. Henri Tassin's report to the French Chamber, *Journal des Débats* (Geneva) February 26, 27, 28, 1926 (D4, 212), I, pp. 119-22, of H. Giscard d'Estaing's *Le France et l'Union Soviétique* (Paris: Blusky 1925).
16. Cf. Friedrich L. Schuman, *War and Diplomacy in the French Republic* (New York: Macmillan, 1921).

### 3. SIMON TO HOARE

17. Cf. the *New York Times*, April 26, 1935.
18. *Id.*, 1925, I, pp. 198-20.
19. Cf. *Blue Book Misc.* No. 3, (Cmd. 2122) of 1926, No. 12.
20. The *New York Times*, May 28, 1925.
21. *Commons*, May 21, 1925.
22. The Marquess of Londonderry, *Churches and Germany*, p. 74.
23. Ramsay Muir, *The Record of the National Government* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1926), p. 7.
24. Quoted in John Gaudin, *Inside Europe* (1934 edition), p. 170.
25. LNTS, Vol. 20, No. 190; British White Paper, Cmd. 2925, 1925, D4, 1925, I, pp. 42-3. The text of the supplementary accords, putting into effect an agreement Great Britain, Germany, Poland, and the USSR the public terms limitations of the London naval treaty of 1922, will be found in Cmd. 2507 of 1925, Cmd. 2702 of 1925, Cmd. 2703, 2705, 2706 of 1926. Cf. S. Rod-

101. *Haber's Conspiracy against Peace* (London: Collins, 1931), pp. 172-80.
102. *Leuch*, June 26, 1933.
103. *Commons*, June 25, 1933, and *Leuch*, June 26, 1933.
104. *Quoted in the New York Times*, June 25, 1933.
105. Cf. Admiral Lacaze: *France's Naval Policy* (*Paris: Centre d'Informations Documentaires*, 1932).
106. *Le Temps*, June 26, 1933; *IDL*, 1933, I, pp. 131-4.
107. *Commons*, July 13, 1933.
108. For a good summary see Yves Maréchal-Dani: "Europe's Struggle for Security," *Foreign Policy Reports*, June 15, 1933.

## V. CÉSAR AFRICAINUS

### 1. DUCLE'S DILEMMA

1. *Popule d'Alaba*, March 5, 1934, quoted in Herbert W. Schneider: *Making the Fasces Grow* (New York: Oxford, 1935), pp. 224-5.
2. *Kind Leuch*; *New York Times* from *Life* (New York: Macmillan, 1934), pp. 21-22.
3. On Mussolini's life and constitution see George Seldes: *Benito Mussolini* (New York: Harper, 1933), and *Georges Seldes: Mussolini in the Making* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1937).
4. On Mussolini as a woman of love see Anthonia Balabanoff: *My Life as a Rebel* (New York: Harper, 1935), pp. 100-4.
5. Quoted in F. Evelyn Jones: *The Road for Peace*, p. 39.
6. Cf. G. A. Scaggs: *Quaker: The March of Fascism* (New York: Viking, 1935), and Herman Foner: *Mussolini's Italy* (New York: Holt, 1935).
7. Cf. Maxime Cursey: *Italian Foreign Policy* (London: Nicholson, 1931), and Elizabeth Monroe: *The Mediterranean in Politics* (London: Humphrey Milford, 1930), cf. too E. H. Carr: *Through Russia to World Peace* (London: MacLaren, 1931).
8. Cf. Giovanni Salvemini: *Under the Star of Reaction* (New York: Viking, 1930), Royd Kesteven of International Affairs: *The Economic and Financial Policies of Italy* (2nd edition, London, September 1933).
9. *AP dispatch in the New York Times*, January 11, 1934.
10. *Popule d'Alaba*, August 4, 1933.
11. *Mussolini* quoted in *Harvard Feb. Anniversary: We or They—Two Worlds in Conflict* (New York: Macmillan, 1933), p. 25.
12. On European diplomacy arising in Italy's power in 1914 see Ernest Mark: *European Affairs in European Diplomacy* (New York: Macmillan, 1933).
13. Cf. W. B. Stein: "The Treaty Background of the Indo-Ethiopian Dispute," *ANL*, April 1934, pp. 37-45.
14. From minutes, U. S. Department of State, April 28, 1934.
15. *NYA*, 1935, II, p. 28.
16. President Wilson's address to the Senate on "A World League for Peace," January 13, 1917.

19. This question, often attributed to Mussolini, comes from the pen of one of his early aides, Ruffin, mentioned by Herbert W. Schneider: *Meeting the Fascist State*, pp. 159-60.
20. Page 7 of *Revue de Rome: Année XXV—The Conquest of an Empire* (London: Cassell, 1927), translation of *Le Preparations e le Prime Operazioni*, with an introduction by Mussolini, published in Rome in the autumn of 1922. Cf. the *New York Times*, October 26, 1922; the *Library Digest*, January 19, 1923; Geoffrey T. Gearey: *Mussolini's Roman Empire* (London: Penguin, 1928), pp. 17-23.
21. *Revue de Rome*, op. cit., p. 13.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 200-1.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 202.
24. Cf. *AP* dispatch from the *New York Times*, October 26, 1922.
25. See footnote 17 above.

#### L. RESCUE BY LAYAL

26. *L'Humanité*, May 2, 1924.
27. Alexander Ward: *Which Way France?* pp. 29-30.
28. Cf. E. Miller and S. Arshon: "Les Ligues et les groupements," *Le Temps*, January 24, 25, 26, 27, through February and March, and April 19, 20, 25, 1922; also *Sick*, 1922, II, pp. 202.
29. All quotations from Alexander Ward: *Which Way France?* pp. 113-4, 1921, 1922.
30. *The Daily Star*, September 19, 1922.
31. *Sick*, 1922, I, pp. 202.
32. George Mason: *Italy against the World* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1922).
33. Cf. Eriqslap's Memorandum to Secretary-General of the League, January 23, 1922, LNO, February 1922, pp. 121-4, cf. General Yagis: *The Abyssinian Empire* (London: Macmillan, 1927).
34. Cf. Eriqslap's career: see Asfa Yilma: *Haile Selassie—Emperor of Ethiopia* (London: Sampson Low, Marston, 1926) and Robinson Macdonald: *John May of Ethiopia* (New York: Putnam in London, 1927).
35. George Mason: *Carac in Abyssinia* (London: Lark, Scarce, 1922), pp. 17-22.
36. Cf. LNO, February 1922, pp. 122-23, and June 1922, pp. 222-4.
37. Cf. the *New Dominion and Mirror*, November 28, 1922, and the *Living Age*, October 1922, pp. 122-4.
38. *Hours in Congress*, October 22, 1922.
39. Cf. Alexander Ward: *Which Way France?* pp. 114-5.
40. For a full account see *Affaire de Lapochelle: Le Conflit Asie-Ethiopien* (Paris: *affaires internationales*, 1924), a 473-page documented study of the dispute; see also LNO, June, May-October 1922; John H. Spencer: "The Italian-Ethiopian Dispute and the League of Nations," *AIR*, October 1922; and Herman E. Foster: "The Wild Wild Abyssinians," *AIR*, January 1923.
41. Friedrich T. Reichall in the *New York Times*, August 3, 1922.

## 1. FRAUD AND FORCE

27. *Gloucester Herald*, February 29, 1926, quoted by Arnold Cohen, *the New York Times*, February 29, 1926.
28. *Id.*, 1925, II, p. 31.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
30. *Id.*, 1925, II, p. 129.
31. *The New York Times*, October 29, 1923.
32. *Id.*, 1925, II, pp. 481 and 482, cf. P. Vachon and P. H. Reier, *L'Opinion Britannique, la Société des Nations et la guerre anti-impérialiste* (Paris: Hermann, 1926).
33. *The New York Times*, July 20, 1922.
34. Address as Captain, *the New York Times*, June 2, 1922.
35. *LNU*, August 1925, pp. 370-2.
36. Editor in the League Council, *Id.*, 1925, II, p. 174.
37. See correspondence and comments by Herbert Matthews in *the New York Times*, August 29, 1925.
38. August 19, 1925, *Id.*, 1925, II, p. 173.
39. *The Daily Mail*, August 24, 1925.
40. *Id.*, December 21, 1925.
41. *LNU*, 12th Assembly, September 22 and 23, 1925.
42. *The New York Times*, September 23, 1925.
43. "The most shameful manner of their conduct would be that they were blessing, while, as a harsher interpretation, they were deliberately throwing dirt at the eyes of the electorate of the United Kingdom and of the governments and peoples of all the States members of the League whom they persuaded to participate in the legislation of economic sanctions." Arnold J. Toynbee in *Id.*, 1925, II, p. 184.
44. Interview with Matthews in *Le Monde*, September 17, 1925.
45. *The Daily Mail*, September 29, 1925.
46. *LNU*, November 1925, pp. 186-7.
47. *The New York Times*, September 25, 1925.
48. *Ibid.*
49. *Ibid.*, October 5, 1925.
50. *LNU*, November 1925, p. 186.
51. *Asie Yémite: Notes de l'été*, p. 189.
52. *Cronaca della Sera*, October 5, 1925.
53. *Le Free Journal*, September 29, 1925. Cf. Pierre Joseph: "I have examined and read everything, and, with a sane conclusion, I set out on the path to reaching my dear point." July 26, 1924, cited in *Id.*, 1925, II, p. 100.
54. *The Park Monthly*, September 29, 1925.

## 2. HOARE TO EDEN

55. *LNU*, November 1925, pp. 112-3.
56. *Id.*, 1925, II, pp. 170-171.
57. On Belkaid's strategic position in the Mediterranean see Elizabeth Monroe, *The Mediterranean as Politics*, pp. 3-17, and Lillian Harz, *Europe as Seen* (New York: Random House, 1927), pp. 16-17.

70. On the economic consequences of sanctions in Italy see Royal Institute of International Affairs: *International Sanctions*, 2nd ed., League of Nations Documents, General, 1928, 3, British White Paper, Cmd. 2022 of 1928, Appendix I, reprinted in *SLA*, 1928, II, pp. 291.
71. One of Mussolini's most violent adherents in Britain, Major E. W. Fokan-Murray wrote in Italy's *Conquest of Abyssinia* (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1935, pp. 122-123): "The League of Nations policy played into his hands in its endeavor to frustrate his enterprise, and it might well have done him serious harm by seeking to evict his troops . . . The adoption to type of the policy of the League Powers must have been a great relief for Mussolini in many ways. Although the impotence and misadventure of sanctions made Italy's task more difficult, this was more than counteracted by the way they accomplished the basic business Mussolini and the Italian people as a pure demonstration to see the Abyssinian campaign through to the bitter end."
72. *British White Paper*, Cmd. 2022 of 1928.
73. *The New York Times*, January 25, 1928.
74. *The Manchester Guardian*, November 26, 1922, and *Journal des Nations* (Geneva) November 26, 1922.
75. *The Daily Telegraph* (London), October 22, 1922.
76. *The New York Times*, October 22, 1922.
77. *SLA*, 1922, II, p. 24.
78. Also in the *Manchester Guardian*, December 4, 1922.
79. Cf. George Marshall: *Italy against the World*, pp. 100-11.
80. *SLA*, 1922, II, pp. 100-1.
81. *The New York Times*, December 14, 1922.
82. Cmd. 2022 of 1928, p. 40.
83. *George Mason: Case in Abyssinia*, pp. 100-101.
84. *The New York Times*, December 14, 1922.
85. On the League and Ethiopia as presented by Victor Marguerite: *The League Phase (1922-1925)* (London: Hodges, 1926); and, for a pro-Franco account, *Jean Sarrat: L'Éthiopie et les diplomates, 1922-27* (Geneva: Universitäts, 1927).

## VI • WATCH ON THE RHINE

### 1. LOCARNO ? MARCH 5, 1925

1. William Churchill: "First, the Prime Minister had declared that sanctions meant war; secondly, he was resolved that there must be no war; and thirdly, he decided upon sanctions. It was evidently impossible to comply with these three conditions." *The Evening Standard*, June 26, 1925.
2. From Gilbert and Sullivan's *The Sorcerer*. Cf. Harold J. Wilson's article on Eden in the *Atlantic Monthly*, May 1928, *Review of Reviews* (London), January 1929; Victor Gordon Lennox: "Anthony Eden," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1928; Also Campbell-Johnson: *Anthony Eden—A Biography* (New York: Ivan Winkler, 1928). Cf. John Gower: *Mr. Richard A. Lloyd in Post War Conversations* (London: Sampson Low, 1927).

1. "The Unofficial Observer," *Our Look and Mirror* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1925), p. 42.
2. *The New Statesman and Nation*, November 21, 1925.
3. *Ibid.*, November 22, 1925.
4. S. Erdman: *Hilder's Conspiracy against Peace*, pp. 207-13.
5. Cf. F. J. Barber: *Lecture*, pp. 127-32.
6. Cf. *Blue Book Mem.* No. 1 of 1925, *Documents* 22, 24, 25. See John Fisher Williams: "Nations under the Germans," *British Year Book of International Law*, 1925; and Quincy Wright: "The Rhineland Occupation and the Enforcement of Treaties," *AML*, July 1925.
7. Cf. *Asper* in the *New York Times*, October 15, 1922.
8. *The New York Times*, January 26, 15, 1925.
9. *The Marquis of Lansdowne: Observer and Germany*, pp. 17-19.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 124.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 116-17.
12. F. J. Barber: *Lecture*, pp. 151-2.
13. *Ibid.*, 1925, pp. 175.
14. F. J. Barber: *Lecture*, pp. 129-31.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 128-31; the *New York Times*, March 2, 1925.
16. Cf. Alexander Wark: "Which Way France?" pp. 261-2 and Paul Kemp: "France-Wine and France-Foodstuffs," *Kron*, June 26, 1925.
17. *The Marquis of Lansdowne: Observer and Germany*, pp. 120-2.
18. For a detailed account of these discussions see F. J. Barber: *Lecture*, January 24, 1925, pp. 121-122; *Ibid.*, 1925, pp. 1-22; Cf. R. B. Merrin: *Europe on Order* (London: Hutchinson, 1926).
19. *The New York Times*, May 3, 1925.
20. *Ibid.*, 1925, pp. 148-9.
21. *Commons*, May 15, 1925.
22. For a good discussion and story of documents see Henri A. Rolin: *La Belgique Menace* (Brussels: Larcier, 1925).

#### 2. EPILOGUE † MAY 9, 1925

1. Cf. *Le Temps*, April 15, 1925.
2. French White Paper, *Chron.* 1925 of 1925, *Etudes* No. 3.
3. Cf. *Genevieve Tolson* in *L'Esprit*, March 3, 1925.
4. *SL*, 1925, II, p. 124.
5. John T. Wheeler: *And Four Cases*, pp. 20-21.
6. George Saxe: *Case in Alsace*, pp. 3, 21, of *Robert Hershorn: Two Wars and More to Come* (New York: Garden & Evans, 1925).
7. G. T. Garrow: *Stanley's Roman Empire*, pp. 4-5.
8. Lillian Wells: *Stand on the Rhine*, pp. 28-29.
9. George Saxe, op. cit., pp. 19-20.
10. From his memoirs, *Fortitude Alone*, quoted in E. Elwyn Jones: *The Battle for Peace*, pp. 27-8.
11. Quoted in Bernard Knudell: *Peace* (New York: Macmillan, 1925), p. 29.
12. *SL*, 1925, II, p. 125.
13. Cf. George Saxe, op. cit., pp. 28-9.

38. G. E. Garrow, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-12.
39. *Id.*, 1931, II, p. 126.
40. *The New York Times*, April 20, 1936.
41. *Id.*, May 5, 1936.
42. *The New York Times*, May 10, 1936. Cf. Eddell Hunt, *Europe as Seen*, pp. 117-122; Margaret Barrow, *Mediterranean Cross Currents* (New York: Oxford, 1937); M. H. H. Macmillan and E. Cresswell, *Italy's Foreign and Colonial Policy 1912-1937* (New York: Oxford, 1937); William L. Langer, "Turbulence of Empire: the Mediterranean Problem," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1937.

#### 3. GENEVA + JULY 4, 1936

43. "In President Wilson's address the resolution the question of reason was a determination to unite in resistance to aggression: 'The union of wills is a common purpose, a union of wills which cannot be resisted and which I dare say no nation will run the risk of attempting to resist.' The reader may possibly conclude that it is the absence of this 'union of wills,' rather than any technical obstacles, or lack of efficacy in the measures available, which prevent the members of the Conference from being the safeguard of peace and deterrers of aggression which they were considered to be by their delegates. The question will remain whether, if the world lacks the spirit of co-operation and self-sacrificing co-operation on which nations depend, any alternative course is available whereby the calamity of war can be permanently averted." Royal Institute of International Affairs, *International Conference*, pp. 111-12.
44. *Id.*, 1936, I, pp. 42-43.
45. See Aguir in the *New York Times*, May 2, 1936.
46. Cf. *Id.*, 1936, I, pp. 42-43.
47. *Id.*, pp. 43-44.
48. *The New York Times*, June 21, 1936.
49. *Id.*, 1936, I, p. 426.
50. *Le Temps*, June 22, 1936.
51. *The New York Times*, July 1, 1936.
52. *Id.*, July 16, 1936.
53. Cf. Lord Darnley, *Meeting the Abyssinian Legation of Bishop's Garden, Garmale*, 1936.
54. Philip Gibbs, *European Journey* (Garden City: Doubleday, Doran, 1936), pp. 146-7.

#### 4. EAST OF ROME AND BERLIN

55. *The New York Times*, October 16, 1936, on the proclamation and the two conditions attached, see *Id.*, 1936, pp. 127-28.
56. Aguir in the *New York Times*, April 2, 1936.
57. *Id.*, 1936, pp. 127-28.
58. Aguir in the *New York Times*, November 16, 1936.
59. *Id.*, September 8, 1937.
60. *Id.*, November 3, 1937.

32. *Ibid.*, November 26, 1931, G. R. E. Carter: "The Russian International," *Foreignbody News*, February 1932.
33. Cf. the Russian Movement of 1932 in *The Russian Drive of Manchuria* (Shanghai: China United Press, 1932) pp. 204-26, on the struggle of a Soviet Japanese war, see Gregory Semench: *The Struggle for the Far East* (New York: Macmillan, 1926), pp. 102-22, and F. H. Harrington: *The Coming World War* (New York: Schust, 1925), Appendix. See also Tom Blizard's predictions of general war in 1932 in *The New World War* (London: Harv, 1931), pp. 261.
34. Cf. Tina Blizard: *Japan Must Fight Russia* (New York: Telegraph Press, 1936).
35. Introduction to F. L. MacGraw: *Russian War or Peace* (New York: MacGraw-Hill, 1930), 1930.
36. Cf. *Id.*, 1936, pp. 102-22.
37. The picture appeared in no language on the envelope of a map of "Hungary 1904-1918," showing in terrible figures the territories lost by the Treaty of Trianon, published by the "Hungarian Women's National Association" and widely distributed during the middle 1920's. Cf. C. A. MacGraw: *Hungary and Her Successors: the Treaty of Trianon and its Consequences, 1918-1927* (New York: Oxford, 1927); Count Stephen Batthy: *The Treaty of Trianon and Hungarian Fate* (New York: Longmans, 1926).
38. *Id.*, 1936, pp. 261-2.
39. F. Eberz Jones: *The Race for Peace*, pp. 184.
40. Cf. *Living Age*, October 1932, pp. 127-9.
41. *The New York Times*, August 26, 27, September 2, 3, 1931.
42. *Ibid.*, March 20, 1932.
43. *Ibid.*, November 8, 1932.
44. Cf. Max C. De Wilt: "Germany's Trade Drive in Southeastern Europe," *Foreign Policy Report*, November 12, 1936, Cf. F. Eberz Jones: *Mohr's Drive in the East* (New York: Outen, 1937); Henry C. Wright: *The German Empire* (Garden City: Doubleday, Doran, 1945).
45. On January 12, 1937 Emperor Shoyasohwa and Konowara signed a famous pact of friendship: "Article 1. There shall be inviolable peace and amity and perpetual friendship between the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of Bulgaria." This pact was a reference for Bulgarian membership in the Balkan union, which would have required a formal recognition of Bulgarian independence hopes. By 1936 the prospects were bright that these hopes might eventually be realized by German support of Bulgaria.
46. Cf. M. W. Fiske: *East and Center-East in Central Europe*, pp. 2-3.
47. H. E. Woodson: *Atatürk: Ruler of Turkey* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1931), p. 70.
48. For a detailed account see D. A. Smith: "The Moslems' Question," *Id.*, 1936, pp. 261-71.
49. Cf. *Id.*, 1936, pp. 66-70.



## 1. MOSCOW

79. Cf. G. Deansoff: *Working Class Unity—Bolshevik against Foreigners*, address of August 2, 1927 before the 7th Congress of the Comintern (New York: Workers Library Publishers).
80. See Vladimir L. Schuman: "Leon Trotsky, Renegade or Martyr?" in *The Southern Review*, Summer, 1929, and comments therein in "Correspondence" section by Malcolm Cowley, Max Eastman, John Dewey, Carlotta Bush, and James T. Farwell, reproduced by Sidney Hook: "Leninism in the Case of Leon Trotsky," *Southern Review*, Autumn, 1929, and letters in "Correspondence" section by Sidney Hook, Carlotta Bush, James T. Farrell, and Vladimir L. Schuman. The principal works on the Moscow trials are: *Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyist Group* (Moscow, 1927) and *Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet "Ring of Rightist and Trotskyists"* (Moscow, 1928), both verbatim reports of trials issued by the People's Commissariat of Justice of the USSR, Moscow Edition; *Old U. Jensen* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1928); Dudley Collins: *Soviet Justice and the Trial of Bakst and Others* (London: Gillman, 1928); and *The Case of Leon Trotsky*, manuscript of hearings in Marine City (New York: Harper, 1928).
81. See Paul Schaffner: "Bakst's Revenge," *Fortnightly Review*, March, 1927.
82. Leon Trotsky: *The Defense of Terrorism* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1920), pp. 21-2. "The man who repudiates terrorism in principle—i.e. repudiates measures of repression and accumulation towards declassed and armed counter-revolution, must reject all ideal of the political supremacy of the working class and its revolutionary dictatorship. The man who repudiates the dictatorship of the proletarian repudiates the Socialist revolution, and signs the grave of freedom." P. 20. "We were never acquainted with the Kautsky-principle and repudiated-Kautsky people about the 'freedom of human life.' We were revolutionaries in opposition, and have realized revolutionaries in power. To attain the universal good we must destroy the social order which creates evil. And this problem can only be solved by blood and fire."
83. Leon Trotsky: *The Revolution Betrayed* (Garden City: Doubleday, Doran, 1927), p. 127: "In the last analysis, Soviet Bolshevism came in birth to the liberation of the world revolution. But in the capitalist countries the same cause gave rise to fascism. We then arrive at the conclusion, unexpected at first glance, but in reality inevitable, that the crushing of Soviet democracy by so all powerful bureaucracy and the extermination of Bolshevism determined by fascism were produced by one and the same cause—the dictatorship of the world proletarian in solving the problems set for it by history. Socialism and fascism, in spite of a deep difference in social foundations, are symmetrical phenomena." Pp. 215-6: "Holding young large had it inevitable to breathe in the atmosphere of hypocrisy inseparable from a Thermidor. . . . The more exposed, hot-blooded, undisciplined injured in their interests and feelings, are turning their thoughts in the direction of revenge revenge. . . . Although completely impossible to solve the problem which

in an itself, the individual never has personality as an entity; important symptoms are significant." Pp. 255-6. "Individual never is a weapon of conquest or despising individuals, belonging most frequently to the younger generation of the bourgeoisie itself. But, at the same time, in some times, political movements manifestable symptoms of a young conception, and herald the beginning of an open political action. . . . There is an important concern for this action. No dead end, yet, voluntarily put off his own claim. The Soviet bureaucracy will not give up its position without a fight. The development leads obviously to the road of revolution. . . . The bureaucracy can be removed only by a revolutionary force. And, in always, there will be fewer victims the more bold and desperate is the attack. To prepare this and stand at the head of the masses is a horrible but happy situation—that is the task of the Soviet people of the Fourth International!"

16. Cf. A. Winkler: *The Conquest of Power* (New York: Quinn Tamm, 1931), pp. 109-10.
17. *The New York Herald Tribune*, October 14, 1934.
18. See the occasional and somewhat unreliable work by Ernst Huns: *Minor over Russia* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1931), pp. 18-19.
19. Cf. Ludovic Pange: "And Now to the Ukraine," *Kom*, October 10, 1934.
20. Cf. F. Korya, *Notes: The Route for Peace*, pp. 14-15; Maurice Edelman, op. cit., pp. 118; *Voz Radio*: "The Moscow Trials," and Edelman: "The Russian Mystery" in *Foreign Affairs*, October 1935.
21. Trotsky's phrases in his issue of October 14, 1934, on the occasion of the founding Congress of the Fourth International, reproduced by Paul Tolson in the *New York Herald Tribune*, October 14, 1934.

## VII · CAMPAIGN IN IBERIA

### 1. DEATH AT MADRID

1. Harry Gamson and Theodore Bageant: *Spain as Russia* (New York: Knopf, 1931), pp. 10-11.
2. See Geoffrey Frennau: "Will Spain Follow Russia?" *Contemporary Record*, Vol. 190, pp. 434-45; Gamson and Bageant, op. cit., pp. 10-11, and the admirable work by Frank Marshall: *The Politics of Modern Spain* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1931).
3. Cf. Charles A. Thompson: "Spain: latest behind the curtain," *Foreign Policy Report*, January 1, 1935, citing Spanish official sources; cf. Frank Johnson: *The Civil War in Spain* (London: Gollancz, 1935), pp. 144. This is by all odds the most detailed, authoritative, and penetrating study of the background and early phases of the conflict. Cf. E. Alvarez Peña: *The Spanish Tragedy, 1930-1934* (New York: Oxford, 1936).
4. Cf. S. Jackson, *Nasser's Conspiracy against Peace*, pp. 147-49, and Elizabeth Monroe: *The Mediterranean in Politics*. Professor Max Gerson in a lecture at Garmisch in April 1934 declared: "The war in Spain is a European war that is being waged for hegemony in the Mediterranean. . . . If Spain falls into the hands of France, then Gibraltar is threatened, and the trans-

port of French troops from the colonies will be made almost impossible because of the isolated Canary Islands. . . . We demand what was stolen from our own colonies. In case of war, Italy will enter a part of western France!" Quoted from the *Manchester Guardian*, April 18, 1938, in F. Elzaya Jover, *The Road for Peace*, pp. 149-51.

2. Frank Jellinek, *op. cit.*, pp. 237-38.
3. G. T. Garner, *Mussolini's Roman Empire*, pp. 130-31.
4. See the *Manchester Guardian*, August 2, 1938, *Journal der Nation* (Geneva), November 25, 1938, Charles A. Thompson, "Spain: Civil War," *Foreign Policy Report*, January 12, 1939.
5. Most of the documents revealing the methods and purposes of these Nazi activities were cited in the German Consulate in Barcelona. See 1938 and references in *The Mass Conspiracy in Spain* (London: Gollancz, 1939), especially pages 162, 163, 168, 169, 170-72, 177, 182, and 241-45. Robert Barrow, *Spain's Civil War* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1938), p. 75, admits the authenticity of this material, as do other famous apologues.
6. Cf. Robert Barrow, *op. cit.*, p. 75, and Frank Jellinek, *op. cit.*, pp. 231 and 232.
7. Jacques Aron, *France's Foreign Policy* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1937), pp. 177-8.
8. Cf. the *Evening Citizen*, June 12, 1937.
9. The best biography of Franco in English is Jacques Aron, *op. cit.*, written by an ardent sympathizer. See also the German work by Rudolf Tessenow, *General Franco* (Olsen: Walser, 1937).
10. Robert Barrow, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-9. The latter cited in part: "Those who claim that the army is loyal to the Republic are just telling the truth; they are deceived by those whose stated purpose gives them the tone of conspiracy. But it is a wretched service to the patriotic cause to misrepresent the remains, the dignity and the patriotism of the officers all day with the figures of conspiracy and defection. From the lack of equity and justice of the public bodies in their treatment of the army in the year 1937 were the military 'juntas' of defense. Today you can virtually say that, on a similar plan, military juntas have again been formed. The writings which appear secretly under the initials U.M.R. and U.M.F. are authentic symptoms of their existence and herald future civil struggles, if one does not take the trouble to deal with them, a thing which I feel would be easy, if one thought a man in possession of justice and equity." Cf. Frank Jellinek, *op. cit.*, pp. 176.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 177.
12. Jacques Aron, *op. cit.*, p. 182.
13. Frank Jellinek, *op. cit.*, pp. 237-9 and 241-45.
14. Jacques Aron, *op. cit.*, p. 182.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 210-2.
16. Letter of the Spanish bishops, July 2, 1937, in Robert Barrow, *op. cit.*, pp. 161.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 87-91.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 146-5, 147-48. Cf. Harold G. Cannon (correspondent of the *Daily Mail*), *The March of a Nation* (New York: McGraw, 1937), pp. 71-4 and 240-2.

22. *Current History*, June 1937.
23. G. T. Garret, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-1, quoting *Warren Pajuelo-compana por torras apuntes* (19th edition, 1931).
24. G. McNeill Blum: *The Spirit of the Atlantic*, p. 225, quoted with appreciation by Robert Bennett, *op. cit.*, p. 215.
25. See articles by Ralph Bates in the *New Republic*, October 22 and 23, 1937.
26. Among the many accounts of the military aspects of the war, the most readable of those sympathetic to the Iberian cause are, in addition to Johnson, the following: Geoffrey Cox: *Defense of Madrid* (London: Gollancz, 1937); Haydon Matthews: *Two Wars and More to Come* (New York: Carroll & Brown, 1937); Ramon Broder: *Casualty-Account in Spain* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1937); Peter Mann: *Spain between Death and Fire* (New York: Dodge, 1937). For a description of what happened by an avowed pro-Francoist, *See* Eric Vilanova: *Spain's Justice* (New York: Knopf, 1937). For a sympathetic view of the republican cause by a Catholic, see Alfred Manstigall: *The Abandonment of Spain*, with a Foreword by Jacques Maritain (New York: Random's, 1937).

## 2. RESCUE BY BLUM

27. See Richard L. Bricker: *Liam Blum: From Poet to Pioneer* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1937), and Geoffrey Freyer and Thaddeus Mazuron: *Liam Blum: Men and Mountains*. Cf. John Gardner's *poet previous to Irish Emigrant* (1936), pp. 87-100.
28. *Liam Blum: Poet and Disarmament* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1931) p. 86.
29. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-15, 26-7.
30. See William R. Sharp: "The People's Front in France: British or Imperial?" *APR*, October 1936.
31. *L'Europe nouvelle*, August 12, 1936.
32. Robert Bennett, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-21.
33. Alexander Wirth: "What Was France?" pp. 120-1, cf. Richard Bricker, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-41.
34. *Le Temps*, August 2, 1936.
35. Alexander Wirth, *op. cit.*, pp. 124-6.
36. See Van H. Duns: "European Diplomacy in the Spanish Crisis," *Foreign Policy Report*, December 1, 1936.
37. *L'Europe nouvelle*, September 22 and 23, 1936; Norman L. Pettiford: "The International Non-Intervention Agreement and the Spanish Civil War," *ANE*, October 1937, pp. 548.
38. See Report of Frances Haining, Secretary of the Non-Intervention Committee in Spain, No. 1 (1937), *ibid.*, 1937.
39. *CE LINDI*, Special Supplement, No. 22, 17th Assembly, pp. 27, 28, 29.
40. *ANE*, October 1937, p. 548.
41. Cf. Alexander Wirth: "French Politics," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1936.
42. *Current History*, July 1937, p. 75, quoting *Guerrilla e Libertas*.
43. See Gastiano Salvemini: "The Spanish Morale," the *New Republic*, August 18, 1937, and G. Salvemini: *Circle and Noble Revolt* (London: For Individual Liberty, 1929).

40. See "Headed Women in France," *Kan*, June 1, 1938, E. Clays Jones. The Battle for France, pp. 120-121.
41. Cf. Jacques Kayser: *Rapport sur la Politique Extérieure, pour Congrès Radical et Radical-Socialiste*, Lille, October 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 1937. See Robert Doll: "France's Debt to Paris," *the Nation*, November 20, 1937.
42. *The New York Times*, September 7, 1938, Alexander Week. "What If *l'Esp. France*?" pp. 16-9.

### 3. COMEDY IN LONDON

43. AP dispatch, *New York Times*, October 8, 1938.
44. *Ibid.*, October 20, 1938.
45. "In consequence of the fact that General Franco has taken possession of the greater part of Spain, and the development of a situation which shows with increasing clarity that in the remaining part of Spain one cannot speak of the existence of a responsible governing power, the French Government has decided to recognize the government of General Franco and send to that government a chargé d'affaires to begin diplomatic relations. The chargé d'affaires will go there immediately. The present diplomatic representatives (to the Madrid Government) have been recalled." *New York Times*, November 10, 1938.
46. *Ibid.*, January 4, 1939.
47. *The New York American*, February 1, 1939, in Reprinted L. South. United States Secretary in the Spanish Conflict," *Foreign Policy Report*, November 23, 1939.
48. G. T. Gerson: *Mussolini's Roman Empire*, pp. 18-19.
49. *The New York Times*, March 20, 1939.
50. See George Seldes: "Mussolini versus His Pan," *Kan*, April 21, 1938.
51. Frank Johnson: *The Civil War in Spain*, p. 219.
52. See George Seldes: *The Fate of Gernika* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1938). In the United States Senate, May 4, 1939, William E. French declared: "These Fascists present to the world no message. It has hung upon the wall of civilization a painting that will never show downmaster rule one of the wonders of man. So long as men and women may be interested in marching out from the pages of history surrounding men of cruelty and injustice of madman destruction of human life they will linger longer and with the greatest horror over the tragic story of the Fascist war in Spain. . . . No language can describe the scene at Guernica, and Guernica was not a single moment it was simply a culmination of a long line of unspeakable atrocities. It was not a military maneuver. The city was a long distance from the battle line. The attack had no legitimate military objective. An unarmed, non-combatant city was singled out for the most revolting massacre of modern times. It was Fascist strategy."
53. See Rein Villalpando: *Spain's Justice*, pp. 77-9.
54. See commentary in the *New York Times*, June 29, 1939.
55. *Ibid.*, July 13, 1939.
56. Cf. *APC*, Vol. 32 and Supplement, pp. 179-81.

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40. Cf. George Sacerdoti, *Il Mito in Grecia*, pp. 228-29, and Victor Zanghieri, *The League of Nations*, pp. 222-3.
41. LING, records of the 18th Assembly.
42. See articles in *Review of Monthly Review of World Affairs*, edited by Spencer Bradbury, for July-November 1932, by William E. Longfellow, R. Whaley Griswold, W. P. Morgan, J. S. Morgan, Charles A. Beard, G. Nye Sargent, Delany B. Fay, and others, including the present writer.
43. *The Times*, August 22, 1932, at San Vito, pp. 16, p. 134.

## VIII · MARCH DOWN THE DANUBE

### 1 VIENNA'S LAST CHANCELLOR

1. *SL*, 1934, p. 421.
2. J. D. Grayson, *Dallfus and His Times*, pp. 26-7.
3. See correspondence from Berlin, *New York Times*, July 13, 1934.
4. *Ibid.*, July 17, 1934.
5. Cf. *The New Danubians*, pp. 470-2.
6. Kurt Schuschnigg, *My Austria*, pp. 272-3.
7. *SL*, 1934, p. 416.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 416-7.
9. *My Austria*, p. 277.
10. Cf. Margaret Ball, *German-Austrian Relations*, pp. 134-4. Dr. Wilhelm Baumbach has donated of the First World War, but given private scholarships (a. \$2,500) to the Jewish National Fund, 25,000 to the Poles, 25,000 to the Protestant Union, 25,000 to the Catholics, 25,000 to the Legation, 25,000 to Saxony, and 1,250,000 to the Austrian press.
11. *SL*, 1934, p. 420.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 421.
13. Cf. Michael Wandelaar, "Austria Enkaiser a Trade Show," *Foreign Policy Report*, September 15, 1933.
14. Cf. *My Austria*, pp. 266-70.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 421.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 266.
17. *SL*, 1934, p. 420.
18. From *Washington*, December 1933, *Reynolds's* *Journal of American Affairs*, quoted in the *New York Times*, January 2, 1934.

### 2 EDEN TO HALIFAX

19. Thomas Jefferson to Governor J. Langdon, March 2, 1800. I am indebted to Dr. Paul Pedersen for bringing this letter to my attention.
20. See Robert Brinkley, *The Decline and Fall of the British Empire* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1930); Kingsley Martin, *The Magic of Monarchy* (New York: Knopf, 1931).
21. Sir Charles Fawcett, *The Chamberlain Tradition* (London: Longsight, 1930), p. 114. Cf. Simon Halgan, *The Men Who Made Peace* (New York: Chamberlain, New York: Dutton, 1931).

10. *Current History*, May 1937.
11. See Charles Fries, *op. cit.*, p. 115.
12. *The New Statesman and Nation*, January 18, 1935.
13. *The Daily Telegraph*, August 5, 1936.
14. See Herbert Hoover "British Dominions in Canada," *Foreign*, August 1937.
15. See Charles A. Beard, "On the Diplomatic Front," *Foreign*, September 1937.
16. *The Maelstrom of Landoberg: Czechoslovak and Germany*, pp. 142-43.
17. *Foreign*, November and December 1937.
18. *Czechoslovak and Germany*, pp. 123-4.
19. *IBid.*, pp. 121-2.
20. See Egon Schuch, "Germany's Colonial Demands," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1937. Cf. A. L. Kennedy: *British Faces Germany* (New York: Oxford, 1937).
21. See "England behind the Fabians," *Econ.*, May 15, 1938. H. N. Brailsford "British Approach the Fabians," *the New Republic*, December 15, 1937, and contemporary accounts of the Fabian mission in *The Times*, the *Manchester Guardian*, the *Fabianian* (Fabian's paper), the *New York Times*, the *New York Herald Tribune*, the *Christian Science Monitor*, and the *Chicago Daily News*.
22. Ferdinand Kahn, Jr. in the *New York Times*, February 15, 1938.
23. *The New York Times*, February 15, 1938.
24. Cf. H. N. Brailsford "British Labor's Lost Cause," *the New Republic*, April 15, 1938.

### 3. AUSTRIA + MARCH 11, 1938

25. M. W. Fiske, "Fate Austria," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1938.
26. *Ibid.*, and Eugene Lambeth: *The Last Four Hours of Austria* (London: Rich & Cowan, 1938), pp. 71-3.
27. Cf. M. W. Fiske, *loc. cit.*
28. See the *New York Times*, February 22, 1938.
29. No mention of this conference was at yet available. Schuschnigg's own memorandum was reported to have been taken out of Austria on March 11 by Hans Kerschner, his deputy, but it has not yet been published. See M. W. Fiske, *loc. cit.*; Eugene Lambeth, *op. cit.*, and August Kohn "Escape from the Mountains," *the Nation*, June 15, 1938.
30. Cf. E. R. Gidycz in the *New York Times*, February 26, 1938.
31. See Ludwig Loh: "On Syria and the Impact," *the Nation*, April 20, 1938.
32. See text of memorandum in the *Monitor*, April 5, 1938.
33. Eugene Lambeth, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-3.
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 122-4.
35. *Ibid.*, pp. 41-2.
36. Cf. Robert Young: *A Young Man Looks at Europe* (London: Hutchinson, 1938), pp. 122-23.
37. Eugene Lambeth, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-1.
38. *The New York Times*, March 11, 1938.
39. M. W. Fiske, *loc. cit.*
40. See Sidney B. Fay: "The Nazi Atrocities of Austria," *Foreign*, May 1938.

- 12 Douglas Reed: *Justify Fair*, pp. 98-7.
- 13 See Lt. M. Foster: "The Geography of Europe," the *Admiral Monthly*, August 1941; Seymour Newman: "The American Republic: An Obituary," the *Physica Quarterly Review*, Summer, 1941; Peter E. Goodson: "The Social Renaissance in Russia," the *New Republic*, July 8, 1941; James Malt: "Europe from the Moscovite," the *Nation*, June 2 and 15, 1941; Eugene Louis: ed., 194-100, postscript; E. Ruyss: *Europe: The Battle for Peace*, pp. 127-40; William Gordon: *Twenty Four America*, 1941-1942 (New York: Farrar & Runkhart) 1942), pp. 121-46.

## IX - PEACE BY PURCHASE

### 1. RESCUE BY CHAMBERLAIN

1. For criticism of misrepresentation on the part of some British observers, see Norman Angell: *Peace with the Dictators* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1941), pp. 121-46 and R. M. Soren-Wasson: *Britain and the Dictators* (New York: Macmillan, 1942).
2. See H. B. G. Clarendon's selective file volume of essays: *Reactionary England* (London: Arvon Press, 1942).
3. See J. M. Chubb, *Memoirs*, 1912-1917 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1931), p. 112.
4. *Statement Relating to Defense*, Cmd. 3715, March 1941, also Cmd. 3717, March 1942 and Cmd. 3717, March 1942.
5. Ralph Wodehouse: *English Fairy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1941), pp. 112f.
6. Quoted in R. Palmer Day: *World Politics*, 1941-1942 (New York: Random House, 1942), p. 164.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 165.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 193. The post-Versailles British Entry in Berlin, Vice-Chancellor, feared with alarm any prospect of a German-Soviet rapprochement. Cf. *The Diary of an Ambassador: Fanny in Russia*, 1918-1922 (New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1942), pp. 121. "It was apparent to those who took a world view that Russian civilization was menaced by an external danger which, coming into being during the war, threatened a catastrophe equalled only by the fall of the Roman Empire. The danger arose from the sweeping success in 1917 of the revolution against the Czarist regime and the establishment in Russia of a formal Communist Government, supported by forces of all political organizations which stood in the way of a world recovery of the Soviet state. . . . Public opinion both in France and Germany was so unconvinced upon the Russian Russian question that it relegated the really most important problem of the defense of Europe against Soviet communism to the category of the neo-imperial. And yet there is little doubt that a third partition in the policy of maintaining the war going of the Allies against Germany would eventually have led to Germany being forced into close alliance with Russia. . . . An Anglo-Soviet order German-Soviet alliance against established international law supported by German industry and science may be considered an essential condition



son. But were it no more than being, the danger to European civilization would be due in the extreme. . . . On behalf generally of European interests the case was strong. Was the Lomax policy of peace in the West and a firm hand for the East in the East for all nations who regarded Western civilization as a precious heritage. It was even stronger when judged from the spiritual standpoint of the British Empire. Apart from the general danger resulting from the spread of communism, the new English bias in Russia throughout the Nineteenth Century had to be borne in mind. The presence of Bolshevik propaganda in combination with the traditional political hostility might create a focus of huge revolutionary influence. Reference to international propaganda, the maintenance of peace in Europe, the establishment of another Great War, the establishment for instance for expelling leaders, the preservation of society on existing lines, were typical objects of British policy. But there was more than this. England's reputation and vital interests in Asia were menaced by a danger greater than any which existed in the time of the old Imperialism against in Russia. Hostility to England or jealousy of the influence of British civilization here Asia was united of old standing. For the last twenty years of the Nineteenth Century, rivalry between England and Russia had been a dominant force in history. But the Bolsheviks disposed of new weapons which Imperial Russia lacked—class-strife propaganda, appealing to the proletarians of the world, and the quasi-religious fanaticism of Lenin, which induced a rigor and zeal unknown to the officials and politicians of the Czar. In the presence of the menace of such forces no solution of the European problem could be advanced by English measures which threatened the existence of Germany from the European combination, and left her a prey to Russian wilds and Russian influence. . . . Communism had already shown its power over French troops at Orléans in 1919. . . . Such were some of the arguments which drove the first made collective man disposed of any permanent benefit to Europe or to England from the policy of pure compulsion against Germany? This view, which has behind, Tory policy toward both Germany and Japan since 1911, was formulated by Lord D'Almeida in 1921.

9. *The New Statesman and Nation*, January 20, 1924.

10. See Norman Angell, *Peace with the Dictator* (pp. 124-5, 185, 184).

11. Cf. Ward Price, *I Know These Germans* (New York: Holt, 1925), p. 173.

12. *Continental and Germany*, p. 163.

13. Interview in Los Angeles, the *New York Times*, February 10, 1928.

14. See Lubbock Fergus, "How Hitler Conquered England," *Even*, May 2, 1928.

15. Quoted in H. R. G. Gowers, op. cit., p. 28.

16. Stanley Baldwin, *Evolution of Our Lives* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1927), pp. 41-2.

17. See quotations in Norman Angell, *Peace with the Dictator*, p. 112.

18. *The New York Times*, November 10, 1928.

19. See Arnold Lane, *Spanish Schism* (New York: Stoddard & Ward, 1927), and G. M. Goddard, *Conflict in Spain, 1918-1922* (London: Quercy, 1925).

20. *Continental and Germany*, p. 128.

21. *The Evening Age*, January 1924, p. 422.

22. *Current History*, June 1928, p. 21.

23. See David Cockburn, "The Chamberlain," *Current History*, February 1928, "England behind the Palestine," *Kos*, May 12, 1928, Frederick L. Schuman, "The Personality of Athens," *the New Republic*, April 20, 1928, and "The London-Sofia Axis," *Boston*, May 1928, Robert Hall, "Chamberlain's Treason," *the Nation*, March 22, 1928.

A clear indication was given in Berlin that Downing Street would not accept German expansion in the East by Anthony Eden's address to the quinquennial in Liverpool on November 20, 1928. "These [British] arms will never be used in a war of aggression. . . . They may, and if the occasion arises they would, be used in our own defence and in the defence of the territories of the British Commonwealth of Nations. They may, and if the occasion arises they would, be used in the defence of France and Belgium against unprovoked aggression in accordance with our existing treaty obligations. They may, and if a new Western European confederation can be secured, they would, be used in the defence of Germany were she the victim of unprovoked aggression by any of the other signatories of such a settlement. Thus, together with our Treaty of Alliance with Italy and our projected treaty with Egypt, are our definite obligations. In addition our armaments may be used in helping help in a variety of aggression in any case where, in our judgment, it would be proper under the provisions of the Covenant to do so. I use the word 'may' deliberately, since in such an instance there is no automatic obligation in this military matter. It is, moreover, right that this should be so, for serious reasons are exposed to many automatic military obligations were for areas where these vast armaments are concerned." On March 2, 1929, in London, Lord Halifax asserted that while the Government did not determine itself in those areas, "we are unable to define beforehand what might be our attitude in a hypothetical contingency in Central or Eastern Europe" (*SEA*, 1928, pp. 394-41).

Eden and Halifax were thus in agreement, at a time when Eden was Foreign Minister and posing as the champion of collective security, that Britain should assume no commitments in defined regions of aggression in Europe or Central Europe. This was the only assurance which the leaders of the Third Reich required. It meant that, so far as London was concerned, they had a free hand in the East. Then and later, the only stipulation attached upon by Downing Street was that Nazi agitators must observe no purposeful weakness was, once war might arise Britain by involving France. After Munich this stipulation was no longer necessary, since France would no longer become any of us remaining obligations in the East. The Treaty came Munich to Hitler with respect to the Treaty with Czech was that given in the summer of 1921—and by none other than Anthony Eden!

## 2. CIRCUIS IN ROMÉ

24. *The New York Times*, March 22, 1928.  
 25. *Ibid.*, March 23, 1928.  
 26. See *Card*, 1924, 1925, 1926, Treaty Series No. 28, 29, 30 (1926).  
 27. See George Scoville, *A Munich in Germany*, pp. 28.  
 28. Ernest Hamilton, "The Cardinal Rule of Munich," *Kos*, May 2, 1928, and *the New York Herald Tribune*, March 22, 1928.

19. See *Anger* in the *New York Times*, April 2, 1938.
20. Official text in *Conf. Hist.* of 1938, Treaty Series No. 31.
21. The *New York Times*, April 20, 1938.
22. *Ibid.*, April 20, 1938.
23. LINGE, 1938 Meeting of the Council, *passim*, for a sketch, see *Monthly Summary of the League of Nations*, May 1938, and *Survey*, July 1938.
24. Robert Dool: "Diplomacy Has a New Law," *the Nation*, June 2, 1938.
25. *Conf. Hist.* of 1938: "The Text of a proposed Resolution authorizing and extending the Non-Intervention Agreements, and providing for the withdrawal of Spanish volunteers from Spain, for the grant to certain governments of belligerent states in the two parties in Spain, and for the observance of the Spanish frontiers by land and sea, adopted by the International Committee for the Application of the Agreement Regarding Non-Intervention in Spain at a Plenary Session held on Tuesday July 5, 1938, for transmittal to the two Spanish parties for their approval." One striking phrase, *see*.
26. AP dispatch from London, *the New York Times*, August 12, 1938.

### 3. DEATH OVER FRANCE

19. Cf. Germany and Czechoslovakia (Prager: Orbis, 1937).
20. Cf. Emil Kofler: *A Short History of Czechoslovakia* (London: Williams & Norgate, 1937); Germany and Czechoslovakia (3 vols. Prager: Orbis, 1937); Edgar F. Young: *Czechoslovakia—Keynote of Peace and Democracy* (London: Gollancz, 1938).
21. Edward Bruce Maany's *Path and Legacy* (Prager: Orbis, 1937). Cf. Emil Kofler: *Maany's on Thought and Life* (New York: Macmillan, 1937); Emil Ludwig: *Nine Starred from Life*, pp. 49-64; Bruce Lockhart: *Britain from Glory*, pp. 474; John Gaudson: *Inside Europe* (1938 edn.), pp. 117-21; and Thomas G. Maany: *The Making of a State* (New York: Macmillan, 1937). See also Donald A. Lovell: *Maany's of Czechoslovakia* (New York: Orbis, 1937), and Thomas Mann: "In Memory of Maany," *the Nation*, October 9, 1937.
22. See Pierre Gollancz: *Europe* (London: Knowledge, 1934).
23. *Ibid.*, p. 104; E. F. Young: *Czechoslovakia*, pp. 34-6.
24. In 1934 Harold J. Toynbee wrote that Czech treatment of the Sudetens was "amounting to the death of Czechoslovakia as a non-national entity." "Light shining in the darkness of European national oppressions and weakness" (*ibid.*, 1935, p. 107). Cf. E. F. Young, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-1; R. W. Soame-Watson: "The German Minority in Czechoslovakia," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1938; Joseph Coudert: *National Minorities in Central Europe* (Prager: Orbis, 1937), and *The German Problem in Czechoslovakia* (Prager: Orbis, 1938); Elizabeth Willemsen: *Czechs and Germans* (New York: Orbis, 1938).
25. Quoted in William Lloyd's introduction to Harold Kofler: *The War against the West*.
26. Quoted from *The Times* and the *Manchester Guardian*, April 5, 1938, by E. Elwyn Jones: *The Battle for Peace*, p. 26.

40. E. P. Young, *op. cit.*, pp. 1079.
41. See Ludwig Löwe, "The Fall of Konrad Heide," *the Nation*, April 6, 1938.
42. See FORTUNE: "Vanguard on Economic Matters" *the New York-Tribune Herald*, August 15, 1938; cf. Josef Heller, Victor Frank, and Vladimir Fuchs, *Die Kampf-der modernen Welt der Welt* (Katholik, Gießen, 1931); Dorothy Thompson, *Catholics and the World* (New York: Long, 1933).
43. *The New York Times*, March 21, 1938.
44. *The New York Herald Tribune*, March 25, 1938.
45. *Radio News* in London, March 28, 1938.
46. *The New York Times*, March 28, 1938.
47. *Ibid.*, April 12, 1938. See also *The Times* (London), September 8, 1937. These demands, along with some of the more significant documents of the Czech-German "treaty" between April 14 and October 19, 1938, are reproduced in *International Coordination*, November 1938, No. 122. The *Cable in Czechoslovakia* (Czechoslovak Endowment for International Peace).
48. AP dispatch from Berlin, *the New York Times*, April 27, 1938.
49. See S. Fowler Wright's remarkable *demons* essay, *The War of 1938* (Probably to appear) published in 1937 (New York: Perseus, 1938).
50. See Ferdinand L. Schumann's article in *Review*, July 1938; *Le Temps* and *Le Petit Parisien*, May 11-June 2, 1938; *the New York-Tribune Herald*, June 20, 1938.
51. See *Cord*, 1938 and 1939 of 1938.
52. For more of these Anglo-French records of May 12, 1938 see *Cord*, 2704, 2720, and 2721 of 1938.

## X · DESIGN FOR GIVING

### 1. RESCUE BY HUNCIMAN

1. Cf. dispatch of Ferdinand Kohn, Jr. in *the New York Times*, July 21, 1938.
2. AP dispatch from Paris, July 20, 1938.
3. AP dispatch from London, July 23, 1938.
4. *The New York Times*, July 23, 1938.
5. *Ibid.*, article by Gaila Enders.
6. *Ibid.*, July 24, 1938.
7. *Times*, August 15, 1938.
8. From dispatch of G. E. B. Galyon, *the New York Times*, August 15, 1938.
9. See summary by G. E. B. Galyon in *the New York Times*, September 2, 1938. Another version in somewhat another was issued by Reuters and published in *The Times* (London), September 10, 1938, and reproduced in *International Coordination*, No. 124, pp. 476. This version does not differ in substance from the summary given here.
10. See Dorothy Thompson, "On the Raccoon" and Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow" in *the New York Herald Tribune*, October 1, 1938, and following days.

## 4. THUNDER IN NÜRNBERG

11. *The New York Times*, August 24, 1938.
12. *Ibid.*, September 7, 1938.
13. See exchange of letters between Lord Rothermere and William Reed in the former's *Daily Mail*, unrecorded in the *New York Times*, August 24, 1938.
14. It may be of interest to some readers that the analysis here suggested was forwarded by me in substantially the form in which it is here reproduced long before the "incident" of September 18, 1938. See "The Feasibility of Alliance" in the *New Republic*, April 20, 1938, "The London-Berlin Axis" in *Forum*, May 1938, and "War by Backstab" in *Forum*, October 1938, which went to press September 29.
15. On September 18, 1938 Frank McManis, London correspondent of *Smith's Weekly* of Sydney, Australia, edited his paper "that there would be no war unless the Czech began to—Hitler had already decided before Chamberlain's visit that Germany would not make a war; that the Czech crisis would be settled ultimately by a Four Power Conference, that Russia would be kept out of the talks, that an armistice would be made to keep Germany and England close together." See *Smith's Weekly*, September 17 and October 4, 1938, and *The British Australian and New Zealand*, November 20, 1938.
16. All these headlines, with notes in kind, are taken from a single issue of the *Völkischer Beobachter*, September 17, 1938. For words the entire *New York Times* was kind with similar material.
17. *The New York Times*, August 28, 1938.
18. *The New York Herald Tribune*, September 3, 1938.
19. *Ibid.*, September 3, 1938.
20. *Business Party communique*, *Foreign*, September 7, 1938, from the *New York Times*, September 8, 1938.
21. *Informations Diplomatiques*, issued by the official British News Agency, summarized in AP dispatch to the *New York Times*, September 9, 1938.
22. *Foreign Office statement* of September 10, 1938, in the *New York Herald Tribune*, September 11, 1938.
23. *Ibid.*, September 11, 1938.
24. *Edgar Ansel Mowrer in the Chicago Daily News*, September 11, 1938.
25. *The New York Times* and the *New York Herald Tribune*, September 12, 1938; *International Conference*, November 1938, No. 342, pp. 207-10.
26. See dispatch of G. E. R. Gedye to the *New York Times*, September 10, 1938, and of Walter E. Rieu to the *New York Herald Tribune* of same date.
27. AP dispatch of Louis Lochner from Nuremberg, September 8, 1938.
28. *Ibid.*, September 9, 1938.
29. *The New York Times*, September 11, 1938. In this, as in other instances, the various translations in the English and American press differ slightly from one another and when official news were supplied these differed considerably in some instances from what was actually said. The translations here given are based upon comparison between the various versions and,

with respect to Hitler's final address, upon the dinner broadcast of the speech.

49. *The New York Times*, September 12, 1938.

#### 3. THE HOME OF THE EVIL FAIRY

50. See *Portents in the Chicago Daily News*, September 12, 1938.  
 51. See Dominating Caption of John Elmer from Paris in the *New York Herald Tribune*, September 12, 1938, of Vera Molinsky-Dore: "A Lesson in Nazi Technique." *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, October 7, 1938.  
 52. Dr. August E. Smith: "White Paper: 'Correspondence Regarding Czechoslovakia,'" *Cred.* 1938, September 23, 1938.  
 53. *The New York Times*, September 23, 1938, International Column, No. 144-28 427-3.  
 54. See M. W. Foster in the *New York Sun* and the *Chicago Daily News*, October 2, 1938. Foster subsequently admitted publicly that there was no Soviet "Mentor" of France.  
 55. AP dispatch in the *New York Herald Tribune*, September 23, 1938.  
 56. *The New York Times*, September 23, 1938.

#### 4. THE HELL OF THE PAGAN GODS

57. See summary of Czech "White Paper" (suppressed in France and smuggled to Paris) by Walter B. East in the *New York Herald Tribune*, November 13, 1938, Part B.  
 58. See dramatic account by Joseph Danzell in the *New York Herald Tribune*, September 19, 1938.

#### 5. IN HITLER'S HOUSE

59. *The New York Times*, September 30, 1938.  
 60. *Cred.* 1938, Misc. No. 8 (1938) No. 4.  
 61. Joseph Danzell in the *New York Herald Tribune*, October 4, 1938; *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 30. 10. 1938 (*The New York Times*), October 1, 1938.  
 62. *The Times* (London), September 26, 1938.  
 63. Thomas Gray's "The Bard," on the birthday of the poet of White by Edward L. Smith (poet): Gray composed this Chamberlain is a descendant of Edward I through eighth generations.

### XI · TORY TRIUMPH

#### 1. CZECHOSLOVAKIA : OCTOBER 1, 1938

64. *NYoder (Paris)*, November 22, 1938, *Der Neue Tage-Buch* (Paris), November 22, 1938.  
 65. *The New York Times*, October 4, 1938, of M. W. Foster and John T. Whitaker in the *Chicago Daily News*, October 4, 1938.  
 66. *The New York Times*, November 19, 1938.  
 67. See Paul B. Taylor: "The Portents of Czechoslovakia," *Foreign Policy Report*, November 11, 1938.

## 2. FRANCE IN THE SHADOWS

1. Frances "Can Germany be Checked?" *The Week*, the *New York Herald Tribune*, November 15, 1938.
2. See *Overline Tribune* "What Can France Do?" the *New Republic*, November 2, 1938. On the diplomatic background, see her admirable *Blackmail or War* (London: Penguin, 1938, Spring).
3. See Robert Dell "French Rules in Europe," the *Nation*, October 11, 1938, Paul C. Hargrove "Why France Sold the Peace," the *New Republic*, October 26, 1938. See the files of *Journal des Nations* (Geneva), the *Manchester Guardian*, the *Chicago Daily News* (especially the dispatch of E. A. Mowrer), the *New York Times*, and the *New York Herald Tribune* (especially the dispatches of John Elliott and Walter Kerr) for September and October 1938.
4. See Alexander Week. "France's Triple Dilemma," the *Nation*, October 4, 1938.

## 3. DUSE OVER WESTMINSTER

9. "Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with Germany," reproduced as publication No. 16 by the Friends of Europe, quoted in Douglas Reed, *January Fall*, pp. 110-11.
10. Cf. Winston Churchill: *White Paper* (New York: Putnam, 1938, speeches, 1939-41).
11. See Joseph Delors "Lindbergh's Role in Crisis Diplomacy," the *New York Herald Tribune*, October 26, 1938; Frederick L. Collins: "Why Did Hitler Give Lindbergh a Medal?" *Liberty*, December 13, 1938. Cf. George Fildes item: "The Military Consequences of Munich," *Foreign Policy Review*, December 15, 1938.
12. *New Review* (London), October 4, 1938.
13. See the *New York Times* and the *New York Herald Tribune*, October 11, 1938.
14. The *New York Times*, November 26, 1938.
15. See Richard Mowrer in the *Chicago Daily News*, October 3, 1938.
16. AP dispatch from London, October 26, 1938.
17. Walter R. Dand in the *Chicago Daily News*, October 11, 1938.
18. See *New Review* (London), October 15, 1938. The writer was reported and repudiated by the *Perry Schooner*.
19. See Sam Haver: "Britain Moves along Path to French Rule," the *Chicago Daily Tribune*, November 15, 1938.
20. See *Time and Tide* (London), November 26, 1938.
21. See M. W. Feltus in the *Chicago Daily News*, November 26, 1938, cf. Walter Duranty in the *New York Times*, October 11, 1938.
22. See *Frontier* in the *New York Times*, December 4, 1938.
23. The *New York Times*, December 1, 1938. Among the more valuable accounts of the Munich crisis and its aftermath see Hamilton Fish Armstrong "America at Munich," *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1939. Revue de E. Scherer: *From Versailles to Munich, 1919-1938* (University of Chicago Press, 1938). R. W. Swan-Watson: "Munich and After," *Fortnightly Re-*

1934, November, 1934, and Van M. Duan. *Europe in Revolt* (Knopf, 1935).

## XII - DEFEAT

### 1. THE HOLLOW MEN

1. The *Southern*'s Gibson, edited by William Smith (London, 1935), p. 104.
2. Thomas Mann "Gottfried, Take Care!" in *Atlantic Monthly*, August 1935.
3. André Malraux "The Tragic Decline of the Human Mind," in *New York Times Magazine*, June 23, 1935.
4. See Raymond Kipling's "The Old Game," pp. 107-11 of *Redmond Kipling: The First Novels* (New York: Doubleday, Dapn, for Review of Reviews, 1944).

### 2. THE LOST SOULS

1. Hans Kohn: *Power or Powerlessness* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1937), pp. 44-5.
2. See, inter alia, G. A. Borgesen. *Germany: The Menace of Reaction* (New York: Viking, 1937); Robert A. Brady. *The Spirit and Structure of German Fascism* (New York: Viking, 1939); E. Palmer Dunn. *Fascism and Social Revolution* (New York: International, 1934); C. Harter Gerson. *Fascism in China* (New York: Dapn, 1935); Axel Kahan. *The War against the West* (London: Collins, 1935); Stephen H. Roberts. *The Hour and the Hourglass* (London: Methuen, 1935); John Womack. *Floral Light on Europe* (New York: Random's, 1935); Max Barak and Arthur Fisher. *Fallacies for Whom?* (New York: Norton, 1935).
3. See Shelby Culbert Dunn. "Capitalism also Stagnant," *Evening*, November 1935.
4. *The New Discoveries*, p. 104.
5. E. S. Adams. *The Future—Millions and Millions* (New York: Morrow, 1935).
6. *The War against the West*, p. 113.
7. See Sidney and Barbara Webb. *Social Communism. A New Criticism?* (2 vols. New York: Schwartz's, 1935).
8. For an astounding example of verbal juggling, see Max Karrison. "Enslaved Slavdom's Freedom," in *Samuel Marchand's Library*, December 10, 1935.
9. See Friedrich L. Schuman. "Liberalism and Communism Reconsidered," in *Teachers Review*, January, 1936.

### 3. THE KINGDOM OF DEATH

14. See Joe Woodgett. *In the Shadow of Tomorrow* (New York: Harcourt, 1935).
15. Oswald Spengler. *The Decline of the West* (New York: Knopf, 1941, Vol. II, pp. 104-7).
16. S. Erikson. *Hitler's Conspiracy against Peace*, pp. 180-2.
17. *Id.* 1935, Chap. 7.





# DOCUMENTS

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## FRENCH-ITALIAN AGREEMENTS OF JANUARY 7, 1935

(*Documents on International Affairs*, 1935, I, pp. 19-24)

### DECLARATION, JANUARY 7TH, 1935

The Foreign Minister of the French Republic and the Head of the Italian Government,

Witnessing the continuation of work's done have around the resolution of the principal questions which previous accords left pending between them, and principally the questions relating to the application of Article 13 of the agreement of London, April 16, 1934,

Witnessing the disputes questions which might arise in the future between their governments will find their solution either by diplomatic consultation or by procedure established by the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and by the general arbitration acts,

Declare the determination of their governments to develop the traditional friendship which unites the two nations and co-operation in a spirit of mutual confidence in the maintenance of peace.

In view of this collaboration they will proceed between themselves with all the consideration which the circumstances warrant.

See done in duplicate, in Rome, January 7, 1935.

(Signed)

PIERRE LAFAY.

(Signed)

MUSMANN.

### TREATY BETWEEN FRANCE AND ITALY REGARDING THE SETTLEMENT OF THEIR INTERESTS IN AFRICA, JANUARY 7, 1935

The President of the French Republic and His Majesty the King of Italy, desiring of developing in Africa the relations of friendship and good neighborliness which exist between the two nations, and to that end, of settling in a definitive manner the questions pending under the convention of September 16,

which relating to Tunis and the accord of London of April 26, 1902 in its Article 23, have delivered as their plenipotentiaries:

*The President of the French Republic:*

*M. Ferns Loubet, Minister of Foreign Affairs,*

*His Majesty the King of Italy:*

*M. Benito Mussolini, Head of Government, Minister of Foreign Affairs,*  
who having recognized their full powers in good and due form,  
have concluded the following agreement:

*Title I*

- § 1. (An agreement in the region of Italian subjects and colonial subjects in Tunis, to be regulated by a special protocol.)

*Title II*

- § 2. (Border between Libya and French Possessions. Here follows a detailed geographical account of the new frontier by which France ceded to Italy 4000 sq. miles of the Libyan region.)

- § 3. (Provision for actual demarcation and fixation of the boundary by a survey commission.)

*Title III*

- § 4. (Similar to § 1 & 2 as border between Egypt and French Somaliland Coast, extending 400 sq. miles to Italy.)

- § 5. (Same as 4.)

- § 6. (French recognition of Italian sovereignty over the island of Dodecanese and adjacent islands.)

- § 7. The treaty will be ratified and the ratifications will be exchanged at Rome in the shortest possible time and will come into force on the day of exchange of ratification.

In faith whereof the Italian-mentioned plenipotentiaries have signed the treaty in duplicate, and have thereon set their seals.

*Concluded at Rome, January 7, 1903.*

*(Signed)*

*FERNs LOUBET*

*(Signed)*

*MUSsOLINI*

*Annexed—Protocol in Tunisian Questions*

*Austria and Central Europe*

The two governments declare themselves to be agreed to communicate to the principal States concerned the conclusion of an accord of non-interference in the (other's) internal affairs, and agree reciprocally not to undertake any action which has for its end the violation of the internal sovereignty or any organ, political or moral, of any of the contracting parties.

The accord herein envisaged is to be concluded between Italy, Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Austria—that is to say all the states bordering on Austria—and Austria itself.

It is to be open to adhesion by France, Poland, and Rumania, being thus extended to neighboring states and maximum states as well as to Austria and to France.

Further, the Italian Government and the French Government to consider—

and of the necessity of maintaining the independence and integrity of African territories from today that is when the independence and the peoples are granted the French and Indian Governments will continue to exchange themselves and with Africa to consider measures to be taken. This conclusion will be extended by Italy and France to other areas with the object of ensuring their cooperation.

#### *Colonial Economic Interest*

The Head of the Indian Government and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs have recognized the opportunity to develop the economic relations of their metropolitan country with their colonies in Africa and neighbouring areas and pledge themselves to take the necessary measures to ensure the collaboration. In the field of this collaboration is included Indian participation in the railway between Djibouti and Addis Ababa.

#### *Armaments*

The Indian and French Governments in reference to the declaration on equality of rights of December 12, 1955, find themselves in accord in recognizing that no country may weakly, by a unilateral act, its obligations in the matter of armaments, and that in case such an emergency is required, they will consult one another.



## TREATY OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

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*(League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 117, p. 262, No. 886)  
(The Exchange of Ratifications took place at Moscow, March 27, 1956)*

The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
and

The President of the French Republic,

Being desirous of strengthening peace in Europe and of guaranteeing to themselves their respective countries by ensuring a better and more application of their provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations which are designed to maintain the national security, territorial integrity, and political independence of States,

Determined to devote their efforts to the preparation and conclusion of a European agreement for that purpose, and in the intention to promote, as far as lies in their power, the effective application of the Covenant of the League of Nations,

Have resolved to conclude a Treaty to this end and have appeared at their Headquarters

The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
Minister Vladimir Pavlov, Member of the Central Executive Committee,

*Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics accredited to the President of the French Republic.*

*The President of the French Republic:*

*Monsieur Pierre Laval, Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs,*

Who, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following provisions:

1. In the event of France or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics being threatened with or in danger of aggression on the part of any European State, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and respectively France undertake mutually to join in an immediate consultation as regards the measures to be taken for the observance of the provisions of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

2. Should, in the circumstances specified in Article 15, paragraph 2, of the Covenant of the League of Nations, France or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics be the object, notwithstanding the sincerely peaceful intentions of both countries, of an unexpected aggression on the part of a European State, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and respectively France shall immediately come to each other's aid and assistance.

3. In consideration of the fact that under Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations any member of the League which resorts to war is deemed to be in breach of the Covenant under Articles 12, 13, or 17 of the Covenant if (per force) deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, France and respectively the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics undertake, in the event of one of them being the object, in these conditions and notwithstanding the sincerely peaceful intentions of both countries, of an unexpected aggression, on the part of a European State, immediately to come to each other's aid and assistance in application of Article 16 of the Covenant.

The same obligation is assumed in the event of France or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics being the object of an aggression on the part of a European State in the circumstances specified in Article 15, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

4. The undertakings stipulated above being consonant with the obligations of the High Contracting Parties as Members of the League of Nations, nothing in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as concerning the duty of the latter to take any action that may be deemed true and efficient to safeguard the peace of the world or as relieving the obligations resulting for the High Contracting Parties from the Covenant of the League of Nations.

5. The present Treaty, both the French and Russian texts whereof shall be equally authentic, shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Moscow as soon as possible. It shall be registered with the Secretariat of the League of Nations.

It shall take effect as soon as the ratifications have been exchanged and shall remain in force for five years. If it is not denounced by either of the High Contracting Parties prior to the expiry of that period, it shall remain in force indefinitely, each of the High Contracting Parties being at liberty to terminate it at a year's notice by a declaration to that effect.

In faith, whereof the Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed their seals.

Done at Paris, on the fifth day of May 1891.

(Signed)	T. GIESSÉ
(Signed)	FRANZ LAMM

#### PROTOCOL OF SIGNATURE

Upon proceeding to the signature of the Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance of today's date, the Plenipotentiaries have signed the following Protocol, which shall be included in the exchange of ratifications of the treaty.

It is agreed that the effect of Article 3 is to oblige each Contracting Party immediately to come to the assistance of the other by immediately complying with the recommendations of the Council of the League of Nations in so far as they have been issued in virtue of Article 1 of the Covenant. It is further agreed that the two Contracting Parties will act in concert to assure that the Council shall give the said recommendations with all the speed required by the circumstances and that, should the Council nevertheless, for whatever reason, have no recommendations or fail to reach a unanimous decision, either shall none the less be given to the obligation to render assistance. It is also agreed that the undertakings to render assistance mentioned in the present Treaty refer only to the case of an aggression committed against either Contracting Party's own territory.

It being the common intention of the two Governments in no way to surrender, by the present Treaty, undertakings previously assumed towards third parties by France and by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in virtue of political treaties, it is agreed that effect shall not be given to the provisions of the said Treaty in a manner which, being incompatible with every obligation assumed by one of the contracting Parties, would expose that Party to the risk of an international dispute.

The two Governments, desiring to definite the regional agreement should be concluded among its neighboring country between Contracting Parties, and which might otherwise seriously or be accompanied by claims of moral assistance, recognize their right to become parties by mutual consent, should consider what, in similar agreements in any form, direct or indirect, that may exist, especially, the obligations under these various agreements in view the place of those assumed under the present Treaty.

The two Governments place on record the fact that the engagements which have resulted in the signature of the present Treaty were originally undertaken with a view to implementing a Security Agreement embracing the nations of North-Eastern Europe, namely, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Baltic States which are neighbors of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in addition to that agreement there was to have been concluded a Treaty of Assistance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, France, and Germany, by which each of them these States was to have undertaken to come to the assistance of any one of them which might be the object of aggression on the part of any other of these three States.

Although circumstances have not hitherto permitted of the conclusion of this Agreement, which both Parties consider as regard its desirability it is none the less the case that the undertakings stipulated in the Franco-Soviet Treaty of Assistance are to be understood as intended to apply only within the limits contemplated in the three-party Agreement previously planned. Independently of the obligations assumed under the present Treaty, it is further recalled that, in accordance with the Franco-Soviet Pact of Non-Aggression signed on November 19, 1925, and moreover, without affecting the universal character of the undertakings assumed in that Pact, in the event of either Party becoming the object of aggression by one or more third European Powers not referred to in the above-mentioned three-party agreement, the other Contracting Party is bound to abstain, during the period of the conflict, from giving any aid or assistance, either direct or indirect, to the aggressor or aggressors, such Party declaring furthermore it is not bound by any Assistance Agreement which would be contrary to the undertakings.

Done in Paris, this said day of May 1935.

(Signed) N. AVRAMOV  
(Signed) FÉLIX LEVY



## TREATY OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

The President of the Czechoslovak Republic

and

The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Being desirous of strengthening peace in Europe and of guaranteeing its benefits to their respective countries by ensuring a fuller and more effective application of those provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations which are designed to maintain the national security, territorial integrity, and political independence of States,

Determined to devote their efforts to the preparation and conclusion of a European agreement for that purpose, and in the meantime to promote, as far as is in their power, the effective application of the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations,

Have resolved to conclude a Treaty to this end and have appeared at this final plenipotentiary:

The President of the Czechoslovak Republic:

Monsieur Edvard Beneš, Minister for Foreign Affairs,

The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Monsieur Sergé Alexandrovitch, Deputy Chairman and Minister  
Plenipotentiary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Who, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following provisions:

(Articles 1-3, identical with French-Italian Pact, Ann. 1-3, and Articles 3 and 4 identical with Ann. 4 and 5.)

4. Making provision in the pending provisions of the present Treaty, it is stipulated that should either of the High Contracting Parties become the object of an aggression on the part of one or more third Powers in conditions not going beyond but not exceeding within the meaning of the present Treaty, the other High Contracting Party undertakes not to abstain, for the duration of the conflict, aid or assistance, either directly or indirectly, to the aggressor or aggressors. Each High Contracting Party further declares that it is not bound by any other agreement for assistance which is incompatible with the present undertaking.

#### PROTOCOL OF SIGNATURE

(3 articles, of which 1 and 3 are identical with 1 and 3 of French-Italian Protocol of Signature of May 2, 1935; article 2 reads as follows):

2. The two Governments declare that the undertakings laid down in Articles 1, 3, and 4 of the present Treaty, concluded with view to promoting the establishment in Eastern Europe of a system of security, envisaged by the Franco-Soviet Treaty of May 2, 1935, will be combined within the same limits as were laid down in paragraph 4 of the Protocol of Signature of the said Treaty. At the same time, the two Governments recognize that the undertaking to render mutual assistance will operate between them only in so far as the conditions laid down in the present Treaty may be fulfilled and in so far as assistance may be rendered by France to the Party victim of the aggression.



#### BRITISH-ITALIAN ACCORD OF APRIL 16, 1935

(Cmd. 5021 of 1935, Treaty Series, No. 23)

#### PROTOCOL

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Italian Government, moved by the desire to place the relations between the two countries on a solid and lasting basis and in accordance to the general state of peace and security, have decided to underwrite their intentions in order to reach agreement on questions of mutual concern, and the said undertakings having been placed,

His Excellency the Right Honourable the Earl of Pons, GCMG, CB, His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in Rome, and

His Excellency Count Galeazzo Carlo di Castiglione, Minister for Foreign Affairs,



fully authorized for that purpose by their respective Governments, have drawn up the present Protocol and have signed the Agreements and Declarations annexed hereto, each of which shall be regarded as a separate and self-contained instrument.

(1) Ratification of the Declaration of January 2, 1937, regarding the Mediterranean, and of the Notes exchanged on December 31, 1936,

(2) Agreement regarding the Exchange of Military Information;

(3) Agreement regarding certain Areas in the Middle East,

(4) Declaration regarding Propaganda,

(5) Declaration regarding Lake Tana;

(6) Declaration regarding the Military Forces of Madinet of Indian East Africa (Kisumu),

(7) Declaration regarding the Free Exercise of Religion and the Treatment of British religious Bodies in Indian East Africa,

(8) Declaration regarding the Suez Canal.

The said instruments shall take effect on such date as the two Governments shall together determine.\* Except as so far as any of these various provisions shall regard to their relation to duration, each of the said instruments shall remain in force indefinitely, but should either Government at any time consider that a change of circumstances renders the retention of any of these instruments necessary, the two Governments will consult together with a view to such a revision.

The two Governments agree that, immediately after the taking effect of the said instruments, negotiations will be opened, in which the Egyptian Government will be invited to participate so far as all questions affecting Egypt on the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan are concerned, with a view to a definite agreement on the boundaries between the Sudan, Kenya, and British Somaliland on the one side and Indian East Africa on the other, and with regard to other questions affecting respectively

(a) Indian interests on the one hand and British, Egyptian, or Sudan interests on the other hand in the above-mentioned countries, and (b) the relations between these countries.

These negotiations will also include the question of commercial relations between the Sudan and Indian East Africa.

It is also agreed that negotiations between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Indian Government will take place as soon as possible on the subject of commercial relations between Indian East Africa and the United Kingdom, India, and British colonies, overseas territories, possessions and mandated territories administered by the Government of the United Kingdom, including the subject of the application, on conditions to be stipulated, to the whole of Indian East Africa of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation signed at Harar on June 15, 1913. These negotiations will be required by the occasion, drawn to further commercial relations between these countries and to assure adequate facilities for trade.

\* The second was put into effect as of November 21, 1938.

• Done at Rome, in duplicate, April 26, 1948, in the English and Italian languages, both of which shall have equal force.

Signed: same  
Signed: same

#### Article 1

The Governments of the United Kingdom and the Italian Government hereby ratify the Declaration signed in Rome on January 2, 1947, regarding the Mediterranean, and the Notes exchanged between the two Governments on December 21, 1947, regarding (the maintenance of) the status quo in the Western Mediterranean.

#### Article 2

Agreement regarding the Exchange of Military Information: that the governments of the United Kingdom and the Italian Government agree in the month of January each year a reciprocal exchange of information shall take place through the Naval, Military, and Air attachés in London and Rome regarding any other propaganda administrative movements or indications of their respective naval, military, and air forces. The exchange of information will take place in respect of such forms attached in or bound to.

(1) certain portions of other party (which places shall for this purpose be deemed to include possessions and maritime resources) as well as a seaboard on the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, or the Gulf of Aden, and

(2) territories or Administrations that have referred to in paragraph (1) above and lying in an area bounded on the north by latitude 32° east (corner of Libya) and on the south by latitude 7° south (corner of Tanganyika). Such exchange of information will not necessarily preclude occasional dissemination of topographical military information, should either party consider the political circumstances of the moment make it desirable.

The two Governments hereby agree to notify each other in advance of any decision to provide information or to base in the Mediterranean east of longitude 15° east (Suez) and in the Red Sea or approaches thereto.

#### Article 3

##### ANGLO-ITALIAN AGREEMENT REGARDING CERTAIN AREAS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

The Governments of the United Kingdom and the Italian Government,

Being desirous of insuring that there shall be no conflict between their respective policies in regard to areas of the middle East referred to in the present agreement.

Being desirous, moreover, that the same friendly spirit which has attended the signing of today's present and of the ~~document~~ <sup>document</sup> signed thereto should also attend their relations in regard to these areas.

Have agreed as follows.

1. Neither party will conclude any agreement or take any action which

might in any way impair the independence or integrity of South Arabia or Yemen.

2. Neither party will choose or seek to obtain a privileged position of a political character in any territory which at present belongs to South Arabia or to Yemen or in any territory which either of these States may hereafter acquire.

3. The two parties recognise that in addition to the obligations mentioned in each of them in Articles 1 and 2 heretofore, it is in the common interest of both of them that no other power should acquire or seek to acquire sovereignty of any privileged position of a political character in any territory which at present belongs to South Arabia or Yemen, or which either of these States may hereafter acquire including any islands in the Red Sea belonging to either of these States or to any islands of the Red Sea in which Turkey announced her rights by Article XVI of the treaty of peace signed at Lausanne July 24, 1923.

In particular they regard it as an essential element of each of them that no other power should acquire sovereignty of any privileged position on any part of the coast of the Red Sea which at present belong to South Arabia or Yemen or to any of the abovesaid islands.

4. As regards those islands in the Red Sea to which Turkey announced her rights by Article XVI of the treaty of peace signed at Lausanne July 24, 1923, and which are now comprised in the territory of South Arabia or Yemen, neither party will in or in regard to any such island finally establish its sovereignty or authority, except from facts and on evidence.

It is agreed that neither party will employ as Consul, the presence of British officials at Kismayo for the purpose of securing consular services of the pilgrimages to Mecca in accordance with the provisions of the agreement concluded in Paris on June 20, 1922, between the governments of Great Britain, North Ireland, and India on the one part and the government of the Netherlands on the other; it is also understood that the Italian Government may appoint an Italian consular officer to be stationed there on the same conditions as the Netherlands consular officer under the said agreement; similarly, the presence of Indian officials at Great Harish, Little Harish, and Jabel Tefur for the purpose of processing pilgrims who resort to those islands, chiefly, the presence at Abri Ad, Capra Peak, and Jabel Tuf of such persons as are required for the maintenance of light on those islands.

5. The two parties agree that it is in the common interest of both of them that there shall be peace between South Arabia and Yemen, and within the territories of these States. But while they will in all cases exert their good offices in the event of peace they will not intervene in any conflict which departs from good offices may break out between or within these States.

The two parties also recognise that it is in the common interest of both of them that no other power should intervene in any such conflict.

6. As regards the coast of Arabia lying to the east and south of the present boundaries of South Arabia and Yemen or of any of the former boundaries which may be established by agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom on the one hand and the Government of South Arabia or Yemen on the other:

(a.) The Government of the United Kingdom declares that in the territories of the Arab rulers under their protection, within this coast:

No action shall be taken by the Government of the United Kingdom which shall be such as to prejudice in any way the independence or integrity of South Africa or Transvaal (which words possess here independent or subject to Article 1 hereof) within any territory or portion belonging to those States or within any additional territory which may be assigned by the Government of the United Kingdom to belonging to either of those States in the result of any agreement which may hereafter be concluded between the Government of the United Kingdom and the government of either of them.

The Government of the United Kingdom will not undertake or cause to be undertaken any military preparations or works other than military preparations or works of purely defensive character for the defence of said territories or of communications between the different parts of the British Empire. Furthermore, the Government of the United Kingdom will not send detachments of any of their contingents or cause them to be recalled in any military form other than forces designed and used solely for the preservation of order and for local defence.

While the Government of the United Kingdom reserves the liberty to take in these territories such steps as may be necessary for the preservation of order and the development of the country, they intend to maintain the sovereignty of the Arabs within their possession.

(c) The Indian Government declare they will not seek to acquire any political influence in this zone.

5. The Government of the United Kingdom declare that within the limits of the *Acien* possessions as defined in the *Acien* possessions order of 1911 Indian citizens and subjects (including Indian companies) shall have liberty to come into their ships and goods to all places and ports and they shall have freedom of entry to travel and residence and the right to exercise their any occupation of business, profession, occupation or industry so long as they satisfy and observe the customs and regulations from time to time applicable in the possessions as citizens, subjects, and ships of any country not being a territory under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection, or mandate of His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions Beyond the Seas, Emperor of India.

6. Should either party at the time give notice to the other that they consider that a change has taken place in the circumstances leading to the void of any law factor of the present agreement such as to necessitate modification of the provisions of the agreement, the two parties will enter into negotiations with view to revision or amendment of any of the provisions of the agreement.

At any time after the expiration of a period of ten years from the entry into force of this agreement either party may notify the other of its intention to terminate the agreement. Any such notification shall take effect three months after it is made.

#### Article 4

#### DECLARATION REGARDING PROPAGANDA

The two Governments welcome the opportunity afforded by the present occasion to place on record their agreement that any attempt by either of them

to employ the methods of publicity or propaganda at its disposal in order to injure the interests of the other would be inconsistent with the good relations which are the object of the present Agreement to establish and maintain between the governments and peoples of their respective countries.

### *Annex 1*

#### DECLARATION REGARDING LAKE TANA

The Indian Government confirms to the Government of the United Kingdom the assurance given by them to the Government of the United Kingdom on April 3, 1924, and renewed by the Indian Minister for Foreign Affairs to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome on December 31, 1924, to the effect that the Indian Government were fully conscious of their obligations towards the Government of the United Kingdom in the matter of Lake Tana and had no intention whatever of overlooking or repudiating them.

### *Annex 2*

#### MILITARY DUTIES OF NATIVES OF ITALIAN EAST AFRICA

The Indian Government reaffirms the assurance which they gave in their Note to the League of Nations on June 10, 1924, that Italy on her side was willing to accept the principle that natives of Italian East Africa should not be employed in undertake military duties other than local policing and territorial defence.

### *Annex 3*

#### DECLARATION REGARDING THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION AND THE TREATMENT OF BRITISH RELIGIOUS BODIES IN ITALIAN EAST AFRICA

Without prejudice to any treaty engagements which may be applicable, the Indian Government declares that they intend to ensure to British nationals in Italian East Africa the free exercise of all rights compatible with public order and good morals; and to the extent they will consider favorable any request which may reach them from the British side to ensure in Italian East Africa religious minorities to British nationals; and that as regards other requests of British religious bodies in Italian East Africa in humanitarian and benevolent spheres, such requests as may reach the Indian Government will be considered, the general line of policy of the Royal Government in this matter and the principles of legislation in force in Italian East Africa being borne in mind.

### *Annex 4*

#### DECLARATION REGARDING THE SUEZ CANAL

The Government of the United Kingdom and the Indian Government hereby reaffirm their constant desire to respect and abide by the provisions of

the Convention signed at Constantinople on October 29, 1880, which guarantees in all times and for all Powers the free use of the Bosphorus.



## EXCHANGES OF NOTES

between Paris and Rome, April 26, 1918

### *Telegram to Libya*

During our recent negotiations your Excellency has referred to the question of the strength of Italian forces in Libya.

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the Head of the German-press has given orders for a dissemination of these forces. Withdrawing there already begun at the rate of 1,000 a week and will be continued in not less than one year until the Italian Libyan offensive weakens greatly. This will constitute an obvious disinclination of these efforts by not less than half the numbers present in Libya when our negotiations commenced.

(Signed) none

(Formal acknowledgment of the receipt of this telegram)

(Signed) none

### *Italian Ambassador to Spain*

Your Excellency will remember that, in the course of our recent conversations, I gave your Excellency certain assurances regarding the policy of the Italian Government in connection with Spain. I now wish to reaffirm these assurances and to place them on record.

First, the Italian Government have declared to maintain their full adherence to the United Kingdom formula for the proportional evacuation of the foreign volunteers from Spain, and pledge themselves to give practical and real application to such an evacuation at the moment and on the conditions which shall be determined by the Non-Intervention Committee on the basis of the above-mentioned formula.

I desire specially to reaffirm that if this evacuation has not been completed at the moment of the termination of the Spanish civil war all remaining Italian volunteers will forthwith leave Spanish territory and all Italian war material will simultaneously be withdrawn.

I wish chiefly to repeat my previous assurance that the Italian Government have no intention of political aims, and seek no privileged economic position, be it with regard to Spain, Moroccan Spain, the Balearic Islands, any of the Spanish possessions overseas, or the Spanish zone of Morocco, and that they have no intention whatever of keeping any armed force in any of the said countries.

(Signed) none

### *Reply to Paris*

(Formal reply, taking note of the reaffirmation contained . . . in the

above now). His Majesty's Government . . . will, I feel sure, be gratified in its contents. In due season I hardly need to remind your Excellency that His Majesty's Government regard a settlement of the Spanish question as a pre-condition of the entry into force of the agreement between our two Governments.

I have further the honor to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government, being desirous that such obstacles as may at present be held in respect the freedom of member States in regard to recognition of Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia should be removed, intend to take steps at the forthcoming meeting of the Council of the League of Nations for the purpose of clarifying the position of member States in that regard.

(Signed) *curry*

#### *London Naval Treaty*

I have the honor to inform your Excellency that the Italian Government have decided to accede to the Naval Treaty signed at London on March 21, 1923, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 31 of the Treaty. This accession will take place in view of the instruments attached to the Protocol signed that day come into force.

In advising your Excellency of the foregoing I deem to add that the Italian Government intend in the meantime to act in conformity with the provisions of the abovesaid Treaty.

(Signed) *curry*

[Formal acknowledgment of the receipt of the above now.]

(Signed) *curry*

#### *San Fermo agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom, the Egyptian Government, and the Italian Government*

The Italian Government on the one hand and, on the other hand, in respect to Kenya and British Somaliland, the Government of the United Kingdom, of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and, in respect to Italian, the Government of the United Kingdom and the Egyptian Government,

#### *Desiring to provide for friendly relations in East Africa,*

Understand, in addition to proceeding with due regard to the discussion of disputed questions connected with frontiers between Italian East Africa and Sudan, Kenya, and British Somaliland as provided in the protocol signed today by the Government of the United Kingdom and the Italian Government, at all times to co-operate for the maintenance of good neighborly relations between the said territories and to endeavor by every means in their power to prevent such or other unlawful acts of violence from being carried out across the frontiers of any of the above-mentioned territories,

Agree that in view of the fact that by virtue of the Italian decree of the 20th of April 1923, slavery was prohibited in Ethiopia, as it had already been abolished in other above-mentioned territories, the good neighborly relations referred to above shall include co-operation to prevent existence of any-slavery left of the respective territories.

\* Agrees that the nationals of the other party shall not be excluded on account of race, beliefs, or formation of a military force recruited in the other mentioned countries, including in particular any such nationals who are detached from troops, battals, or formations recruited in or refugee from territories of the other party.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized persons by their respective governments, have signed the present agreement.

Done at Rome in triplicate on the 16th of April 1944, in the English and Italian languages, each of which have equal force.

(Signed) *XXXX*

(Signed) *XXXXXXXXXX*

(Signed) *XXXX*





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